That portion of the present State of Mississippi and that part of Alabama lying between the Mississippi and Chattahoochee rivers, and bounded on the south by the thirty-first parallel of latitude and on the north by a line drawn due east from the mouth of the Yazoo river, was organized into the Mississippi Territory in pursuance of an act of Congress, approved April 7, 1798. Afterwards, in 1804, the country lying south of the State of Tennessee and north of the original Mississippi Territory was added; and in 1812 that portion of the present States of Alabama and Mississippi lying south of the thirty-first degree of latitude was annexed. Mississippi became a state in 1817 and Alabama was then separated from it. This historic statement at the outset will explain why several matters pertaining to suffrage in municipalities not now in the state, are hereafter mentioned.

The organic law of the Territory enacted that the people thereof should "be entitled to and enjoy all and singular the rights, privileges and advantages granted to the people of the territory of the United States, northwest of the river Ohio in and by the ordinance of the thirteenth day of July in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, in as full and ample a manner as the same are possessed and enjoyed by the people of the said last mentioned Territory," and thus in our investigation of the subject we are led to examine the ordinance referred to, and which we find in the statutes entitled, "An ordinance for the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio," to see if it contains any provision relative to suffrage. We find it, and the words of this celebrated ordinance are as follows. "So soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants, of full age, in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time and place, to elect representatives from their counties or townships, to represent them in the general assembly; provided that for every five hundred free male inhabitants, there shall be one representative, and so on progressively with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase, until the number of representatives shall amount to twenty-five; after which the number, and proportion of representatives shall be regulated by the legislature; Provided that no person be eligible or qualified to act as a representative, unless he shall have been a citizen of the United States three years, and be a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years, and in either case, shall likewise hold in his own right, in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within the same; Provided also, that a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the states, and being resident in the district, or the like freehold, and two years residence in the district shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative."

With all due respect to the fathers, nothing in statutory language could be more awkward; the reading of it, however, will serve to remind us that the modern legislator cannot claim originality for his habitual use of the word "provided" as introductory to amendments, and with which to string his ideas together.

The last of the three provisos is necessarily a limitation on the "free male inhabitants, of full age," mentioned at the beginning of the section, since there is no provision in the ordinance for the election of any officers save representatives to the general assembly; all other officers in the scheme of government here provided were appointive. An analysis of the laws of 1787, which evidently must be basis of suffrage in a number of states as well as Mississippi, shows that to entitle a person to vote under our first suffrage law he must have been (1) Free, (2) Male, (3) of full age, presumably 21 years, (4) citizen of the United States and resident of the Territory or a resident for two years in the Territory and (5) Freeholder of fifty acres of land in the district.

While this organic law was in force, of course the territorial legislation was confined, so far as concerns our subject, to municipal suffrage, but I have thought reference thereto not without the scope of this paper, since such legislation, perhaps more than any other, being untrammeled as a general rule by unyielding constitutional restrictions, throws light upon the spirit, temper and thoughts of the people on the subject at the time of the enactment.

Before the amendment of the organic law herein next mentioned I find but one piece of such legislation; by an act approved in 1803 the "freeholders, landholders and householders" of the city of Natchez were authorized by a majority vote to elect municipal officers, and the act further reads that "for the better understanding of the meaning of the term householder, it is hereby declared that any person who shall be in the occupancy of a room, or rooms, separate and apart to himself, shall be deemed a householder, and entitled to vote at the annual and other meetings of the said city: Provided that such occupancy shall have existed six months next preceding such election." Were this explanatory enactment omitted it would seem that to entitle a person to vote he should have been a freeholder and a landholder and a householder, all three conjointly, but it is apparent that the legislature did not so intend, since it provided by the explanation that if he were a householder alone, he would have been entitled to vote. The explanation, while directed at a definition of a householder, settles by indirection the only doubt arising from the text sought to be explained, but unfortunately the proviso brought with it a greater difficulty than the explanation had removed, and that was whether other householders than those directed to be so deemed, were required to have been such for six months before offering to vote. The phraseology suggests legislative amendments and indicates a difference of opinion as to who should be intrusted to vote; but all seem to have agreed upon permanent residence anchorage to the soil as an essential qualification, the difference being as to rigidity and extent to which it should be carried. The most notable thing about this, the first legislative act of Mississippi conferring the right of suffrage, is that no distinction is made because of age, color, or sex. Whether this were by accident or design, and whether other persons than adult white males really voted thereunder, does not appear.

