THE PARLIAMENT OF 1624. ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE.

After the Prince had taken leave of his Spanish escort, and had gone on board an English fleet at Santander, whither it had put in to fetch him away, contrary winds, or, in the words of a contemporary narrative, 'the brothers Boreas and Eurus,' for a while delayed his departure. We are assured that people in England never regarded the weathercocks and the direction of the smoke and of the clouds with more painful anxiety than at that time. Even among the dependents of the royal house many almost gave up the Prince as lost; for who, they said, could trust the word of the Spaniards? The Protestant part of the population thought that he would at least be compelled to abjure his religion. At last the wind subsided. On October 5, after an absence of almost eight months, the Prince arrived in Portsmouth, and the day after in London. The universal joy with which he was received was indescribable: all business was at a standstill; the shops were shut; nothing was seen but waggons driving backwards and forwards, laden with the wood intended for the bonfires which blazed at evening in all the open squares, at all corners of the streets, even in the inner courts, but were most brilliant and costly at the Guildhall.[432] The joyful acclamations of the multitude mingled with the sound of the bells; people congratulated each other that the heir to the throne had returned as he had gone, and that without the Infanta; for this marriage had never been popular; but above all, that he returned rather confirmed than shaken in his religion. They praised God for his deliverance out of the land of Egypt. Even Buckingham, who was not loved at other times, enjoyed a moment of universal popularity.

Nevertheless the effect which would have been most welcome to the majority, that of banishing all thoughts of an alliance with Catholic powers, and of causing a wife to be sought for the Prince among Protestants, was certainly not produced, for the King had long been revolving another plan. The combination with Spain, although it had best corresponded to his wishes and ideas, had nevertheless been only an experiment: when it miscarried, he was predisposed to return to the thought of an alliance with France. The Prince, on his way through France, had already seized the opportunity of seeing the Princess, his possible bride, while she was dancing, without being remarked by her; and the impression which she made upon him had been by no means unfavourable.

Instantly on his return from Spain Buckingham opened communications with Mary de' Medici, Queen of France, and that through means of a Franciscan monk, who could not be suspected, and who presented himself to her while she was at dinner. Buckingham made secret overtures to her, intimating that he wished to resume the old negotiations for an alliance between the royal families of England and France, for that he was a Frenchman at heart.[433] As the Queen expressed herself favourably inclined, Henry Rich, who then bore the title of Lord Kensington, and afterwards that of Lord Holland, was sent before the end of the year 1623 on a secret mission to France in order to set the affair in motion. Rich was one of the most intimate friends of Buckingham, and to a certain extent resembled him in character.

In this affair Buckingham had two circumstances in his favour. It was the main ambition of the Queen-mother to see her daughter on the throne of the neighbouring kingdom. The preference accorded by the English court to an Infanta of Spain over a daughter of France had had A.D. 1624. a painful effect upon her: she was the more gratified when that court now resumed the negotiations which had been broken off. Nevertheless she did not embark on so delicate an affair, the failure of which was still possible, without the necessary reserve. The French court could not but ask for religious concessions in favour of the Princess, as Spain had for the Infanta: but on the very first approach to the subject it hinted that it would not urge the King to such strict pledges as had been demanded on the side of the Spaniards.[434] The second influence in Buckingham's favour was the political. The advance of the alliance, and of the power of the Spaniards, especially their establishment in the Palatinate, aroused the jealousy of the French. The opinion, which Cardinal Richelieu so often emphatically expressed, that France, everywhere enclosed by the power of the Spaniards, might some day be prostrated by it, was generally held. The interests of his country seemed to be deeply interested when England, from whose close connexion with Spain the greatest danger was to be apprehended, separated herself from that power, and showed a disposition to adopt a policy in harmony with that of France. Henry Rich assures us that so universal an agreement had never been known among Frenchmen as was shown at that time in the wish to ally themselves with England. Already agents of Mansfeld and Brunswick were seen at Court: an intended mission to Maximilian of Bavaria was given up on the representation of the English ambassador. Envoys from the expelled King of Bohemia also soon arrived, in order to gain the co-operation of the French in his restoration. The negotiations with England actually began: they were directed to an alliance and a marriage at the same time: in each case it was made a preliminary condition that England should openly and completely break with Spain.

