Roy Franklin Richardson

MENTAL SITUATION STIMULATING ANGER

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Professor Titchener (19) states concerning emotions in general three essential factors for their formation. First, a series of ideas shall be interrupted by a vivid feeling; second, the feeling shall mirror a situation or incident in the outside world; and third, the feeling shall be enriched by organic sensations created by the course of bodily adjustment to the situation. It has been well agreed from casual introspection that the stimulus to an emotion is a total mental situation or predicament. It is evidently necessary in the psychology of the emotions that each emotion should be studied in connection with its predetermining mental situation giving rise to it. Anger because of its slowness to develop, lends itself more readily to a study of the situation from which it arises, than some other emotions.

It is well known that there is little constancy in the outside situation, associated with the emotion of anger. What one will take as an insult, another will regard as a joke. With the same individual, what will at one time excite anger, will at another be scarcely noticed. We commonly say, referring to some incident, “There was nothing for him to be angry about,” and the statement may be correct if the outside situation is viewed as the stimulus to the emotion. With the insane and hysterical, an observer is often baffled by the apparently harmless idea that will excite anger. The fact is, the situation stimulating anger is a psychic one. We fail in viewing our emotional life in the same manner as we do in observing our sensations. Whatever the outside conditions, it is the psychic situation as only a partial reflection of outside conditions, that is of primary importance. A few instances of the current views of the situation exciting anger may be given. What may be called a genetic view is illustrated in McDougall’s (15) statement, “The condition of its (anger) excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts.” Dewey (6) in his conception of instincts has pointed out that we are not angry when we are fighting successfully. Only when the pugnacious instinct is impeded does emotion arise. An introspective view may be taken from Bain (2), “When we have suffered harm at the hands of another, it leaves a sting in the violation of the sanctity of our feelings. This pre-supposes a sentiment of self regarding pride, the presence of which gives rise to the best developed form of anger.” David Irons (12), who did some keen work in the analysis of the emotions, does not qualify his statement that anger appears only when we feel that we have been injured.

From the pathological side, FÉrÉ (7) and Magnan (11) have described slow accumulation of anger in paranoiacs, which seems to re-enforce the casual introspective view stated above. These insane persons first believe they are persecuted. They suspect all about them. Even their very best friends are trying to injure their business or reputation. Gradually reactionary impulses begin and they themselves become the persecutors and concern themselves with the business of revenge. They find gratification in every sort of angry outburst,—insult, abuse, threat, murderous attack, irony, witticism, etc.

The same view has been advanced by Steinmetz (18) in the observation of the behavior of primitive people. He holds that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises upon the experience of injury and its aim is to enhance self-feeling, which has been lowered by the injury suffered.

The next few pages will be devoted to an examination of the mental situations from which anger develops as found in the results of the introspections. About six hundred introspections from the various observers have been used for this study.

Feelings of Irritation. One of the characteristic mental situations from which anger arises is that connected with feelings of irritation. These feelings are described as unpleasant nervous tension with a tendency to motor activity. Awareness of the feeling may be present while attention is directed elsewhere. It may or may not be referred to any particular incident. C.—“It is a sort of diffused unpleasant consciousness that things in general are going wrong.”

Irritation in connection with pain or illness is a condition from which anger may develop. From this a trivial incident may give rise to anger. A note from E.’s records says, “I had a severe headache to-day and felt irritable. When X. would try to sympathize with me, the irritation would increase and I tended to be angry.” G, who has relatively few emotions of anger, introspected upon ten cases of anger, arising from a fore-period of irritation during a day’s illness. Subject I. states with reference to pain, “While the pain was on I felt as though I wanted to be angry at somebody or something, X. spoke to me and at once I was angry.” Feelings of irritation may increase, gradually, accompanying the increased intensity of pain. A. states, “Irritableness at the first beginning of the pain increased to intense anger at the moment the pain was most severe. There was a strong motor tension in the hands and face muscles with the impulse to look about, vaguely aware that I was trying to find something to refer the anger to.... A decrease of the pain was accompanied by a decrease of the anger to a feeling of irritation again.”

