(Scripture Reading Exercise.)

THE ADAMIC DISPENSATION—IV.

[Footnote A: As in the case of lesson viii and ix it is thought that the brief treatis which is here given on "The Problem of Moral Evil" will be more serviceable than detached notes, and hence it is given in their stead. It might be well also to assign the subject of the lesson to one of the more experienced of the elders for a discourse, giving ample time for preparation.]

NOTES.

1. The Problem of the Existence of Moral Evil: The existence of evil in the world has ever been a vexed problem for both theologians and philosophers, and has led to the wildest speculations imaginable. It will be sufficient here, however, if I note the recognition by high authority of the difficulties involved in the problem. Of those who have felt and expressed these difficulties, I know of no one who has done so in better terms than Henry L. Mansel in his celebrated Lectures on "The Limits of Religious Thought" (1858), in the course of which he says:

"The real riddle of existence—the problem which confounds all philosophy, aye, and all religion too, so far as religion is a thing of man's reason, is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it exists for a longer or a short duration. Is not God infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? and does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for his perfections to expand? Does the infinity of his eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against the immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought, and have retired broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface."

This truly great writer then proceeds by plain implication to make it clear that religion no more than philosophy has solved the problem of the existence of evil:

"But this mystery, [i. e. the existence-of evil], vast and inscrutable as it is, is but one aspect of a more general problem; it is but the moral form of the ever-recurring secret of the Infinite. How the Infinite and the Finite, in any form of antagonism or other relation, can exist together; how infinite power can co-exist with finite activity;'how infinite wisdom can co-exist with finite contingency; how infinite goodness can co-exist with finite evil; how the Infinite can exist in any manner without exhausting the universe of reality;—this is the riddle which Infinite Wisdom alone can solve, the problem whose very conception belongs only to that Universal Knowledge which fills and embraces the Universe of Being."

In the presence of these reflections it cannot be doubted, then, that the existence of moral evil is one of the world's serious difficulties; and any solution which may be given of it that is really helpful, will be a valuable contribution to the world's enlightenment, a real revelation "a ray of light from the inner facts of things."

In the Book of Mormon there is such ray of light, a word that is helpful.

The statement of the doctrine in question occurs in a discourse of Lehi's on the subject of the Atonement. The aged prophet represents happiness or misery as growing out of the acceptance or rejection of the Atonement of the Christ, and adds that the misery consequent upon its rejection is in opposition to the happiness which is affixed to its acceptance: "For it must needs be," he continues, "that there is an opposition in all things. If [it were] not so * * * righteousness could not be brought to pass; neither wickedness; neither holiness nor misery; neither good nor bad. Wherefore [that is, if this fact of opposites did not exist], all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it [the sum of things] should be one body, it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility. Wherefore, it must needs have been created for a thing of naught; wherefore there would have been no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing [i. e. the absence of opposite existences which Lehi is supposing] must needs destroy the wisdom of God, and his eternal purposes; and also the power, and the mercy, and the justice of God."

[Footnote: II Nephi ii.]

The inspired man, however, even goes beyond this, and makes existences themselves depend upon this law of opposites:

"And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness, there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness, there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not, there is no God. And if there is no God, we are not, neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things; neither to act nor to be acted upon, wherefore, all things must have vanished away."

This may be regarded as a very bold setting forth of the doctrine of antinomies, and yet I think the logic of it, and the inevitableness of the conclusion unassailable. "The world presents us with a picture of unity and distinction," says S. Baring-Gould, in his excellent work "Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs" "Unity without uniformity, and distinction without antagonism. * * * * * Everywhere, around us and within us, we see that radical antimony. The whole astronomic order resolves itself into attraction and repulsion—a centripetal and a centrifugal force; the chemical order into the antimony of positive and negative electricity, decomposing substances and recomposing them. The whole visible universe presents the antimony of light and darkness, movement and repose, force and matter, heat and cold, the one and the multiple. The order of life is resumed in the antimony of the individual and the species, the particular and the general; the order of our sentiments in that of happiness and sorrow, pleasure and pain; that of our conceptions in the antimony of the ideal and the real; that of our will in the conditions of activity and passivity.^[A] The American Philosopher, Emerson, also has something like this. He says: Polarity, or action and reaction, we meet in every part of nature; in darkness and light; in heat and cold; in the ebb and flow of waters; in male and female; in the inspiration and expiration of plants and animals; in the systole and diastole of the heart; in the undulations of fluids and of sound; in the centrifugal and centripetal gravity; in electricity, galvanism and chemical affinity. Superinduce magnetism at one end of the needle, the opposite magnetism takes place at the other end. If the south attracts, the north repels. To empty here, you must condense there.' An inevitable dualism bisects nature, so that each thing is a half, and suggests another thing to make it whole; as, spirit, matter; man, woman; subjective, objective; in, out; upper, under; motion, rest; yea, nay. * * * * * Every sweet hath its sour, every evil its good." (Emerson's "Compensation.")

[Footnote A: "Origin and Development of Religious Belief" Vol. II pp. 22, 23.]

In view of the utterances of the Book of Mormon already quoted I am justified in saying that evil as well as good is among the eternal things. Its existence did not begin with its appearance on our earth. Evil existed even in heaven; for Lucifer and many other spirits sinned there; rebelled against heaven's matchless King, waged war, and were thrust out into the earth for their transgression.

