Henry A. Rayne

The Mullah's deeds—Supply and transport—Arrival of No. 2 Unit, R.A.F., at Berbera—Details and arrangements—Mullah miracles—Aeroplane scouting—Friendlies—R.A.F. reports—Post-bag bombing—To Medishe—The Mullah's birds—A Mullah victim—Tali and the last of the Mullah.

In 1919 British Somaliland was roughly divided—politically—into two separate territories, the East and the West. The former dominated by one saturnine personality, the Mad Mullah, who rarely (of late years never) intruded into the more peaceful, if more subtle, situation of the West.

Not one day since I landed in Somaliland has passed without my running up against one or more of the victims of the Mullah, now reported to be getting old, and so stout as to be almost inactive. On trek I could not sit down to breakfast without hearing the wail of some poor woman or child outside the encampment. "Sahib! Sahib! for the love of God! A bite of food for a poor meskin!" Daily in the Court Room wrecks of women and children came before me for relief. Almost invariably I found, on the strictest inquiries being made into their cases, that their villages had been destroyed, their property looted, their men-folk killed, by the murdering gang of thieves who carried out incessantly the merciless policy of this awful man. In desperation they had roamed across country, ever making away from the territory where the terror reigned. How the Mullah had put to the sword the men, women, and children of one whole section of a tribe because, whilst being shown over a fort in the course of construction by their headman, a wooden beam had fallen and broken his arm, was related to me a few days before she died by a poor woman, one of the few survivors.

I had read much of the man before I came to Somaliland, and rather admired what I imagined to be his sporting character. But since I have learned enough about him at first hand, and have been so shocked at the misery, caused by this fiend, that is ever being brought to my notice, the very mention of his name causes my blood to boil.

It was in the West, and in the month of October, 1919, that I found myself deeply involved in nothing more exciting than the hearing of divorce cases, marriage disputes, petty loots, and homicides. In fact occupied with the thousand and one affairs, the settlement of which goes to make up the greater part of the routine work in the daily life of a District Commissioner in the Zeila District of British Somaliland.

Into the midst of all this came a mail, and in the mail a letter addressed to me from the Officer Commanding Troops (also, at that moment, administering the Government) asking if I would take over the organisation of the supply and transport for certain contemplated operations against the "Mad Mullah." My reply, though couched in more official language, can be summed up briefly as, "Rather!"

In the course of this narrative, and after having thus explained my rÔle in the expedition, I do not propose to do any more than set forth such events and happenings as came to my personal notice, or with which I naturally became conversant as being in close touch with the officers, or units, of whom I write. This is not a disquisition or treatise on how to run Supply and Transport in Somaliland, though a by-no-means unexciting subject.

On the 3rd of November there was landed at Berbera the first consignment of aerial bombs. These were followed, on the 13th of November, by Colonel R. Gordon, C.M.G., commanding No. 2 Unit, Royal Air Force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrell, D.S.O., who was responsible for the R.A.F. medical arrangements. Shortly afterwards the first contingent of the 6th King's African Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, D.S.O., landed at Las Khorai, where they were joined later by the remainder of the battalion; about eight hundred and fifty rifles all told. The temporary garrison at Las Khorai, composed of four hundred and forty rifles—the 101st Grenadiers, Indian Army—evacuated Las Khorai and proceeded by sea to Berbera, thence to Las Dureh. It had at first been decided to use Las Khorai as the base from which the R.A.F. should commence operations, but, owing to the prevalence of wind and dust storms at that port, this plan was given up, and the base was fixed on—much to my regret as it meant land transport—at El-dur-Elan. By Christmas-time preparations were well advanced, and, in spite of the lack of facilities, the R.A.F. were well up to time in their preparations for the attack, planned to take place early in January.

On the 12th of January it was certain that the aeroplanes would be ready to commence operations on the 21st. The position was then as follows:—the Mullah was reported at Medishe, about eight miles North West of Jidali. The country he held can very roughly be summarised as that in the vicinity of his more important fortified posts, namely Garabghari, Jidali, Medishe and Baran, with a clear run to the East, water, which is scarce, permitting: and a clear run to the South, to Tale, the largest and most strongly fortified position of all. There were many other minor forts, but I believe I have mentioned the principal ones.