Feelings of irritation follow as a result of the thwarting of some desire or mental attitude and are consequently predetermined by the attitude of the moment. From this, anger develops for the most part, as a result of a series of stimuli, which have a cumulative effect. Each thwarting of the impulse intensifies the irritation until anger is developed. One or two failures may stimulate unpleasant feelings, which at the time are ignored; but with an increase of the number of stimuli, there is an accumulative effect in which the awareness of the previous failures becomes more intense than at the moment when they occurred. The following from B.’s observations will illustrate, “I was writing a letter to an important personage and was making special effort to write it neatly. I made an error and felt unpleasantly irritated. Still feeling quite unpleasant, I turned to look for my eraser and could not find it. I looked in several places. Each failure was followed by a sudden increase in intensity of unpleasant feelings.” Finally B. found himself using defamatory language prolifically, giving expression to a rather well developed case of anger. One is usually aware in anger of this type, that the emotion is the cumulative effect of a number of previous stimuli. It appears from the reports, that if the mental predisposition is intense enough, one or two failures may suffice to excite anger. In general the stronger the predisposition, the less number of failures is required before anger is fully developed.

Another characteristic of the feeling of irritation is its indefinite objective reference. It may not refer definitely to any object at first. The tendency is usually present to refer it to some object or person, regardless of the real cause of the feeling. E. states, “I felt I wanted to get angry at somebody or something and I did not care much what.” While it is common with all the persons studied, to be irritated and burst out angrily at objects, the tendency to transfer the anger from objects which may be the real objective cause to unoffending persons, is a matter in which there is a wide individual difference. C. when irritated by objects, finds a partial relief if he can lay the blame on some person and take an imaginary vent against him. He states, “I have been cross and grouchy all day; ‘felt out’ with everybody. Several times the association of X. and Y. came up with a little rising anger and an attitude that they were somehow to be blamed. I was aware that they were not to be blamed, but at times I would find myself ignoring this and taking pleasure in criticising them adversely.” This tendency to personify the source of anger is illustrated in another incident from C. He lost his umbrella. He looked for it in several places with an increased feeling of irritation; following a line of other associations, he imagined Z., a person whom he dislikes, walking off with it. He says, “All this was mildly pleasant. I was scarcely aware how improbable it was that Z. had taken it, till the act of introspecting on the emotion. I really wanted to believe that he had taken it.” The personal objective reference to somewhat suppressed feelings of irritation frequently facilitates the sudden development of the emotion. The tendency to refer the anger to some innocent person, ignoring for the moment the real facts and forgetting one’s sense of justice for the time being, is a matter in which there are marked individual differences in the subjects studied.

It is a common characteristic of the initial stage of anger, that although there is an awareness that the emotion is due to a series of irritating stimuli, the entire situation exciting the anger is ignored and the anger is referred to some person, frequently one recently associated in time. Thus objectified, anger seems to find a more ready expression. Anger is more successfully developed from a fore-period of irritation if the present predicament is in any way associated with a person or situation against which there is already an emotional disposition of dislike. A feeling of pleasurable satisfaction is often reported to follow the successful expression of anger after feelings of irritation.

Anger with a fore-period of irritation is common with all the subjects studied, but the manner in which the anger arises from these feelings is a matter of wide individual difference. They all get angry at objects when they act as hindrances. With B. and C., who live alone, this tendency is more marked. With all the persons studied, anger with a fore-period of irritation occurs more frequently against objects and situations than against persons. When persons are involved in anger of this type, they are usually those with whom there is close intimacy or with servants and children.

