A.D. 1779–1783.

As in the history of mankind there are some persons so remarkable and universally known as to make a notice of them almost a work of supererogation, so there are events, which, from the interest they have excited, and the consequences that have attended them, demand, in a work of this description, a much less detailed account than others of less importance: they have created deep and widely-spread excitement during their enactment, and have produced historians worthy to commemorate them. And such is the siege of Gibraltar. This stupendous rock has now remained in the hands of the British one hundred and fifty years! We can only judge of the anomaly of this circumstance by bringing it home by comparison. Suppose the Spaniards, in their zeal for religion, had determined to seize upon the rocky point of the Land’s End, in Cornwall, or the Isle of Anglesea, in Wales, to facilitate their intercourse with Catholic Ireland, this would have been with them quite as legitimate an object as our trade with the Levant is to us. And yet we hold it, in spite of all the hostile efforts of the Spaniards to retake it; and what is still more strange, in spite of treaties of peace, at which such chance acquisitions are generally restored to the right owner. In the same manner the British held Calais, a French town, from the reign of Edward III., 1346, to that of Henry II. of France and Mary of England, when it was taken by surprise by the duke of Guise in 1557. As may be naturally supposed, the proud Spaniards have not quietly submitted to such a disgrace as that of having an inseparable portion of their country held by a foreign and frequently rival power: they have made several efforts to regain it, the most conspicuous of which comes within the scope of this work.

But, as we said above, the history of this siege has been so well written and is so generally known, that Drinkwater has placed it in the same position as Homer has that of Troy;—we could not pass it by, but yet we are not called upon to be particular in our account of it: the world does not stand in need of our history; it has one, better than any we could produce. Gibraltar was one of the fruits of the War of Succession: England took up arms to keep a Bourbon from the throne of Spain, and, during the conflict, an enterprising admiral, Sir George Rooke, added this gem to her crown. There are politicians who think the retention more a point of honour than a real advantage, but such discussions are not within our limits.

The war of 1762 did not present a favourable opportunity for retaking Gibraltar; Chatham was too vigorous a minister to allow a chance of such a loss; but England being at war with her colonies and with France, encouraged Spain, in 1779, to come to a rupture with her, for the well-understood purpose of attempting the great object of the national wish. That this was so, was rendered plain by preparations to cut off the African supplies of provisions to the rock, before war had actually taken place.

Gibraltar is situated in Andalusia, the most southern province of Spain. The rock is seven miles in circumference, running out into the sea in the form of a promontory of more than three miles in length, and is joined to the continent by an isthmus of low sand. The promontory, or rock, at the foot of which stands the town, is upwards of one thousand three hundred feet in height, and appears to have been formerly surrounded by the sea. The breadth of the isthmus at the foot of the rock is about nine hundred yards, but grows much wider as it approaches the country. Across this isthmus, at about a mile’s distance from the garrison, the Spaniards have drawn up a fortified line, extending one thousand seven hundred yards, and embracing both shores, with a strong fort of masonry at each end. That both parties, under such extraordinary circumstances, should exhaust art in their means of defence, and be always on the watch against surprise, we may readily imagine; but what gives the garrison a great advantage in this respect is its commanding height, from which it can see everything that approaches it, by either land or sea. Thus in the whole of this long siege, they appear to have been able to ascertain all that was going on in the enemy’s camp, and to descry every hostile vessel in time to be prepared for it.

Until we come to the great finale, this siege was little more than a blockade, and that imperfect. And yet, with the exception of the “Iliad,” we know of none that is so interesting. Drinkwater’s account has exactly the same charm as Robinson Crusoe’s journal; the events are so minute, and brought so completely home to the apprehension of the reader by the plain and graphic style of the author, that you forget it is an awful reality, and enjoy it as you would a fiction. But such a narrative we cannot adopt into our pages: to transfer it wholly would be dishonest towards a fine work; to garble it would not redound to our credit.

When the re-capture of this member of their own country was undertaken, as there was much difficulty, there was proportionate glory in the enterprise, and the eyes of all Europe were turned towards the Herculean straits. Every exertion was made by Spain—neither labour, money, nor blood was spared. The valour of her troops was ably directed by her generals, and persistently exercised through length of time and difficulties of obstacles enough to cool the ardour of the most devoted partisans. But in addition to the immense advantage of situation, upon a lofty impregnable rock, open to almost constant succour by sea, the British garrison had the still further good fortune of being commanded by a governor most admirably suited to the post. As you read the details of this memorable siege, you cannot help being struck with the idea that General Elliott’s government was a parental one. Never-flinching courage, sleepless watchfulness, consummate prudence, and far-discerning foresight, were joined in him to a kindliness of heart and an urbanity of manners, that made all he required from the troops and officers he was placed over a labour of love. And yet his bonhomie did not overcome his judgment; though never severe, he was never falsely indulgent; he could punish when he was called upon to do so for the public good, as readily, though not as willingly, as he could encourage merit or devotedness by promotion or reward. It may be asserted that Elliott was never so placed as to display the genius of a great commander: but this we deny. In a difficult, isolated position, he was in no instance at a loss; no danger approached him that he was not prepared to meet, and no opportunity for gaining an advantage offered itself that he did not seize.

