“The most arduous, while at the same time the most important, duties that devolve upon soldiers in the field are those of outposts ... all concerned should feel that the safety of the army and the honour of the country depend upon their untiring vigilance and activity.”—Lord Wolseley.

The art of maintaining himself and his command in the outpost line is a question of vigilance, imagination, and forethought on the part of the commander, and cunning on the part of his men. Let us place ourselves in the position of an officer commanding a hundred to two hundred men, and detached some ten miles out to the flank and front of a force.

The commander must take it for granted that he may be attacked at any moment, and so he must run through in his mind what he intends to do. It is his business to look ahead and foresee dangers and misfortunes—and by his preparations to rob them of their bad effect.56 If he has left his bivouac a couple of hours before dawn and moved, carefully feeling his way, in the direction of the enemy, and has perhaps driven in one of their outposts, he need not feel it incumbent on him to hold the ground gained À outrance. He has seen into their outpost line, gained certain information, and come to certain conclusions; therefore when the enemy attack him, as they certainly will do, he should have made all preparations to fall back to the bit of good ground previously selected, where he can see and where his movements cannot be seen. Here he can make a good show, and ten to one they will let him stay there. But instead of staying there with 100 men all day, which would fatigue his men and horses without result, he places some Cossack posts and a small picket or two and retires all the rest of his men, without the enemy’s knowledge, to his bivouac, and is at breakfast by 9 or 10 A.M., his horses watered and fed. At 4 P.M. he canters out to his posts, spends the remaining daylight in observation of the enemy’s movements, relief of posts, etc., and withdraws his Cossack posts and picket at dark, leaving the picket fires well stoked up; one or two men only are left to feed these fires at intervals through the night. His real line of night outposts is placed on the possible lines of advance to his bivouac. But if his bivouac can be observed, or is likely to be reported upon to the enemy, he may change it after dark. His men should have been practised so constantly in alarm posts at night that they know exactly where to go, and what to do in case of a night alarm, and how to do so in absolute silence. Only the C.O. may make a few uncomplimentary remarks about the enemy in a stentorian voice, and invite them to “come on,” which goes far to cool the ardour of a night attack and hearten up his own men.

Next morning up again at two hours before dawn by the sound of a long-drawn-out whistle, upsaddle and off again, and get into your outpost line before dawn or, if preferred, take up a fresh line.

During the day there is plenty to do, but it is well to have an hour or so during which the men get a sleep; though with most men, after a time, it becomes a habit to sleep whenever they have nothing to do or think about, and, if they go to sleep directly it is dark, and do not sit up and talk, they get enough sleep, and are alert before dawn. All talking should be stopped a quarter of an hour after dark in every part of the lines.

The men soon learn the routine, and know how to take care of themselves, sleeping, bathing, washing, and feeding when they get a chance, and forming into small messes of four or five, who co-operate in all their food, messing, and fuel arrangements. In a very short time everything begins to go smoothly. The kits are packed, horses saddled, waggons inspanned, and coffee drunk in twenty minutes to half an hour (considerably less if there is an alarm) from the time the men are roused, whether in the dark or not. It is only when they have attained a fair degree of celerity that their C.O. can feel any confidence in them in the outpost line.

The officers, except the quarter-master and adjutant, must attend every stable hour, see the horses finished before the men leave stables, and one officer per squadron must also go to water. One glance is enough to tell an experienced eye if all is right with a horse or not. They cannot speak, but they are very full of expression if anything is wrong. The good troop and squadron leader is for ever solicitous about his horses, and woe betide the unlucky stable-guard whom he catches resting his back against a bale of hay when there is a horse loose. Once it is understood that each man stands or falls in the squadron leader’s estimation, and is noted for punishment or a light reprimand when brought up before him, according to the care of his horse, everything will go well. Nothing less will make some of them always keep up to the mark.

Nor must you forget the magpie instinct in some men, which leads them to collect all sorts of rubbish and carry it on their horses. So, on some favourable occasion on the march, halt near a deep river or pond, hold a kit and saddlery inspection, and hurl far into the water all unauthorized articles. Let the leader set the example himself of walking and leading his horse a great deal, especially down hills, when the loaded saddle slips forward on to the shoulder-blades. This is the merest routine, but a hundred things will occupy the C.O.’s mind. First, forage and water in plenty for his horses. Second, food and firing for his men. It is essential to keep the men well fed, dry,57 if possible, and that they should always have their coffee and tea, and in trying times their glass of rum twice a week or so. Soap and tobacco are the other main essentials. If you can give them half their ration in flour and half in biscuit, it will preserve their health. There are at least twenty reasons why, if you requisition anything, you should never permit the slightest waste or prodigality. De Brack says truly: “In peace wastefulness is a wrong; in war it is a crime.” Always see a receipt is given in due form.