The sentiment of justice may facilitate the development of anger arising from feelings of irritation. Irritable feelings may more readily develop into anger if a situation is associated in which fairness and justice are violated, although the point of justice may be far removed from the actual cause of the irritation. Under the influence of irritation, there is frequently a little more sensitiveness to injustice if the idea of unfairness can facilitate in the objective reference to the emotion. The following instance will illustrate. A. was walking along the street at night in an irritable state of mind in connection with a series of incidents just past. In this state of mind he came to a place where a new house was being built and the builders had left an accumulation of dirt on the sidewalk. When it rained, the water would collect making the walk bad. He had previously noted that they had made enough progress with the building that it was unnecessary to leave the dirt on the walk. “On this occasion,” he states, “I now become quite indignant, and suddenly found myself in imagination telephoning the street commissioner in an angry attitude and tone of voice, telling him about the dirt and where the house was located, and ending with the sentence, ‘It is an outrage to tax payers.’” But this did not fully satisfy his resentment. He imagined himself the next day walking up to the overseer of the construction gang and assuming a rather indignant air, telling him among other things that the way he had left the walk was an outrage to the public. On the other hand, the sense of justice may be ignored for the time if it does not aid expression. In some extreme cases the subject may assume a make-believe attitude and trump up reasons to suit his own ends regardless of the facts. The tendency is strong to give some justifiable expression to the present mental predicament. In such cases reason serves the purpose of feeling. All other mental processes may become subservient to the rising indignation till the point of anger is reached, but with the expression of anger, the illusion of fairness usually disappears. The behavior that seemed so commendable while angry may excite shame or regret after the emotion has been vented.

Negative Self-feeling. A second characteristic mental situation from which anger arises, is that connected with negative self-feeling; the self-feeling has been lowered and anger follows. In the observation of all the observers, it appears at times in the initial stage of anger. Whatever outside situation occasions lowered self-feeling may indirectly give rise to anger. And just as there are feelings of irritation, which do not pass into anger, so there are negative self-feelings which are not followed by anger. In the description of this feeling, it appears in marked contrast to the anger that follows. As to time, it may last but a moment before anger arises. In other instances the feeling of humiliation may be rather prolonged or repeated before anger arises. The feeling is described as unpleasant, as a lack of motor tension, a feeling like shrinking up, an impulse to get away, a confused inco-ordinated state of mind. A rather wide vocabulary referring to self and the feeling side of experience is used by the subjects to designate this feeling in colloquial language. Examples of such phrases from the observations are as follows:—“I felt sat on,” “Was humiliated,” “Felt inefficient,” “Felt imposed upon,” “Felt stepped on,” “A feeling of self depreciation,” “Felt offended,” “A feeling of subjection,” “Felt as if he thought I were no good,” “Felt worried,” “Felt as if he were hitting at me,” “Felt that what he said reflected on my ability,” “Disappointed in myself,” “Felt ashamed,” “My feelings were wounded,” “Felt that that was insult added to injury,” “Felt slighted,” “Feeling of abasement,” “I was embarrassed,” “Felt as if I had been caught with the goods on.”

Unlike the feeling of irritation, negative self-feeling has a more definite reference to the outside situation and for the most part refers to persons. It will be noted that the origin of anger from the mental situation of lowered self-feeling, and that from a condition of irritable feelings, comes about by quite different processes. The latter is reached by an increased complexity till the anger point is suddenly attained. In the former case the anger comes about as a rather sudden reaction from a state of consciousness that is in marked contrast to anger. Notes from the reports will illustrate this characteristic. B. had made some errors at a public meeting. X. in a speech jokingly called attention to the errors. At first B. was confused and felt a little worried and embarrassed. In a few moments he found himself mildly angry at X. and was planning to retaliate. B. states that his anger did not refer to the fact that he had made the error, but to X. who had humiliated him by calling public attention to it. F. went to get a check cashed and was refused. He states, “I felt belittled and became indignant as I walked away.... With the appearance of the imagery of another person getting his check cashed the day before, I became quite angry.” He adds that he was not angry because of the failure to get the check cashed, but because of the discrimination against himself. The anger referred to the cashier. The idea that he was acting according to rules and not personally responsible, appeared, but was ignored by a recall of the imagery of the other person getting his check cashed.

