(Scripture Reading Exercise.)

MEDIAEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF GOD.

SPECIAL TEXT: "And without controversy, great is the mystery of Godliness." I. Tim. iii, 16.

NOTES.

1. The Mediaeval Period: The Patristic Period, according to our announced grouping of the Christian Fathers, extended to 750 A. D. and included in the enumeration of the fathers John of Damascus. The Mediaeval Period will extend from the above date to the middle of the sixteenth century, which brings us to the establishment of Protestantism, and the commencement, theologically, of the modern world. This gives us a period of eight hundred years. "Of this period," says Shedd, "not more than four centuries witnessed any great activity of the theological mind."

The "Orthodox Christian" doctrine of God for this period, and for matter of that, for all subsequent periods, was fixed by the Nicene Creed and the creed of St. Athanasius, quoted in Lesson 26. The effort of the Christian scholars of the Mediaeval Period was to maintain, first, the truthfulness of these creeds against skepticism and doubts within the Church itself; and, second, to reconcile the creeds with reason, and develop patristic philosophy into something like system (History of Philosophy—Elmendorf—p. 102). However, "As there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation," to quote Cicero, the efforts of the schoolmen were not very successful, and resulted in multiplying systems of philosophy, rather than in bringing the patristic doctrine into harmony with reason. The systems of thought developed by these efforts may be classed under three heads: Realism, Nominalism, and Mysticism. A brief definition of each will be necessary.

2. Definitions—"Realism:" Realism divides into two classes, extreme and moderate. (1) "Extreme realism taught that universals were substances or things, existing independently of and separate from particulars; this was the essence of Plato's ideas." (Cent. Dict.) The thinking process of the realist is admirably depicted in Note 5, Lesson xxvi, where St. Augustine describes his rise from the conception of the "changeable" to the "Unchangeable," and "thus with the flash of one trembling glance," arrived at the conception of "that which is"—to the real—to the universal—to the apprehension of "God."

"Moderate Realism also taught that universals were substances, but only as dependent upon and inseparable from individuals, in which each inhered; that is, each universal inhered in each of the particulars ranged under it. This was the theory of Aristotle, who held that the individual thing was the first essence, while universals were only second essences, real in a less complete sense than first essences. He thus reversed the Platonic doctrine, which attributed the fullest reality to universals only, and a participative reality to individuals." (Cent. Dict.)

Elmendorf represents moderate realism as recognizing that "the universal has objective reality, as to its contents, in individuals"—(i. e., the universal is expressed through individuals).

Nominalism: Nominalism also divides into two classes, extreme and moderate. "Extreme nominalism taught that universals had no substantive or objective existence at all, but were merely empty names or words. Moderate nominalism or 'conceptualism' taught that universals have no substantive existence at all, but yet are more than mere names signifying nothing; and that they exist really, though only subjectively, as concepts in the mind, of which names are the vocal symbols." (Cent. Dict.).

Mysticism: "Mysticism is a phase of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact definition. It appears in connection with the endeavor of the human mind to grasp the divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communication with the Highest. More specifically, a form of religious belief which is founded upon mysticism, spiritual experience, not discriminated or tested and systematized in thought. 'Mysticism and rationalism' represent opposite poles of theology, rationalism regarding the reason as the highest faculty of man and the sole arbiter in all matters of religious doctrine; mysticism, on the other hand, declaring that spiritual truth cannot be apprehended by the logical faculty, nor adequately expressed in terms of the understanding." (Cent. Dict.). Mysticism may also be regarded as the result of "a despair of reason, a refuge in higher intuitions." (Elmendorf.) These definitions may be regarded as difficult, but I know of no way by which the ideas considered can be more simply explained. The definitions should be discussed until mastered. Perhaps they will grow in clearness after considering the rest of the notes of this lesson.

3. Explanatory: Limiting our inquiry concerning the philosophy of this mediaeval period to the doctrine of God, and selecting an expression of that doctrine from an illustrious representative of each school of thought, may be of assistance in forming a clearer understanding of the definitions given in previous notes, and likewise represent the leading conceptions of God that obtained in the period under consideration.

4. John Scotus Erigena: Extreme realist, and something of a Mystic; "Man finds not God, but God finds himself in man," (Elmendorf) is the keynote of this philosopher's teaching. Erigena was born in Ireland, 800 A. D. Made a pilgrimage to the birthplace of Plato and Aristotle A. D. 825; "and indulged the hope of uniting philosophy and religion in the manner proposed by the ecclesiastics who were studying in Spain."