The two points were,—for the English, the rock, town, and fortress of Gibraltar; for the Spaniards and French, Algeziras, a town situated on the other side of the bay, five and a half miles from Gibraltar. Algeziras had been a city of great importance, and in the middle of the fourteenth century was wrested by Alonzo XI., king of Castile, from the hands of the Moors. This appears to have been a kind of crusade, and one in which the English chivalry took a prominent part; John of Gaunt, and the earls of Derby, Leicester, Salisbury, and Lincoln, all being present. It is likewise said that cannon were first used by the Moors in this siege against their assailants, and were adopted by the English, two years after, at the battle of Crecy, from observing the powerful effects of them. The Spaniards had the great advantage of being masters of the country behind and around them; and though the English had a small naval force in their port, they never had sufficient to prevent constant annoyances from the gun and bomb-boats of Algeziras. Many an anticipated succour, in a vessel which was viewed with delight from the rock, was cut off by the Spanish boats, and carried into Algeziras before the eyes of the disappointed garrison.

With the commencement of the war in 1779, the siege of Gibraltar may be said to have begun. It was, in truth, but an imperfect blockade, but it subjected the garrison to all the watchfulness, labour, and preparation of a real siege. The Spaniards were actively employed in fortifying all their best points; they encamped before the garrison, and erected additional batteries in their lines, but still did not fire upon the town or fort. General Elliott, however, found their proceedings so unmistakable in their purpose, and knowing that war had been declared, he saluted them at their works with a few rounds of shot.

This took place on the 5th of July, 1779; and from that date to the 26th of November, 1781, the siege or blockade was one continuance of mutual attempts at annoyance, interspersed with occasional want of provisions and attacks of the scurvy on the part of the garrison, frequent boat-assaults, always attended with repulses, on the side of the allies; with a strange but perpetual desertion of individuals from both garrison and army. But at the last-named period the enemy had constructed such formidable batteries, and appeared to be approaching so inconveniently near, that General Elliott determined upon the bold expedient of a sortie. This was effected with his usual prudence, foresight, and spirit. As soon as the gates were shut, and the evening gun fired, a considerable detachment was ordered to assemble on the Red Sands, at midnight, with devils, fire-fagots, and working implements, to make a sortie on the enemy’s batteries; the general and other officers to be employed were in the mean time convened, and, lest some matters might have escaped him in the multiplicity of arrangements, the governor desired every person to propose, without restraint, whatever would, in his or their opinion, further promote the success of the enterprise. We place the last passage in italics, as a lesson to self-sufficient commanders: no captain ever more completely performed the duties intrusted to him by his country, and yet he was never averse to receiving advice from the lowest of his staff. On a subsequent occasion an important use of red-hot shot was suggested to him, by Lieutenant-General Boyd, his second in command, and, without the least of the paltry jealousy some superiors would have felt, he not only openly adopted the idea, but intrusted the execution of it to his friend who had thought of it.

“The detachment being formed in three lines, the right column in the rear and the left in front, tools for demolishing the works were delivered to the workmen, and the following directions for their destination were communicated to the principal officers:—‘The right column to lead and march through Forbes’s barrier for the extremity of the parallel, keeping the eastern fence of the gardens close on their left. The centre immediately to follow, marching through Bay-side barrier, and directing their route through the gardens for the mortar-batteries. The left column to bring up the rear, marching along the strand for the gun-batteries. No person to advance before the front unless ordered by the officer commanding the column: and the most profound silence to be observed, as the success of the enterprise may depend thereon. The 12th and Hardenberg’s regiments to form in front of the works, as assaulting corps, and are to detach to the right and left, as occasion may require. The reserve to take post on the furthest gardens. When the works are carried, the attacking troops are to take up their ground in the following manner:—The grenadiers of Reden’s and La Motte’s behind the parallel; the 39th and 73rd flank companies along the front of the fourth branch; and the 72nd grenadiers and light infantry with their right to the fourth branch and left to the beach.’

“The force consisted of ninety-nine officers, one hundred and forty-seven subalterns, and two thousand and thirty-four rank and file.

“By the time the destination of the columns was made known to the different officers, and other arrangements had taken place, the morning of the 27th was far advanced; and as the moon had then nearly finished her nightly course, the detachment, about a quarter before three o’clock, began its march by files from the right of the rear line to the attack. Although nothing could exceed the silence and attention of the troops, the enemy’s advanced sentries discovered the right column before they passed Forbes’s barrier, and after challenging fired upon them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, commanding this column, finding they were alarmed, immediately formed the attacking corps, and pushed on at a brisk pace for the extremity of the parallel; there, finding no opposition, he took possession, and the pioneers began to dismantle the works. Part of Hardenberg’s regiment, which was attached to this column, mistook the route of the grenadiers, owing to the darkness of the morning; and in pursuing their own, found themselves, before they discovered their error, in front of the St. Carlos battery. In this dilemma no other alternative offered but pressing forward, which they gallantly did, after receiving the enemy’s fire. Upon mounting the parapet, the enemy precipitately retreated, and with great difficulty they descended the stupendous work, forming with their left to the tower. They were thus situated, when Lieutenant-Colonel Duchenhausen, at the head of the 39th flank companies, entered the St. Carlos battery, and naturally mistaking them for his opponents, fired, and wounded several. Further mischief was, however, prevented by the countersign; and the Hanoverians joined the remainder of the corps, which now formed en potence in front of the parallel. The 73rd flank companies were equally successful in their attacks, and Lieutenant-Colonel Trigge, with the grenadiers and light company of the 72nd regiment, carried the gun-batteries with great gallantry. The ardour of the assailants was irresistible. The enemy on every side gave way, abandoning in an instant, and with the utmost precipitation, those works which had cost them so much expense, and employed so many months to perfect.

