  There are epochs in the history of the world when in a few raging years the character, the destiny, of the whole race is determined for unknown ages. This is one. David Lloyd George “Sowing the Winter Wheat.” Speech delivered at Carnarvon, to a meeting of constituents, after becoming Prime Minister, February 3, 1917. Part II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy they observe: “No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are going to give the people of India some responsibility for their own government. But no one can imagine that no further development is necessary. It is evident that the present machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it works slowly and it produces irritation; there is a widespread demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration; and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also.” [Italics are ours.] The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, “the logical outcome of the past. Indians “... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we have just indicated.” That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in India “the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole.” With these and a few more prefatory remarks about the educational problem and the attitude of the ryot and the enunciation of the general principles on which their proposals are based they proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces. IThe proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the following heads: (a) Financial devolution: It is proposed that henceforth there should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for the Government of India, all others should be made over to the Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded (b) Legislative devolution: “It is our intention,” say the authors of the report, “to reserve to the Government of India a general overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable, either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to pass legislation which may be adopted either simpliciter or with modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures.” It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it is hoped that “constitutional practice” will prevent the central Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for which the latter is responsible are directly affected. (c) Provincial Executive: Article 220 gives the Governor the power to appoint “one or two additional These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Government of India for the future government of the provinces into which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures make it still more complicated. “Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the executive Governments of the provinces shall be constituted. As we have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by twelve years’ service under the Crown in India. One province, Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a council of three constituted in the same way. The remaining five provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governorships of the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief Commissionerships of the Central Provinces and Assam are under the administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India a very general desire for the extension of Council government.... Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by collective administration. “In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in mind the duties with which it will “We propose therefore that in each province the executive Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise the head of the province and an executive council of two members. In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as Governor.... One of the two Executive Councillors would in practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council. It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes.... The Governor in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other part of the government would consist of one member or more than one member, according to the number and importance of the transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected members of the Legislative council. They would be known as ministers. They would be members of the executive “The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers together with the Governor would form the administration. On such subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the Governor’s advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely constitutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of his ministers.” (d) Provincial Legislatures: “We propose there shall be in each province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary.” The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect of resolutions it is said that “we do not propose that resolutions, whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding.” The classification of the reserved and transferred Legislation on reserved subjects: “For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill dealing with a reserved subject is a measure ‘essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsibility for the reserved subjects.’... The Bill will be read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject. If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion of the various elements in the larger body ... the grand committee in every council should be constituted so as to comprise from 40 to 50 per cent. of its strength. It should be chosen for each Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds should be officials, and the elected element should be elected ad hoc by the elected members of the council on the system of the transferable vote.” “On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a select committee, to which Provincial Budget: “... the provincial budget should be framed by the executive Government as a whole. The first charge on provincial revenues will be the contribution to the Government of India; and after that the supply for the reserved subjects will have priority. The allocation of supply for the transferred subjects will be decided by the ministers. If the revenue