The name of Judge John J. Ormond is inseparable from the judicial history of Alabama. He was recognized on all hands as a jurist of superior ability. The mold of his mind was singularly judicial, and his career as a public servant shines through his jurisprudential service.

A native of England, Judge Ormond was brought by his father to America while yet an infant, his parents making their home first at Charlottesville, Va. Left an orphan in early youth, Judge Ormond’s future course was dependent on the kindness of others, but he was liberally provided for, and means were found for enabling the youth to obtain more than an ordinary education.

After his removal to Alabama, we find him first as a state senator, to which position he was chosen in the early part of his professional career. In 1837 he was chosen as one of the justices of the supreme bench. Here he found a most congenial orbit, for his tastes were aversive to the rough and tumble of political strife. In the seclusion of a law library among the musty tomes of legal lore, or a seat on the bench of the court, met the gratification of this giant jurist.

His studious habits served to impart a reservation of disposition, though he was free from coldness and was not wanting in the elements of companionship. His was the thoughtfulness of the student and the quietness of the scholar. A voracious reader, he reveled in the masterpieces of literature, the results of his close study of which showing themselves in the beauty and charm of his style, both of which found expression in his decision and opinions. Without apparent effort, his sentences have a limpid flow in well-balanced form, while the purity and elegance of his diction fascinates. The dignity of his diction is an inspiration, while his thought, like the sun, shines, by its own light.

For twelve years Judge Ormond occupied a seat on the supreme bench, an honor and an ornament. His decisions were the profoundest, though they were garbed in the striking simplicity of our tongue. His long retention on the bench is an evidence of the general confidence in his integrity of character. This fact becomes more pronounced when it is recalled that Judge Ormond was a whig in politics, yet such was the appreciation of his worth both as a man and as a jurist, that he failed not to command the esteem and votes of the dominant democratic party. By dint of merit alone he compelled not only its recognition but its appreciation. No one ever suspected Judge Ormond of taking an unfair advantage as a judicial officer or as a man. The sincerity of his political convictions were conceded, and all who knew him never thought of him as a partisan. With him political creed was one thing, and judicial scrupulosity another.

Writing of Judge Ormond’s death, a contemporary says: “He occupies a page in the Alabama law reports that will pass down to future times, and be cited as authority in the adjudication of human rights as long as the common law maintains a footing among civilized nations.” Though small and thin with a visage somewhat drawn, his bearing was characterized by a perpetual dignity which elicited the esteem of all.

There was a democratic simplicity in his intercourse with others which was perennially refreshing. An utter absence of self-consciousness marked his bearing, though he was universally recognized as one unsurpassed in his judgment of the law, as well as a ripe and finished scholar. So far from being ostentatious, Judge Ormond was disposed to shyness and taciturnity. His conversation was marked by the finished diction of which he was a complete master. Besides all this, he was self-contained and collected, never allowing himself to be betrayed into undue warmth of expression, no matter what the provocation was. He equalled the conception of the proverb, a soft answer turneth away wrath. The combination of qualities so rare, was the occasion of much comment among the lawyers of the time. His opinions did not escape challenge, nor did his position always go without criticism.

The character of the man as well as the clearness of his judicial judgment may be seen from a single extract from a decision written by himself in a celebrated case which came before the court during his incumbency of the supreme bench. In that learned decision he says: “We have been admonished by the plaintiff in error, that, notwithstanding the state is the party interested as defendant, on this record, the true interest of the people will be promoted by declaring the contract void. It required no admonition to impress us with the conviction that the high trust reposed in us by the people imperiously demanded of us to preserve pure the fountains of justice. Nor will we profess an insensibility which we do not feel to the approbation of the enlightened and virtuous; although all experience shows that such is not always the meed of upright conduct. Our station imposes on us the necessity of deciding the cases brought before us according to our opinion of the law; it is a duty which we cannot avoid. If left to our choice, it is not probable we would have selected this question for adjudication; and as, in our judgment, the law is for the state, such must be our decision, be the consequences to us what they may, and although the judgment may subject us to the imputation of the bias which the argument of the counsel supposes.”

This extract affords a fair index to the character of the man, while it equally furnishes a specimen of the lucidity of his expression. There was never the absence of dignity from his expression, no matter what the occasion. He was not without sensitiveness, but it was not the sensitiveness of inflammation. When necessary, he could wither with an overmastering diction, but it was always with the preservation of a dignity which could not fail of success. The last service rendered by Judge Ormond was that of his association with Messrs. Clay and Bagby in the codification of the statutes of the state of Alabama.