Evil is not a created quality. It has always existed as the background of good. It is as eternal as goodness; it is as eternal as law; it is as eternal as the agency of intelligences. Sin, which is evil active, is trangression of law; and so long as the agency of intelligences and law have existed, the possibility of the trangression of law has existed; and as the agency of intelligences and law have eternally existed, so, too, evil has existed, eternally, either potentially or active, and will always so exist.

Evil may not be referred to God for its origin. He is not its creator, ^[A] it is one of those independent existences that is uncreate, and stands in the category of qualities of eternal things. While not prepared to accept the doctrine of some philosophers that "good and evil are two sides of one thing." I am prepared to believe that evil is a necessary antithesis to good, and essential to the realization of the harmony of the universe. "The good cannot exist without the antithesis of the evil—the foil on which it produces itself and becomes known." As remarked by Orlando J. Smith, "Evil exists in the balance of natural forces. * * * * * It is also the background of good, the incentive to good, and the trial of good, without which good could not be. As the virtue of courage could not exist without the evil of danger, and as the virtue of sympathy could not exist without the evil of suffering, so no other virtue could exist without its corresponding evil. In a world without evil—if such a world be really conceivable, all men would have perfect health, perfect intelligence, and perfect morals. No one could gain or impart information, each one's cup of knowledge being full. The temperature would stand forever at seventy degrees, both heat and cold being evil. There could be no progress, since progress is the overcoming of evil. A world without evil would be as toil without exertion, as light without darkness, as a battle with no antagonist. It would be a world without meaning." Or, as Lehi puts it, in still stronger terms—after describing what conditions would be without the existence of opposites—"Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it [i. e. the sum of things] should be one body, [i. e. of one character—so called good without evil] it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility. Wherefore, it [the sum of things] must needs have been created for a thing of naught; wherefore there would have been no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing [the absence of opposites] must needs destroy the wisdom of God, and his eternal purposes; and also, the power, and the mercy, and the justice of God."^[B]

[Footnote A: Lest some text-proofer should extort, upon the me and cite the words of Isaiah—"I make peace and create evil"—the only text of scripture ascribing the creation of evil to God—I will anticipate so far as to say that it is quite generally agreed that no reference is made in the words of Isaiah to "moral evil;" but to such evils as may come as judgments upon people for their correction, such as famine or tempest or war: such an "evil" as would stand in natural antithesis to "peace," which word precedes, "I create evil," in the text—"I make peace and create"—the opposite to peace, "The evil of afflictions and punishments, but not the evil of sin" (Catholic Comment on Isaiah 45: 7). Meantime we have the clearest scriptural evidence that moral evil is not a product of God's: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man." That is to say, God has nothing to do with the creation of moral evil; "But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." (James i: 13-15).]

[Footnote B: Nephi ii:13.]

As there can be no good without the antimony of evil, so there can be no evil without its antimony, or antithesis—good. The existence of one implies the existence of the other; and, conversely, the non-existence of the latter would imply the non-existence of the former. It is from this basis that Lehi reached the conclusion that either his doctrine of antinomies, or the existence of opposites, is true, or else there are no existences. That is to say—to use his own words—"If ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness, there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness, there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not, there is no God, and if there is no God, we are not, neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be acted upon: wherefore, all things must have vanished away."^[A]

[Footnote A: Nephi ii:13.]

But as things have not vanished away, as there are real existences, the whole series of things for which he contends are verities. "For there is a God," he declares, "and he hath created all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them is; both things to act, and things to be acted upon."

After arriving at this conclusion, Lehi, proceeding from the general to the particular, deals with the introduction of this universal antimony into our world as follows:

"To bring about his [God's] eternal purposes in the end of man, after he had created our first parents, * * * * * it must needs be that there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter; "Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore man could not act for himself, save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other.^[B] And I, Lehi, according to the things which I have read, must needs suppose, that an angel of God, according to that which is written, had fallen from heaven; wherefore he became a devil, having sought that which was evil before God. And because he had fallen from heaven, and had become miserable for ever he said unto Eve, yea, even that old serpent, who is the devil, who is the father of all lies; wherefore he said, Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall not die, but ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil. And after Adam and Eve had partaken of the forbidden fruit, they were driven out of the garden of Eden, to till the earth. And they have brought forth children; yea, even the family of all the earth. And the days of the children of men were prolonged, according to the will of God, that they might repent while in the flesh; wherefore, their state became a state of probation, and their time was lengthened, according to the commandments which the Lord God gave unto the children of men. For he gave commandment that all men must repent; for he showed unto all men that they were lost, because of the transgression of their parents. And now, behold, if Adam had not transgressed, he would not have fallen; but he would have remained in the garden of Eden. And all things which were created, must have remained in the same state in which they were, after they were created; and they must have remained forever, and had no end. And they would have had no children; wherefore, they would have remained in a state of innocence, having no joy, for they knew no misery; doing no good, for they knew no sin. But behold, all things have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things.

[Footnote B: On such a proposition Dr. Jacob Cooper, of Rutgers College, at the head of an article on "Theodicy," the justification of the divine providence by the attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the goodness and sovereignty of God, says (August, 1903), "There must be an alternative to any line of conduct, in order to give it a moral quality. We have to deal with, not an imaginary, but a real world; not with a state of things wholly different from those by which character is developed. If there are to be such qualities as righteousnesss, virtue, merit, as the result of good action, there must be a condition by which these things are possible. And this can only be where there is an alternative which may be embraced by a free choice. If the work of man on earth is to build up character, if his experience is disciplinary, by which he constantly becomes better fitted for greater good and a wider sphere of action, then he must have the responsibility of choosing for himself a course different from one which appeals to the lower qualities in his nature."]