Negative self-feeling appears rather suddenly without any definite conscious fore-period of its own. It is a state of consciousness predetermined by pleasurable feelings of self regard. In taking the report of C.’s emotions one evening, there was found to be an unusual number. He had been usually observing from one to four emotions each day, with occasionally a day having no experiences of anger. On this particular day he had observed and taken notes on twelve rather strongly developed cases of anger. An inquiry into the cause showed nothing except that he had felt extra well all day and had turned off more than the usual amount of work. This was a disturbing situation in connection with evidence that had previously been collected from G. and D. These two persons have few emotions of anger and have gone over a week with no experience of anger. On December 4th, D. took observations on four cases of anger. On inquiry it was found that he had been ill and not slept the night before. G. on the two days that he was ill introspected on ten cases of anger. An examination of G.’s and D.’s reports indicate a fore-period of irritable feelings or a lack of immediate conscious fore-period. In none of these cases was there any indication of lowered self-feeling in the fore-period of the emotion, while with each of the introspections of C. on the day he felt extra well and reported on the unusual number of twelve cases, there was a fore-period of negative self-feeling. With A. on the days when he feels best, there is an increase in the number of cases of anger with an initial lowered self-feeling. Such evidences as we have, indicate that anger with a fore-period of negative self-feeling occurs most readily when the sentiment of self-regard is active,—on the days when the person is well pleased with himself. It is true that the play of this sentiment only appears in consciousness, when it has been interfered with or enhanced. It makes up an essential mental predisposition in connection with the situation stimulating anger. The following note from C.’s observations will illustrate. C. met X. and spoke to him; X. paid no attention. C. states, “For a moment I felt humiliated.... I said to myself, ‘He does not know my importance.’” C. then became quite angry thinking cutting remarks about X. and ending the emotion by finding an excuse for X.’s not seeing him.

Any remark, suggestion, chance association, it may be, attitude of another or incident, which in any way lowers the sentiment of self-respect may stimulate anger. In this regard there is a wide individual difference with the persons studied and with the same person at different times. A trivial incident may lower the play of the self-regarding sentiment and consequently give rise to anger, while at other times a direct thrust at one’s honor may be ignored. The personality of the offender, his social and intellectual standing, his general demeanor and attitude, play an important part in the entire emotional situation, but at times personality is ignored and a “chip is carried on the shoulder” for the chance passer-by.

It appears in the results that the anger of the person who is not in authority against the one who is, or the anger of the man lower down against the one higher up, usually has a fore-period of negative self-feeling. A mental disposition toward the one in power in addition to the sentiment of self-regard, is a predetermining mental situation in exciting lowered self-feeling and consequently anger. The most intense instances of anger that C., D. and E. experienced were against persons in power. D.—“I was aware they were in authority and were taking advantage of it to run us out. I felt a little humiliated but not angry as I left the room. It occurred to me they were rather small in usurping the place.” A little later D. became quite angry and carried on in imagination a rather extensive verbal combat with the usurpers in which he came out victor. E. states in his observation, “If X. had been an ordinary man, I would not have given the occasion a second thought. But being very high up ... I was inclined to take less off of him than those I consider as not knowing better.”

On the other hand a certain mental disposition toward the person lower down in connection with the self-regarding sentiment may be a precondition of anger. Too great familiarity from an inferior may momentarily lower the self-regarding sentiment to his level and in consequence excite anger; we do not resent a slap on the back by one whom we admire or recognize as our superior, but we do from our inferior. The same act from the one may heighten our self-respect while from the other it is lowered. D. reports a case of anger when he was in a crowd. A boy kept purposely stepping on his heels. He states, “I was not hurt but he acted too familiar for a boy under the circumstances. I took his attitude as a personal matter and felt a little humiliated.” A. reporting a case of anger stimulated by a person whom he holds in low esteem, says, “It was not what X. did so much, but it was his familiar confidential attitude before others that embarrassed me.”

It appears frequently in the observations that it is not what is done or said, so much as it is the attitude of the person, that is so offensive. A too positive and aggressive action, a too great display of wisdom, a too familiar or condescending demeanor, may be the essential element in the stimulus to anger. The following phrases are noted by the different subjects as being an important part of the situation stimulating anger of the type now being treated. C.—“I resented his too dignified air more than anything else.” G.—“What angered me most was his condescending attitude as if he knew it all.” I.—“He acted too wise and I was aware he was trying to lord it over us. That was the most offensive part.” H.—“He sat and stared at me as if he thought I didn’t know what I was talking about.” F.—“He took on a wise air implying that he had already passed through the stage in which I now was.” E.—“It was not his statement so much as it was his rather spiteful attitude that angered me.” A.—“It was not what he said. It was his haughty air and little condescending laugh in dismissing the matter that rang in my ears.”