But this condition could not be fulfilled in England quite easily and without opposition. And how indeed could it have been expected that the members of the Privy Council, who had followed the King in the direction given to his policy in favour of Spain, if not without any reserve, yet with an ardour which might be turned to their reproach, would now, as it were, turn round, and follow the example of the favourite in entering on another path? A commission chosen from their body was appointed in order to take into consideration the complaints made by Buckingham about the behaviour of the Spanish court. But the report which Buckingham made was by no means so convincing as to win their concurrence. He rather depended on impressions, which had no doubt in his own eyes a certain truth, than on facts which might have served as evidence for others as well. The commission declared itself almost unanimously against him.[435] Its sentence was, that Philip IV had seriously intended to marry his sister to the Prince; and that in the affair of the Palatinate he had behaved, if not as a friend, yet at any rate not as an enemy. The first part is undoubtedly correct; with regard to the second however, neither the members of the Privy Council had any suspicion, nor had Buckingham himself any real information, that the Spaniards had made the interests of Austria in the Palatinate so decidedly their own. The Council was moreover in an ill humour with the favourite on account of the arbitrary authority which he arrogated to himself. When Lord Bristol came to England in the beginning of the year 1624, and then laid all the blame on Buckingham himself, a party was formed against the latter, which sought to overthrow him, and was even thought to have already secured a new favourite, with whom to replace Buckingham, just as he had formerly stepped into the place of Somerset. It was remarked that the friends and adherents of Somerset, who had always been on the side of Spain, came together and bestirred themselves. It was clear, and was generally said, that if relations with Spain were not broken off, the minister must fall. As people expressed it, 'either the marriage must break or Buckingham.' In this danger Buckingham resolved on a step of the greatest significance, in order to be able at once to attack the Spaniards, and to meet his rivals at home. He turned to those who had for many years demanded war with Spain on principle, the popular and zealous Protestant party. The King assented to his request for the summoning of a new Parliament, of which he had in fact for other reasons already given notice. As was to be expected from the connexion of affairs, the result of the elections corresponded with the views of the last Parliament. Men like Coke, who had been called to account for their attitude at that time, were re-elected two or three times over. The ruling minister now regarded them even as his allies.

What an indescribable advantage however for the supporters of the claims of Parliament was this change! As the ill-success of the German policy of the King in the year 1621 had turned to their advantage, so now they profited by the failure of his negotiations with Spain. The political leanings of James I in favour of Spain, which they had originally opposed, had led to embarrassments in which the First Minister himself invoked their aid.

But not only did party rivalries display themselves at this important moment, but a general opposition also arose on constitutional grounds. The Earl of Carlisle represented to the King that he had been visited by members of Parliament, no mere popular leaders or speakers, but quiet men and good patriots, who feared God and honoured the King: that he had learned from them that the agitation observed in the country had principally arisen because the last grants of Parliament had not been met by any favours on the part of the King, but on the contrary the expression of opinions displeasing to him on the part of certain members had been subsequently punished by their arrest. Carlisle reminded the King that nothing could be more hateful to his enemies, or more strengthening and encouraging to his friends, than the removal of these disagreements; that no king had ever had better subjects if he would but trust them; that if he would but show them that he relied on their counsel and support, he would win their hearts and command their fortunes; and that the people would then work with him for the welfare and honour of the State.[436]

These views prevailed when Parliament was opened on the 19th of February, 1624. Hitherto it had been one of the principal grievances of the King that Parliament wished to have a voice in affairs that concerned his state and his family. The new Parliament was opened with a detailed account from Buckingham of his negotiations with Spain, which affected both these interests, and with a request that Parliament would report on the great questions awaiting settlement.[437]

The answer of both Houses was, that it was contrary to the honour of the King, to the welfare of his people, to the interest of his children, and even to the terms of his former alliances, to continue the negotiations with Spain any longer: they prayed him to break off negotiations on both subjects, with regard to the Palatinate, as well as with regard to the marriage. It was hailed as a public blessing that the conditions accepted for the sake of the latter would not now be fulfilled.

