Pages 104 to 142, Cavalry Training, are devoted to the training of the troop and squadron, and leave little to be desired as far as they take us. But those who wish to study the matter more fully, and to learn some of the “whys and wherefores,” should read Instructions for Cavalry, by the Prussian General Von Schmidt, of whom it was said, “No man exercised so great an influence for good on our arm since the Great King.” His theory was that “everything that is dull, cannot be easily understood or is uninteresting must disappear; the cavalry soldier has less need of this than any one. With such instruction he is quite useless, for to him more than to any one else are freshness, life, activity, mental quickness and vivacity necessary.”83 But most valuable are the glimpses which the book affords us of the Great King (Frederick) in his rÔle as a trainer of cavalry. How thoroughly he “meant business,” and how sternly any weakening, wavering, or indiscipline
Elliot mentions a further inspiriting regulation:—
Frederick the Great, familiar with war, readily grasped the fact that the military discipline necessary in order to train men in the highest degree for the act of war must be stern and inexorable. No bank holiday, please-do-as-you-are-told soldiering for him. He knew what he wanted, and that time was limited.
It must not be imagined that every officer who “A,” the good squadron leader, is easily recognized in the field; he rides well away from his squadron, confident that they will obey his word or signal; his squadron know his ruses and plans, and move smoothly, ready to act at the indicated speed in any direction signalled by him. They are led covered from view,87 duly avoiding or overcoming obstacles, quietly picking their way; the leader is now far to the front, with his eye on the enemy; his second in command passes any signals which are made. Suddenly pace is increased, and the squadron is galloping along under the crest of the hill, the cover which they know without an order he wishes them to utilize; then the troops wheel into line, “direction the enemy”; a defensive flank is dropped back, or an offensive flank pushed up; whilst the enemy’s leader, taken by surprise, is making up his mind, A’s “B,” the indifferent squadron leader, nervously and fretfully jobbing his horse in the mouth, rides near his squadron, at which he constantly looks back to see if the men have not already got out of dressing or committed some fault. Querulously addressing his second in command or sergeant major, he asks some foolish question; already he wants some one to lean on. His squadron moves round from behind some cover, where he has unwisely placed it, at an uneven pace, his ill-bitted horses tossing their heads in pain. Now he executes some movement; but before it is completed, he has given another order to “form squadron,” which formation he forthwith regards with disapprobation from a flank and at some 20 yards from his squadron. He has no eyes for the enemy; two patrols have been sent out who ought to inform him. He gets the information right enough, but riding, as he is, near his squadron, which is walking now, he has barely time to give an order to increase the pace and then “left shoulder” towards the enemy, who are getting to one flank, before he notices his swords are not drawn. To get this done increases the confusion in his squadron. But enough has been said to show the difference in cavalry leaders. In a cavalry engagement A’s squadron will beat B’s nineteen times out of twenty. B, poor fellow, is a danger to the State, and generally not happy in his position. No man likes work which he performs indifferently. Will this kind of leader Take it all round, any officer who is up to the business of efficiently training and leading a squadron must possess qualities which would have rendered his career a successful one in any walk of life. It is impossible to enumerate the hundred and one cares, anxieties, and responsibilities which beset a squadron commander. But it is a good thing to mention what he should regard as his guiding stars. They are:— 1. Efficiency for war in men and horses. 2. Avoidance of mere samples of efficiency. 3. Constant steps taken to make the soldiers confident in their power to use their weapons with deadly effect. 4. To make every trooper self-reliant in danger or unusual circumstances, especially when alone. 5. To cultivate the offensive spirit and a determination to get at the enemy somehow. 1. Efficiency for war in men and horses. Men not worked hard in peace-time are quite useless in war, where they have the added privation of want of food and sleep. Active service is quite unlike peace service; in the latter a man often spends but an hour or two in the open and most of the rest of the day in grooming and cleaning up; these duties are, generally speaking, a pure waste of time, as far as cavalry is concerned, in war. Too much of this barrack-square soldiering is apt to unfit men and make them slack and tired after a long day’s work, of which gillies, herdsmen, and keepers would think 2. It is a common but most pernicious practice, instead of making the effort to train all men in the squadron up to a certain standard of knowledge and ability, to take some of the smart men and make them into “show” teams. It is obviously flat-catching to have a prize team of ten marksmen, whilst the rest of the squadron are indifferent rifle shots. A man who wins prizes year after year at tournaments and assaults-at-arms is not of value unless he teaches other men. Often he does not do this for fear they should come on, “until at last the old man was beaten by the boy.” The best, though perhaps not the most showy, squadrons are those in which there is a recognized standard of efficiency in every exercise and attainment, below which no man is allowed to fall. The story is told of an inspector- 3. See under heading “the personal weapon” in chapter on Training of the Man. 4. Self-reliance may be gained by giving the individual various tasks to carry out by himself and on his own initiative. The return for this form of “casting the bread on the waters” is not immediate, but directly the regiment goes on manoeuvres or on service, the result between a squadron trained on this system and one where this is not done is most marked. The