By an Act of Congress, approved Jan. 9th, 1808, the organic law so far as it related to Mississippi Territory, was amended so as to provide that every free white male person in the Mississippi Territory, above the age of 21 years, having been a citizen of the United States, and resident in the said territory one year next preceding an election of representatives, and who has a legal or equitable title to a tract of land by virtue of any act of Congress, or who may become the purchaser of any tract of land from the United States of the quantity of fifty acres, or who may hold in his own right a town lot of the value of one hundred dollars within the said territory, shall be entitled to vote for representatives to the general assembly of said territory.

The change just made in the suffrage laws of the territory can best be appreciated by the use of parallel columns.

This act of Congress, passed in 1808, first introduced the color line.

In 1811 four municipalities were organized by acts of the territorial legislature, Woodville, Port Gibson, Huntsville and St. Stevens; the latter two are now in Alabama. In the first one named the right to vote was conferred on the freeholders and householders within the town, and in the second the right was conferred on the landowners, freeholders and householders within said town, but in each case the grant was followed by a separate section of the act in these words: "All free male inhabitants, subject to taxation, who shall be in the occupancy of a room or rooms separate and apart to himself, shall be deemed a householder, within the meaning of this act, and shall be entitled to vote at the town elections." Clearly this section was intended to enlarge the scope of those who were authorized to vote and it could not rightfully be construed as narrowing it.

This being true, the freeholder and householders, other than those mentioned in the quoted section, were empowered to vote without reference to sex and all without regard to age or color. In the charter of Huntsville the suffrage was conferred on "all free white male inhabitants of said town above the age of twenty one years," and in the case of St. Stevens the right to vote was given to "the citizens of said town," but this was amended in 1815 so as to limit the right to "landholders, freeholders and householders."

In January, 1814, the territorial legislature treated the town of Mobile as an existing municipality, the section of the country surrounding it, acquired from West Florida, was added to the territory in 1812, and restricted suffrage to the "landholders, freeholders and householders within the town," and followed this with a section in the very language of the one quoted above from the charters of Woodville and Port Gibson, but this was amended in 1816 so as to limit suffrage as written in the following section, viz: "No person shall vote at any election for president and commissioners, assessor and collector for the said town, unless he be twenty-one years of age, and shall have been a freeholder in said town, or the tenant of a house or separate roof at least six months previous to any election and shall have paid a county, territorial or corporation tax, nor unless he be a citizen of the United States, or shall have resided within that part of West Florida now in the possession of the United States, at the time of the change of government in that province." The next legislation pertinent was the act of Congress, approved April 25th, 1814, amending the organic law of the territory. This provided "Each and every free white male person, being a citizen of the United States, who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall also have resided one year in said territory previous to any general election, and be at the time of any such election a resident thereof, shall be entitled to vote for members of the house of representatives, and a delegate to Congress for the territory aforesaid." The only effect of this act was to dispense with the property qualification previously prescribed and to substitute in its place the payment of a county or territorial tax. In 1815 an election was authorized for the purpose of locating the county seat of Jackson County by act providing simply that such persons as were authorized to vote for representatives might cast their ballots thereat, but in 1816 a like act for Adams County was passed providing "every free male white person, being a citizen of the county of Adams who shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one years and resided in the said county twelve months previous to the said election, shall be admitted to vote thereat and none other." This brings us to the end of territorial legislation and from it we learn that ownership of or anchorage to the soil was a prominent conception of the times; all else as a necessary qualification for voting, even age, color and sex, seems to have been subordinate, or accidental or exceptional. There was certainly no prejudice then in the good old days because of color; the color idea came from without, from Congress.

UNDER THE FIRST CONSTITUTION.

The constitution under which Mississippi came into the Union as a state was adopted on the 15th August, 1817, and by the first section of Article three thereof, the following provision is made: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this state one year, next preceding an election, and the last six months within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote and shall be enrolled in the militia thereof except exempted by law from military service; or having the aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and residence, shall have paid a state or county tax, shall be deemed a qualified elector; but no elector shall be entitled to vote, except in the county, city or town (entitled to separate representation) in which he may reside at the time of election."

An analysis of this section shows that in order for a person to be a qualified state and county voter thereunder he must have been,

(1) Free,
(2) White,
(3) Male,
(4) Twenty-one years of age or upward,
(5) A citizen of the United States,
(6) A resident of the state for at least one year,
(7) A resident of the county, city or town at least six months,
(8) Enrolled in the militia unless exempt therefrom, or he
must have had the "aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and
residence" and have paid a state or county tax.