Up to this time the Military Policy had been to make preparations as unostentatiously as possible, so that the Mullah would not take fright and move off from Medishe. His doing so would have necessitated a complete rearrangement of plans, so telling heavily on the transport arrangements—an important consideration. The assembling of the aeroplanes at Berbera was nearing completion, and trial flights to the West were being made. The reason why the planes were not tried to the Eastward is obvious, but the native population believed they were prevented from doing so by the supernatural power of the Mullah, who had, they said, cast a spell over the machines, so barring them from using the aerial route over the town of Berbera (East of the R.A.F. Camp) or above the hills to the South-East. As a proof of what the Mullah could do in this direction I have heard intelligent natives state that on a certain occasion the old man pointed out three crows, high in the air, to his followers, directing them to watch that which was about to happen. The three crows fell dead to the ground. A holy man, who could bring down birds by reciting a verse from the Koran, the method employed, was not likely to be troubled by aeroplanes. But to return to the disposition of the military forces on the 12th of January.

The 101st Grenadiers had occupied El-dur-Elan, where a dump of stores for all arms had been established. The Somaliland Camel Corps, leaving a small dismounted detachment at headquarters, Burao, was moving on the same point, where a detachment of R.A.F. was busily preparing the aerodrome, workshops and camp necessary for their Corps. The Somaliland Field Force Field Hospital, and the R.A.F. Field Hospital, were likewise established at the same point. The King's African Rifles had established their base at Musha Aled, and, in spite of the fact that, owing to lack of steamer transport, great difficulty was experienced in supplying them with transport camels, they were practically ready to move.

At Berbera the R.A.F. were feverishly engaged in the assembling and tuning up of the ten fighting two-seaters, and the two ambulance planes that had been landed from H.M.S. Ark Royal. In addition to this work they had prepared emergency landing grounds and established dumps at Las Khorai, Burao, and Eil Dab.

The P.W.D., Somaliland, was pushing on as quickly as possible with the work of making the track between Berbera and Las Dureh passable for motorcars, which were not, however, used for transport for the expedition. They were found most useful in carrying European ranks over the first, and worst, stage of the journey between Berbera and Las Dureh. A dry barren terrain, over which they were never able to proceed farther than within a few miles of Hagal, about forty-five miles out. From here the almost impossible country for cars became quite impossible, unless most expensive works were undertaken.

On the 16th of January, His Excellency the Governor left Berbera for El-dur-Elan, and on the following day, accompanied by the Director of Public Works, I followed.

On the 20th of January and at seven a.m. I arrived at El-dur-Elan, to find that the Camel Corps and the 101st Grenadiers had moved on to El Afweina with the bulk of supplies intended for the land forces. The only troops at El-dur-Elan were seventy rifles of the 101st Grenadiers, and His Excellency's bodyguard. His Excellency would not grant me permission to proceed farther without an adequate escort, so that I had a good opportunity of seeing the first machines arrive at El-dur-Elan from Berbera, and likewise the first flight, timed for the 21st, that was to break for ever the power of the Mad Mullah in British Somaliland.

On the 21st, although the machines were not completely assembled, the R.A.F. preparations were sufficiently advanced to commence operations, the scheme of which was roughly as follows. Medishe, where the Mullah was known to be, was to be bombed first. The Camel Corps, which had left El-dur-Elan on the 19th, was to move forward and take Jidali, thus cutting off any concerted move to the South. A large party of friendlies under Captain Gibb had been collected to the South, to keep a sharp look-out for scattered groups of fugitives and stock, and most particularly to intercept the Mullah himself should he succeed, as was considered highly probable, in breaking South for Tale. These friendlies had suffered severely at the Mullah's hands for years, and were dying to see the last of him. They, as subsequently transpired, gave a good account of themselves.

The transport of the Camel Corps, escorted by the 101st Grenadiers, was to move forward from El Afweina towards Jidali, when opportunity offered and the situation developed. The K.A.R., from Musha Aled, were to attend to the fortress of Baran, which they approached over a difficult and precipitous escarpment.

On Wednesday morning, the 21st, the first four aeroplanes got away from El-dur-Elan, and how anxiously their return was awaited at the Camp is beyond the power of my pen to describe. When the first faint drone of engines was heard there was a general rush for the "drome." Only two machines had returned and they reported as follows:—

On flying out four smoke signals, lit by Somali scouts to mark the vicinity of the dervish cattle, had been readily found, but, shortly afterwards, one of the planes was seen to be in trouble and heading for the sea. This machine and the two pilots, who had returned, followed, until they were assured it had a good chance of landing either at Las Khorai or on the sea-coast, when they returned. We learned later it had landed safely at Las Khorai.

They had not seen Medishe, or any of the Mullah's forts. The fourth plane, which had not returned, left them when over the hills, and had swung Eastwards, after the first machine was in difficulty. All the men who listened to the report, and who knew Somaliland, offered up a silent prayer that her pilot and observer were safe or dead, and had not been delivered into the merciless hands of the Mad Mullah.

