A.D. 1812.

The allied army under Lord Wellington remained in cantonments till the 7th of January, waiting for the arrival of the artillery; the light divisions being advanced in front, observing the enemy’s movements.

The battering-train having reached Almeida on the 8th, Lord Wellington commenced the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo. Before this place could be even approached, it was necessary to take or destroy a palisadoed redoubt, which had been erected on the hill of St. Francisco, as also three fortified convents connected with that work. This operation was given to Major-General Crawford, who, as soon as it was dark, sent Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd, with a detachment of the light division, to take the fort. The attack was ably conducted by Colonel Colborne; it was stormed in gallant style, two captains and forty-seven men being made prisoners. Captain Mein, of the 52nd, who led the storming party, was severely wounded, but the British loss was trifling. In consequence of this success, the army broke ground the same night, within six hundred yards of the city, notwithstanding that the enemy held the fortified convents.

On the 14th of January, Lord Wellington opened his fire from twenty-two pieces of ordnance, which formed three batteries in the first parallel. On the night of that day, likewise, the approach was opened with the second parallel, and the besiegers were established in it, within a hundred and fifty yards of the walls of the place. This operation was rendered secure on the right, by General Sir Thomas Graham having surprised the enemy’s detachment in the convent of Santa Cruz, and General Colville equally secured it on the left by getting possession of the convent of St. Francisco.

January 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent in completing the second parallel and the approaches to it, and in erecting a battery in the neighbourhood of the convent of St. Francisco, which opened on the 18th. By the 19th the breaches in the fausse-braie wall, and in the body of the place, effected by the batteries in the first parallel, were considered practicable, as was also a breach in the suburbs of St. Francisco, which had been made by the batteries opened on the 15th. Marmont was now, to all appearance, advancing with a powerful force from Salamanca, for the purpose of raising the siege; Lord Wellington therefore saw that no time was to be lost, and accordingly determined to make an instant attempt on the city by storm.

The third and light divisions were fixed upon for this important service, as they happened to be the troops on duty that day, the army taking the duties of the trenches by divisions during the siege. They were formed into five columns. The two right, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Toole, of the 2nd Portuguese CaÇadores, and Major Ridge, of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of the third column, which was composed of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, to the top of the breach in the fausse-braie wall. The fourth column was composed of the 43rd and 52nd, and part of the 95th regiments, and was directed by General Crawford. This was destined to attack the breach on the left, in the suburbs of St. Francisco, and to cover the left of the attack at the principal breach by the troops of the third division, under General Picton. General Pack’s Portuguese brigade, which formed the fifth column, was directed to make a false attack upon the south face of the fort. Besides these columns, the 94th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, was ordered to descend into the ditch on the right of General M’Kinnon’s column, for the purpose of protecting it against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose its progress to the principal breach in the fausse-braie wall.

The assault was made according to these arrangements. Major Ridge with his column escaladed the fausse-braie wall, and stormed the principal breach in the main body of the place, together with the 94th regiment, which had moved along the ditch, and had stormed the breach of the fausse-braie wall in the front of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, so that it not only covered the advance of that brigade, but even preceded it in the attack. Generals Crawford and Vandeleur, with the troops on the left, were equally forward in their movements, and in less than half an hour from the commencement of the attack, the city was in possession of the allies. General Pack converted his false attack into a real one. The Portuguese troops scaled the walls in every direction; and the advanced-guard, under Major Lynch, followed the enemy’s troops from the advanced works into the fausse-braie, where they made prisoners of all that opposed them.

Major-General M’Kinnon was blown up by the explosion of one of the enemy’s mines near the breach. General Crawford received a mortal wound while leading on his division; and Major Napier, one of the bravest men in the army, lost an arm. M’Kinnon had been a schoolfellow of Buonaparte.

The value of this capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was very great. 1st. It erected a wall, and a very strong one, against any new invasion of the Portuguese frontier. 2nd. It was so much gained towards clearing the country between the Douro and the Tagus. 3rd. It intercepted the communication of the enemy between the north and south of Spain, and thereby rendered the operations of their armies in the north, and their army in the south, two distinct lines, having the allied army between them. 4th. It paved the way for the siege of Badajos. 5th. It greatly raised the credit and popularity of the allied cause.

This siege only lasted twelve days. The allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety officers; among the latter of whom was one who appears to have been a general favourite, for it was said, “Three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman:” he was a captain of the 45th.

It is lamentable to hear the historian of the Peninsular war attach the same blame to the allied troops in this siege as we have mentioned in that of Badajos. “Disgraceful,” he says, “were the excesses of the allied troops: the Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, yet all these claims were disregarded. ‘The soldiers were not to be controlled.’ That excuse will not suffice. Colonel Macleod, of the 43rd, a young man of most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach, and constrained his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorder commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.” This is a severe but just censure upon “the higher authorities.” We know that the British common soldier is taken from the lowest ranks of society, but we cannot agree that cold-blooded cruelty is a distinguishing characteristic even of these classes; we believe the British people to be averse to cruel triumph over a fallen enemy, and we should rather attribute the excesses complained of to the partisan portion of the army: civil warfare is generally the most inveterate. The Spaniards were most likely to be cruel towards their compatriots; few people are more inveterate when their passions are roused.

For this achievement Lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese.