FIRST PART

It is related that its owner tried as an experiment to find out what was the smallest amount on which a horse could work. When he had reduced the animal to one straw per diem, the experiment ceased, as the horse died.

The reader, constantly bearing in mind the above anecdote (since, if great generals have overlooked in the past the moral of the tale, there is no reason why others should not do so in future), may proceed to the subject of this chapter, but not without the recurrent thought, that, however dashing the conception of the use of cavalry in a campaign, this one point must be foremost. What will the cavalry horses live on? Horses cannot live on nothing. Few survive if put for a prolonged period on ½-grain rations and no hay or grazing, if such is followed by work.

How far motor vehicles carrying supplies have changed the aspect of affairs in regard to this question is at present a moot point. Undoubtedly the effect of the domination of the air by man has materially affected the question of obtaining information.

The principle, “that an army should place in its front the whole of its available cavalry forces from the very beginning of a campaign,” to some extent arises from the desirability of an undisturbed concentration for one’s own army, and also the advantage of checking that of the enemy.

Next in order will be the desire of the commander-in-chief of the army to have definite information of the enemy’s movements whilst at the same time his own movements are covered. This will enable him to direct the movements of his army, whilst still at a distance from the enemy’s advanced guards, and effect concentration for battle neither too soon nor too late (since both of these contingencies entail grave inconveniences), but at the right moment.

But when it comes to practical politics, it is plain, and must be regarded as a principle, that a cavalry brigade, division or corps cannot be relied upon to perform efficiently the duties of policeman and detective at one and the same time. The duty of the latter would carry the former away from his beat.

The French cavalry in 1870, though they possessed what Ardant du Picq describes as the true “Casse cou”47 readiness to charge (and by the bye, that is a portion of the cavalry spirit), almost entirely lacked skilled direction by the higher leaders. This fault was no doubt due, in some degree, to the three arms training each in separate water-tight compartments, and not on a large and comprehensive scale in peace, precisely as Langlois says of us in reference to our army’s work in South Africa: “The English took no steps in peace to create and strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them.”

Direction by the higher leaders will always be lacking, where those leaders, in peace time, are unable to divorce themselves from the surroundings and prejudices of their own particular arm, whatever it may be, and to enter whole-heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit of the Napoleonic maxim (No. 47): “Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without each other.”

Be that as it may, after the 1870–71 war the French cavalry had a moving spirit in General Galliffet, and he was well supported by some of the cleverest French military writers. They dissected French and German cavalry action in 1870–71 (and that of cavalry in other wars), laying bare the mistakes and failures of the cavalry of both armies. They saw what was wanted, higher direction and co-ordination of the work of cavalry, so that the two functions of cavalry, information and security (prior to its rÔle on the battlefield), might be realized to their full extent. Their deduction from the campaigns of the Napoleonic period was, that that great leader and organizer had discerned the impossibility of co-ordinating these duties; that in his earlier campaigns there were two great units of war, the cavalry of army corps and a corps of reserve cavalry;48 the latter was composed of numerous light cavalry, acting about a day in front of the columns of the main body. Again, that in 1812, corresponding with the formation of groups of armies, the corps of cavalry was created to act independently, in advance of the general movement of the armies, making a third great unit. They arrived at the conclusion that war brings into play three great units, each of which requires its special cavalry.

1. In front of armies under the generalissimo an independent cavalry, in one or more bodies, to insure liberty of offensive action to the generalissimo.

2. In each army a division of cavalry to ensure to it the liberty of defensive action by giving time to concentrate and take up favourable positions.

3. In each army corps a regiment or half-regiment to ensure tranquillity and freedom from surprise.

Nor did they fail to bring to notice that Napoleon’s system was to find a cavalry leader, and let him organize his cavalry to help the plan of campaign, and not to waste his cavalry in a sort of insurance policy.

The essence of cavalry is offence, “offensive rÉsolue, offensive quand mÊme offensive À outrance, qui fut le plus souvent la seule rÈgle de tactique,” not defence and shepherding infantry divisions;49 this latter work does not demand the most highly trained cavalry.