“When our troops had taken possession, the attacking corps formed agreeably to their orders, to repel any attack which the enemy might make to prevent the destruction of the works, whilst the 12th regiment took post in front of the St. Carlos battery, to sustain the western attack; and the reserve, under Major Maxwell, drew up in the further gardens. The exertions of the workmen and artillery were wonderful. The batteries were soon in a state for the fire-fagots to operate, and the flames spread with astonishing rapidity into every part. The columns of fire and smoke which rolled from the works beautifully illuminated the troops and neighbouring objects, forming altogether a coup d’oeil from the rock, not possible to be described.

“In an hour, the object of the sortie was fully effected; and trains being laid to the magazines, Brigadier Ross ordered the advanced corps to withdraw, and the sustaining regiments to cover their retreat; but by some oversight, the barrier at Forbes’s was locked after the flank companies had returned; which might have proved of serious consequence to Hardenberg’s regiment, as they were from that circumstance under the necessity of following the 12th regiment through Bay-side barrier.

“Several small quantities of powder took fire whilst the detachment was on its retreat; and just as the rear had got within the garrison, the principal magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion, throwing up vast pieces of timber, which, falling into the flames, added to the general conflagration. Although the enemy must have been early alarmed, not the smallest effort was made to save or avenge their works. The fugitives seemed to communicate a panic to the whole; and instead of annoying the English troops from the flanking forts, their artillery directed a ridiculous fire towards the town and our upper batteries, whence we continued a warm and well-served discharge of round shot on their forts and barrier. Only two officers and sixteen privates were taken prisoners, and, so little opposition being made, very few were killed in the works.

“Thus was this important attack executed beyond the most sanguine expectations of every one. The event challenges greater admiration, when we reflect that the batteries were distant near three-quarters of a mile from the garrison, and only within a few hundred yards of a besieging enemy’s lines, mounting one hundred and thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The detachment had only four privates killed, and one officer and twenty-four privates wounded. The ordnance spiked in the enemy’s works amounted to ten thirteen-inch mortars and eighteen twenty-six pounders. Although subject to the little derangements naturally attending on a night attack, not one musket, working-tool, or other instrument, was left behind.”

Such is Captain Drinkwater’s account of a spirited and successful action of which he was an eye-witness. The French historians of the siege say that the British could not stand against the fire of the batteries, and retreated. This is one of the innumerable contradictions to truth offered by French authors whenever the military honour of their country is concerned. They always forget that their contemporaries and posterity will judge which party was victor in a conflict, by the results. Victor Hugo poetically said, that Buonaparte was never conquered: at Moscow it was fire—at Waterloo it was fate. Headers of history are nevertheless convinced of the reality of the two defeats, by the events which followed them.

The affair had now been so prolonged, and had excited so much attention throughout Europe, that the Spaniards and French began to think it a point of honour to subdue this general on his rock; and the duke de Crillon, accompanied by the eminent French engineer D’ArÇon, and followed by an army of thirty thousand men, came to Algeziras. Immediately upon his arrival, D’ArÇon changed the mode of attack: it had been previously mostly confined to the land side of the rock; he, most unfortunately for the cause he served, directed almost all his offensive efforts from the sea, and yet by no means neglecting his fortifications. General Elliott’s principal extraordinary preparation consisted in grates and various apparatus for heating shot, as he found red-hot balls by far the most efficient instrument of destruction he could employ. But he was too watchful and prudent a commander to let this engross all his attention: in addition to constant labours at the works, he ordered holes to be blasted in the rocks, nearly on a level with the water, from which he could pour showers of stones and other missiles upon his assailants. He likewise had a number of gun-boats built; and, having received supplies and reinforcements from the British fleet under Lord Hood, he felt himself in a condition to cope with his powerful enemies. Determined to have no idle hands, even the serjeants and drummers were armed with muskets; and musicians, who had before been exempted from duty, had to exchange their instruments for firelocks and shovels. The strength of the garrison with the marine brigade, including officers, amounted to seven thousand five hundred men.

The comte d’Artois and the duke de Bourbon joined the Spanish and French armies; after whose arrival many civilities passed between the besieging camp and the garrison. The French general sent presents of game, fruit, vegetables, and ice, to the governor, accompanied by a letter breathing the highest respect and admiration for his courage, talents, and firmness. Here again is the beautiful simplicity, combined with military virtues, displayed in the character of Elliott; he might be imagined an ancient Roman rather than a modern soldier of fortune. He accepts the presents with a courtesy due to the kindness with which they were offered; but requests they may not be repeated, as it is his pride and pleasure to live as plainly as the humblest soldier in his army.

After a good deal of sharp preliminary sparring on both sides, the awful conflict came on. In our account of this, we shall mostly adhere to the very words of the historian of the siege, convinced that no other can lay it so plainly and yet so interestingly before our readers.

“In the evening of the 7th of September, a little before midnight, two large lights appeared on the shore of the Orange-grove battery, and at the same time, two similar fires were seen behind Fort St. Philip; whence, if a line was produced, it would to appearance have intersected the former about eight hundred or nine hundred yards to the north-west of the old mole head. These unusual signals made many conjecture that the enemy were sounding in that quarter. A few rounds were accordingly fired at intervals in that direction from the north bastion.

