A.D. 1541.

The never-ending piracies of Algiers had for centuries made this city or state the object of the hatred of all Christian princes, and the dread of all Christian peoples. The opinion entertained by Europeans of the pirates of Algiers can be compared to nothing but that inculcated of the demons of another world. Among the most daring, ambitious, and successful of this race of marauders was Barbarossa: he aspired to something above the character of a “salt-water thief,” and intruded upon the lands as well as the vessels and subjects of his opposite neighbour, Charles I. of Spain, and V. of Germany.

The emperor was politic as well as brave; he watched for an opportunity of avenging himself with safety; and he thought he had found this when he learnt that the emperor of the corsairs was gone to Constantinople. A volume written upon the power of Barbarossa could not display it so eloquently as the circumstance of the monarch, possessed of more extensive territories in Europe than had been held by one man since the time of Charlemagne, being obliged to wait till this Cacus was absent from his den before he would venture to assail it. Charles prided himself upon being a brave knight, but this was a wide departure from the laws of chivalry, which commanded all who acknowledged them to send due notice to an enemy of an intended hostile attack. This absence appeared to Charles a favourable opportunity for attempting the subjugation or destruction of Algiers. It was the autumn of 1541, the season of storms at sea and of diseases and plagues on the coast of Africa. Ambitious princes do not often benefit by the study of history; they think their own genius or their own power can overcome obstacles that have been fatal to others; otherwise Charles might have learnt what would be the issue of his enterprise by turning to the melancholy story of the death of Louis IX. of France. Neither did he want for prudent advice from living counsellors. The great seaman Admiral Doria, who was likewise an excellent general, and of approved valour, when consulted by the emperor on the subject, said: “Let me persuade you from this enterprise; for, par Dieu, if we go thither, we shall all perish.” But Charles was never easily turned aside from a favourite project by good advice, and he replied: “Twenty-two years of empire for me, and seventy-two years of life for you, ought to be sufficient to make us both die content.” A few days after this advice had been asked and refused, the emperor and his army embarked; and upon their landing in Africa, were immediately assailed by the diseases and subjected to the famine that had been predicted. Before they commenced the attack, an eloquent and politic gentleman was sent to the old eunuch Hasem, who commanded in the absence of Barbarossa, to endeavour to intimidate him, and, if that could not be effected, to corrupt him. But this trustworthy governor replied, that “it was very foolish to attempt to give advice to an enemy, but it would be still more foolish for the enemy to attend to that advice when it was given.” These dispositions reduced the emperor to the necessity of attacking the place in form. The defence of the Algerines was firm and vigorous; and their valour, assisted by frightful tempests, compelled the emperor to raise a siege in which his army was perishing with famine and misery. When he returned to Europe, Charles V. instantly sent Aretin a gold chain of the value of a hundred ducats, to engage him to be silent on the subject of his disaster. “This,” said Aretin, “is but a poor present for such an enormous piece of folly.” Aretin, we should inform our young readers, was an Italian writer, who by some bold satires directed against princes and other conspicuous characters, had elevated himself to the position of a kind of European censor. As in most such cases, the persons attacked really gave importance to satires which, if they had been left alone, like other bubbles, would have burst very innocuously. But the speculation answered: potentates vied with each other in throwing sops to this Cerberus, whose own life as a man, like, we fear, that of most other satirists, was as obnoxious to censure as any of those he unscrupulously attacked.

SECOND SIEGE, A.D. 1682.

Although the following short passage cannot be said to relate to a siege, yet as it concerns the introduction of an arm employed in sieges, particularly such as are maritime, it becomes our duty to repeat it.

Louis XIV., ever anxious to extend what he and his nation called his glory, turned his attention to the sea. He saw what the Dutch, Portuguese, Spaniards, and English were doing; he knew what Venice, Genoa, and other Italian states had done on that element; and he deemed it inconsistent with that universal fame to which he aspired, to neglect this wide field of enterprise. With her coasts, and her possessions on so many seas, France is legitimately a naval power, and Colbert was not a minister to leave natural advantages unemployed. When the reader of history pauses at this period of the reign of Louis XIV., and contemplates his grandeur,—we may say true grandeur,—the principal thing he must be struck with is the astonishing influence of one great master mind. When Mazarin died, he bequeathed Colbert to Louis XIV., and never did dying minister bestow a richer treasure upon his master: the portion of their ill-got wealth, which Richelieu and Mazarin left to Louis XIII. and Louis XIV., as an indemnity for the rest, was nothing when compared with a bequest which we strongly suspect the cunning Italian would not have ventured to make a gift whilst living: he might avail himself of Colbert’s talents, and take the credit of their efforts, but he would not have proposed that he should assume the place while he lived, which he knew it was for the king’s interest he should occupy when he was gone. The date standing at the head of this passage is only one year before the death of Colbert, and of the decline of all that was great in the reign of Louis XIV. Mazarin died in 1661, Colbert in 1683; and in these twenty-two years alone, out of a reign of more than seventy, did Louis XIV. earn any part of the proud title which is claimed for him.