What our forefathers meant by alternate qualifications is hard at this day to find out. A literal construction would have authorized a free white male person having the qualifications of citizenship and residence to have voted irrespective of age, but there is no record of infants having exercised the right, nor is there in our books a judicial interpretation of the constitutional provision. It is notable, too, in respect to this section of the fundamental law that crimes did not disfranchise under the terms of the constitution itself and that the murderer, the thief et id omne genus are relegated to the legislature so far as voting was concerned by the 5th section of the sixth article which provides, "laws shall be made to exclude from office, and from suffrage, those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crimes or misdemeanors." We find, however, that the legislature in 1822 undertook to perform its duty in this regard by providing that "no person shall vote at any election whatever in this state who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury, and the final judgment or sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crime or misdemeanor, unless the person so convicted shall receive a full pardon for such offense."

On the subject of pardons and its effect on the right of suffrage it may be stated here that the doctrine in this state until the adoption of the constitution of 1890 was in favor of the restoration of the right to vote; the constitution just named having made provision for a legislative restoration of the right to vote leaves the matter now an open question as concerns executive pardons.

It is worthy of note that by legislative act, approved February 10th, 1821, elections in this state were held viva voce, but this act remained in force only until June 13th, 1822, the date of the act repealing it, since which time they have been by ballot; since 1869 the constitutions have required them to be so. In truth there is no record of an election held viva voce under the law of 1821, though the election held on the 1st Monday of August, 1821, under Sec. 6, Art. 3 of the first constitution must have been so held. Of course the laws passed under the constitution of 1817 on the subject of state and county elections conformed their provisions, defining who should have the right of franchise to the terms fundamental law on the subject and, as we have seen, the legislature excluded criminals from the right to vote, but the lawmakers of that day by no means confined themselves to the constitutional qualifications when they came to prescribe who should be entitled to vote in municipal elections; for instance, we see that "citizens of the town" were made voters in Shieldsborough (Now Bay St. Louis) in 1818, in Greenville (Jefferson county) in 1819, and in Holmesville in 1820; and "citizens of one month's residence" were allowed to vote on the subject of the location of the Madison County court house by act approved 1829, and "free white male citizens of the town above the age of twenty-one years" were made voters by act incorporating Pearlington, passed in 1822, and in the same year "free citizens resident in the town" were made voters in Columbus. In 1821 "free white male inhabitants, resident of the town, twenty-one years of age and upwards" were authorized to vote in Monticello, and in 1831 in Warrenton; and in 1824 such residents of the county were authorized to vote on the location of the county seat of Warren County.

By act of 1821 "every free white male person, twenty-one years old or upwards, an inhabitant of the town for six months and who had been assessed and paid a town tax within a year," were allowed to vote in municipal election at Port Gibson, and so too were the owners of land in that town, if the land had been assessed and taxes paid on it, whether the owner resided in the corporate limits or elsewhere; and I am advised the law of that town so remained until after the war; the idea has been adopted by several municipalities of the state in later days. By the early charters of Vicksburg, approved 1825, and Rodney, approved 1828, suffrage was conferred on "landholders, householders, freeholders and such as shall have paid a town tax, being inhabitants and residents for three months in the town."

In 1830 "freeholders and householders" were made voters in Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis) and Raymond, and in 1825 "freeholders and householders," whether resident or not, were given the right to vote in the town of Washington, and in 1831 the right to elect a constable was given "actual citizens of Vicksburg, over twenty-one years of age," and in 1830 the "freeholders and householders" of the town of Washington were required to be males in order to vote after that date, and the only qualification of voters in the town of Liberty, according to the act of 1819, were that they should be "free white males, resident citizens of the town," and this is true under the first charter of Warrenton, approved in 1820. In all these instances the constitution of 1817 was not regarded as establishing a rule to be applied to municipal suffrage. By several acts passed while this constitution was operative the constitutional rule was, however, adopted in defining who should vote in municipal elections. Thus in 1821, in respect to the town of Washington the language is "persons entitled to vote for members of the general assembly," and the same language is used in the charter of Clinton, passed in 1830, and to the same language is added the words, "and who shall have resided in the town three months" in the charters of Meadville and Brandon passed in 1830 and 1831 respectively. In the amendment to the charter of Liberty, passed in 1828, suffrage is limited to "inhabitants of the town under the restrictions prescribed by the constitution of the state," and the same language substantially is to be found in the act incorporating Gallatin approved in 1829.

"The qualified electors" of Jackson county voted on the subject of the location of their court house under the provisions of an act passed in December, 1830. The "free white male inhabitants, residing within the town entitled to vote for members of the general assembly" were made the electors of the city of Jackson by the first act of incorporation passed in 1823, and by legislative grant approved in 1830 incorporating Manchester (now Yazoo City) the "inhabitants entitled to vote according to the constitution and laws of the state" were given the right to participate in municipal elections, and the same language is used in the charter of Athens, approved in the same year.