Detached, or in the outpost line, you are more likely to get shelter in rainy weather for your horses and men than in a big camp. Take advantage of this, but recollect that it entails extra vigilance as a rule in your outposts, and that to get out of a farm and into a fighting formation requires forethought, prearrangement, and test practice, and usually entails the improvement of existing exits, and the blocking of all approaches, etc.

One of the rules, in all contact with the enemy, is always to do the opposite to what you appear to him to be about to do, e.g. never go straight to the point for which you are really making. Never come straight back to your support. Mystify him as much as you can. Never do the same thing two days running. Always come back from a patrol by a different way from that by which you went out. When alone go across country rather than on the tracks. Patrols should go across open country in the dark and be in observation and concealed before dawn. Cunning rather than audacity is required, and should be rewarded when it has good results.

Scouts have a hard time, and it is most important to have relays of them and not to let them go out too many nights running. They must also learn to put up with or remain impervious to that foolish and abominable remark of Tommy Knowall, the young and inexperienced staff or intelligence officer: “WE knew all that before.” If chased in by superior numbers, double as a buck or fox does directly you are out of sight.

If you are scouting near the enemy’s lines do not take cover on your side of rocks, bushes, etc., but on theirs, and turn your horses and pretend to look back at your own side. They will hesitate to fire on you at 700 yards or upwards, as they will think you are their own scouts riding in. But never permit a party of your own scouts to ride in to your line without sending one of their number to gallop on and tell you who they are. A shot “across the bows” of one of your own parties which is coming into a line of videttes or bivouac, without taking this precaution, will soon teach them all to do so. À propos of this, “punishments should fit the crime,” they are more easily remembered; after all, punishments are for the prevention of similar conduct in others and not retaliatory.

A high standard of conduct, zeal, and bravery comes from the example set in the first few encounters of coolness and light-heartedness. A C.O. whose men were under a wearing fire was sent a message by a troop leader, who did not quite enjoy the situation, asking, “What shall I do?” The reply was, “Give your men the second lecture on musketry.”

No one likes to be out of the fashion, and it is desirable to lay stress on not coming off second best to the enemy; to give him more than you get; to make him pay for his audacity heavily, and so on. To do so distracts the men’s minds from your own losses in dead or wounded men, etc., of which you must make little.58 Much mourning for the dead makes men sorry for themselves too, and has a bad effect. Shakespeare tells us:

Deceiving the enemy by ruses, and killing or taking him prisoner, is very desirable, and plans for doing so should be thought over and deliberately carried out. Henderson, Science of War, p. 101, says:

To sustain the moral of his own men; to break down the moral of his enemy—these are the great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, the leader must always keep in view.

Shaikh Sadi says:

If thou art harsh the foe will fight shy of thee; if thou art lenient they will be audacious and forward.

If the force to which you belong suffers reverses early in the war, “traitors,” “spies,” etc., are words which one may hear, and they will be applied ungenerously, indiscriminately, and invariably wrongly. Any talk of this sort should be sternly repressed; it is due to a craven desire to blame others for their own cowardice, which some men, curs and runaways themselves, are base enough to indulge in. This will certainly not help them to be brave on future occasions, whilst it serves to disintegrate a force. It will be found that on those men who are practised frequently in going up to the enemy’s pickets before dawn, and retiring gradually, there is not, even in a severe retreat, the same bad moral effect which there is on unpractised men.

A very important point to impress on your men is the following. No horseman should believe that he cannot escape capture, or that a bullet will hit him. Let it be clearly understood by all that, as the saying goes, “A horseman and a heavy shower of rain can get through anything.” Snap-shots fired by men in haste, or when excited, never do hit any one who is mounted and moving, especially if the firer is being “peppered” himself. A very good reason this for arranging for covering fire, if only by one rifle, when riding up to ground likely to be held by the enemy’s pickets. Another point to be remembered by scouts is that when they get into the dead ground, which is almost always to be found in front of a hill, they should always change both their pace and direction, and arrive at the top of the hill both sooner and at a different point from where they might be reasonably expected to arrive. Again, scouts in their advance should invariably look out for an alternative line of retreat, especially if they cross an obstacle such as a brook, ditch, or strong fence. They should not expect to see the enemy’s picket or videttes if they deliberately dismount in view and look for them. But if they ride back over a hill, disappear, and then creep back at another point, they are pretty sure to see some heads coming up.