Under the auspices of Colbert, Louis had a hundred ships of the line built, and engaged sixty thousand sailors. Although he restrained as much as possible these rude men by stringent laws, he did not think it prudent to let them remain idle in port. His squadrons, commanded by Duquesne, swept the seas infested by the pirates of Algiers and Tunis. To punish Algiers, he employed a new invention. This fatal but admirable means of destruction was that of bomb-vessels, with which maritime cities may be reduced to ashes. There was a young man named Bernard Renaud, known by the name of Little Renaud, who, without having served, had become, by the influence of genius, an excellent shipbuilder. Colbert, who always knew how to discern and employ merit wherever he found it, had often consulted him upon naval affairs, even in the king’s presence. It was by the cares and from the intelligence of Renaud that a better plan of shipbuilding was shortly adopted. He ventured to propose in council to have Algiers bombarded by a fleet. Till that time no idea was entertained that bomb-mortars could be placed upon anything but solid ground. This proposition appeared ridiculous, and Renaud met with all the contradictions and railleries that every inventor must expect; but his firmness, and that eloquence which men properly impressed with their inventions generally have, made the king determine to permit a trial of this novelty. Renaud had some vessels constructed, smaller than usual, but stronger with regard to wood, without upper decks, but with a false deck at the bottom of the hold, upon which hollows were built for the reception of mortars. He set sail with this preparation, under the orders of old Duquesne, who was charged with the enterprise, but who anticipated no success from it. But Duquesne and the Algerines were equally astonished at the effects of these bombs; a large part of the city was quickly battered to pieces and consumed by them.

THIRD SIEGE, A.D. 1683.

Although punished, Algiers soon renewed its brigandages, and Louis XIV. repeated his chastisement on the 30th of the following June. Algiers, after being twice bombarded, sent deputies to ask pardon and sue for peace. They restored all their Christian slaves to liberty, and—which is the severest punishment for corsairs—paid a large sum of money. When D’Amfreville, a naval captain, came to Algiers to deliver all the Christian slaves, in the name of the king of France, there were among them many Englishmen, who, after they were on board, persisted in telling D’Amfreville that it was out of consideration for the king of England they were set at liberty. The French captain called back the Algerines, and replacing the English on shore, said, “These people insist upon it that they are set free in the name of their king; that being the case, my king cannot take the liberty of offering them his protection: I restore them to you, and it is for you to show what respect you owe to the king of England.” The weakness of the government of Charles II., and the respect in which most nations then held Louis XIV., are both made evident by this anecdote.

FOURTH SIEGE, A.D. 1689.

Six years after, Marshal D’EtrÉes once again bombarded Algiers, always unfaithful to its treaties, and still supporting a fearful power by robbery and rapine. Ten thousand bombs ruined this retreat of corsairs despising the laws of nations; six of their vessels were sunk in the port. They were thus taught to respect the French flag, and the liberty of the seas for great powers; but they did not cease to pillage with impunity the subjects of weak states, without bombs or vessels of war to make themselves feared.

FIFTH SIEGE, A.D. 1816.

Although the bombardment of Algiers by a naval force can scarcely be termed a siege, as a conclusion to the above history, a mention of that which took place under Lord Exmouth is necessary. Exasperated by many acts of wanton cruelty and daring piracy on the part of the dey of Algiers, the greatest naval country took into its hands the chastisement the corsairs so richly deserved. With a comparatively small force with what even great commanders had deemed necessary for the undertaking, Lord Exmouth, by the most judicious management, seconded by the skill and bravery of his officers and men, in one short day brought these sanguinary marauders to an expression of repentance, if not a feeling of it. A treaty of peace was signed, under a salute of twenty-one guns, on the following conditions, which had been dictated by the Prince Regent of England:—

“1. The abolition for ever of Christian slavery.

“2. The delivery to the admiral’s flag of all slaves in the dominions of the dey, to whatever nation they may belong, at noon to-morrow.

“3. To deliver, also to the British admiral’s flag, all money received by him for the redemption of slaves since the commencement of this year, at noon also to-morrow.

“4. Reparation has been made to the British consul for all losses he may have sustained in consequence of his confinement.

“5. The dey has made a public apology, in presence of his ministers and officers, and begged pardon of the consul, in terms dictated by the captain of the Queen Charlotte.”

The killed and wounded in this great settling-day between civilization and barbarism, amounted to between 6,000 and 7,000 on the part of the Algerines, and to 141 killed and 742 wounded on the side of the British and Dutch.

The bombardment of Algiers is deemed important as a military experiment, proving the efficacy of ship artillery against stone fortifications; but the distance, and the nature of the sea, must never be forgotten in such calculations: the season was the most favourable possible as regarded the weather, and Lord Exmouth was enabled to bring his vessels within fifty yards of the Mole, into which he poured his destructive thunders. If Cronstadt had been as favourably circumstanced in these respects as Algiers, we feel confident Sir Charles Napier would not have come “bootless home.”

The operations of the French, in their war of conquest in Algiers, do not come within the scope of our plan.

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