“By the morning of the 8th, the preparations in the department of the artillery, under General Boyd’s direction, were completed, and the success of the attack in a great measure depending upon embracing the favourable moment, it was no longer deferred. At seven o’clock, the town-guards being relieved, the firing commenced from all the northern batteries which bore upon the western part of the parallel, and was supported through the day with admirable precision and vivacity. The effect of the red-hot shot and carcases exceeded our most sanguine expectations. In a few hours, the Mahon battery of six guns, with the battery of two guns on its flank, and great part of the adjoining parallel, were on fire, and the flames, notwithstanding the enemy’s exertions to extinguish them, burnt so rapidly, that the whole of these works before night were consumed. The St. Carlos and St. Martin batteries, however, on this occasion, escaped the fate they had formerly experienced, but they were so much damaged, that the greater part was taken down.

“For near an hour, the enemy continued silent spectators of our cannonade. About eight, they fired a few guns from the St. Martin battery, and between nine and ten returned our fire from Fort St. Philip and Barbara, with the seven-gun battery in the lines, and soon after, from eight new mortar-batteries in the parallel. This tardiness in returning our fire in some degree we attributed to the works being confused with materials, and some of the batteries being deficient in ammunition. It might, however, be owing to want of discretionary orders, as an officer of rank was observed to enter the lines about the time when their cannonade became general; a reinforcement also marched down from the camp.

“The astonishing bravery displayed by the enemy in their repeated attempts to extinguish the flames, could not fail to attract the particular notice and admiration of the besieged. Urged on most probably by emulation, they performed prodigies of valour, so that their loss, under so well-directed a fire, must have been very considerable. The French brigade had one hundred and forty killed and wounded, and the Spanish casualties most likely bore an equal proportion. About four o’clock in the afternoon the cannonade abated on both sides, and the enemy soon after were totally silent, though the garrison continued its usual fire. The British had two or three killed and several wounded. Lieutenant Boag, of the artillery, and Ensign Gordon, of the 58th regiment, were of the latter number. The former officer had been wounded before; on this occasion, he was pointing a gun from Hanover battery in the lines, when a shell fell in the battery. He had scarcely time to throw himself down in an embrasure, when the shell burst, and fired the gun under the muzzle of which he lay. The report immediately deprived him of hearing, and it was some time before he recovered a tolerable use of that faculty. Major Martin, of the same corps, had likewise a very fortunate escape from a twenty-six pounder, which shot away the cock of his hat close to the crown. This anecdote is inserted because it is commonly believed that if a cannon-ball of large diameter passes so near the head of a person, the wind of it is generally fatal. The major was considerably stunned by the passage of the shot, but experienced little further injury. In the forenoon of the 8th, two more ships of the line removed to the Orange-grove, followed some time afterwards by twenty-two gun and mortar boats; and in the evening, one of the French men-of-war joined them from Algeziras. In the course of the day, a number of troops were embarked on board such of the battering-ships as were finished; and at night, the garrison artillery replaced the ammunition in the expense magazines, which had been used to such good purpose in the morning.

“This unexpected insult undoubtedly precipitated the duke’s measures; and, by provoking him to the attack before the preparations in the other departments were ready to combine with him in a general and powerful effort against the garrison, served greatly to frustrate the enterprise. Apprehensive probably, that, elated by their good fortune, they might renew their attempts finally to destroy the land-works which had escaped, the duke determined to avoid the blow, which might be so dangerous in its consequences, by opening his batteries, even in their unfinished state. Actuated most probably by these motives, the embrasures of the new batteries were unmasked during the night of the 8th; and the succeeding morning at daybreak, the garrison were surprised to find every appearance in their works for firing upon them. Two rockets from the forts in the lines were the signals to begin; and the cannonade commenced at half-past five o’clock, with a volley of about sixty shells from all their mortar batteries in the parallel, succeeded by a general discharge of their cannon, amounting in the whole to about one hundred and seventy pieces of ordnance, all of large calibre. Their firing was powerful, and entirely directed against the works of the besieged, but was not, after the first round, altogether so tremendous and destructive as might have been expected from such a train of artillery. At intervals, from ten to twenty shells were in the air at the same moment, but their effects were not equal to the numbers expended. The town, southward of the King’s bastion, was little affected; but the northern front, and line-wall, leading from the Grand Parade to the North bastion, were exceedingly warm; and the lines and Landport were greatly annoyed by the shells from the howitzers, which were distributed in various parts of their parallel; Montague’s and Orange’s bastions seemed to be the centre of the enemy’s cross-fire, whilst the line-wall in their vicinity and to the southward was taken À revers by the shot which passed over the lines from the sixty-four-gun battery.

“Not imagining, from the rough appearance of the enemy’s works, that they could possibly retaliate so soon, the guards and pickets of the north end of the garrison were for some time exposed, and some casualties occurred; but they soon discovered whence they were chiefly annoyed, and consequently became more cautious. Lieutenant Wharton, of the 73rd regiment, was dangerously wounded at Landport.