An analysis of all this will show that under the constitution of 1817 "color" was not a qualification or a disqualification in eight of the towns of the state legislated upon, viz: Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), Greenville (Jefferson County), Holmesville, Columbus, Vicksburg, Rodney, Raymond and Washington. Of course slaves were not freeholders or citizens, but free men of color were frequently freeholders and before the Dred Scott decision were regarded by many as citizens. It will be noted, too, that sex was not made a qualification or a disqualification for voting in seven of the towns whose charters were passed or amended during the period in which the first state constitution was operative, viz: those, except Washington, just enumerated. There is no evidence, however, that women ever voted in any of these towns, and all that can be learned on the subject leads to the belief that they not only never did but the right seems never to have been claimed for or by them. Free persons of color, however, as I learn, did claim the right in some of these towns and it was generally conceded by those of the white men whose interest was on the side of the claimant's political preference, but was generally denied by the opposition, and it is doubtful if a negro ever voted in any of them until after the war. On the whole it is not so clear but that the failure to exclude women and free persons of color in the early legislation on the subject of voting in municipalities was but the result of legislative awkwardness and a want of exactness in statutory exclusion and inclusion.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1832.

The exact period in Mississippi legal history extends from 1832 to 1869, and embraces the period during which the constitution adopted in 1832 remained in force. This, the second state constitution, was adopted October 26, 1832; its provisions on the subject of suffrage are as follows: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election, and the last four months within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector." * * * * * "Every person shall be disqualified from holding an office or place of honor or profit under the authority of this state, who shall be convicted of having given or offered any bribe to procure his election. Laws shall be made to exclude from office and from suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." * * The second of the sections above quoted was acted upon by the law-making power March 2, 1833, and the following piece of legislation then became operative:

"No person shall vote at any election whatever in this state, who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury and the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, unless the person so convicted shall have received a full pardon for such offense."

It will be noted that the conviction must have been by the verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court both conjunctively. What was the effect if the criminal plead guilty does not seem to have been considered. Of course the general legislation of the state on the subject of state and county elections, conformed to the constitution, and we are again led to examine the acts incorporating municipalities within the period, and providing who should be voters therein, in order to obtain light on the thought of the times relative to our subject.

A great many cities and towns were incorporated during this period; in a large majority of charters it was simply provided that the "qualified voters" should exercise the right of suffrage, thus recognizing the constitutional rule. In many instances additional qualifications to those named in the constitution were imposed, thus, residence for a specified time within the corporate limits was required in 1833 for Columbus, Amsterdam, Manchester (now Yazoo City), Jackson, Sartartia, Liberty, Woodville, and in 1836 for Plymouth. But by no means did the legislatures of the period conceive that they were bound to require all the constitutional qualifications as essential for municipal suffrage. A favorite idea was to authorize "every free white male inhabitant of the town" who had resided therein for a specified time, to vote in municipal elections. This was the case in Raymond, by act passed in 1833; Salem, Starkville and Sharon, 1837; Cotton Gin Port, Farmington and Philadelphia, 1838; Cooksville and Emory in 1839; Hernando, 1840; Gainesville, 1846; Shongole and Camargo, 1850; Sarepta, Hermans, Eastport and Benela, 1852; Columbus and Aberdeen, 1854 (in the latter, however, non-resident freeholders were allowed to vote by the act); Bonner, 1860; Wesson, Beauregard, Hickory and Hazlehurst, 1865; Lodi, Batesville and Sardis, 1866; Crystal Springs and Winona, 1867. In addition to the ordinary qualifications the payment of a town tax was required for Grand Gulf, 1833; Vicksburg, 1833 and 1839; Rodney, 1844; Yazoo City, 1846; Natchez, 1865. During this period, too, a few municipal charters pursued the language which was so frequently used at an earlier day—"freeholders, landowners and householders." This was the case in the acts for Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), 1838 and 1850; Pass Christian and Biloxi, 1838, and Rodney, 1844. In a few instances every adult resident person was allowed to vote, without reference to race, color, sex or anything else if the laws were administered as they are written. This was the case in Macon, 1836; Paulding, 1837, and Raleigh, 1838, and in Brandon, by act of 1833, resident persons were not excluded by law because of infancy. For liberality of sentiment on the subject of universal suffrage, Brandon's charter of 1833 is without an equal, but whether this liberality of expression proceeded from a liberality of feeling or from ignorance in the forms of expression doth not appear. Registration of voters was first required in this state by act passed in 1839, and it applied to municipal elections at Vicksburg only; in 1861 a similar provision was enacted for Canton, and in 1865 for Natchez. Of late years a municipal registration is quite common, as we shall see hereafter.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1869

By the second section of article seventh, constitution of 1869, the following qualifications of voters were prescribed; in order to be a voter a person must have been,

1. Male,
2. Inhabitant of the state; idiots, insane persons and Indians
not taxed excepted,
3. Citizen of the United States, or naturalized,
4. Twenty-one years old or upwards,
5. Resident of the state six months and in county one month,
6. Duly registered.