"From Eastern sources, John Erigena had learned the doctrines of the eternity of matter, and even of the creation, with which, indeed, he confounded the Deity Himself. He was therefore a Pantheist, accepting the Oriental ideas of emanation and absorption, not only as respects the soul of man, but likewise all material things. In his work 'On the Nature of things,' his doctrine is, 'That, as all things were originally contained in God, and proceeded from Him into the different classes by which they are now distinguished, so shall they finally return to Him, and be absorbed in the source from which they came; in other words, that as, before the world was created, there was no being but God, and the causes of all things were in Him, so after the end of the world, there will be no being but God, and the causes of all things in Him. This final resolution he denominated deification, or theosis. He even questioned the eternity of hell, saying, with the emphasis of a Saracen, 'There is nothing eternal but God.' It was impossible under such circumstances, that he should not fall under the rebuke of the Church." (Draper's "Intellectual Development," Vol II, p. 9.)

5. Roscelin of Compiegne: Extreme Nominalist. Sometimes credited with being the originator of the system; but he was "not the originator of the system," says Elmendorf, "but its clearest exponent and sharpest defender in the eleventh century." The same authority says that he regarded "universals" as "merely universal names." A title "for the totality of things. This be applied to the doctrine of the Trinity in the form of tritheism. There are three divine essences or substances, like one another; for only individuals have a real existence"—(Hist. of Philosophy—Elmendorf—pp. 105-6.) "Roscellinus taught that whatever exists as a real thing or substance, exists as one self-identical whole, and is not susceptible of division into parts. This was the part of his teaching which created so much scandal when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity. Roscellinus maintained that it is merely a habit of speech which prevents our speaking of the three persons as three substances, or three Gods. If it were otherwise, and the three persons were really one substance or thing, we should be forced to admit that the Father and the Holy Spirit became incarnate along with the Son. Roscellinus seems to have put forward this doctrine in perfect good faith, and to have claimed for it at first the authority of Lanfranc and Anselm. In 1092, however, a council convoked by the Archbishop of Rheims, condemned his interpretation, and Roscellinus, who was in danger of being lynched by the orthodox populace, recanted his error. As his enforced penitence did not prove lasting, his opinions were condemned by a second council (1094), and he himself fled to England. Forced by a fresh persecution to return to France at a later date, he taught at Tours and Loc-menach in Brittany (where he had Abelard as a pupil), and resided latterly as canon at Besancon." (Ency. Brit.).

6. St. Anselm, Realist: Born at or near Aosta, Italy, 1033, A. D.; died at Canterbury, 1109. Credited with being the founder of scholastic theology. He held that faith is not the pre-requisite, and the regulator of knowledge, but leads to it. Also that "God can be known through reason, attempts ontological, a priori proof, from the concept of the objective existence. That than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot exist in intellect alone; for then a greater can be conceived." His doctrine is set forth in detail by Shedd: "The human mind possesses the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable. But such a being is necessarily existent; because a being whose existence is contingent, who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect that we can conceive of. But a necessarily existent Being is one that cannot be conceived of as non-existent, and therefore is an actually existent Being. Necessary existence implies actual existence. In conceiving, therefore, of a being who is more perfect than all others, the mind inevitably conceives of a real, and not an imaginary, being; in the same manner as in conceiving of a figure having three sides, it inevitably conceives of a figure having three angles." (History of Christian Doctrine—Shedd—Vol. I, pp. 231-2.)

This argument of Anselm's was attacked by a Catholic Monk of the name of Gaunilo, whose main point is that the existence of an idea of a thing does not prove the existence of the thing itself. Shedd, in order to exhibit the strength of Anselm's argument, suggests throwing it into dialogue form, thus:

Anselm: "I have the idea of the most perfect being conceivable."

Guanilo: "True; but it is a mere idea, and there is no being corresponding to it."

Anselm: "But if there is no being answering to my idea, then my idea of the most perfect being conceivable is that of an imaginary being; but an imaginary being is not the most perfect being that I can conceive of. The being who corresponds to my idea must be a real being. If, therefore, you grant me my postulate, namely, that I have the idea of the most perfect being conceivable, you concede the existence of an actual being correspondent to it." (History of Christian Doctrine—Shedd—Vol. I, p. 237.)