At this moment Buckingham's wishes were on the side of this policy; for otherwise he could not have advanced a step in his dealings with France. But the King had not so fully made up his mind. He had approved the overtures made to France: but when he was now asked to break with Spain, the power which he most feared, and whose friendship it was the first principle of his policy to cultivate, there was something in him which recoiled from the step. Buckingham acknowledged for the first time that he was not of the same mind with the King. He said that he wished to tread only in one path, whereas the King thought that he could walk in two different paths at once; but that the King must choose between the Spaniards and his own subjects. He asked him whether, supposing that sufficient subsidies of a definite amount were at once granted him, and the support of his subjects with their lives and fortunes were promised him for the future, so far as it might be necessary—whether in that case he would resolve to break off the matrimonial alliance with Spain. He asked for a straightforward and definite answer, that he might be able to give information on the subject beforehand to some members of Parliament. It is evident that this was no longer the attitude of a favourite, who has only to express the opinions and wishes of his prince. Buckingham came forward as a statesman, who opposes his own insight to the aims of his sovereign. He says that if he should concur with the King, he should be a flatterer; that if he should fail to express his own opinion, he should be a traitor. In this matter he could rely on the support of the Prince, who, without estranging himself from his father, still appeared to be less dependent on his will than before.[438] The result was that James I again gave way. He named the sum which he should require for the defence of his kingdom, for the support of his neighbours, and for the discharge of his own debts. Parliament, although it did not grant the whole amount demanded, yet granted a very considerable sum: it agreed to pay three full subsidies and three fifteenths within a year, if the negotiations were broken off. At the beginning of April Buckingham was able to announce to Parliament that the King, in consequence of the advice given to him, had finally broken off negotiations with Spain on both matters.

Other and further concessions of the greatest extent were coupled with this announcement. The King promised that, if a war should break out, he would not entertain any proposals for peace without the advice of Parliament. It was of still more importance, for the moment at least, that he declared himself willing to allow Parliament itself to dispose of the sums it had granted. He said that he wished to have nothing to do with them: that Parliament itself might nominate a treasurer. These likewise were admissions which Buckingham had demanded from the King:[439] but it maybe supposed that he had a previous understanding on the subject with the leaders of the Parliament. He also represented to the King that the removal of the old grievances was an absolute necessity. The monopolies to which James had so long clung, and which he had so obstinately defended, he now in turn gave up; while the penal laws against the Catholics, to which he was averse, were revived.

This was an intestine struggle between the different powers in the state, as well as a question of policy. Parliament and the favourite made common cause against the Privy Council, which was on the side of Spain.

Among his opponents in the Privy Council, Buckingham hated none so much as the Lord Treasurer Cranfield, then Earl of Middlesex, for Cranfield, although raised from a humble station by Buckingham himself, had the courage to resist him on the Spanish question.[440] By his strict and successful management of business, Cranfield had won the favour of the King, who believed that he had found in him a second Sully. It seems that Cranfield himself had intended to effect the ruin of Buckingham: but Buckingham was too strong for him. Certain accusations, which were partly well founded, were made available in bringing him to trial by Parliamentary means, and in removing him from his office like Bacon; for he had incurred the enmity of many by his strictness and incorruptibility. The King professed to regard this case as even worse than the former, because Bacon had acknowledged his guilt, while Cranfield denied all guilt. The doctrine of the responsibility of ministers was by this means advanced still further, for it was now becoming more dangerous to fall out with Parliament than with the King.

The authority of Parliament in general made important strides. It now threw paramount weight into those deliberations which concerned the general affairs of the kingdom, war and peace, and the royal family. What became of the principle on which the King had hitherto taken his stand, that the decision of these matters must be left exclusively to his discretion? Parliament again assumed the attitude which three years before had led to its dissolution.

It was not possible that James I could look on all this without displeasure and uneasiness. Sometimes the thought occurred to him that Buckingham had not been the right man to conduct the negotiations with Spain. The words escaped him that, if he had sent the Lord Keeper Williams with his son instead of Buckingham, his honour would then have been saved, and his heart would now beat more lightly. He did not approve of the decided turn which was being given to foreign politics. He was once heard to say that he was a poor old man, who in former times had known something about politics, but who now knew nothing more about them.