But soon the faint drone of the missing plane was heard. It landed safely, and reported that it had found and bombed Medishe. The observer said the place was strongly held, and defended by five stone tower-like forts. He could not say what damage had been done, but he had made direct hits, causing great confusion amongst the garrison. The group of officers broke up, now well satisfied, and there was a feeling all round that the aeroplanes were going to justify their existence.

But, on Thursday morning, when they started out again, the pilot who had bombed Medishe the day before was forced to descend, and the planes that went on again failed to locate Medishe, for the very good reason, I believe, that it had only been fixed approximately (on native information) on the maps supplied to the expedition.

At this stage the wireless communications between the King's African Rifles, the O.C. Somaliland Field Force, and the R.A.F. at El-dur-Elan broke down, or were working badly. It was an anxious time, and when three aeroplanes, which went out in the afternoon, returned to report that they had located, and heavily bombed, the Mullah's stronghold, there was general rejoicing.

On Saturday the aeroplanes again visited Medishe, which they believed had been severely dealt with, went on and bombed Jidali.

On the same day I left by aeroplane for Al Afweina, where I assumed command of the transport and dismounted column, marched on Sunday for Jidali, which we reached on Thursday, the 29th, after a hard trek.

An incident during this trek, though it was not amusing at the moment, is not without its humorous side. The camel transport, consisting of fourteen companies, was able to march in fairly good formation—line of companies in single file—but, at one point, whilst crossing a narrow neck, was thrown into some confusion on the rough narrow track it was forced to converge upon, so that it looked not unlike a mob of dervish pack-camels. At this particular moment an aeroplane glided over the hills on our right, and began to take some interest in our movements. It had been arranged that all troops should carry several pieces of white cloth which, when spread on the ground, would convey to the pilots of the R.A.F. who it was they were observing from the air. But, as so often happens with such arrangements, I found that, when we wanted our signalling apparatus, it was mixed up with the transport. The aeroplane, swooping right across us, had turned, and was coming up again for what appeared to our nervous minds might strike the pilot as the target of a lifetime. The 101st Grenadiers had brought a "Very Light" pistol with them. This weapon was hastily loaded, but before it could be discharged the observer dropped—not a bomb—but a letter containing orders from the O.C., Somaliland Field Force.

As the coloured post-bag with its gay streamers floated through the air, the semi-savage camel attendants, who had heard of the awful effect of bombs, stood rooted to the ground with terror. There was a gasp of relief when the bag harmlessly struck the earth without exploding. I believe we should have fired a green light, but just for luck, and to show our independence, we fired two red lights at the plane, which answered with a green as it circled away. Speaking for myself, I realised for the first time what "wind up" really means. I had it!

At Jidali we were met by the O.C. Somaliland Field Force, Colonel Summers, in person, who showed us into camp and made us au courant with the situation. Jidali had been attacked by the Camel Corps. The three-inch Stokes guns were brought into play, and shells dropped on the roof of the fort in the late evening. Early next morning it was found that the enemy had disappeared.

Soon after our arrival orders were issued for a move on Medishe, to be followed by a drive through the hills, but, about midday, on Friday, the 30th January, as I was standing in our lines, the Colonel walked quietly up to me and stated that he had information which led him to believe the Mullah had escaped South towards Tale, and that he was launching the Camel Corps in pursuit. As he was accompanying them for a certain distance, until he was in a more central position owing to the change of situation, I was to command at Jidali until the arrival of the K.A.R., which had been ordered up from Baran. I could see that, though he was not going to commit himself as to the position at Jidali, he believed the dervish power on the Las Khorai escarpment was broken.

That evening the Camel Corps marched on what was to end up in one of the finest rides, and most successful operations, in its history.

The next morning, following a consultation with the O.C. 101st Grenadiers, I decided to occupy Medishe. Accordingly, Captain Cross marched with a party of the Grenadiers, and about two hours later we received a helio message stating that he had entered the place, without much opposition, and captured vast quantities of stores. Meanwhile I busied myself with the prisoners left behind by the Camel Corps, from whom I learned the following facts:—

On the 21st instant the Mullah, who was well aware of the pending operations, heard the hum of the aeroplanes, and, with most of his head-men, went out in the open to observe them. Medishe, being in a narrow valley, was not "spotted" by the planes they passed to the West, but the dervishes had a clear view of the machines.

"Look," said the Mullah, "Allah has sent these great birds as a sign to me and the faithful," upon which the planes disappeared. But one came back, and again the Mullah addressed his followers.

"Indeed, but God has sent this one great bird back to me!"

"AT 1,000 FEET." BOMBS BURSTING N.W. OF TALE.

(By permission of the Air Ministry.)