“Whilst the land-batteries were thus pouring forth their vengeance upon the northern front, nine line-of-battle ships, including those under the French flag, got under way from the Orange-grove, and passing along the sea-line, discharged several broadsides at the garrison, and particularly at a settee which had just arrived under their guns from Algiers. When this squadron had got round Europa Point, they suddenly wore, and returning along the Europa, Rosia, and New Mole battery, commenced a regular and heavy fire upon the garrison. The marine brigade and artillery returned the salute till they passed, when the men-of-war wore and returned to the eastward. About the same time that the enemy were thus amusing the garrison at the southward, fifteen gun and mortar boats approached the town, and continued their fire for some time; but the artillery giving them a warm reception from the King’s bastion, two of them were towed off with precipitation, and the rest retired in great disorder. One was thought to be very considerably damaged, and some imagined that her gun was thrown overboard to save her from sinking. “This mode of attacking on all sides exactly corresponded with what the garrison had heard was the plan of M. d’ArÇon. He hoped, probably, to confound and overwhelm them, by presenting destruction under such various forms, and by the enormous quantity of fire which he poured in upon the garrison. The governor, however, did not approve of his troops being thus subjected to be harassed at his pleasure, and resolved, if possible, to put a stop to the sea attacks. For this purpose the furnaces and grates for heating shot, at the New Mole, were ordered to be lighted, and some new arrangements took place in the ordnance upon Windmill-hill. Towards dusk the enemy abated in the fire from their cannon, increasing, however, in the expenditure of shells, which being generally fired with short fuses, broke in the air. This practice seemed well calculated for the purposes in view. In the day they could observe with greater certainty the effect of their shot, and alter as circumstances directed; the firing at night must unavoidably be less depended upon: shells were therefore burst over the heads of the workmen of the besieged, to prevent them, if possible, from repairing at night the damage received in the day. Nevertheless it did not obstruct the duties in the department of the engineers, and the artillery were not hindered from further completing the expense magazine with ammunition. The 97th regiment19 was now so far recovered as for some time to assist in the fatigue duties of the garrison; and this day the officers, with one hundred men, were added to the general roster. The town guards were likewise ordered to assemble in Southport ditch.

“The enemy’s men-of-war, as General Elliott had expected, repeated their attack very early in the morning of the 10th. Each ship carried a light at her mizen-peak; but they did not appear near enough to produce much effect. They were received with a well-supported fire, and the next morning one of them was to be observed at Algeziras, with her bowsprit unshipped. The remaining eight renewed their cannonade about nine in the forenoon, and killed two of the marine brigade, and wounded a serjeant of artillery and two other men. After they had passed as before, they wore ship, apparently with an intention of continuing their visits; but suddenly put about, hauled their wind, and anchored off the Orange-grove. The governor was afterwards informed that the discovery of a red-hot shot on board one of the ships was the immediate cause of this hasty manoeuvre.

“The enemy continued their firing from the isthmus, recommencing at morning gun-fire on the 10th from their gun-batteries. At seven o’clock, including the expenditure on the eighth, they had discharged 5,227 shot and 2,302 shells, exclusive of the number fired by the men-of-war and mortar-boats. The garrison, on the contrary, took no further notice of them than to return a few rounds from the terrace batteries at their working parties, who were repairing the damage done on the 8th, and completing the rest of the works. In the course of the day the Brilliant and Porcupine frigates were scuttled by the navy in the New Mole; and at night the engineers, with a working party, cleared the lines of rubbish, and restored those traverses which had been demolished. At night the enemy’s fire was under the same regulation as the preceding evening.

“The next morning, when the garrison guards were being relieved, a signal was made at the town, near the quarry, under the Queen of Spain’s Chair, and the enemy’s cannonade became excessively brisk: fortunately few casualties occurred. Their firing, when this object ceased to engage them, seemed to be principally directed against the obstructions at Landport, and in that part of the garrison. Many of the palisades in the covered way were destroyed, and the chevaux-de-frise considerably injured; artificers were, however, constantly detached to repair those breaches, so that the whole were kept in a better state than might be expected. In the afternoon the garrison began to conclude that the attack with the battering-ships was no longer to be deferred. Several detachments of soldiers embarked from the camp, and others were standing on the neighbouring eminences, which, with the appearance in the evening of signals like those which had been observed on the night of the 7th, led the besieged to believe that every preparation was complete; and the wind at that time blowing gently in the bay, from the north-west, favoured the conjecture. Landport and Waterport guards were immediately reinforced, the furnaces and grates for heating shot were lighted, and the artillery ordered to man the batteries.

“Thus prepared, the garrison waited their approach, for it seemed to be the general opinion that the battering-ships would advance and be moored in the night, that they might be less exposed to annoyance in this duty, and open together, with greater effect, at daybreak. Attention was, however, called off from the bay to the land side, where the enemy had set fire to the barriers of Bay-side and Forbes’s, and the whole of those palisades to the water’s edge were instantly involved in flames. The northern guards and pickets were immediately under arms, and a smart discharge of musketry was directed upon several parties, which, by the light of the fire, were discovered in the meadows. The enemy increasing their bombardment, and nothing new happening in consequence of the conflagration, the pickets and guards were remanded under cover, but the artillery continued upon the batteries. The garrison had scarcely recovered from this alarm, before the gun and mortar boats, with the bomb-ketches, began to bombard the northern front, taking their station off the King’s bastion, extending towards Fort St. Philip. They commenced about an hour after midnight, and their fire, added to that of the land-batteries, exceedingly annoyed Waterport and the vicinity. The out-pickets were again under arms, but providentially the British loss was trifling. The garrison returned a few rounds from the sea-line, but still disregarded the batteries on the isthmus, excepting when their workmen appeared, or were thought to be employed. Major Lewis, commandant of the artillery, was unfortunately amongst the wounded; but, however meritorious an officer, his second supplied his place admirably during his confinement.

