A.D. 1809.

Although, like the most trivial accident of life, every small siege which occurred in the memorable Peninsular war had, doubtless, its bearing upon the general result, we can afford room only for the most prominent. The siege of every place remains, to all time, an interesting epoch in its own annals, but the student of history only pauses at such conflicts of the kind as have been distinguished by the presence of great captains, have been brought about by remarkable circumstances or revolutions, or have led to consequences important to nations or to mankind in general. We have another cause, likewise, for not dwelling upon the Spanish sieges; they have been laid before the public so admirably, that to go into their details after Sir William Napier, would not only be a work of supererogation, but would lead to a comparison in which we could but suffer.

After glancing over the vast number of sieges that have been the subjects of our attention, we cannot but consider that of Saragossa to be one of the most anomalous. A strongly-fortified city, admirably placed, was filled to overflowing with a population enthusiastic in the cause, and with thirty thousand cannoniers, and a body of peasants, sappers, miners, and navigators from the canal-works, contained a mass of fifty thousand combatants. In addition to this, many, if not most of the houses were fire-proof; and there were innumerable large buildings, such as convents and churches, that were all capable of being fortified, and supplying defences in detail against an enemy who might penetrate into the interior. They had abundance of provisions, and all the munitions of war,—even its sinews, money,—that could be required in a long protracted siege. But above all this was the cause; every man might be said to be a volunteer, fighting for all he held dearest in life. “Doors and windows were built up, house-fronts loop-holed, internal communication opened, streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was a fortification: there was no weak point, there could be none, in a city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the measure of the ramparts.” So, and admirably, says Sir William Napier; but in one so well read in the history of sieges as he must be, this is saying a great deal. For our part, we think there is no fortification in which genius equal to that of the constructor, backed by courage, vigilance, and enterprise, cannot find a weak point. Look back at the impregnable Valenciennes, taken by a coup-de-main in a few hours, from the discovery of an imprudently-constructed door.

But what marks the siege of Saragossa so distinctly from all others, is the small number of the besieging army. To invest a large city, so garrisoned and provided, the French had but thirty-five thousand men, and were only able to complete their investment in a thin indefensible manner. In addition to the siege, they were compelled to be perpetually on the watch, as the whole country around was against them, and Palafox’s brother, Lazan, hovered about with a body of troops, to throw in when occasion offered.

In reading the details of the siege, we meet with little or no defection, because defection was punished with the utmost severity; the garrison having only the “choice of the enemy in front of their dwellings, and the gibbet behind them.” The public enthusiasm was kept up by processions, sham miracles, false manifestoes, indeed everything that could work upon a superstitious, excited people; and yet from the beginning the progress of the French was steady, and almost unbroken. They had certainly vicissitudes; in such a conflict how could it be otherwise? They even became dispirited for a moment, by fatigue and the prospect of the obstacles before them; but we do not think that Lasnes had ever a doubt of ultimately obeying Napoleon’s commands, by taking the city. It certainly was a great triumph of seasoned disciplined soldiery, conducted by courage and skill in their commanders, over a much superior force, surrounded by all the defences art and nature could furnish. As soldiers, we think the taking of Saragossa highly to the honour of the French.

Napoleon was very desirous of the capture of Saragossa, which is looked upon as the bulwark of the eastern provinces of Spain; and his preparations for effecting it were those of a general and a politician. But Lasnes, to whom he had assigned the command, fell sick; Moncey and Ney committed strategic errors, and his purpose was at least delayed. This gave the Spanish leaders time to prepare likewise, and they did not neglect it. In the sieges of cities, when people are earnest in their defence, they do not confine themselves to the operations of art, or even the weapons of war; they think everything a legitimate instrument that can protect themselves or annoy the enemy: thus we see in one the citizens hurling their beehives, with their swarms of stinging insects, upon their invaders; and in another, one of the greatest, but at the same time the most senseless of the world’s disturbers, killed by a tile thrown by an old woman. So with the inhabitants of Saragossa: while paying due attention to their military works, they took advantage of everything that could be converted to the one great purpose in hand.

The only unpardonable error was that of Palafox; although zealous in all ways at the commencement of the contest, when the French had made serious way into the heart of the city, he seems to have abandoned his post, and to have passed his time in intemperance and debauchery.

Like men made wise by practice in their cruel trade, the French generals did not move till they were quite prepared with not only magazines but hospitals; they knew such a game could not be played without losses and accidents; and there is no greater encouragement to the soldier marching into battle than an undoubting conviction that if wounded he shall be taken care of;—the sight of the hospital is as cheering to him as that of the provision-store.