By these steps gradually the principle, which is clearly stated in our F.S. Regulations, was arrived at, viz.:

The main force of cavalry will usually be organized in one or more cavalry divisions, and retained as the instrument of strategical reconnaissance under the immediate orders of the commander-in-chief.—Part II., British F.S.R., 1909, p. 25.

At the present date the French, German, and Austrian organization is practically identical in this respect. All recognize that “we must fight to reconnoitre, and fight to screen.”50

The rÔle of cavalry, as defined at p. 182 of the French Service de la Cavalerie, 1909, is as follows:

1. The Cavalry of Exploration (answering to our own independent cavalry), the personal agent of the generalissimo, is sent where he wishes, in quest of the news he desires. This news the leader of this cavalry must send in good time; his independence is limited to the means he employs to get news. The cavalry of exploration may also be sent on special missions against the columns or convoys of the enemy, and ought, whilst observing its instructions and carrying out its important rÔle, to seize any opportunity of destroying the enemy’s cavalry. Cavalry is the arm, above all, of surprise, and consequently may often obtain the greatest results by a sudden attack on the wings or rear of the adversary.

2. The Cavalry of the Army Corps (answering to our protective cavalry) and the divisional cavalry find out and inform their commander what is happening in the zone allotted to them.

They must keep off the enemy’s cavalry, guard the columns against surprise, cover their deployment, and seek every opportunity of intervening with effect in the combat.

3. The Divisional Cavalry may, in the combat, be the only troops on whom the divisional general can depend for safety from surprise: their commander must, accordingly, not only seek opportunities to use the bulk of his troops opportunely in the combat, but also give information and guard the division against surprise on its flanks and rear.

What use, then, does the generalissimo make of his independent cavalry? He sends it forward to tear the veil from his adversary’s armies; whilst thus engaged it may, in fact almost certainly will, meet the enemy’s independent cavalry similarly employed, when, with a view to carrying out its orders, it will probably be compelled to fight—to fight for information.

Let us suppose it successful and the squadrons of the enemy’s independent cavalry dispersed, unable to face their adversary. Our independent cavalry push on to the enemy and meet the screen of cavalry, the service of security which covers his army. This again they must tear aside, and lay bare the heads of the enemy’s infantry columns. Even then their mission is not complete; they must direct their energies against the flanks of the enemy’s columns and demoralize them. It is plain, then, that on the successful action of the independent cavalry great issues may depend.

With regard to the movement of these forces, whenever cavalry are moving in the direction of an enemy (whether they are the independent cavalry or the protective cavalry), it is obvious that they will endeavour to pass quickly through ground which is for any reason unfavourable to them and advantageous to the enemy for attack, whilst they will dwell in positions which present obvious advantages to them. The result is, that from large forces of cavalry down to the smallest unit there is a tendency to move forward in bounds.

The protective cavalry will further be influenced by the desire to forestall the enemy in gaining positions for the infantry columns following them, and in taking up for the night a line of outposts on some natural obstacle, which will give them some security whilst they are halted.

It is quite a debatable question whether the evolution of cavalry into three classes as at present is not largely due to the arming of cavalry with a good rifle, and to rendering them consequently able to protect themselves, and able to turn out small parties of the enemy who hold defiles, railway stations, etc., against them. The new German Cavalry Regulations, para. 391, state: “Thus cavalry, owing to its great adaptability, is capable of independent action in practically every eventuality of the battlefield.” In any case horse artillery, machine guns, and the rifle have added enormously to the defensive power of cavalry; when, therefore, the protective cavalry are thrown back on the infantry, by the enterprise of the enemy’s independent squadrons, the latter may lightly, and without warning, find themselves attacking infantry in position, by mistake for dismounted cavalry, and consequently suffer very severely. Not only that, but the mixed detachments of all arms likely to be met with at this juncture, possess a power and length of resistance, which our cavalry may perhaps successfully simulate, and thus hold back and delay the advance of the enemy’s cavalry.

SECOND PART

“A writer upon strategy and tactics ought to treat his subjects as national strategy and tactics; for only such teaching can be of real service to his country.”—Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 143.

