“War is a business and must be learned like any other profession.”—Napoleon.

The attributes which a cavalry officer of the rank of squadron leader and upwards may to advantage possess are so many as to defy enumeration; some of them really possessed in perfection are so rare and valuable that in war they may even counterbalance the fact that their owner is barely able to read or write.

It was not without reason that Napoleon said of Ney: “When a man is as brave as he is, he is worth his weight in diamonds.”

To cavalry officers of all others are the reflections of Von der Goltz applicable, when he says: “Restless activity on the part of the general is the first condition of connected and rapid action in war”; and then he details the weakening of troops exposed to hardships, “exertion, and privations of all kinds, fatiguing marches, and wet nights in bivouac, cheerfully endured for a short time, but not for months together. They damp martial ardour considerably. A few privileged natures escape the effect of such conditions, but not so the mass of men.”

To the officer it is well that it should be known that, as war goes on, he may expect to find himself weakening, but, as with any other disease, forewarned is forearmed.

It is a duty to his country for a cavalry officer in peace-time to take such exercise in the available sports of hunting, pig-sticking, polo, big-game shooting, and other exercises as will keep muscles and lungs in condition and training, and his nerves in order. The cavalry officer, and for that matter the general and staff officer, who seldom gets on a horse in peace-time, will not suddenly change his nature in war; on the contrary, the enforced exercise will knock him up. Long days in the saddle, and nights spent on the outpost line with an insufficiency of food, the constant strain of vigilance will tell on most men, in fact in some degree on all men. But the officer who knows beforehand that he may expect his initiative, firmness, zeal, and love for action to evaporate somewhat after some months or even weeks of campaigning will be on the look-out. He will school his mind and countenance in cheerfulness and lightheartedness before his subordinates:

He will practise himself in firmly repressing all grumbling and cynicism, in assiduously performing all details of duty, and in constantly caring for the welfare of his men and horses. “Such independent persons,” says Emil Reich, “have long since learnt to stand adversity, to be, as the saying is, ‘good losers.’ This has given England her peculiar tone, her stamina, her power in adversity.”75 With such all will go well, for war is the region of reality in which there is no place for shams; but woe betide the regiment where the senior officers set an example of cynicism, grumbling, neglect of duty, want of zeal; these faults become exaggerated in their subordinates till they result in the worst military crimes and in the disgrace of the regiment, by a state of indiscipline and neglect of duty which only the strongest measures can put right.76

Whatever the value of a senior officer of cavalry from the point of view of courage, horsemanship, resolution, and bodily fitness for a campaign, there are other points to which he should devote attention. Von Bernhardi (p. 288 of Cavalry in Future Wars) says:

A comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of higher strategy, are essentials for every reconnoitring officer.

Now a field officer of cavalry may find himself at any time thrown on his own resources, perhaps cut off from his base, many miles from superior authority and with several squadrons at his disposal. His action, its direction and scope, and the information gained or missed may have the most marked effect on the course of the operations.

Again, at any period in an engagement the moment for action may arise; will then an officer, who is not trained in peace-time to know his duty, and to act on his own initiative, have the nerve “to go in,” without waiting for the order which nearly always comes too late? Settled convictions as to his duty,77 acquired by previous practice and study of similar situations in peace, will nerve him to a correct interpretation of his duty, which may or may not be to charge. He will remember what was said of so-and-so who did or did not “go in.” He must be able to await a favourable opportunity in cold-blooded calm; and the time for deliberation once over, he must possess the cool daring to throw relentlessly all his available forces into battle.78

About the end of the Boer War an officer was heard to say: “I only learnt one thing at a garrison class which I attended. In a rearguard action my instructor told me to go lightly out of two positions and then let the enemy have it hot at the third one, when they came on with confidence and without discretion. That tip has been more useful to me than anything else I ever learnt, and has pulled me through again and again.”

But besides this a great deal is now to be learnt, and many ideas gained from the many excellent military works which are translated into English from other languages. Thirty years ago, beyond Von Schmidt and De Brack (certainly the best of their kind), few foreign works on tactics and the more recent wars had been translated. Nowadays four are translated where one was formerly. These give a better idea of the varied rÔle of cavalry on a battlefield; we get a little farther than the drill of a squadron or regiment; we can see laid bare the faults of our cavalry and of their direction in South Africa, or what was noticed by various military attachÉs as regards the shortcomings of cavalry in the Manchurian or other campaigns. These, read and noted in an intelligent fashion, and more especially if later discussed amongst the officers of a regiment in their application to the work of training a regiment, are of great value. Perhaps their principal value is that they enable officers to lay out plans of action for emergencies, to get what Langlois calls a doctrine.79 “Without a doctrine,” he says, “text-books are of little avail. Better a doctrine without text-books than text-books without a doctrine, for the former was the case in Napoleon’s time.”