One feels, however, that this is but playing with and upon words, and is much of kith and kin with that other abstraction, that "the thought of God makes God." Maurice remarks upon this argument of Anselm's for the divine existence, as follows: "In the present day, when the arguments for the Divine existence from the constitution of the visible world have displaced all others in the minds of theological advocates, and when these are in their turn exposed to the severest criticism from philosophers, such a subtlety as this of Anselm's would be dismissed by both parties with indifference or scorn. Without participating in either feeling, or pre-judging the question whether the argument is tenable in itself, we may express our opinion, that in a time of clubs and newspapers, it would be a serious moral offense to introduce into discussion, upon a subject of the greatest interest to all men, that which must appear to nine out of ten a play upon words, or a conjurer's trick." (History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. I, 524.)

7. Abelard, Peter: A moderate nominalist, and usually regarded as the founder of "Conceptualism." Born in Brittany, 1079. Moderate nominalist. "Inspired by Aristotle, he taught * * * * that nothing exists apart from the individual, and in it the individual only." (Elmendorf History of Philosophy, p. 108.) Abelard also held that there is "no believing antecedent to scientific understanding, and consequently that the degree of posterior faith depends upon the degree of anterior science." "Knowledge is prior to faith," was his dictum. (See Shedd, Vol. I, pp. 163, 186 et seq.)

8. St. Thomas Aquinas: Scholastic par-excellence. Born at Acquino, in the kingdom of Naples, 1225. His great effort was to reconcile faith and reason. Called the "Aristotle of the middle ages." His doctrine respecting God, condensed by Elmendorf, is:

"In God is no composition of matter or form, nor any other. He is pure actuality; for potentiality, in any sense, would imply an actuating cause.

"In Him essence and being are one.

"In Him is no imperfection, because no potentiality; all perfections which earthly things possess, being from Him, are in Him, one and indivisible.

"From God as Absolute Intelligence, follows, necessarily, the concept of God as Absolute Will. He wills what is not Himself freely, because it is not necessary to His perfection and beatitude. From this follows His Omnipotence.

"His Providence is the ordering of all things, both universal and singular, with reference to an end, for it extends as far as His knowledge and causality.

"The casual is with respect to a particular cause, not to the universal.

"Ills, corruptions, defects, are permitted in particular things, contributing to the greater good of the whole." (History of Philosophy—Elmendorf—p. 121.)

"The system of philosophical theology set forth in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, is of supreme importance in Ecclesiastical History, not only as intellectually perhaps the most perfect work of the Scholastic age, but because it has been adopted as the authoritative standard of doctrine in the Roman Catholic Church. Such pre-eminence is reported to have been assigned to Thomas by the saying of his great master, Albert, that he had "put an end to all labor even unto the world's end." * * *

"In the great controversy of the schools, Aquinas cannot be ranked strictly with either the Realists or the Nominalists; his position has been described as an Aristotelian Realist. Like the orthodox in general he ranged himself with the modern section of the Realists, who while holding that Universals—namely, genera and species—are more than mere mental abstractions, and have a real existence, yet limited them to an existence in the individual, and refused to attribute to them any antecedent or independent existence." * * * *

"In this work of buttressing authority by philosophy, and vindicating orthodoxy by the light of nature, as the way was led by Albert, so his greater pupil carried it on to perfection; and the consequence has been that the stately edifice of Systematic Theology, reared in the Church of the West by the labors of the Schools, repose on the foundation laid by the great luminary of Pagan Greece." (Smith's Students' Ecclesiastical History, Vol. II, pp. 512-515.)

Eckhart, Mystic: Born, it is thought, at Strasburg, 1250 A. D. Taught and preached through Germany. Follows to some extent Erigena, tending, unconsciously, to emanistic pantheism. "The inner ground of man's soul is Divine, a 'spark' of Deity; knowledge is a real union of subject and object. The soul's highest power is an immediate intuition of the 'Godhead' transcending the determinate.

"The Absolute is impersonal, concealed even from thought; of the 'Godhead' no predicates may be used; it is hidden in eternal darkness. In the act of self-knowledge, God is developed as the Trinity, the form of 'Godhead' which beholds itself with love;—the subject is the Father, the object is the Son, the love is the Holy Spirit. * * * *

"God is the essence of all essences, which are ever in Him; in sending forth His Son, He sends forth all things (ideal world). In space and time, natura naturata, are the Three Persons of the Trinity, eternal as the world is, but in natura non naturata is only the 'Godhead.'

"Apart from God, the world is nonentity; God is in all things, and is all things, for creatures have no essence except God. Yet He is not nature, but above it, for the world of space and time is created out of nothing. The motive of God's goodness, which necessarily extends itself; and, by the same necessity, creation is continuous, eternal. Different from this, as the realizing of the ideal by the artist, is the creation out of nothing, in time." (History of Philosophy—Elmendorf—pp. 136-137.)