“Fundamental principles of action against different arms must be laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular case will not be required. This is needed because the utmost possible independence of leaders down to the squadron commander is desirable. It must not degenerate into selfish wilfulness.”—Von Bernardi.

That modern horse artillery coupled with cavalry and machine guns has almost unlimited opportunities can hardly be gainsaid. Only a madman or an absolute ignoramus would willingly dispense with horse artillery. But can it be said that, without an organization and training in peace-time, which has afforded full opportunity of practising every situation which we can meet, we shall get full co-operation in war?

Arms brought together almost for the first time on the battlefield cannot have mutual confidence in one another. Yet how much depends on a thorough understanding and good feeling between the cavalry leader and his commander of horse artillery. If the battery commander cannot from constant practice and usage actually foretell nine times out of ten what the cavalry brigadier will order at a certain stage of the attack, or if the officer commanding horse artillery of a cavalry division does not know by intuition his divisional general’s views, farewell to any idea of valuable combination between the two arms.

Heretofore this brotherhood of arms has not existed, nor has our organization aimed at effecting it.

Langlois in Lessons from Two Recent Wars, p. 140, puts this very tersely:

Cavalry has need of the support of the other arms in strategical exploration.

And again:

The English took no steps in peace to create and strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them. I cannot insist too much on this point, and we (the French) must profit by the lesson.

A large number of horse artillery officers never have opportunities of working with cavalry. Our horse artillery batteries are too often quartered where such cannot be obtained. But even at places like Aldershot and the Curragh little can be done in this direction, the ground is too cramped and too well known, and there was always the necessity of a good classification at the practice camp haunting the mind of the battery commander, and making him grudge every moment not spent in the direction of attaining that most important item.

Unfortunately it is hard to find concrete examples of cavalry and horse artillery action. For good horse artillery and cavalry, trained to work in conjunction, on modern ideas, have never yet been seen on any battlefield in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1870? No. In South Africa? No. In Manchuria? A thousand times no. We have to go back to the days of Frederick and Napoleon.

In all cases where the army is on the defensive a great and potent factor is in the energy of the attack, or, as one might put it, in carrying through the whole according to prearrangement and “at one run,” so that the gun and machine-gun fire is directed at that particular portion of the defence which can offer most opposition, and do most damage to the attack.

Let us take an instance of a cavalry attack on dismounted men holding an isolated kopje. Starting from 1200 yards’ distance, and suddenly appearing over a ridge, one squadron of the attacking cavalry riding en fourrageur, supported by another squadron echeloned on the first squadron’s flank, will probably reach the dead ground, which exists in the front of nearly every kopje, when within some 400 yards of the enemy’s firing line; then their leader should give the order “Right turn,” or “Left turn” (never “Right wheel” or “Left wheel” of troops, which would obviously cause them to afford a good mark), and gallop to one flank or the other. He should of course choose the weakest flank. (It may assist him in his decision if he remembers that, in a force rapidly taking up a position on a hill, the greater number of rifles will go to the right side, as they approach it, because there the hill will cover all but a small portion of their body and head as they shoot; but on the left side, unless left-handed, half the body will be shown.) See Diagram VIII.

Arrived at the flank, whilst the artillery and machine guns of the attack shell that end of the ridge to be attacked from the moment the cavalry leader makes his right or left turn, he halts and dismounts his men (that is, if the ground is unsuitable for mounted action), and sweeps the hill from end to end; the artillery, etc., now firing one hundred yards in front of his line of men. His other squadron should, meanwhile, “go for” the led horses. What time is at the defender’s disposal if this attack is made suddenly? Frederick the Great used to say: “Rapidity is an element of particular importance in the tactical offensive; therefore the sharper attacks are, the fewer men they will cost.”

Picture yourself on the ridge, where ten minutes before the enemy’s cavalry have been reported as moving apparently away from or parallel to the defence. Your men have resumed their avocations; if they have been there some time, some will be cooking, others sleeping. Suddenly some unusually alert individual shouts out, “Hallo! the enemy are galloping straight at us.” Men scramble to the sangars, or are waked up and hustled to their loopholes. They will not be ready to fire under a minute; this will bring the enemy’s cavalry at a gallop over six hundred yards nearer. For two or three hundred yards the attackers will be exposed to magazine fire, but they are certainly not an easy mark, and few would fall, even on a rifle range. But at this moment during the twenty or thirty seconds which elapse before most of them will be in dead ground, a perfect inferno of shell and, still worse, machine-gun fire bursts on the ridge. Many men will now slightly shift their position in order to get more cover and wait for the enemy to come straight on, nearer, where they can see him. But the attack does not come on; instead, it has slipped away to a flank, and the men’s next thought will be for their led horses and so on. They are already beat.

This is no fancy picture of artillery and machine-gun support, but a method which was utilized a score of times in the latter part of the operations of 1899–1902 in South Africa by both cavalry and mounted colonials. It is one which can be made, where the artillery and machine guns are in cool, skilled hands, with comparative safety, but it is not one which the average cavalryman would care to make, supported by rifle fire, unless the latter can be brought up to six hundred or seven hundred yards’ distance, where they can distinguish friend from foe.

Whilst by the above we attempt to show that horse artillery is a most valuable accessory to cavalry in the attack, we believe it is even more efficacious in retreat. An artillery officer sent in advance of the rearguard can select various positions from which horse artillery, practically covered from view, can put a few shells into the mass of the enemy’s troops, as they pass some defile; or it may engage the hostile artillery in order to draw fire off the retreating cavalry, if the former exposes itself unduly. Meantime another section or battery is sent on, thus the action is taken up successively. In every case the ground should be selected so that it is (i.) possible to act in combination with the cavalry, and (ii.) withdraw without the enemy seeing the movement. Nor must it be forgotten that the enemy may engage in the “parallel pursuit,” consequently the wider the front shown by the force covering the retreat the better.

Thus it may happen that, following the rule that in a retreat the most mobile troops should be farthest out to the flanks, a cross fire may be brought by two sections on the enemy’s pursuit. The drill regulations of German cavalry, 1909, impress the point

... that, should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate the retreat of the other arms. It is in just such cases that they must assume a restless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of pursuing troops will produce the best results.

In regard to the many other occasions on which horse artillery can assist cavalry they say:

The horse artillery will often by its fire cause the foe to disclose his strength and thus help reconnaissance. In union with maxims it enables the opposition of the enemy in occupied positions and defiles to be overcome, and thus spares the cavalry a dismounted attack.

Horse artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry to hem in at long range the enemy’s marching columns, to cause these to partially deploy through flank fire to change the direction of their march.

Horse artillery is the one thing that prevents an enemy sitting still and thus preventing the cavalry factor of mobility asserting itself.