“When the gun-boats retired, nothing new occurred till the morning of the 12th: the enemy’s fire continued to be supported at the average of four thousand rounds in the twenty-four hours. About eight o’clock reports were received from Europa guard that a large fleet had appeared in the Straits from the westward. The wind was brisk, and there was scarcely time to form any opinion concerning them ere they approached the bay, and proved to be the combined fleets of France and Spain; consisting of seven three-deckers, and thirty-one ships of two decks; with three frigates, and a number of xebeques, bomb-ketches, and hospital-ships, the whole under the command of ten admirals and a broad pendant. In the afternoon they were at anchor in the bay, between the Orange-grove and Algeziras.

“This great accumulation of force could not fail to surprise, if not alarm the garrison. It appeared as if the enemy meant, previous to their final efforts, to strike, if possible, a terror through their opponents, by displaying before them a more powerful armament than had probably ever been brought against any fortress. Forty-seven sail of the line, including three inferior two-deckers, ten battering-ships, deemed perfect in design and esteemed invincible, carrying two hundred and twelve guns; innumerable frigates, xebeques, bomb-ketches, cutters, gun and mortar boats, and smaller craft for disembarking men: these were assembled in the bay. On the land side were most stupendous and strong batteries and works, mounting two hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, and protected by an army of near 40,000 men, commanded by a victorious and active general, of the highest reputation, and animated with the immediate presence of two princes of the royal blood of France, with other dignified personages, and many of their own nobility. Such a naval and military spectacle is scarcely to be equalled in the annals of war. From such a combination of power, and favourable concurrent circumstances, it was natural enough that the Spanish nation should anticipate the most glorious consequences. Indeed, their confidence in the effect to be produced by the battering-ships passed all bounds; and, in the enthusiasm excited by the magnitude of their preparations, it was thought highly criminal even to whisper a doubt of success.

“In drawing these flattering conclusions, the enemy, however, seemed entirely to have overlooked the nature of that force which was opposed to them; for though the garrison scarcely consisted of 7,000 effective men, including the marine brigade, they forgot that they were now veterans in this service, had been a long time habituated to the effects of artillery, and were prepared by degrees for the arduous conflict that awaited them. They were, at the same time, commanded by officers of approved courage, prudence, and ability, eminent for all the accomplishments of their profession, and in whom they had unbounded confidence. Their spirits, too, were not a little elevated by the success attending the recent practice of firing red-hot shell, which, in this attack, they hoped would enable them to bring their labours to a period, and relieve them from the tedious cruelty of another vexatious blockade.

“In the morning of the 12th the governor reinforced the pickets of the line; nine of which, in future, were stationed in town, and distributed as follows: two at Waterport, two at Landport, two in the lines, and the remaining three in the picket-yard, with the field officer of the town district. The other picket of the line was continued at the southward.

“In the evening, about dusk, a number of men were observed to embark from the Orange-grove, on board the battering-ships; which, with the presence of the combined fleet, and the wind blowing favourably, induced the garrison to conclude that the important and long-meditated attack was not now to be deferred.

“The enemy’s cannonade was continued, almost on the same scale as the preceding days, during the night of the 12th. The next morning it was observed the combined fleet had made some new arrangements in their position or moorings, and that the remaining two battering-ships had joined the others at the Orange-grove, where their whole attacking force seemed to be now assembled. About a quarter before seven o’clock some motions were observed amongst their shipping; and soon after the battering-ships got under way, with a gentle breeze from the north-west, standing to the southward, to clear the men-of-war, and were attended by a number of boats. As the English naval officers were of opinion that the battering-ships would be brought before the garrison in the night, few suspected that their present manoeuvres were preparatory to their commencing the attack; but, observing a crowd of spectators on the beach, near Point Mala, and upon the neighbouring eminences, and the ships edging down towards the garrison, the governor thought it would be imprudent any longer to doubt it. The town-batteries were accordingly manned, and the grates and furnaces for heating shot ordered to be lighted. “Thus prepared for their reception, the garrison had leisure to notice the enemy’s evolutions. The ten battering-ships, after leaving the men-of-war, wore to the north, and a little past nine o’clock bore down in admirable order for their several stations; the admiral, in a two-decker, mooring about 900 yards off the King’s bastion, the others successively taking their places to the right and left of the flag-ship in a masterly manner, the most distant being about 1,100 or 1,200 yards from the garrison. The British artillery allowed the enemy every reasonable advantage, in permitting them without molestation to choose their distance; but as soon as the first ship dropped her anchors, which was about a quarter before ten o’clock, that instant the British fire commenced. The enemy were completely moored in a little more than ten minutes, and their cannonade then became, in a high degree, tremendous. The showers of shot and shells which were now directed from their land-batteries, the battering-ships, and, on the other hand, from the various works of the garrison, exhibited a scene of which perhaps neither the pen nor the pencil can furnish a competent idea. It is sufficient to say that upwards of four hundred pieces of the heaviest artillery were playing at the same moment: an instance which has scarcely occurred in any siege since the invention of those wonderful engines of destruction.