While in the presence of a situation that lowers self-feeling, even though persons may not be connected with the situation, it is a common characteristic to refer the anger to some person. The bounds of justice may be, for the moment, overstepped. The dim awareness with some, that the person is not to be blamed, is ignored for the time, while the tendency is strongest in consciousness to give expression to the emotion. The individual differences here are quite marked. G. apparently has developed a habit of referring his anger to a principle, ignoring the personality. In many of his observations, persons were connected with a situation, but were neglected in his attention to the principle violated. A business man had told him an untruth causing him difficulty. G. states, “I was not angry at the man. That was his way of doing business.” In the course of his emotional experience, his anger became rather intense, referring to the business ethics practiced. The degree in which the sense of justice is ignored under the influence of anger of this type is also a matter of wide individual difference.

In the observations collected, anger at one’s self appears quite frequently. There have been no cases found, in which anger at one’s self develops purely from a fore-period of irritation. The subject takes the matter to himself and feels a little humiliated and degraded and may react against his own personality in the same manner that he would against another. Two observers, B. and G., quite frequently get angry at themselves. A. reports that this sort of anger rarely occurs with him. G. observes the following case. After he had been repeatedly humiliated by his own failure, he says, “I felt as if I were so inefficient. I said to myself, ‘If I had a man working for me and he should do work in that manner I would discharge him.’” G. then continued to talk to himself like another person in rather severe condemnatory language. B. was reading a book. He could not understand the author’s demonstration. He had made several trials at it. He states, “I felt as if I must be stupid, somehow; there was a slight feeling of worry and dejection. The idea of my stupidity was followed by anger at myself for being so stupid. I clinched my fists and threw my arms in angry demonstration, feeling as if I would like to pummel myself. I went over the demonstration again with an attitude of carefulness and finally concluded that it was the author who was hazy instead of myself. I slammed the book down on the table and broke forth angrily, ‘You, X., are the one who is stupid, you don’t make it clear.’ This anger at the author was rather pleasant in quality. I felt a sort of triumph over him.”

Another situation quite common in the origin of anger with a fore-period of lowered self-feeling, is its appearance at times with greater intensity after the actual outside stimulus is passed. One becomes more angry in recalling afterward what was said, than he was at the time of the offense. This belated origin of anger appears in the observations of all the subjects studied. It may be noted that anger with a fore-period of irritation does not appear in this retarded manner. In the recall of an incident in imagination, anger may become quite intense; while it may be at the time of the incident, there was no awareness of any tendency to anger. Mild anger at the time of the initial stimulus may become intensified in its recall. In such cases there was evidently some element lacking in the mental situation stimulating anger. An offensive statement in the heat of an irascible discussion may be ignored. A rather severe thrust may seem proper, but when recalled in connection with another mental situation, the emotional content may be entirely changed. X. in the course of an argument with E. implied, “You never will know as much about the subject under discussion as Y.” “At the time I noted his statement and was aware that it was a thrust at myself, but I had no feeling about the matter then. I considered that I was producing the better argument, and his personal thrust I was aware was an admission on his part that he knew I was. To-day I recalled his statement and felt degraded and angry.” Then C. proceeded to plan a series of cutting remarks that he would like to tell X. In some instances the presence of a too active aggressive attitude at the time of the stimulus seems to predispose against a too easy lowering of self-esteem, and consequently anger with a fore-period of negative self-feeling does not appear. But let one momentarily lose faith in his point of view or fail in words to express it, and he becomes more sensitive to the thrusts of his opponent’s argument.