On the 20th of December they advanced, and on the 21st attacked Monte Terrore, deluding the besieged by the show of one column, while another crossed the canal, under the aqueduct, and passing beneath the city and the fort, entered the latter in the rear. With a third column they attacked the grand sluice. The Spaniards were forced to retreat; which so exasperated the populace and their leaders, that the captain, who had been thus the first to retreat, was with difficulty saved from the effects of their indignation.

While this assault was being made, General Gazan made a simultaneous attempt upon the suburb, in which he put from three to four hundred men hors de combat. He, however, did not do all he might have done, which cheered the Spaniards.

By the 24th the city was invested, and every French general was at his post; Lacoste directing the operations, as chief engineer. He instituted one false and two real attacks; and on the 29th the trenches were opened. According to custom, the place was summoned, and the terms previously offered by Napoleon were repeated; it being added that Madrid had surrendered. To this Palafox haughtily replied, “If Madrid has surrendered, Madrid has been sold. Saragossa will neither be sold nor surrender.” This was accepting the challenge, and the French ordered three attacks to be made.

On the 31st the besieged made a sally, which would have been a complete failure but for a small advantage gained by a body of their cavalry. Palafox, perhaps justifiably, magnified this into a victory in his manifesto: he had not only to lead his compatriots, but to keep up their enthusiasm: his great opponent, Buonaparte, was a past master in this part of his craft.

On the 1st of January the besieged made a serious assault upon Gazan, whom they seemed to consider weak, and, to mask their design, sent out skirmishing parties: the great affair was a failure, while the skirmishers gathered a few laurels.

A change took place in the French generals; Moncey went to Madrid, and Junot succeeded him. The very thin investment was completed by a line of circumvallation, to supply the want of numbers.

The Spaniards had looked for the destruction of their enemies to the diseases usually produced by the wet period; but it this year proved a very dry season, and the French were enabled to proceed with their works in comparative secrecy, by the prevalence of dense morning fogs. On the 10th the city was bombarded with so much effect that the Spaniards withdrew their guns from the convent of San Joseph. The latter attempted a sally at midnight, but, though bravely executed, it proved unsuccessful: they lost one hundred men out of two hundred engaged.

The batteries having made a practicable breach, the French resolved upon an attack on the 11th. After much hard fighting, the convent of San Joseph was stormed, and some of the Élite, as in the door at Valenciennes, finding a bridge, entered by the rear, while their comrades were storming the front. The French lost but few men, and made a considerable advance.

The operations on the 15th were still in favour of the French; the Spaniards cut the bridge of Santa Engracia, and sprung a mine, but it proved harmless. The progress of the French was steady and scientific, and the inhabitants were confined to the city.

In this aspect of affairs the Spanish leaders published a flaming account of the emperor being defeated; and, amidst music and shouts, named the marshals who had fallen in the battle. They likewise asserted that Palafox’s brother was devastating France: “but,” says Sir William Napier, “however improbable, this all met with credence; the invention of the leaders being scarcely able to keep pace with the credulity of their followers.” The French were not without their difficulties; all the country was in a state of insurrection against the king they wished to impose upon the Spanish nation, and they began to be sensible of the want of provisions. The generals were also said not to accord in their views; discipline was relaxed, and the soldiers were reported to feel their zeal diminished. But we can scarcely imagine that there were any serious obstacles, when we look to the result.

Another strange circumstance is, that while the Spaniards obtained supplies of troops, the French could not bring up a division without its being harassed by the insurgents. Lazan, Palafox’s brother, was very active in his annoyances.

Lasnes, now recovered from his illness, resumed the command, and soon made it appear that the French had a captain at their head. In an attempt to silence a battery, Mariano Galendo gained much honour but no advantage, for he missed his object, lost his men, and was himself taken prisoner.

The operations continued to be all gradually in favour of the French; the walls began to fall, and the breaches were many and wide. On the 29th, a formidable body marched from the trenches to the walls; and though driven back by a heavy fire from the inner intrenchments, they kept their lodgment and connected it with the trenches.

A division of Poles in the French army now made a most successful assault, which stimulated the men in the trenches to make a wild effort to get into the city; but they were stopped by grape and a severe fire from the houses. The French lost six hundred men; but they never seemed to move without advance.

Thus the walls of Saragossa were brought to the ground; “but,” as Sir William Napier eloquently says, “Saragossa remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the aspect of her naked strength.” The defences of art had failed and were gone, but the people and the spirit that animated them were still in full vitality. As if to denote that science was not the principle to be now relied on, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain.

When we revert to the manner in which the town was internally fortified, we may suppose the nature of the warfare carried on, when besieged and besiegers were mingled in the desperate conflicts of house and street fighting: all the confusion and all the horrors that the most powerful imagination can conceive, were to be found in this doomed city; and, as yet, neither side blenched; the Spaniards fought as desperately for their hearths and their homes, as the Trench contended bravely for victory and honour.