squadron in which every man can read a map and orient himself (and this is now not exceptional) moves with perfect confidence on the line marked out for it, and if “held up” in front at once proceeds to find a way round or through. Squadrons trained to this degree may be confidently expected to give great results when employed with independent cavalry or as contact squadrons. From this it will be seen that the education of the modern working classes has been exploited and improved upon to a very high degree in the cavalry Competitions between sections and troops, the former for choice, work great things in a squadron. If the minds of sixteen section leaders are all at work to find out the best way to train a recruit in various exercises, to feed a horse to the best advantage with the forage available, to get the best shooting average, and so on, it is obvious that the squadron leader has a good chance of disseminating his knowledge, when found out, through his squadron, whilst an interest is given to the work which is perfectly invaluable. Certainly men, who have to go through four or five months’ hot weather in the plains of India with the thermometer occasionally at 115° in the verandah, want these mental exercises and interests just as they want games of hockey, cricket, and football in the evening to keep them sound in wind, limb, and mind. In every respect competition is a healthy lever in training; only quite recently a squadron which, Again, when on the march, or going to or returning from a field day, by means of judging distance on prominent objects (to be checked afterwards from the map), or by noticing the features of the country and subsequently answering questions on them, or by guessing what is on the other side of a hill, habits of observation which are invaluable in a cavalryman may be inculcated. This last is a capital exercise, and one which the Duke of Wellington practised. It is related that he was posting with a friend, and they passed the time in guessing what was behind the next hill. His friend remarked how often he was right in his guesses. Wellington replied, “Well, it is what I have been practising all my life.” This instruction It is not in the brigade nor even in the regiment that dismounted work can be taught, but it is there that the effects can be seen. It is in the troop and the squadron that men should be taught to be quick, not hurried, in getting on and off their horses, and it must be done without the old-fashioned caution in the navy, “Five-and-twenty for the last man up the rigging.” A brigade is manoeuvring against an enemy; a house, a garden, a clump of trees is seen, which, if seized and held by rifle fire, will prove a most valuable pivot of manoeuvre. A squadron is ordered to seize it. Now is the time to see whether men have been taught their work in the squadron. Are they awkward in getting off their horses? Is there delay in handing over the horses to the Nos. 3? Is there uncertainty what to do with the lances? Are proper precautions taken? If the men have been well taught, they will be ready to meet with fire the opposing squadrons sent to seize it. And further, when the meeting between the brigades takes place, a well-trained squadron will have had time to mount again, and will be on the spot to A whole brigade may have to act dismounted. One not trained in the work will leave its horses behind and become inferior infantry. If the squadron training has been well done, they will act like a swarm of bees, trying here, trying there, everywhere moral and movement, till the weak spot is discovered; and then the rush will be made with an irresistible force in the firing line, and no slow pushing up of supports and reserves. We do not wish to see cavalry always getting off their horses and trying everywhere to shoot their enemy out of each bit of difficult ground, but neither do we wish to see a regiment or brigade sitting helplessly in mass with an infantry or cavalry patrol holding a defile in front of them, unable to turn them out because the ground prevents them galloping at it. Von Bernhardi says:90
These problems come as too much of a surprise in war for the ordinary individual, unless he has acquired character and a large degree of confidence by frequent exercises in peace-time such as those indicated above. But, thus equipped, and steeled, as it were, by a doctrine of resolution, the officer or non-commissioned officer will perhaps call to his mind some saying such as “a mounted man and a shower of rain can get through anywhere.” In an
Problems can be found in the support of mounted attacks by fire, dismounted attacks, rearguard actions, the defence or attack of positions taken up in farms or kopjes by flankguards or rearguards, feints made to draw the enemy or distract his attention, the precautions necessary at a halt to water or when in bivouac, the scouting of an enemy’s outpost line or in getting into a position before dawn, the passage of obstacles and defiles, and so on. Always remember to vary the ground, conceal the enemy’s numbers, and insist on decisive action. In practice, in cavalry matters, the wrong action taken in a resolute fashion is sometimes preferable to right action arrived at after vast consideration. The reflection on our British cavalry made, we believe, by a cavalry officer, that it was well drilled but badly instructed for war in 1899, appears to be a Above all, let us study in our instruction how best to make moral go hand-in-hand with method; without this what army can do great things? Have not civilization, education (conducted on our own lines), the insidious lessening of animus all conspired against our soldier’s moral in war? How much simpler and more effective was the modus operandi of the Zulu Impis clearly enunciated in their war chant, “If we go forward we conquer, if we go back we die”; their ruler invariably putting to death all who returned from an unsuccessful expedition. Conclusions1. That interest must be sustained. 2. That with cavalry above all arms, there is a need for a very stern discipline. 3. That only a really good man can lead a cavalry squadron. 4. That flat-catching must be sternly discountenanced. 5. That a wise delegation of certain points of instruction and horse-management to section leaders will have valuable results. |