It seems indeed that he had fancied that he could still continue to hold the balance between parties: so at least those who knew James understood him. He had no intention of allowing Buckingham's fall, as the enemies of that nobleman wished, but he perhaps thought of finding a counterpoise for him: he did not wish to let him become lord and master of affairs. On the other hand Buckingham, by his connexion with the leading men of the Lower House, had already won an independent position, in which he was no longer at the mercy of the King. He may perhaps be set down as the first English minister who, supported by Parliament and by public opinion, induced or compelled the King to adopt a policy on which of his own accord he would not have resolved. In conjunction with his new friends Buckingham succeeded in breaking up the Spanish party, with which he now for the first time came into conflict: his adherents congratulated him on his success.[441] In court and state a kind of reaction against the previous importance of this party set in. The offices which were vacated by the fall of Cranfield were conferred on men of the other party, the kind of men who had formerly been displaced under the influence of Gondomar. Seamen were acquitted who had shown the same disregard for orders as Walter Ralegh had once done, and preparations were made to indemnify Ralegh's posterity for the loss of property which they had suffered. The Spanish ambassadors at court availed themselves of a moment of ill humour on the part of the King, to whom indeed they had again obtained access, to call his attention to the loss of authority which threatened him on account of Buckingham's combination with the leading men in the Parliament. But in what they said they mingled so much falsehood with the truth that they could be easily refuted; and Buckingham successfully resisted this attack also.

People still perceived in the King his old indecision. He consented, it is true, that Mansfeld, whom he had formerly helped the Spaniards to expel from his strong position on the Upper Rhine, should now be supported by English as well as French money in a new campaign to recover the Palatinate. But nevertheless he wished at the same time to enjoin him as a condition to abstain from attacking any country which rightfully belonged to the Archduchess Isabella, or to the crown of Spain.[442] So far was he still from undertaking open war against Spain, as his subjects hoped and expected.

And though he acceded to the negotiations with France, yet in this transaction the very circumstance which displeased the majority of his subjects—namely that he was hereby making an alliance with a Catholic power—was acceptable to him. For even then he would not have consented at any price to have interfered in the general religious quarrel merely on religious grounds. He felt no hesitation in promising the French, as he had the Spaniards, not only freedom of religion in behalf of the future queen, but even relief for his Catholic subjects in regard to the penal laws imposed by Parliament. Yet he could have wished that they had contented themselves with his simple promise. One of his envoys, Lord Nithisdale, was himself of this opinion. On the other side it was remarked that perhaps the Catholics, of whom he also was one, might be contented with a promise from their sovereign, on whom their whole welfare depended, but that the French government could not, as it must have a dispensation from the Pope, which could not be obtained without a written assurance. James I at first declared himself ready to give such a declaration in a letter to the king of France, and La Vieuville, who was minister at the time, expressed himself content with that. But after his fall and Richelieu's accession to power this arrangement was rejected. It was in vain that the King's ambassadors held out a prospect that the letter should be signed by the Prince and by the chief Secretary of State; the French insisted that the King should ratify not only the treaty, but also a special engagement which they themselves wished to frame and to lay before Urban VIII. The English plenipotentiaries at the French court, Holland and Carlisle, were still refusing to agree to this, when King James had already given way to the French ambassador in England.

The agreement, in the form in which it was at last concluded, was in some points more advantageous for England than that with Spain had been. While the latter stipulated that the laws which had been passed, or might hereafter be passed, in England against the Catholics were not to be applied to the royal children, but that these on the contrary were still to be secured in their right to the succession, an agreement which, as was mentioned, opened a prospect of an alteration in the religion of the reigning family; this supposition was avoided in the contract with France. But it was agreed on the other hand that the future queen was to conduct the education of her children, not merely till their tenth year, as had been stipulated with Spain, but till their thirteenth. She herself and her household were also to enjoy a higher degree of ecclesiastical independence; the superintendence of a bishop was even allowed them. It was the ambition of the Pope to demand not much less from the French than his predecessor had demanded from the Spaniards as the price of bestowing a dispensation for the marriage of a Catholic princess with a Protestant prince; and it was the ambition of the French court to offer him, or at least to appear to offer him, no less. In the special assurance above mentioned James gave a promise that his Catholic subjects should look forward to the enjoyment of still greater freedom than that which would have been conferred on them by the agreement with Spain. They were not to be molested for the sake of religion, either in their persons or in their possessions, supposing that in other respects they conducted themselves as good and loyal subjects.[443]

The English ambassadors took exception to single expressions: the King himself passed lightly over them. He was mainly induced to do so by the absence from the agreement with France of the most offensive and burdensome clauses which had been contained in the secret articles of the treaty with Spain. On December 12, 1624, the treaty was signed at Cambridge by the King, and the special assurance both by the King and by the Prince.