And by section two, article twelfth thereof, the legislature was required to pass laws to exclude from suffrage "those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crime or misdemeanor."

The public laws of the state, on the subject of state and county elections, of course conformed to the constitutional provisions; the section thereof found in the code of 1871 on the subject of criminals excluded from the right to register and vote "persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or infamous crime;" that of 1880 denied suffrage to persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, grand larceny or any felony.

Under this constitution (1869) of course the negroes were voters. Much has been said of late years to the effect that the grant of the right to vote on the negroes by the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States was a mistake; perhaps the adoption of that amendment was an error in statecraft; certainly it proved a party mistake to the Republican party. But every thoughtful and candid man will doubt the proposition that the grant of suffrage to the negro was a mistake when viewed from the standpoint of the negro's welfare. Would his rights as a citizen have been as soon respected had he remained deprived of political power? Of course this is a question that can never be settled. We can only speculate upon it.

The provisions of this constitution, like that of the preceding ones, were construed by the legislature as applying only to state and county elections; hence we find that in municipal matters the provisions of the acts of the legislature passed under it defining who should vote in city, town and village elections are variant. It is sufficient to extract from the numerous municipal charters any governing principle. It is apparent, however, that the tendency was, perhaps from convenience of expression, to adopt the constitutional rule, simply adding that the voter should be a resident of the municipality. In a few instances persons having "permanent business" in the town were permitted to vote at municipal elections even though their citizenship and residence were elsewhere.

This was the case in Bolton, 1871; Quitman, 1880; Laurel, 1886; Scooba, 1886; and non-resident freeholders of the town were permitted to vote in Senatobia in 1882 and Tunica, 1888.

In a majority of cases the provision was that the voter should be a qualified elector of the state, or state and county, and that he should have resided within the municipal limits a specified time. This time varied greatly, from ten days, the shortest, to two years. Of the various acts of legislation on this subject I find thirteen in which the length of residence was required to be only ten days; one in which the time is fifteen days; eight fixing twenty days; forty-five prescribing one month; nine fixing two months; fifteen naming three months; nine prescribing four months; one fixing five months; twenty-one naming six months; three fixing one year, and four prescribing two years. The municipalities in which one year's residence was required are Pass Christian (a seashore resort), the purpose evidently being to exclude summer visitors, 1882; Rosedale, 1890; and Durant, 1890. Those in which two years' residence was prescribed are Eureka Springs, 1880; Seven Pines, 1882; Pass Christian, 1890; and Jackson, 1890. The principal purpose in each, except the summer resort, was to exclude the transient negro voter.

During this period it was not unusual for the legislature to provide that there should be a separate registration of municipal voters. This was the case with Natchez, 1870; Columbus, 1884; Senatobia, 1884; Macon, 1884; Yazoo City, 1884; Ellisville, 1884; Bolton, 1886; Bay St. Louis, 1886; Brooksville, 1886; Fulton, 1886; Pass Christian, 1886; Scooba, 1886; Biloxi, 1888; Terry, 1888; Potts Camp, 1888; Tunica, 1888; Water Valley, 1888; Rosedale, 1890; Clarksdale, 1890; Jackson, 1890; Durant, 1890 Indianola, 1890.

The prepayment of a municipal tax was in several instances made a requisite qualification: This was the case as to a street tax in Brookhaven, 1884; Greenville, 1884 and 1886; Vicksburg, 1886; Vaiden, 1886; and as to street tax and poll tax, Jackson, 1890; Durant, 1890.

In but one instance during the period, 1869 to 1890, do we find the "householders and freeholders" made voters, the case of Greenwood Springs, 1871, though, as we have seen, this was a favorite idea in the early days of the state. In 1882 the spirit of liberality was given full scope by the act providing that "all persons residing within the town limits" should have the right to vote in Columbia; again we will make the suggestion of a skeptic and express doubt whether the girl babies exercised the right.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1890.