is insufficient for their needs, the question of new taxation will be decided by the Governor and the ministers. We are bound to recognise that in time new taxation will be necessary, for no conceivable economies can finance the new developments which are to be anticipated. The budget will then be laid before the council which will discuss it and vote by resolution upon the allotments. If the legislative council rejects or modifies the proposed allotment for reserved subjects, the Governor should have power to insist on the whole or any part of the allotment originally provided, if for reasons to be stated he certifies Modification of the Scheme by the Government of India. “After five years’ time from the first meeting of the reformed councils we suggest that the Government of India should hear applications from either the provincial Government or the provincial council for the modification of the reserved and transferred lists of the province; and that, after considering the evidence laid before them, they should recommend for the approval of the Secretary of State the transfer of such further subjects to the transferred list as they think desirable. On the other hand, if it should be made plain to them that certain functions have been seriously maladministered, it will be open to them, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, to retransfer subjects from the transferred to the reserved list, or to place restrictions for the future on the minister’s powers in respect of certain transferred subjects.... But it is also desirable to complete the responsibility of the ministers for the transferred subjects. This should come in one of two ways, either at the initiative of the council if it desires and is prepared to exercise greater control over the ministers, or at the discretion of the Government of India, which may wish to make this change as a condition of the grant of new, or of the maintainance of existing, powers. We propose, therefore, that the Government of India may, when hearing such applications, direct that the ministers’ salaries, instead of any longer being treated as a reserved subject, and, therefore, protected in the last resort by the Governor’s order from interference should be specifically voted each year by the legislative council; Periodic commissions: ... Ten years after the first meeting of the new councils established under the Statute a commission should be appointed to review the position. Criticism has been expressed in the past of the composition of Royal Commissions, and it is our intention that the commission which we suggest should be regarded as authoritative and should derive its authority from Parliament itself. The names of the commissioners, therefore, should be submitted by the Secretary of State to both Houses of Parliament for approval by resolution. The commissioners’ mandate should be to consider whether by the end of the term of the legislature then in existence it would be possible to establish complete responsible government in any province or provinces, or how far it would be possible to approximate it in others; to advise on the continued reservation of any departments for the transfer of which to popular control it has been proved to their satisfaction that the time had not yet come; to recommend the retransfer of other matters to the control of the Governor in Council if serious maladministration were established; and to make any recommendations for the working of responsible government or the improvement of the constitutional machinery which experience of the systems in operation may show to be desirable.... “There are several other important matters, germane in greater or less degree to our main purpose, which the commission should review. They should investigate the progress made in admitting Indians into the higher ranks of the public service. They should examine the apportionment of the financial burden of India with a view to adjusting it more fairly between the provinces. The commission should also examine the “In proposing the appointment of a commission ten years after the new Act takes effect we wish to guard against possible misunderstanding. We would not be taken as implying that there can be established by that time complete responsible government in the provinces. In many of the provinces no such consummation can follow in the time named. The pace will be everywhere unequal, though progress in one province will always stimulate progress elsewhere; but undue expectations might be aroused, if we indicated any opinion as to the degree of approximation to complete self-government that might be reached even in one or two of the most advanced provinces. The reasons that make complete responsibility at present impossible are likely to continue operative in some degree even after a decade.” IIThe proposals regarding the Government of India called the Central Government may be thus summed up: (a) General: “We have already made our opinion clear that pending the development of responsible government in the provinces the Government of India must remain responsible only to Parliament. In other words, in all matters which it judges to be essen (b) The Governor General’s Executive Council: “We would therefore abolish such statutory restrictions as now exist in respect of the appointment of Members of the Governor General’s Council, so as to give greater elasticity both in respect to the size of the Government and the distribution of work.” At present there is one Indian member in the Viceroy’s Executive Council consisting of six ordinary members and one extraordinary besides the Viceroy. This scheme recommends the appointment of another Indian. (c) The Indian Legislative Council. I. Legislative Assembly: “We recommend therefore that the strength of the legislative council, to be known in future as the Legislative Assembly of India, should be raised to a total strength of about 100 members, so as to be far more truly representative of British India. We propose that two-thirds of this total should be returned by election; and that one-third should be nominated by the Governor General, of which third not less than a third again should be non-officials selected with the object of representing minority or special interests.... Some special representation, we think, there