Another factor partly accounts for the greater emotional intensity of the recalled incident. The conventional control of emotions during social contact may be relaxed during the memory recall. The same ethical standard is not required for one’s private thinking as in actual contact with others. In this respect there is rather wide individual difference with the subjects studied. Though in general with persons of rather intense emotions, there is a marked difference in the ethical standard they practice, when the incident is present to consciousness, and the standard used when the anger occurs from the imaged situation; with all persons studied at times during their most intense anger emotions, the imaginative reaction is far more crude and unethical, and consequently the imaged anger may be more intense. A third factor may be involved here. A personal thrust may be partly ignored at the time without lowered dignity because it is given with a smile or a friendly attitude, but when recalled later, the friendliness may be neglected and consequently anger is more intense. A fourth condition that partly accounts for more intense anger in the imaged situation, is that the anger consciousness of this type is usually cumulative. With an entirely novel experience, a certain amount of resistance must be broken down before the emotion develops. The emotion seems to develop by a cumulative process through a series of stimuli. One personal thrust in a situation in which there is involved no previous emotional excitement, may be ignored or the humiliation may be borne at the time with no anger reactions; but when it is repeated one or more times under similar circumstances, there is present a characteristic mental situation for the development of anger. The repeated occurrence of the incident in the imagination intensifies the feelings till anger becomes fully developed. E.’s observations will illustrate. “During the argument with X., I was in splendid humor, enjoying myself to the fullest and naturally supposed everybody was.” Referring to a statement made by X. during the argument, E. states, “The glow of the conflict had not entirely departed when I began to see his statement in an entirely new light as reflecting on myself, then I felt somewhat distressed and overcome to a slight degree, by a feeling of abasement but no resentment against X. The next day at ten o’clock I was recalling the events of the argument. There was still a feeling of abasement but now it stirred me to anger. I found myself going over it and thinking what I might have said, and what I would say the next time.”

Anger Without an Immediate Feeling Fore-period. This study was begun tentatively with the view held by Wundt (21) that each emotion of anger has an immediate feeling fore-period. The study had not progressed far till this view had to be abandoned. It early appeared in the observations that anger may begin rather suddenly with no initial feeling fore-period, which the observer is able to find. The subject reports that he suddenly finds himself in the midst of an emotion of anger before he is scarcely aware of it, and is giving verbal and motor expressions usually accompanying such emotions. In many of the emotions of this type there is evidence in the observations that the emotion refers to a previous emotional experience. From the mental disposition left over from the previous emotion, the emotion suddenly emerges without passing through the cumulative process that is necessary with an entirely novel emotional experience. In other words the way has previously been broken so that it is not necessary to break down the same amount of resistance. A. observes, “Sitting in my room, I imaged X. At once I was angry, motor expression not marked at first. X. was imaged in a rather positive and demonstrative attitude which he sometimes takes. I found myself with quite a good deal of motor activity saying in voco-motor fashion as if talking to X.——I was partly aware of three former disagreements with X., the imagery of the circumstances of the last one was most clearly defined. I imagined X. a little humbled by my remark. The emotional experience from the first was pleasant. I felt a little victorious in the imaginary act of dealing a telling thrust.”

With all persons studied, there is evidence of a previously developed mental disposition against certain persons and against certain principles which allows the anger point to be reached in a short cut fashion. Anger is easily attained without the initial feeling either of irritation or lowered self-feeling. Anger that rises from this situation is usually pleasant in quality. The mental disposition which is connected with this sudden origin of anger may be present during the later recall of the emotion. It is also shown by the frequent re-occurrence that the same situation may repeatedly give rise to anger. B. has a rather strongly developed sentiment against ministers who preach what they do not believe; G. against persons who do their work carelessly, especially manufacturers who send out goods of inferior quality. I. has a marked sentiment against acts of cruelty in the treatment of animals. D. reacts rather vigorously against persons who are disloyal to friendship. These sentiments go back to early experiences in the life of the individuals.

B. in talking with X. directed the conversation to ministers who preach what they really do not believe. He took Dr. Y. as an example. He had previously seen Dr. Y. drinking beer with the boys and had resented his behavior. He began to vituperate to X. against Y., giving instances and telling his opinion rather vigorously about such men who have a double personality. “Before I was scarcely aware of it, I was in the midst of motor and verbal expressions of righteous indignation. I enjoyed it all very much. I always take delight in making myself angry with ministers of this sort.” B. has reported other instances of his anger against ministers of this type. A case from I. will illustrate further. “I had the same recurring anger for three weeks. A delivery boy who passes about the same time each day goes by whipping and abusing his horse. Anger arises each time the incident occurs. The sight made me pleasantly indignant. I have the image of an old German, living near my home as a child, who treated his horse so cruelly. The idea of telephoning to the police occurs to me, but the boy goes on and the idea is abandoned.”