In all the arrangements to be made for sending out scouts, never neglect the value of darkness for getting near the enemy’s lines, or through their line of pickets. What can be done with ease then, is impossible in daytime for the cleverest scout in the world, and it is foolish and unfair to scouts to ask them to do this; in fact, it is seldom asked for except by officers unacquainted with their business. All who have attempted to shoot big game, even in a fair moonlight, are aware how uncertain their aim is then. Consequently, if a scout stumbles on a sentry or picket at night, it is twenty chances to one that he gets off without a bullet in him. This fact it is well to remember when posting your own pickets, whom you should protect from being rushed by wires and ropes stretched a foot from the ground, some ten yards or so from their post, rather than trust to their rifle fire, for the “bullet is a fool.”

As will be seen from the above, pickets, Cossack posts, and observing parties should be in position, halted and invisible to the enemy before dawn, and should not, as a rule, be withdrawn till dusk covers them from the enemy’s observation. It seems puerile to urge these obviously common-sense precautions, and they would be omitted were it not that experience shows that they are most studiously neglected by our regular and irregular troops till bitter experience teaches their necessity.59

Sniping by nervous sentries, which will always take place the first few nights on which untrained or unseasoned troops are, or think they are, in contact with the enemy (note the Dogger Bank episode with Rozhestvenski’s fleet), must, and can be, at once firmly put a stop to. To do so, give orders that the C.O., adjutant, and regimental sergeant-major of the corps, in whose section of outposts it occurs, are at once to go and spend a couple of hours in the outposts, and then on their return to report whether “all is quiet in the outpost line.”

Young men, especially, are apt to get “rattled” when “on sentry go,” and to imagine small bushes and so on are the enemy’s scouts. Even fireflies are known to have been mistaken for the enemy’s lanterns and subjected to a heavy fire. When the fire had ceased, and it became evident that they were fireflies and not the enemy with lanterns, the commander of the picket was much annoyed at receiving an order to “Push in now and kill the remainder with the bayonet.” Sentries had far better rouse the rest of the group quietly in case of the enemy really being on the move towards their picket, and then all may fire a volley at “point blank” range only.

It is frequently desirable to impress the enemy with a mistaken estimate of your strength. This might be done by sending a detachment out some hours before dawn towards your base, then before it is light they turn round and march in to your bivouac in full daylight and in sight of the enemy as reinforcements.

There are obviously many plans by which an enemy can be deceived as to the strength of your force, if you can work behind cover, by first showing a number of men in one place and then in another. It is well to remember that even if an enemy sees you acting with duplicity the effect is by no means a bad one, as next time he sees you moving in your real direction he may think the action is for his benefit, and covers a movement from an entirely different direction.

In the outposts a knowledge of strategy and battle tactics is most necessary, and every officer should try to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the terrain, geography, and strategical issues of the campaign, otherwise he may miss great chances, and his extracts from the information, which he will get first of all, may be valueless instead of being such as will bring him to the favourable notice of his superiors. Nor should his superiors forget the late Admiral Makarov’s opinion, that “a sub-lieutenant acting intelligently and sensibly was more useful to the state than a flag officer who was carrying out to the letter an order which he did not clearly understand.”

In regard to terrain, if, as is most probable, the map is on a very small scale, the general direction of the watershed is one of the best general helps in finding the way.

It is absolutely necessary for any cavalry scout moving at night to know enough of the stars to orient himself and to guess correctly the time. British troops serve in so many parts of the world that no special instructions can be given, but Orion is one of the constellations which may prove useful, and which is quite unmistakable.

To establish a system by which you “picket the enemy,” which may be defined as placing observers round him so that he can make no movement without your knowledge, is the acme of good work in the outpost line: it is almost a counsel of perfection. But there are two points which deserve consideration in this connection: the first is that the mounted men whom you employ for this purpose must know, or have time to learn, the country thoroughly; and the second is that, however thoroughly you may imagine that you have picketed the enemy, he will be able to move out of his environment at night, and if your safety is based on knowledge of his movements he will, as likely as not, upset your calculations. This deduction is drawn from facts. The Boers habitually picketed our garrison towns and columns, but our columns, taking the ordinary precautions of moving by night and off the main tracks or roads, constantly surprised and captured their laagers of waggons. The “desultory operations for two or three years in South Africa,” 1899–1902, contain no unusual circumstances, we are told, but one is tempted to consider whether the outpost system evolved out of their own consciousness by the Boers was not better than that so laboriously studied by us in former days at Sandhurst. Our system was almost entirely directed towards “security,” and largely neglected “information.” Theirs studied information of the enemy first, a desire for security being a secondary consideration.60

As regards a service of information, certainly an idea of using contact squadrons had long been known and considered by us. Had we not long ago read the fascinating account of CurÉly’s adventures in De Brack, and also the “Conduct of a Contact Squadron,” translated from the German? But it soon became evident in South Africa that it was not very easy to carry out; every native was of assistance to the Boers, and afraid to serve us, even if we understood their language and could interrogate them. In this respect the Russians in Manchuria were almost similarly handicapped. It will usually be the same in war; one side can go anywhere, the other finds every man’s hand against it. Under these circumstances, to lay down one law for both sides is obviously folly. Every report on the Peninsular War shows the extent to which the French were handicapped by the guerrillas, and how our troops were assisted.