The people seemed animated by the very frenzy of despair; and Lasnes, convinced that his comparatively small army could not expect success against such numbers, and so excited, resolved to depend upon the slow but certain process of the mine.

Each day now is nothing but a repetition of fighting for every house, and sweeping the great thoroughfares with artillery. We endeavour to follow the contests, and account for the results, but we cannot; all seem struggling, and that bravely: the French are little more than half the number of the Spaniards; the latter are in their own place, of which they know every nook and corner; they are seconded by their women, and are stimulated by everything that can act upon the generous part of the nature of man;—and yet, at every nightfall, the French have made progress.

The French found that by the usual allowance of powder for their mines they destroyed the buildings, and left no walls to shelter their own soldiers; they therefore lessened the quantity. Their adversaries perceiving this, saturated the timbers of their buildings with resin and pitch, and setting fire to those that could not be maintained, raised a burning barrier to their progress.

And now came on the horrors of devastation; the city was crumbling before the French fire and above their mines in all parts; the noises of artillery, crashing houses, shouts, shrieks, and groans of anguish, were mingled in awful sublimity. The Cosso, or great public walk, was the principal object of attack and defence for several days; by immense mines and constant firing, the French at length succeeded in obtaining this; and they then continued their underground ramifications in the most surprising manner. It was at this point of the siege the spirit of the French began to flag: fifty days’ incessant labour and fighting had exhausted, for a moment, their boiling courage; they were dying ingloriously, like rats, in subterraneous trenches. This is not the scene for the French soldier:—he likes broad day, the eyes of man upon him, and an obstacle that can be overcome by one brave effort. They began to reflect upon the disparity of numbers, and to ask each other who ever heard of thirty-five thousand men besieging fifty thousand?

But Lasnes knew the stimulant that was wanted. A harvest of glory in promise was sufficient; and whilst excited by the prospect, he led them on the 18th of February to a grand assault.

During this assault, mines containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and amidst the crash of falling buildings, fifty guns thundered upon the suburb and the bridge over the Ebro, and made a large practicable breach in the convent of St. Lazar. This was taken, the passage of the bridge was intercepted, and awful havoc was made among the troops. Gazan forced two thousand men to surrender, and took possession of the Spanish works.

This being followed by another attack and by the devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the besieged began to tremble. Palafox sent an aide-de-camp to demand, in addition to certain terms before offered by the French commander, that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, with a fixed number of covered carriages. As might have been expected, Lasnes rejected these proposals, and the firing continued; but the hour of surrender was come. A little more sharp firing and the explosion of another mine or two, together with the dread of others, completed the consternation.

But to increase the horrors of the situation of the people, pestilence of a fearful kind arose from the manner in which the women, children, and aged inhabitants were crowded into cellars lighted by oil. The closeness of the atmosphere, with bad and unusual diet, produced diseases that assailed both the strong and the weak; the daily deaths were from four to five hundred. Sixteen thousand shells were thrown during the siege, and forty-five thousand pounds of powder had been exploded in the mines; forty thousand persons had perished!

Palafox was sick, and most of the other leaders were either dead or disabled. According to French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish authors assert that Lasnes granted the following terms, the name of Ferdinand VII. being omitted from the instrument:—“The garrison to march out with the honours of war, to be considered prisoners, and sent to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks. Persons of either class willing to serve under Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in the ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to be guaranteed.”

There was much dissension in the city about these terms; but the Junta took prompt measures to give up the walls near the castle, and, in the words of Sir William Napier, “on the 21st of February, from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly beings, having laid down their arms, which they could now scarcely handle, this cruel and memorable siege terminated.”

In this siege we have had recourse principally to Sir William Napier; indeed, to what other source could we look with so much confidence? We only regret that we did not feel at liberty to copy his account literally. His is the graphic description of a man who not only conscientiously relates the history of the events, but proves that he professionally understands all he speaks of. He is like Xenophon describing the immortal retreat of the ten thousand. There is only one thing in which we cannot agree with him. Being a soldier, he perhaps has a leaning to all who have distinguished themselves in his profession, and on that account, gives frequent and strong praise to Buonaparte. Now we cannot join him to anything like the extent of his admiration for that extraordinary adventurer. When the wings of victory fanned his standard, he was glorious and triumphant; but in reverses, he showed himself deficient in what has been the pride of the greatest generals. CondÉ’s retreat from Arras was one of the proudest feats of his military career. As a piece of generalship, Moreau’s famous retreat is equal to any one of Buonaparte’s victories.