James I wished to see his son married. At the Christmas immediately following he greeted him according to English fashion with the tenderest expressions: he said that he existed only for his sake; that he had rather live with him in banishment than lead a desolate life without him. He thought that the treaty of marriage which had just been concluded would establish his happiness for ever.

An alliance between France and England for the recovery of the Palatinate was now moreover in contemplation. From the first moment the French had acknowledged that this would be to their own interest, and had promised to assist in that object to the extent of their power. Nevertheless they hesitated to conclude an express agreement for this object; for what would the Pope say if they allied A.D. 1625. themselves with Protestants against Catholics? At last they submitted a declaration in writing, but this appeared to the English ambassadors so unsatisfactory, that they preferred to return it to them. The French said that this time they would perform more than they promised. Although exceptions of many kinds might be made to their performances, yet they were really seriously bent on doing as much as possible for the recovery of the Palatinate. Just at that time Richelieu had stepped into power, and he expressly directed the policy of France to the destruction of the position which the Spaniards had occupied on the Middle Rhine. In spite of the obstructive efforts of a party which had both ecclesiastical and political objects in view, he concluded the arrangements for the marriage of the Princess to the Prince of Wales without any delay, even without waiting for the last word of the Pope.

By this means the connexion which the King had formed in earlier years seemed once more to be revived. The Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Venice supported Mansfeld's preparations with subsidies of money. The States General took the most lively interest in the warlike movements in Germany, on which the Elector of Brandenburg also set his hopes. The King of Denmark offered his help in the matter with a readiness which created astonishment. While the English ambassadors were busy in adjusting the disputes that were constantly springing up afresh between him and Sweden, he gathered the estates of Lower Saxony around him, in order to check the swift advance of the Catholic League.[444] Of the members of the old alliance the princes of Upper Germany alone were absent. It was hoped that the Union would be revived by the efforts of Lower Germany, and above all that its head, the Elector Palatine, would be restored to his country. Induced by the failure of peaceful negotiations for the restoration of his son-in-law, James allowed greater progress to be made in the direction of war than he had ever done before. He took an eager interest in the preliminaries and preparations for war, even for a naval war. But would he ever have proceeded to action? While preparing to attack the Emperor and the League did he intend to do anything more than make a demonstration against Spain? In truth it may be doubted. He never allowed his English troops to attempt anything for the relief of Breda, which at that time was still blockaded by the Spaniards.[445]

And in his alliance with France he certainly still held fast to his original principles.

The marriage of his son to a Catholic princess, and the indulgence towards the Catholics to which he thereby pledged himself, express the most characteristic tendencies of his policy. Notwithstanding all the concessions which he made to Parliament, he still refused to grant many of the demands which were addressed to him. The special agreement which he made with France corresponded to the conception which he had formed of his prerogative. By means of it he imported into relations controlled by the law of nations his claim to give by virtue of his royal power a dispensation even from laws that had been passed by Parliament.

After, as well as before, this event his idea was to control and to combine into harmony the conflicting elements within his kingdom by his personal will; outside his kingdom, to guide or to regulate events by clever policy. This is the important feature in the position and in the pacific attitude of this sovereign. But the blame which attaches to him is also connected with it. He made each and everything, however important it might be in itself, merely secondary to his political calculation. His high-flying thoughts have something laboured and flat about them; they are almost too closely connected with a conscious, and at the same time personal, end; they want that free sweep which is necessary for enlisting the interest of contemporaries and of posterity. And could the policy of James ever have prevailed? Was it not in its own nature already a failure? A great crisis was hanging over England when King James died (March 1625). He had once more received the Lord's Supper after the Anglican use, with edifying expressions of contrition: a numerous assembly had been present, for he wished every one to know that he died holding the same views which he had professed, and had contended for in his writings during his lifetime.