De Brack and many other writers make it plain that whilst from 1805 up to, perhaps, 1812 information was easily gained by the French cavalry for Napoleon, later a complete change came over the scene, and the Cossacks, overrunning the country, picketed the French columns. Perhaps the natives were weary of French exactions, but in any case the result is said to have been that “the genius of the Emperor was paralysed by the activity of the Cossacks.”

We have at least four or five instances where one side’s light cavalry or guerrillas “paralysed the genius” of the other’s generals by gaining superiority in the outposts, or, rather, anywhere outside their opponent’s outposts: (a) in 1812, 1813, 1814; (b) in the Peninsular War; (c) in the early part of the American Civil War; (d) in the South African War; and (e) in the Manchurian War.

With these examples before us it must become a serious factor in taking thought for a campaign, how far the cavalry will be able to effect this. Our training must be such as to enable us to play this part, of picketing the enemy, if possible; certainly we should do so in a friendly country.61 We know it is usually only done by the side which has a knowledge of the country; but may not the almost universal knowledge of map-reading in the cavalry and a good supply of maps obviate this? But let us remember above all things that nothing will be done in war which has not by constant practice become a second nature in peace. Let us then practise not only our officers, but our men, in picketing every large body of troops which train within fifty miles of us.

Often C.O.’s, shortsightedly we think, do not welcome the attention of cavalry thus picketing them; but even if this is the case, it may still be practised by our cavalry, but in a way which does not draw attention to the fact—the training will be none the worse, and (though perhaps hardly in this sense) the “offensive spirit” must be second nature to us.62

The instruction of cavalry in outpost work is difficult, because in the first place many parts of the duty make great demands on the instructor’s imagination, powers of explanation, and what we may call ability for stage management.

In teaching recruits, it is far better, instead of saying “You will imagine the enemy are in that direction,” to say, “Those red flags carried by horsemen, or those men in the white caps are the enemy.” Farther, the parties carrying the red flags should, in order to show that they are enemies, take some action, such as to come within about 800 to 600 yards, and shoot with blank at the parties of recruits, retiring when the latter return the fire, etc., etc. Beginning from this point the recruit may be asked by the instructor how they would suggest that the duties of a vedette, or, better, “look-out man”63 should be carried out, and he will then gradually impart to them the accepted mode of outpost duty, which is, after all is said and done, only common sense. For it is certain that, under active service conditions, men learn very quickly by their own mother-wit in real dangers and difficulties what precautions are necessary. These services are consequently ill taught by theoretical instruction in the barrack-room, and well taught if the work is done from the start in the open, and, for choice, in unknown ground and with a represented enemy. The ground also must be changed constantly, and this, certainly in the United Kingdom, is difficult, and makes considerable demands on horse-flesh and on the instructor’s time. But it is the one thing for which horse-flesh must not be grudged, even though the work is thankless from the point of view of immediate reward or recognition, for it is work which presents more difficulties in regard to inspection than any other; consequently, a careful instructor gets little or no credit for his work till war begins. It is only then that the immense difference between the cavalry or infantry, who are well grounded and thoroughly honest in their outpost work and those who are not so, comes to light in so-called “regrettable incidents.”

A cunning enemy will soon discriminate between those who do their outpost work well and those who do it carelessly, and will attack the latter. It may be of interest to state that a very close union soon grows up between regiments of cavalry and infantry in a column, where there is a mutual recognition of honest work in the outposts, whilst there is a wholesome detestation for slack regiments. A most important point is to train men in the duty of night outposts, whilst the subordinate leaders should have it dinned into their minds that there is always a definite point beyond which no one is to retire. It has been very truly said that sentries always think of retiring on groups, groups on pickets, pickets on supports, and supports on reserves, with the result that the enemy is in camp before you know where you are.

The training of regiments in the duties of outpost work cannot be carried out really satisfactorily and thoroughly unless the regiment goes into camp for a few days. Otherwise, many of the real difficulties, such as the cooking and supplies of food, the off-saddling, watering, reliefs of sentries and pickets, lighting of fires, arrangements for men to get a good sleep, are never grasped.