must be, as for European and Indian commerce, and also for the large landlords. There should be also communal representation for Muhammadans in most provinces and also for Sikhs in the Punjab.” II. The Council of State: “We do not propose to institute a complete bi-cameral system, but to create a second chamber, known as the Council of State, which shall take its part in ordinary legislative business and shall be the final legislative authority in matters “Inasmuch as the Council of State will be the supreme legislative authority for India on all crucial questions and also the revising authority upon all Indian legislation, we desire to attract to it the services of the best men available in the country. We desire that the Council of State should develop something of the experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen; and we suggest therefore that the Governor General in Council should make regulations as to the qualification of candidates for election to that body which will ensure that their status and position and record of services will give to the Council a senatorial character, and the qualities usually regarded as appropriate to a revising chamber.” III. Legislative procedure: “Let us now explain how this legislative machinery will work. It will make for clearness to deal separately with Government Bills and Bills introduced by non-official members. A Government Bill will ordinarily be introduced and carried through all the usual stages in the Legislative Assembly. It will then go in the ordinary course to the Council of State, and if there amended in any way which the Assembly is not willing to accept, it will be submitted to a joint session of both Houses, “We have to provide for two other possibilities. Cases may occur in which the Legislative Assembly refuses leave to the introduction of a Bill or throws out a Bill which the Government regarded as necessary. For such a contingency we would provide that if leave to introduce a Government Bill is refused, or if the Bill is thrown out at any stage, the Government should have the power, on the certificate of the Governor General in Council that the Bill is essential to the interests of peace, order, or good government, to refer it de novo to the Council of State; and if the Bill, after being taken in all its stages through the Council of State, was passed by that body, it would become law without further reference to the Assembly. Further, there may be cases when the consideration of a measure by both chambers would take too long if the emergency which called for the measure is to be met. Such a contingency should rarely arise; but we advise that in cases of emergency, so certified by the Governor General in Council, it should be open to the Government to introduce a Bill in the Council of State, and upon its being passed there merely to report it to the Assembly.” IV. Powers of dissolution, etc.: “The Governor General should in our opinion have power at any time to dissolve either the Legislative Assembly or the Council of State or both these bodies. It is perhaps V. Fiscal legislation: “Fiscal legislation will, of course, be subject to the procedure which we have recommended in respect of Government Bills. The budget will be introduced in the Legislative Assembly but the Assembly will not vote it. Resolutions upon budget matters and upon all other questions, whether moved in the Assembly or in the Council of State, will continue to be advisory in character.” (d) Privy Council: “We have a further recommendation to make. We would ask that His Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve the institution of a Privy Council for India.... The Privy Council’s office would be to advise the Governor General when he saw fit to consult it on questions of policy and administration.” (e) Periodic commissions: “At the end of the last chapter we recommended that ten years after the institution of our reforms, and again at intervals of twelve years thereafter, a commission approved by Parliament should investigate the working of the changes introduced into the provinces, and recommend as to their further progress. It should be equally the duty of the commission to examine and report upon the new constitution of the Government of India, with particular reference to the working of the machinery for representation, the procedure by certificate, and the results of joint sessions.” IIIIndia Office in LondonThe principal proposals under this head may be thus summarized; “We advise that the Secretary of State’s salary, like that of all other Ministers of the Crown, should be defrayed from home revenues and voted annually by Parliament. This will enable any live questions of Indian administration to be discussed by the House of Commons in Committee of Supply.... It might be thought to follow that the whole charges of the India Office establishment should similarly be transferred to the home Exchequer; but this matter is complicated by a series of past transactions, and by the amount of agency work which the India Office does on behalf of the Government of India; and we advise that our proposed committee upon the India Office organization should examine it and taking these factors into consideration, determine which of the various India Office charges should be so transferred, and which can legitimately be retained as a burden on Indian revenues. “But the transfer of charges which we propose, although it will give reality to the debates on Indian affairs, will not ensure in Parliament a better informed or a more sustained interest in India. We feel that this result can only be accomplished by appointing a Select Committee of Parliament on Indian affairs.” The above in substance is the proposed scheme. In India it has met with varied response. The European community does not approve of it. They think it is too radical. The European Services have struck a note of rebellion threatening to resign in case of its acceptance by Parliament. The Indian politicians A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESOLUTIONS RELATING |
| By the Special Congress | By the Moderate Conference |