The provisions of the new constitution of Mississippi on the subject of suffrage are as follows:

ARTICLE 12.

FRANCHISE.

Section 240. All elections by the people shall be by ballot.

Section 241. Every male inhabitant of this state, except idiots, insane persons, and Indians not taxed, who is a citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old and upwards, who has resided in this state two years, and one year in the election district, or in the incorporated city or town in which he offers to vote, and who is duly registered as provided in this article, and who has never been convicted of bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, or bigamy, and who has paid, on or before the first of February of the year in which he shall offer to vote, all taxes which may have been legally required of him, and which he has had an opportunity of paying according to law for the two preceding years, and who shall produce to the officers holding the election satisfactory evidence that he has paid said taxes, is declared to be a qualified elector; but any minister of the gospel in charge of an organized church shall be entitled to vote after six months' residence in the election district, if otherwise qualified.

Section 244. On and after the first day of January, A. D. 1892, every elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications, be able to read any section of the constitution of this state; or he shall be able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. A new registration shall be made before the next ensuing election after January the first, A. D. 1892.

The qualifications at the present time, therefore, of an elector are:

1. Male,
2. Inhabitant of the state, excluding idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed,
3. Citizen of the United States,
4. Twenty-one years old or upwards,
5. Resident of the state for two years,
6. Resident for one year in the election district, or city or town, except ministers of the gospel who may vote on six months' residence,
7. Duly registered,
8. Never convicted of bribery and other enumerated crimes,
9. Has paid two years' taxes,
10. Able to read any section of the constitution of the state; or able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof.

It will be noted that these constitutional qualifications, unlike the provisions of former fundamental laws, are by the section above quoted made to apply to electors in municipal elections; the legislature, however, is authorized to prescribe additional qualifications. And it has prescribed as such additional qualifications, by the section on that subject in the chapter of the new Code on Municipalities, that the voter must have resided within the corporate limits for one year next before he offers to register and he must not be in default for taxes due the municipality for the two preceding years.

Much has been said about this constitution, both for and against it; especially has the "understanding clause," the tenth qualification as enumerated above, been severely criticised. Thus we find in the American Law Review of January-February, 1892, the following: "It is quite apparent that this clause was never intended to be carried out faithfully. It will be so administered as to exclude the negro voters, hardly one of whom will be eligible under it, and so as not to exclude the ignorant white voter. The last qualification, the ability to give a reasonable interpretation of any clause of the constitution of the state, would exclude nearly all the lawyers and judges in the state. In this manner the people of Mississippi endeavor to solve the appalling problem of carrying on civil government with a mass of voters easily corrupted and so stolid and ignorant as not to be able to understand the first principles of their political institutions."

And we find in the Atlantic Monthly, December, 1892, the following statement in reference to it:

"That it may, and probably will, be put into operation so as to preclude the negro from voting, while his equally ignorant white neighbor is allowed the privilege, appears from the fact that the inability to read does not constitute an absolute basis of exclusion; for the inspectors may allow a person to vote who can understand or give a reasonable interpretation of a section of the constitution when read to him. It is apparent that an inspector may very easily reject as unreasonable an interpretation from a colored man, and accept one no whit better from a white man. Such discrimination in practice would be very hard to discover."

And Mr. John F. Dillon, one of the most distinguished of American lawyers, in his address as President of the American Bar Association, at Saratoga, August, 1892, speaking of this section of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, says:

"It has been supposed that this clause was a concession made in the interest of illiterate whites; but whether this be so or not, a general and indiscriminate requirement that all voters shall be able to read and write is, in my judgment, not contrary to the fundamental principles of American government, but in accordance with the principles on which such government must securely rest, namely, the intelligence and virtue of the people."

I have heard attributed to a distinguished United States Senator, who would have been glad to have come to a different conclusion, that this constitution demonstrated that Anglo-Saxon ingenuity could accomplish anything; that the provisions of it on the subject of the suffrage was a practical repeal of the fifteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and yet the result was effected in such a way that its legality could not be successfully denied.

The truth is, without reference to the designs of its authors, that we have under it in the state, to all intents and purposes, an educational qualification pure and simple. More negroes, the American Law Review and the Atlantic Monthly to the contrary notwithstanding, have registered under the alternate or understanding clause than white men. Only 2,672 illiterate, both white and black, had up to 1893 registered under it. I have not seen the figures since. The negroes who have taken advantage of it exceed the white men who have done so in a majority of the counties of the state.