“After some hours’ cannonade, the battering-ships were found to be no less formidable than they had been represented. The heaviest shells often rebounded from their tops, whilst the thirty-two-pound shot seemed incapable of making any visible impression upon their hulls. The garrison frequently flattered themselves they were on fire; but no sooner did the smoke appear, than, with the most persevering intrepidity, men were observed applying water from their engines within to those places whence the smoke issued. These circumstances, with the prodigious cannonade which they maintained, gave the garrison reason to imagine that the attack would not be so soon decided as from the recent success against their land-batteries had been fondly expected. Even the artillery themselves, at this period, had their doubts of the effect of the red-hot shot, which began to be used about twelve, but were not general till between one and two o’clock. To show the spirit in which the defence was carried on, the men jocularly called the supplies of red-hot shot, obtained by making fires of wood in the corners of old buildings, ‘batches of roasted potatoes for the dons and monsieurs.’”

“The enemy’s cannon at the commencement were too much elevated; but about noon their firing was powerful and well-directed. The garrison casualties then became numerous, particularly on those batteries north of the King’s bastion, which were warmly assailed by the enemy’s flanking and reverse fire from the land. Though so vexatiously annoyed from the isthmus, the garrison artillery totally disregarded their opponents in that quarter, directing their sole attention to the battering-ships, the furious and spirited opposition of which served to excite their people to more animated exertions. A fire more tremendous, if possible, than ever, was therefore poured down from the rock; incessant showers of hot balls, carcases, and shells of every description, flew from all quarters; and, as the masts of several of the ships were shot away and the rigging of all was in great confusion, hopes of a favourable and speedy decision began to revive in the garrison.

“About noon, their mortar-boats and bomb-ketches attempted to second the attack from the battering-ships, but the wind having changed to the south-west and blowing a smart breeze with a heavy swell, they were prevented taking a part in the action. The same reason also hindered the British gun-boats from flanking the battering-ships from the southward.

“For some hours the attack and defence were so equally well supported, as scarcely to admit any appearance of superiority in the cannonade on either side. The wonderful construction of the ships seemed to bid defiance to the powers of the heaviest ordnance. In the afternoon, however, the face of things began to change considerably: the smoke which had been observed to issue from the upper part of the flag-ship appeared to prevail, notwithstanding the constant application of water, and the admiral’s second was perceived to be in the same condition. Confusion was now apparent on board several of the vessels, and by the evening their cannonade was considerably abated: about seven or eight o’clock it almost totally ceased, excepting from one or two ships to the northward, which from their distance had suffered little injury.

“When their firing began to slacken, various signals were made from the southernmost ships, and as the evening advanced, many rockets were thrown up, to inform their friends, as afterwards learned, of their extreme danger and distress. These signals were immediately answered, and several boats were seen to row round the disabled ships. The garrison artillery at this period caused dreadful havoc amongst them. An indistinct clamour with lamentable cries and groans proceeded, during the short intervals of cessation, from all quarters; and a little before midnight, a wreck floated in under the townline-wall, upon which were twelve men, who only, out of threescore which were on board their launch, had escaped. These circumstances convinced the garrison that they had gained an advantage over the enemy; yet they did not conceive that the victory was so complete as the succeeding morning evinced. The British firing therefore was continued, though with less vivacity; but as the artillery from such a hard-fought day, exposed to the intense heat of a warm sun, in addition to the harassing duties of the preceding night, were much fatigued, and as it was impossible to foresee what new objects might demand their service the following day, the governor, about six in the evening, when the enemy’s fire abated, permitted the majority of the officers and men to be relieved by a picket of a hundred men from the marine brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Trentham; and officers and non-commissioned officers of the artillery were stationed in the different batteries, to direct the sailors in the mode of firing the hot shot.

“About an hour after midnight, the battering-ship which had suffered the greatest injury, and which had been frequently on fire the preceding day, was completely in flames, and by two o’clock in the morning of the 14th, she appeared as one continued blaze from stem to stern. The ship to the southward of her was also on fire, but did not burn with so much rapidity. The light thrown out on all sides by the flames enabled the artillery to point the guns with the utmost precision, whilst the rock and neighbouring objects were highly illuminated, forming with the constant flashes of the cannon, a mingled scene of sublimity and terror. Between three and four o’clock, six other of the battering-ships indicated the efficacy of the red-hot shot; and the approaching day now promised the British garrison one of the completest defensive victories on record.

“Brigadier Curtis, who was encamped with his brigade at Europa, being informed that the enemy’s ships were in flames, and that the calmness of the sea would permit his gun-boats to act, marched about three o’clock A.M. with a detachment to the New Mole; and, drawing up his twelve boats in such a manner as to flank the battering-ships, compelled their boats to abandon them. As the day approached and the garrison fire abated, the brigadier advanced and captured two launches filled with men. These boats attempted to escape, but a shot killing and wounding several men on board one of them, both surrendered, and were conducted to Ragged Staff. The brigadier being informed by the prisoners that many men were through necessity left by their friends on board the ships, he generously determined to rescue them. Some of these infatuated wretches nevertheless, it is said, refused at first the deliverance offered to them, preferring the death before them to being put to the sword, as they were taught to believe they should be if they submitted to the British. Being left, however, some moments to the horrors of their fate, they beckoned the boats to return, and resigned themselves to the clemency of their conquerors.