| Resolution IV. The Government of India shall have undivided administrative authority on matters directly concerning peace, tranquillity and defence of the country subject to the following: That the Statute to be passed by Parliament should include the Declaration of the Rights of the people of India as British citizens: (a) That all Indian subjects of his Majesty and all the subjects naturalized or resident in India are equal before the law, and there shall be no penal nor administrative law in force in the country whether substantive or procedural of a discriminative nature. (b) That no Indian subject of his Majesty shall be liable to suffer in liberty, life, property or of association, free speech or in respect of writing, except under sentence by an ordinary Court of Justice, and as a result of a lawful and open trial. (c) That every Indian subject shall be entitled to bear arms, subject to the purchase of a licence, as in Great Britain, and that the right shall not be taken away save by a sentence of an ordinary Court of Justice. (d) That the Press shall be free, and that no licence nor security shall be demanded on the registration of a press or a newspaper. (e) That corporal punishment shall not be inflicted on any Indian serving in his Majesty’s Army or Navy save under conditions applying equally to all other British subjects. | (V) This Conference urges that legislation of an exceptional character having the effect of curtailing ordinary rights such as the freedom of the press and public meetings and open judicial trial, should not be carried through the Council of State alone, or in spite of the declared opinion of the Legislative Assembly of India, except in a time of war or internal disturbance, without the approval of the Select Committee of the House of Commons proposed to be set up under the Scheme unless such legislation is of a temporary character and limited to a period of one year only, the said legislation being in any case made renewable without such approval in the last resort. |
| 10 | |
| (c) All racial inequalities in respect of trial by jury, the rules made under the Arms Act, etc. should be removed and the latter should be so amended as to provide for the possession and carrying of arms by Indians under liberal conditions. (d) A complete separation of judicial and executive functions of all district officers should be made, at least in all |
Fiscal Autonomy
| Resolution V. This Congress is strongly of opinion that essential for the welfare of the Indian people that the Indian Legislature should have the same measure of fiscal autonomy which the self-governing dominions of the Empire possess. | (VI) Saving such equal and equitable Imperial obligations as may be agreed upon as resting on all parts of the Empire, the Government of India, acting under the control of the Legislature, should enjoy the same power of regulating the fiscal policy of India as the Governments of the self-governing dominions enjoy of regulating their fiscal policy. |
Reform Proposals
| Resolution VI. That this Congress appreciates the earnest attempt on the part of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State and his Excellency the Viceroy to inaugurate a system of responsible government in India, and, while it recognizes that some of the proposals constitute an advance on the present conditions in some directions, it is of opinion that the proposals are as a whole disappointing and unsatisfactory, and suggests the following modifications as absolutely necessary to constitute a substantial step towards responsible government: | (III) ‘This Conference cordially welcomes the Reform Proposals of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy of India as constituting a distinct advance on present conditions as regards the Government of India and the Provincial Governments and also a real step towards the progressive realization of “responsible government” in the Provincial Government in due fulfillment of the terms of the announcement of August 20, 1917. As such this Conference accords its hearty support to those proposals, and, while suggesting necessary modifications and improvements therein, expresses its grateful appreciation |
| (V) ‘This Conference regards all attempts at the condemnation or rejection of the Reform Scheme as a whole as ill advised, and in particular protests emphatically against the reactionary attitude assumed towards it by the Indo-British Association and some European public bodies in this country which is certain to produce, if successfully persisted—in, an extremely undesirable state of feeling between England and India and imperil the cause of ordered progress in this country. This Conference, therefore, most earnestly urges his Majesty’s Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom to give effect to the provisions of the Scheme and the suggestion of its supporters in regard thereto as early as possible by suitable legislation.’ |
Government of India
| (1) That a system of reserved and transferred subjects similar to that proposed for the provinces, shall be adopted for the Central Government. (2) That the reserved subjects shall be foreign affairs (excepting relations with the colonies and dominions) army, navy, and relations with Indian Ruling Princes, and subject to the declaration of rights contained in resolution IV, the matters directly affecting public peace, tranquillity and defence of the country, and all other subjects shall be transferred subjects. (3) The allotments required for reserved subjects should be the first charge on the revenues. (4) The procedure for the adoption of the budget should be on the lines laid down for the provinces. (5) All legislation should be by Bills introduced into the Legislative Assembly, provided that, if, in the case of reserved subjects, the Legislative Council does not pass such measures as the Government may deem necessary, the Governor General-in-Council may provide for the same by regulations, such regulations to be in force for one year but not to be renewed unless 40 per cent. of the members of the Assembly present and voting are in favour of them. (6) There shall be no Council of State, but if the Council of State is to be constituted, at least half of its total strength shall consist of elected members, and that procedure by certification shall be confined to the reserved subjects. (7) At least half the number of Executive Councillors (if there be more than one) in charge of reserved