Instead of labouring the point as to the rÔle of cavalry under these circumstances, perhaps one may be permitted to recall to the reader’s mind that, unless we go back to Napoleonic precedent, there are no actual experiences in modern times of the effect to be obtained by using cavalry in the manner prescribed at present. The whole is pure theory, but we can say from our own experience that the protective cavalry may fail if they attempt to be strong everywhere on the old “pepper-box” system.

The drives in South Africa, in which we were strong nowhere and weak everywhere, proved, as indeed was expected, that a strong and determined enemy can always break through the long weak line unless the latter follows the line of some serious obstacle.

It is also a matter of easy demonstration and universal agreement that the cavalry which dominates in the first great cavalry struggle has already gained an enormous advantage for its side.

What is the logical outcome? It is, that unless (1) our cavalry force is redundant, or (2) there are difficulties in feeding our independent cavalry, or (3) the enemy’s cavalry is very weak, or (4) our cavalry comprises squadrons, which we cannot, from reasons of want of training or armament, oppose to the enemy’s cavalry, we shall see every available squadron taken from the protective cavalry and handed over to the independent cavalry. Intelligence comes before security.51 Meanwhile the protective rÔle will be carried out by divisional mounted troops, cyclists, and infantry detachments (see sec. 92, F.S.R.).

Ceteris paribus, the first advantage will be with the side which can put the greatest number of squadrons into the corps of independent cavalry, and, in view of this, a fact plainly spoken of and counted upon in all strategical conceptions of future campaigns on the Continent, the preponderance of well-trained squadrons is clearly the object to be aimed at.

Generally speaking, the ideas which are promulgated as to the rÔle for the weaker cavalry, by which a cavalry, worse trained, worse armed, and proportionately less in numbers will compensate for these shortcomings by superior tactics, are purely Utopian. This “fond thing vainly invented” may interest or beguile the mind of the unfortunate tax-payer, but does not belong to the regions of plain military common sense, which, in its preparation for war, has no place for chance work, and must have no weak link in the chain.

Let those with whom the wish is master of the thought read General von Bernardi’s most recent statement in Cavalry in Peace and War, p. 356, where speaking of the German force of trained cavalry, enormous as it already is, he says:

I have repeatedly stated that I consider our cavalry to be of itself too weak. The more I study modern warfare, the more convinced do I feel that the value of the arm, when handled according to modern ideas, has increased.

Let us remember that cavalry cannot be improvised, and that even squadrons of the best class of mounted rifles, formed entirely of natural horsemen and fairly good shots, are very heavily penalized, apart from their armament and training, unless they have professional brigade, regimental, and squadron leaders, and know how to work with horse artillery. They cannot be expected to face trained and properly organized cavalry brigades on anything like equal terms. At the same time, if reliance is placed on numbers, one is at once faced (i.) by the forage supply and its carriage, (ii.) by the enormous item of expense in remounting, already referred to in the chapter on “The horse.”

The outcome is that one arrives at this plain and simple proposition.52 Only the most highly trained cavalry soldier is worth a horse and food for his horse when a nation is engaged against an enemy of modern continental type. This point is undoubtedly grasped on the Continent, where the proposal to use cyclists as a reserve of riflemen with cavalry is generally accepted.

Every one, practically, can now ride and look after a bicycle, and given passable roads, cyclists can travel farther and faster than horses, and carry more days’ reserve rations. In war in a civilized and well-roaded country they cannot fail to be a most useful adjunct to cavalry: (1) as a reserve of rifles, (2) as despatch-riders, (3) as an accessory in outpost and reconnoitring duty.

It is not the scheme of this book to enter into the question of training other than regular cavalry, nor to enter into any discussion as to the precise value in war of hastily raised mounted troops; since in doing so one might say something which had the appearance of discouraging the volunteer; whereas there is no question that the spirit, which animated for instance those yeomanry and colonial troops who came out early in the operations in South Africa, 1899–1902, is a great national and imperial asset.