It seems that the illiterate white man shrinks from an application to be registered under the "understanding clause;" a refusal to advertise his incapacity, while the negroes as a rule have but little to lose; but another truth is that with scarcely an exception the negroes are thoroughly content with the constitution, and are satisfied to be measured for registration and voting by its standards. The writer, as a member of the convention which adopted the constitution, voted against the "understanding clause," but now that he has seen its practical workings he is prepared to say that the convention did the very best thing that it could have done under the circumstances surrounding it.

This "understanding clause" is not without a parallel in the constitutions of other states; as was pointed out by Senator George of this state in the United States Senate, it is no more difficult of honest administration than are the provisions of the constitutions of other states: for example, the constitution of Vermont of 1777 provided that an elector "should be of quiet, peaceable behavior," and the constitution of Connecticut requires at this day that the voter shall sustain "a good moral character," and numerous other like instances that might be mentioned.

The constitutional provision that a person shall not register as a voter within four months of an election is believed to be a wise measure; the ignorant, the indifferent and the sordid voter fails to register; political excitement never exists to any considerable extent so long before the election; there is no such thing as hiring men to register, for those who can be hired, cannot be trusted for so long a time to vote in the promised or expected way. It is believed that the provision is worthy of adoption everywhere.

The legislation of Mississippi under the constitution of 1890 conforms to that instrument.

By sections 3624 to 3640 of the code (1892) ample provision is made for appeals from adverse rulings of registration officers, and the humblest citizen of the land, the humblest negro, if you please, can invoke the courts of the country, even the Supreme Court, for protection in case he be improperly denied the right to register and vote, and he is also provided with ample remedy before the courts in every case where the right is improperly granted to others. These Code sections are as follows:

3624. Appeal by person denied registration.—Any person denied the right to register as a voter may appeal from the decision of the registrar to the Board of election commissioners by filing with the registrar, on the same day of such denial or within five days thereafter, a written application for appeal.

3625. Appeal by other than person denied.—Any elector of the county may likewise appeal from the decision of the registrar allowing any other person to be registered as a voter; but before the same can be heard the party appealing shall give notice to the person whose registration is appealed from, in writing, stating the grounds of the appeal; which notice shall be served by the sheriff or constable, as process in other courts is required to be served; and the officer may demand and receive for such service, from the person requesting the same the sum of one dollar.

3626. Appeal heard de novo.—All cases on appeals shall be heard by the boards of election commissioners de novo, and oral evidence may be heard by them; and they are authorized to administer oaths to witnesses before them; and they have the power to subpoena witnesses, and to compel their attendance; to send for persons and papers; to require the sheriff and constables to attend them and execute their process. The decisions of the commissioners in all cases shall be final as to questions of fact, but as to matters of law they may be revised by the circuit and supreme courts. The registrar shall obey the orders of the commissioners in directing a person to be registered, or a name to be stricken from the registration books.

3637. Appeal from the decision of the Commissioners.—Any elector aggrieved by the decision of the commissioners, shall have the right to file a bill of exceptions thereto, to be approved and signed by the commissioners, embodying the evidence in the case and the findings of the commissioners, within two days after the rendition of the decision, and may thereupon appeal to the circuit court upon the execution of a bond, with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the commissioners, in the sum of one hundred dollars, payable to the state, and conditioned to pay all costs in case the appeal shall not be successfully prosecuted; and in case the decision of the commissioners be affirmed, judgment shall be entered on the bond for all costs.

3638. Duty of Commissioners in case of appeal to Circuit Court.—It shall be the duty of the commissioners, in case of appeal from their decision, to return the bill of exceptions and the appeal bond into the circuit court of the county within five days after the filing of the same with them; and the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals.

3629. Proceedings in the Circuit Court.—Should the judgment of the circuit court be in favor of the right of an elector to be registered, the court shall so order, and shall, by its judgment, direct the registrar of the county forthwith to register him. Costs shall not, in any case, be adjudged the commissioners or the registrar.

3630. Costs; compensation, etc.—The election commissioners shall not award costs in proceedings before them; but the circuit and supreme courts shall allow costs, as in other cases. The sheriffs, when required to attend before the commissioners at their meetings, shall be paid two dollars a day, to be allowed by the board of supervisors.