subjects should be Indians. (8) The number of members of the Legislative Assembly should be raised to 150 and the proportion of the elected members should be four-fifths. (9) The President and the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly should be elected by the Assembly. (10) The Legislative Assembly should have power to make or modify its own rules of business and they shall not require the sanction of the Governor General. (11) There shall be an obligation to convene meetings of the Council and Assembly at stated intervals, or on the requisition of a certain proportion of members. (12) A statutory guarantee should be given that full responsible government should be established in the whole of British India within a period not exceeding 15 years. (13) That there should be no Privy Council for the present. | (V) (a) ‘This Conference, while making due allowance for the necessities or drawbacks of transitional scheme, urges that, having regard to the terms of the announcement of August 20, 1917, and in order that the progress of India towards the goal of a self-governing unit of the British Empire may be facilitated and not unduly delayed or hampered, as also with a view to avoid the untoward consequences of a legislature containing a substantially elected popular element being allowed merely to indulge in criticism unchecked by responsibility, it is essential that the principle of responsible government’ should be introduced also in the Government of India, simultaneously with a similar reform in the provinces. There should, therefore, be a division of functions in the Central Government into ‘reserved’ and ‘transferred’ as a part of the present instalment of reforms and the Committee on division of functions should be instructed to investigate the subject and make recommendations. (b) While, as suggested above, some measures of transfer of power to the Indian Legislature should be introduced at the commencement, provision should be made for future progress towards complete responsible government of the Government of India by specifically authorizing the proposed periodic Commissions to inquire into the matter and to recommend to Parliament such further advance as may be deemed necessary or desirable in that behalf. (c) The power of certification given to the Governor-General should be limited to matters involving the defence of the country’s foreign and political relations, and peace and order and should not be extended to ‘good government’ generally or ‘sound financial administration.’ (e) This Conference recommends that the composition of the Council of State should be so altered as to ensure that one half of its total strength shall consist of elected members. (f) The Indian element in the Executive Government of India should be one-half of the total number of that Government. |
Provincial Governments
| 1. There should be no additional members of the Executive Government without portfolios. 2. From the commencement of the first Council the principle of responsibility of the ministers to the legislature shall come into force. 3. The status and salary of the ministers shall be the same as that of the members of Executive Council. 4. At least half the number of Executive Councillors in charge of reserved subjects (if there be more than one) should be Indians. 5. The Budget shall be under the control of the Legislature subject to the contribution to the Government of India, and during the life-time of the reformed Councils, to the allocation of a fixed sum for the reserved subjects; and should fresh taxation be necessary, it should be imposed by the provincial Governments, as a whole for both transferred and reserved subjects. | (e) The proposal to appoint an additional Member or Members from among the senior officials, without portfolios and without vote for purposes of consultation and advice only, but as Members of the Executive Government, in the provinces should be dropped. (1) (a) The status and emoluments of Ministers should be identical with those of Executive Councillors, and the Governor should not have greater power of control over them than over the latter. (b) Whatever power may be given to the Governor-in-Council to interfere with the decisions of the Governor and Ministers on the ground of their possible effects on the administration of the reserved subjects, corresponding power should be given to the Governor and Ministers in respect of decisions of the Governor-in-Council affecting directly or indirectly the administration of the transferred subjects. (d) Heads of provincial Governments in the major provinces should ordinarily be selected from the ranks of public men in the United Kingdom. (e) No administrative control over subjects vested in provincial Governments should be ‘reserved’ in the central Government particularly in respect of ‘transferred’ heads. (f) The Government of India should have no power to make a supplementary levy upon the provinces; they may only take loans from the latter on occasions of emergency. (2) This Conference recommends that the largest possible number of subjects should be included in the ‘transferred’ list in every province as the progress and conditions of each province may justify and that none mentioned in the Illustrative List No. 11 appended to the Report should, as far as possible, be ‘reserved’ in any province. IX (c) The Legislative Councils should have the right to elect their own Presidents and Vice-Presidents. VIII (b) The elected element in the Provincial Legislative Councils should be four-fifths of the total strength of the Councils at least in the more advanced provinces. IX. 1 (a) It should be provided that when a Council is dissolved by the Governor, a fresh election should be held and the new Council summoned not later than four months after the dissolution. VIII (a) The Franchise should be as wide and the composition of the Legislative Council should be as liberal as circumstances may admit in each province, the number of representatives of the general territorial electorates being fixed in every case at not less than one-half of the whole council. (c) The franchise should be so broad and the electorates so devised as to secure to all classes of tax-payers their due representation by election and the interests of those communities or groups of communities in Madras and the Bombay Deccan and elsewhere who at present demand special electoral protection should be adequately safeguarded by introducing a system of plural constituencies in which a reasonable number of seats should be reserved for those communities. (e) In the case of any community for which separate special electorates may be deemed at present necessary, participation in the general territorial electorates, whether as voters or candidates, should not be permitted. (f) It shall be left to the option of an individual belonging to a community which is given separate representation to enrol himself as a voter either in the general or the communal electorate. |
