I went to occupy the lines of the Lauter. Twenty-three years before we had defended them; but then they were in a good condition, the left bank of the river was protected; we had 80,000 fighting men, a corps of reserve, and the army of the Upper Rhine assisted us. Nothing of that sort existed now. The lines were merely a heap of ruins: the banks and the sluices, which formed their principal strength, were nearly destroyed, and the places which supported them were neither armed nor even secure against a coup de main. We scarcely reckoned 15,000 infantry, which were divided into three divisions, under the orders of Generals Rottembourg, Albert, and Grandjean. Two thousand horse, under Count Merlin, composed all our cavalry. From Weissemburg as far as Huninguen on one side, and to Belgium on the other, the frontiers were completely unprotected. In this state of things Germesheim became an important position; defended by a considerable garrison, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, it could not be carried but by main force. I despaired not of success, and I made, as soon as the news of hostilities reached me, a general reconnoissance, in which I got possession of Haun, of Auwailler, and of all the villages of the Queich. The chief of squadron Turckheim took at a gallop that of Gottenstein, and the Bavarian detachments which occupied it.

On the 21st, towards midnight, all the arrangements were made, and the columns of attack were already in march, when news of the disaster of Waterloo was announced. The columns were immediately recalled. I well knew that the enemy would lose no time in crossing the river; I hastened to take the administrative measures that circumstances required, and to put in a state of defence the fortresses which were under my command. I threw a battalion of the line into Landau, whither I ordered the treasuries of the country to be removed. But already, as I had foreseen, the troops of the coalition had passed the Rhine at Oppenheim and at Germesheim, and had spread themselves in every direction; our soldiers were obliged to fight their way in order to arrive at their destination. We retreated behind the Lauter; and the rumour of the invasion of the Upper Rhine by the Grand Army under the command of Schwartzenberg having reached me at the same time, I despatched, post haste, two battalions to reinforce the garrisons of Neuf Brisack and of Schelestadt.

The Russians, Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtemburgers, Badeners, and a multitude from other nations, assembled to the number of more than 60,000 men, under the orders of the Prince-Royal, now King of Wurtemburg, soon outfronted the feeble corps under my command.

I had first determined to defend Alsace foot by foot, retiring towards the Vosges, the Meurthe, the Moselle and the Marne: but I learnt that the army of the Moselle, which supported me on my left, had marched towards the north; that the enemy's columns already occupied Sarrebruck, and inundated Lorraine: this movement then was no longer practicable. On the other hand, a hasty decision, in such an unexpected juncture, might be attended with the most serious consequences. I temporized, in hopes of receiving orders to regulate my movements. But after the despatch which informed me of our misfortunes, I did not receive another till the entry of Louis XVIII into Paris.

In the evening of the 24th the Wurtemburg cavalry attacked my advanced posts, the chasseurs of the 7th and the dragoons of the 11th took arms, rushed on the enemy, and cut them in pieces. The next day the army continued its movement of concentration; I fixed my quarters in advance of the forest of Haguenau, the right of the army at Seltz, the centre at Surbourg, and the left, being my cavalry, on the road to Bitche, which the enemy had already invested.

This position was only a temporary one—it was too extended: I only took it to avoid retiring suddenly behind the town, and thus allowing the enemy to penetrate between that place and Saverne, which Lieutenant-general Desbureaux occupied with a battalion of the line, some partisans, and a few lancers.

General Rottembourg was intrusted with the task of observing the Rhine on our rear and on the right.—I had only been able to allow him a brigade, which I had left at Seltz; out of this I was obliged to withdraw the 40th regiment the moment the Austrians appeared. There only remained with him the 39th, whose second battalion formed the advanced posts, and the reserve. The first, a company of sappers and eight pieces of cannon, composed the line of battle for more than half a league of ground. The situation, without being bad in itself, had nothing particularly encouraging in it. The small town of Seltz, supported on the Rhine, is situated on the two banks of the Seltzbach. This river is pretty secure for about 400 yards, but farther up it is fordable every where, and the woods on its banks render the passage of it still more easy. On the other hand, I feared a landing which the enemy could easily effect behind the right, and to which I could make but a feeble opposition, whilst all my attention was wanted to the front, which, as I have said, extended to a great distance.

In this alternative General Rottembourg decided on keeping a watch on the Rhine only by means of patroles, and he sent a company to guard the fords from the mill at Seltz to Nideradern. He placed his artillery on a small eminence on the right bank, to the left of the town; and what remained of his soldiers he sent forward to support the second battalion, which occupied the advanced posts and the wood.

At eleven o'clock the enemy, having assembled his masses, commenced the attack by a well-sustained fire of musquetry, which he supported with eight pieces of cannon. The opposition of our troops was obstinate, and for a long time was effectual, but at last this small advanced post was compelled to retreat into the wood. It maintained itself there with heroic courage, and resisted for a long time the efforts of from 8 to 9000 men, aided by a numerous artillery. In fine, after a few hours of the finest resistance, this handful of valiant troops retreated in the greatest order, and rejoined the first battalion.

Emboldened by this success our adversaries brought down their masses. They debouched by the main road, and marched on Seltz, of which they thought to get possession without difficulty. We allowed them to come up under the fire of our batteries; as soon as they could play, a tremendous discharge carried death into their ranks. Encouraged by their numbers, they nevertheless continued to advance, and the combat recommenced with more vigour than before. But, constantly repelled by the valour of our soldiers, and mowed down by the French artillery, the Austrians in the end gave way, and retired in confusion into the wood. Their movements from that time became uncertain, and they hesitated a long time what they should do. Our cannon continued to carry destruction into their ranks. Attack was not more dangerous than inaction; they again advanced, and succeeded in getting possession of the part of the town situated on the left bank. But this triumph cost them dear: a few shells, thrown on the houses of which they were in possession, compelled them to leave them, and to regain, in a great hurry, their first place of shelter: our batteries fired with increased fury, and the fugitives suffered an immense loss.

This was not the only attack in which they failed. At the commencement of the action they had advanced by the main road from Weissembourg to Haguenau on Surbourg, which was occupied by a battalion of the 18th, under the command of Colonel Voyrol. This village was valiantly defended: for more than two hours the enemy could not penetrate into it; but they at last brought up forces so considerable, that under the apprehension of seeing the position turned, General Albert ordered it to be evacuated. Our soldiers withdrew behind the Saare, where they joined the remainder of the regiment. Attacked in this position by some chosen troops of the Austrian army, they remained immoveable. Wearied with so many fruitless attacks, and convinced that they could not succeed in forcing men who appeared determined to die at their post, nor in getting possession of the avenues of the forest, the Allies at last decided on retreating.

We had three hundred men killed and wounded. The Austrians, by their own account, had lost 2000 men, and had two pieces of cannon dismounted.

Our troops had scarcely taken a few hours rest, when I was obliged to put them again on their march. The Allied army of the Upper Rhine was advancing on Strasburg; I had received this news during the action. I had not a moment to lose: I marched immediately towards that place, and the result has shewn whether this measure was proper.