At the same time it is right to make it perfectly plain that the non-professional cavalry soldier has an exceedingly hard task before him, and one requiring very exceptional qualities such as are not usually found in those who do not possess the initial asset of being constantly in the saddle and out in the open. Even these must find it extremely difficult to train to anything but a very mediocre standard, unless they possess (i.) sufficient leisure to prepare themselves amidst the surroundings of regular troops, and (ii.) the large amount of patriotism and right feeling which induces a man voluntarily to place himself under and endure the irksome restraints of discipline.53 Ten times more does this apply to the officer; purely amateur officers are poison (the virus being in direct proportion to their rank), and entirely out of place in war. To imagine that it is patriotism to wait till war begins, and then aspire to lead others, is an idea that should be crushed once for all. It is not patriotism, it is murder.

Few amateurs would aspire to conduct the operations in a London hospital, and the operations of war are, in their way, no less intricate, and perhaps entail more loss of life and limb when conducted by the unskilled. The amateur who comes out to the war, with the courage of ignorance, and finds how helpless he is, how useless are his best efforts, how complete the disillusionment of those under him as to his power to keep or get them out of trouble, let alone hurt the enemy, will, if he survives, have learnt a very useful and painful lesson, but no nation can afford to give lessons on the field of battle.

The cavalry of an army are a part of a machine, in which reliance must be placed, and in which every nut or screw of doubtful metal is a danger. Cherfils rightly says: “Three-quarters of the strategy of war lies in the method of employment of the cavalry.” Why? Because of the supreme importance to the generalissimo of Liberty of Manoeuvre. But this liberty can only be gained by a thrusting forward of masses of cavalry, which must go on and get the greatest share of the terrain intervening between the two armies. As an instance of this, in the Ulm Campaign on the 4th October Napoleon in his orders to Murat makes it plain that he wants him to push aside the enemy’s patrols and make plenty of prisoners; he tells him to take three divisions of cavalry and do so, leaving one division only to watch his left flank, that on which Napoleon was making his main infantry advance. He left the initiative to Murat.

Does any one imagine that these cavalry masses could, solely by means of musketry fire, drive the enemy out of the positions which they will take up, on finding a stronger force of cavalry in front of them? We believe certain people do reckon on this, though it has never occurred in actual combat, and (in the opinion of those who have witnessed attempts at it) will not do so in the immediate future. Across the open plains the weaker, worse armed and equipped cavalry will keep falling back rapidly to the next defensive line. If this is a river or range of hills, experience shows that the stronger cavalry will soon cross it and move forward.

Too much emphasis can hardly be laid on the value of success in the first great cavalry combat, in “initial ascendancy.”54 Let those who doubt this inquire of any who have been on stricken fields and have learnt the great lessons only taught by defeat.

But these lessons are not to be confused with the tendency to say “A” nation beat “B” nation, therefore “A” nation’s methods are right, and forthwith slavishly follow their methods, even carrying this so far as to follow the fashion of some pelisse or pickelhaube as well.

Occasionally the Boers read us a lesson, and, as Kipling says, “a jolly good lesson too”; at once there is a great rush to imitate their methods, by those impressed by them, as though these were applicable to every possible case. To take one case—they are certainly not suitable for mounted troops who wish to advance. In that case we want the resolute offensive, with a thorough understanding in all ranks that they must be prepared to fight for information and liberty of manoeuvre. Now spectators of any large fight in South Africa cannot claim to have seen this resolute offensive on the part of the Boers. They never pushed us back, partly, no doubt, from difficulties of command, but chiefly from defective armament and training, and consequent inability to bring the combat to a hand-to-hand fight. On the other hand, they fell back fighting whenever we attacked resolutely. Exactly what a generalissimo could not permit his cavalry to do. Why? Because he, by doing so, surrenders his share of liberty of manoeuvre, of which there is a limited amount between the armies, to his adversary.

Our conclusion is that the trained cavalry masses which have a personal weapon and good support from horse artillery will push back any improvised or worse-armed cavalry with the utmost rapidity across all open ground, and that the moral ascendancy thus established will render the enemy’s defeat in rough ground an easy task.