| Legislature | |
| 1. While holding that the people are ripe for the introduction 2. The President and the Vice-President should be elected by the Council. 3. That the proposal to institute a Grand Committee shall be dropped. The Provincial Legislative Council shall legislate in respect of all matters within the jurisdiction of provincial Government, including Law, Justice and Police but where the Government is not satisfied with the decision of the Legislative Council in respect of matters relating to Law, Justice and Police, it shall be open to the Government to refer the matter to the Government of India. The Government of India may refer the matter to the Indian Legislature and the ordinary procedure shall follow. But if Grand Committees are instituted, this Congress is of opinion, that not less than one-half of the strength shall be elected by the Legislative Assembly. 4. The proportion of elected members in the Legislative Council shall be four fifths. | |
| Elections | |
| 5. Whenever the Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, or the Legislative Council is dissolved, it shall be obligatory 6. The Legislative Assembly should have power to make or modify its own rules of business and they shall not require the sanction of the Governor-General. 7. There should be an obligation to convene meetings of the Council and Assembly at stated intervals, or on the requisition of a certain proportion of members of the Assembly. 8. No dissolution of the legislature shall take place except by way of an appeal to the electorate and the reason shall be stated in writing countersigned by the Ministers. |
Parliament and India Office
Mahomedan Representation
| Resolution VII. The proportion of Mahomedans in the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly as laid down in the Congress-League Scheme must be maintained. | (VIII) (d) Mahomedan representation in every legislature should be in the proportions mentioned in the Scheme adopted by the Congress and the Muslim League at Lucknow in 1916. |
Army Commissions
| Resolution XII. This Congress places on record its deep disappointment at the altogether inadequate response made by the Government to the demand for the grant of commissions to Indians in the army, and is of opinion that steps should be immediately taken so as to enable the grant to Indians at | (b) This Conference strongly urges that Indians should be nominated to 20 per cent., to start with, of King’s commissions in the Indian Army and that adequate provision for training them should be made in this country itself. |
Public Services
| Resolution XVII. That this Congress is of opinion that the proportion of annual recruitment to the Indian civil service to be made in England should be 50 per cent. to start with, such recruitment to be by open competition in India from persons already appointed to the Provincial Civil Service. | X (a) This Conference thanks the Secretary of State and the Viceroy for recommending that all racial bars should be abolished and for recognizing the principle of recruiting of all the Indian public services in India and in England instead of any service being recruited for exclusively in the latter country. |
Franchise for Women
| Resolution VIII. Women possessing the same qualifications as are laid down for men in any part of the Scheme shall not be disqualified on account of sex. |
| Constitution of Councils | Constitution of Periodic Commission |
| Resolution XIII. That, so far as the question of determining the franchise and the constituence and the composition of the Legislative Assemblies is concerned, this Congress is of opinion that, instead of being left to be dealt with by Committees, it should be decided by the House of Commons and be incorporated in the statute to be framed for the constitution of the Indian Government. Resolution XIV. That as regards the Committee to advise on the question of the separation of Indian from provincial functions and also with regard to the Committee if any for the | 9 (b) Some provision should be made for the appointment and cooperation of qualified Indians on the periodic commission proposed to be appointed every ten or twelve years and it should further be provided that the first periodic commission shall come to India and submit its recommendations to Parliament before the expiry of the third Legislative Council after the Reform Scheme comes into operation and that every subsequent periodic commission should be appointed at the end of every ten years. |
| Or | |
| In the alternative; if a Committee is appointed for the purpose, the two non-official members of the Committee should be elected—one by the All-India Congress Committee and the other by the Council of the Moslem League while the coopted non-official for each province should be elected by the Provincial Congress Committee of that province. |
The All-India Muslim League is in substantial accord with the resolutions of the Special Congress. It will be easily seen that Indian opinion, of both Hindus and Mussulmans, is substantially in accord in their demands for the democratization of the Central government and in their criticism of the rest of the scheme. The Indians have thus exercised their right of self-determination through their popular bodies and are entitled to get what they demand. After all, what they ask for is only a modest instalment of autonomy under British control.
In the appendices the reader will find a comparative table showing (a) the present Constitution of Government in India (b) the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy (c) and the Congress League Scheme.