And what was Napoleon’s doctrine? Did not Napoleon beyond all others study moral in its application to the training of officers and men, and to the winning of battles? We see it in his selection of his generals. Ney began as a leader of partisan forces. Massena was the head of a band of smugglers. Again, we may note it in the selection of his staff officers and A.D.C.’s of whom he asked (1st): Is he lucky? and (2nd): Is he enterprising? It is evident in his wise distribution of rewards; “I want blood, not ink,” he remarked to a commanding officer who had put forward his quartermaster for a decoration. To another, of whom he had asked the character of a man who was claiming a reward for well-known acts of bravery, when the reply was that the man was a “drunkard and a thief,” he said, “Bah, blood washes all that away.” We see, then, that his doctrine was that the man who will shed his blood is the rarest and most valuable asset in war; and so he, the great leader and organizer of armies, put it before all others, and thus he made it the “fashion.” No doubt Napoleon could have made “ink” the fashion, had he thought it desirable to do so. Further, he decorated men on the field of battle, bearing in mind the maxim: “Bis dat qui cito dat.” Any senior officer may imitate this excellent practice, by putting in his orders, regimental, brigade or otherwise, a notice of an “Act of Courage,” etc. If this is done the same evening it has a great effect.

That the Japanese thought of this is evidenced by the fact that repeatedly in the orders of the day, and in the proclamations of the army commanders and of the commander-in-chief, there were references to the excellent information and reports which reached them from reconnoitring detachments and patrols, and on one occasion Marshal Oyama categorically stated that without the help which had been afforded him by the cavalry, he would have been groping in the dark in the measures he was undertaking.80

Those who neglect to think about these matters soon wear out the patience of the bravest men.81 De Brack writes:—

Reward, then, above all things the courage of him who is first in the mÊlÉe, who delivers his blows with coolness and certainty, who is last in a retreat, who rescues his officers, his comrades, who captures a standard, who recaptures artillery, who is never dismayed by bad luck, and is always ready and willing.... There are several kinds of courage, but it is courage of the daring and impetuous kind which wins battles.

Our text-books have had little to say about moral, and we were apt to take it for granted that all is for the best in the best of all possible armies, so long has the question been overlooked. But is that wise? Should we not know why one regiment will take a loss of 50 per cent and “go in” next day again cheerfully, while another loses 10 per cent, and does not want any more fighting?

Is it not part of the training of the senior officers of cavalry that they should know the nature of the infantry combat, that they should grasp the consumption of reserves and the gradual moral degradation of the enemy’s infantry, that they should have studied works such as Colonel Ardant du Picq’s Études du Combat, which furnish the most thorough and complete dissection of moral in war?

In a note to one of his chapters on the value of discipline, Ardant du Picq relates how in the eighteenth century four British captains “stood off” when signalled to for help in an attack about to be made by their admiral. The latter won his fight, but was mortally wounded. He, however, sent for the four captains, court-martialled them and had three hanged at the yard-arm, and the fourth cashiered before he himself died.

Every leader should know how narrow is the path which he will tread when in command of troops in a fight. How essential it is, then, in cricket parlance to “give no chances.” And it is a great mistake for young officers to be left in ignorance of the fact that a good fighting regiment, battery or battalion, yes, and brigade or division, can only exist where there is a high standard of moral and a thorough mutual understanding that every one will, and must, play the game, be the risk, difficulty, or odium what it may.

Polo players will tell you that one selfish player will ruin a team. This is ten times more true in war, where they will see the selfish polo player skulk, run away, or let in his commanding officer and the army in the very first fight he gets into. And cavalry officers of all ranks must learn in peace that it is only by practising at all times broad-minded comradeship not only in their own corps and arm, but with the other arms, that victory in the field can be ensured. Let them read and ponder on what a French general says of our army in South Africa:—

Each arm acted on its own.... This comradeship can only be fostered by daily intercourse in peace.... In England it exists neither between the different arms nor between one battalion and another.... Good fellowship in the fight can only be produced by good fellowship in time of peace, and the latter results from a life in common.82

This ideal is apparently realized in the Japanese army, where, it is said, “there are no regiments that have a reputation or a history which is not that of the whole army. Just as there are no crack corps, so there is no crack arm. The pay and standard of education and living of cavalry officers are the same as those of other branches of the service.”

Our conclusions then must be:—

1. That courage and activity are the most valuable attributes in the field. 2. That these may wane when the body is exposed to unaccustomed wear and tear, unless this is foreseen and guarded against.

3. That habits of decision in tactical situations must be acquired by practice in peace-time.

4. That a doctrine permeating all ranks is essential to success in war.

5. The doctrine is “The Unison of Arms and the Resolute Offensive.”