Having now considered and presented the evolution of suffrage in this state and given by way of recital and incidentally at least, its present status, we come to consider the objects upon which the suffrage may be exercised, and this can be easily stated by the general averment that all legislative and executive officers are elected by the suffragists; the executive officers of the state are not elected necessarily by a plurality or a majority vote. We have a sort of an electoral scheme, which is created by the constitution in the following words:

Section 140.—The governor of the state shall be chosen in the following manner: On the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November of A. D. 1895, and on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in every fourth year thereafter, until the day shall be changed by law, an election shall be held in the several counties and districts created for the election of members of the house of representatives in this state, for governor, and the person receiving in any county or such legislative district the highest number of votes cast therein, for said office, shall be holden to have received as many votes as such county or district is entitled to members in the house of representatives which last named votes are hereby designated "electoral votes." In all cases where a representative is apportioned to two or more counties or districts, the electoral vote, based on such representative, shall be equally divided among such counties or districts. The returns of said election shall be certified by the election commissioners, or a majority of them, of the several counties, and transmitted, sealed, to the seat of government, directed to the secretary of state, and shall be by him safely kept and delivered to the speaker of the house of representatives at the next ensuing session of the legislature within one day after he shall have been elected. The speaker, shall on the next Tuesday after he shall have received said returns, open and publish them in the presence of the house of representatives, and said house shall ascertain and count the vote of each county and legislative district and decide any contest that may be made concerning the same, and said decision shall be made by a majority of the whole number of members of the house of representatives concurring therein, by a viva voce vote, which shall be recorded in its journal; Provided, In case the two highest candidates have an equal number of votes in any county or legislative district, the electoral vote of such county or legislative district shall be considered as equally divided between them. The person found to have received a majority of all the elective votes, and also a majority of the popular vote, shall be declared elected.

Section 141. If no person shall receive such majorities, then the house of representatives shall proceed to choose a governor from the two persons who shall have received the highest number of popular votes. The election shall be by viva voce, which shall be recorded in the journal, in such manner as to show for whom each member voted.

Section 142. In case of an election of governor or any state officer by the house of representatives, no member of that house shall be eligible to receive any appointment from the governor or other state officer so elected during the term for which he shall be elected.

Section 143. All other state officers shall be elected at the same time and in the same manner as provided for election of governor.

The legislature is prohibited from electing officers to a very great extent by the following section of the constitution:

Section 99. The legislature shall not elect any other than its own officers, state librarian and United States Senators; but this section shall not prohibit the legislature from appointing presidential electors.

All the judges of the state, except justices of the peace, are appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Mississippi was, it may be mentioned parenthetically, the first state to provide for an elective judiciary; this was done in her constitution of 1832; but she is now as far away from that mode of selection as she can well be, her present constitution providing for their appointment and her people generally, it is believed, are thoroughly satisfied with the present status of the matter. There are two instances in which the electors vote directly upon the subject of the enforcement of laws; and without an affirmative vote in their favor the statutes are not enforced. These are, first the Local Option law, by which the qualified electors of a county, if a majority vote against the sale, may prohibit the licensing of dram-shops in the county, and under which a large majority of the counties of the state have secured absolute statutory prohibition of the liquor traffic; and, second, the fence and stock law, by which is determined the question of whether the owners of live stock shall keep them confined, and thus allow of the production of crops on unenclosed lands. This resolves itself into a question of "fences" or "no fences," and it is left to a vote in the counties, or parts of counties can vote upon it. This question is left to "the resident freeholders and leaseholders for a term of three years or more" of the territory so voting. It will be noticed that neither sex nor age is mentioned, and in truth women and infants do actually vote in the state, on this interesting and to those involved, most serious question.

The Supreme Court of the state has settled beyond cavil that the statute is constitutional and valid. This "fence" or "no fence" election is possibly an exception to the general rule of the state that a plurality vote elects or carries. I say, possibly is an exception, because of ambiguity in the statute, construed as I think it may be seen by some minds, it will require two thirds of the vote cast to put the "no fence" law in force.

All elections in Mississippi since 1821 have been by ballot, and this is now the constitutional rule; we have here the Australian or secret ballot system very much as it is found in a number of states of the Union, and it accomplishes in its practical operation the primary objects of the system; first, the absolute prevention of bribery, for no man will bribe a voter if the only evidence of the delivery of the contracted-for vote be the word of the bribe taker, and, second, the prevention of intimidation of voters, which is practically impossible.

The absence from the voting place since the introduction of the system of the ticket broker and professional bummer is notable.

It was the intention of the writer when this article was begun to present his views on many of the questions suggested and germain to the general subject, but this paper has now grown so long that he will have to be content with a presentation of a mere historical narrative of matters pertaining to suffrage in this state. He consoles himself with the reflection that perhaps such a contribution may be more valuable to the true and earnest student of the subject than would be any discourse that he might write which in its nature was sought to be made philosophical, or which was merely speculative. If the facts are presented, if the history be made accessible, the student who is interested enough to read will draw the proper conclusions.