“Whilst the navy were thus humanely relieving their distressed enemy, the flames reached the magazine of one of the battering-ships to the northward, and it blew up about five o’clock, with a dreadful explosion. In a quarter of an hour after, another in the centre of the line met with a similar fate. The wreck from the latter spread to a vast extent, and involved the British gun-boats in the most imminent danger; one was sunk, but the crew were saved. A hole was forced through the bottom of the brigadier’s boat, his coxswain was killed, and the strokesman wounded, and for some time the crew were obscured in the cloud of smoke. After this very fortunate escape, it was deemed prudent to withdraw towards the garrison, to avoid the peril arising from the blowing up of the remaining ships. The brigadier, however, visited two other ships on his return, and landed nine officers, two priests, and three hundred and thirty-four soldiers and seamen, all Spaniards, which, with one officer and eleven Frenchmen, who had floated in the preceding evening, made the total number saved amount to three hundred and fifty-seven. Many of the prisoners were severely, and some of them dreadfully wounded. On being brought ashore, they were instantly conveyed to the garrison hospital, and every remedy was administered necessary for their different cases.” This is one of the brightest pages in the history of British warfare; so striking indeed, that even the enemies were eager to announce to the world what they owed to the humanity of the garrison; both French and Spanish writers are at least as warm in praise of Sir Roger Curtis’s noble exertions on this occasion, as the English historian of the siege.

“During the time that the marine brigade were encountering every danger in their endeavours to save an enemy from perishing, the batteries on the isthmus, which had ceased the preceding evening, most likely from want of ammunition, and which had opened again upon the garrison on the morning of the 14th, maintained a warm fire upon the town, which killed and wounded several men, and three or four shells burst in the air over the very spot where their countrymen were landed. This ungenerous proceeding could not escape the observation of the spectators in their camp, and orders were probably sent to the lines for the batteries to cease, as they were silent about ten o’clock.

“Notwithstanding the efforts of the marine brigade in relieving the terrified victims from the burning ships, many unfortunate men could not be saved. The scene at this time exhibited was as affecting as that which had been presented in the act of hostility had been terrible and tremendous. Men crying from amidst the flames for pity and assistance; others on board those ships where the fire had made little progress, imploring relief with the most expressive gestures and signs of despair; whilst several, equally exposed to the dangers of the opposite element, trusted themselves on various parts of the wreck to the chance of paddling themselves to the shore. A filucca belonging to the enemy approached from the Orange-grove, probably with the intention of relieving these unfortunate persons; but, jealous of her motives, the garrison suspected that she came to set fire to one of the battering-ships, which appeared but little injured, and obliged her to retire. Of the six ships which were still in flames, three blew up before eleven o’clock; the other three burned to the water’s edge, the magazines being wetted by the enemy before the principal officers quitted the ships. The admiral’s flag was on board one of the latter, and was consumed with the vessel. The remaining two battering-ships, it was hoped, might be saved as glorious trophies; but one of them unexpectedly burst out into flames, and in a short time blew up with a terrible report; and Captain Gibson representing it as impracticable to preserve the other, it was burnt in the afternoon under his direction. Thus the navy put a finishing hand to this signal defensive victory.

“During the hottest period of the cannonade the governor was present on the King’s bastion, whilst Lieutenant-General Boyd took his station upon the South bastion, animating the garrison by their presence.

“Whilst the enemy were cool and their ships had received little damage, their principal objects were the King’s bastion, and the line-wall north of Orange’s bastion. Their largest ships, which were about 1,400 tons burden, were stationed off the former, in order to silence that important battery, whilst a breach was attempted by the rest in a curtain extending from the latter to Montague’s bastion. The prisoners informed the garrison, that if a breach had been effected, their grenadiers were to have stormed the garrison under cover of the combined fleets. The private men complained bitterly of their officers for describing the battering-ships as invulnerable, and for promising that they were to be seconded by ten sail of the line, and all the gun and mortar boats. They further said that they had been taught to believe that the garrison would not be able to discharge many rounds of hot balls; their astonishment, therefore, was inconceivable when they discovered that they fired them with the same precision and vivacity as cold shot. The enemy’s loss, including the prisoners, could not be less than two thousand men. The casualties of the garrison, on the contrary, were so trifling, that it will appear almost incredible that such a quantity of fire, in almost all its destructive modes of action, should not have produced more effect. They amounted to one officer, two subalterns, and thirteen privates killed, and to five officers and sixty-three privates wounded!

“An annoying and vindictive firing was kept up occasionally by the besiegers, and warmly responded to by the garrison, but from the 15th of September the siege was little more than a badly-kept blockade. On the 2nd of February the governor received a note from the duke de Crillon, informing him that preliminaries of a general peace had been signed in January. He had likewise the supreme satisfaction to learn that the garrison of Gibraltar, for which he and his gallant garrison had fought so bravely and persistently, was to remain in the hands of Great Britain.

“General Elliott was made a knight of the Bath, the Parliament settled a handsome pension on him for life, and on his return home in 1787, he was raised to the British peerage by the title of Baron Heathfield, of Gibraltar. The gallant and humane Brigadier Curtis received the most appropriate honour of knighthood, as a reward for his truly chivalric conduct. General Boyd was created a knight of the Bath, and General Green distinguished by a baronetcy. The thanks of both houses of Parliament were voted to the generals, officers, and privates who had served on this glorious occasion.”

In our account of this most remarkable siege of modern times, we have unhesitatingly made free with Captain Drinkwater’s admirable narrative. Whilst compiling this work, the reading of that book has been the most pleasing part of our labours, and on closing it we exclaimed, “This is almost as fully entitled to a place in every military student’s library, as Dibdin’s Songs in that of every sailor.”