The empire of Japan has, for a long period, adopted and carried with effect all the exclusive maxims of Chinese policy, with a degree of rigour unknown even in China itself. Previously to the expulsion of the Portuguese and the extirpation of Christianity in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Japanese trade was reckoned by far the most advantageous which could be pursued in the East, and very much superior to either the Indian or Chinese trade. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, a very extensive trade was for some permitted to be carried on by the Dutch, on account of the benefits which the Japanese imagined themselves to have received from that nation during the Portuguese war, and especially the detection of a formidable conspiracy of some of the Japanese princes to dethrone the emperor, the correspondence relative to which was intercepted at sea. It was for these services that the Dutch originally procured the imperial edict, by which they were permitted to trade to Japan, to the exclusion of all other European nations. This public act of their ancestors, the Japanese have repeatedly declared that they will not cancel; but they have done every thing but formally cancel it, for a more limited and less free trade never was carried on by one rich nation with another.[284] For more than half a century, the Dutch trade has been limited to two yearly ships from Batavia, the cargoes of both of which scarcely ever exceeded the value of 300,000 dollars, and their only profitable returns are Japan copper, and a small quantity of camphor. To shew themselves impartial in their restrictions, the Japanese have limited the traffic of the Chinese, the only eastern nation whom they suffer to trade with them at all, in a similar manner to that of the Dutch, and they suffer no more than ten Chinese junks to visit Nangasaki in the year. The trade of those two favoured nations is also limited to the port of Nangasaki.

In pursuance of their exclusive maxims, and conformably to the terms of their agreement with the Dutch, the Japanese have, on every occasion, followed an uniform line of conduct, and rejected, in the most peremptory manner, the various overtures of different nations of Europe, refusing equally to have any intercourse, negociation or commerce, with any of them. It must also be admitted, that the whole foreign trade of Japan, compared with the riches of the country, is absolutely trifling; nor is there any rich or powerful body of them, like the Hong merchants of China, at all interested in its continuance. The yearly presents, whether offered to the governor of Nangasaki or the emperor, are of no great value, and rigidly limited by law and usage; and as the government of Japan is much stronger and more vigilant than that of China, no such abuses can be ventured on at Nangasaki as those which exist at Canton.

The commercial intercourse of the Dutch at Japan was established by an imperial edict in their favour from the emperor Gonging Soma, in the year 1611. [Vol II Pg xviii]

The first Dutch factory was established at Firando, but in the year 1641 it was removed to Nangasaki. The number of the Dutch ships, and the kind of merchandize which they imported, were then left entirely to the discretion of the parties; the merchandize was disposed of to the best advantage, and the returns consisted of such articles as were expected to yield the greatest profit. They were subject only to the municipal regulations of the country, without any further restraint or incumbrance whatever. The trade remained in this state till the year 1671. In the Dutch records of this period, the only complaints made against Japanese authority relate to restrictions laid upon them in matters of religion.

In the beginning the returns from Japan consisted of silver and copper; and the former being coined, was received according to the current value in that country, where the coins and weights went by the same name as in China, viz. katis, tahils, mas, and kandarins. Ten mas were worth a tahil, sixteen tahil a kati, and one hundred kati weighed one hundred and twenty, or one hundred and twenty-one, pounds Dutch, equal to a mark.

There were two sorts of silver, of which the fine was called zoma, and coarser bar-silver, generally distinguished by the Dutch under the terms of heavy and light money. This was at first carried to account at the rate of sixty-two stivers and a half per tahil, no difference being made in the books of that time between the two kinds; but in the year 1635, the common or bar-silver, was fixed at fifty-seven stivers the tahil. Both kinds, according to this regulation, were considered by the Dutch as calculated too high for an article of merchandize, and consequently were not much in demand in the western parts of India, to which it was at first sent by the Company.

The attention of the Dutch being, however, afterwards attracted to the trade in gold from Japan, orders were issued to the factors in the year 1640, requiring gold as a return, to the amount of from ten to twelve hundred thousand florins. These orders were executed with the best success; and a wish seems, on this occasion, to have been expressed by the factory, that Japan might, as formerly, be permitted to supply from one hundred to one hundred and fifty chests of gold kobangs, ubangs, and zebos. Gold and silver were, at this time, the principal articles in the returns from Japan. Their copper was not much in demand, probably because it was so little known in India or Europe; yet the directors, in their requisition for the year 1655, state the price of Japan copper having risen from thirty-six to forty-six florins per hundred pounds weight, and an order having been sent to Japan for twenty thousand pikuls of that metal, the same rendered great profit.

In 1644, requisitions were made from Surat for two thousand pikuls, from Coromandel for one thousand pikuls, and from Batavia for four thousand pikuls of copper; and in reply it is stated, that it would not be difficult to furnish the quantity required; that the Japan copper consisted of both sheet and bar copper, of which the former was purchased at twenty tahils the pikul, or twelve stivers (inferior silver) per pound, being twenty per cent. cheaper than European copper.

The gold, after being coined, was found a very profitable article, being[Vol II Pg xix] purchased at a favourable rate. In the beginning the kobang was purchased for six tahil eight mas, and for six tahil seven mas; and, as appears from the books of 1669, 1670, and 1671, was within those years even purchased as low as five tahils six mas, and five tahils eight mas, from the great men of the country, or from merchants, according to circumstances. During two of these years, more than one hundred thousand kobangs were obtained, which rendered a profit of one million of florins.

In 1671, an edict was issued by the Japanese government, prohibiting the further exportation of silver; but the profit on the gold being so considerable, the restriction on the exportation of silver was a matter of indifference to the Dutch, who still were enabled to obtain their returns in the more profitable articles of gold and copper.

The exchange of the kobang was now fixed by the Japanese government at sixty-eight mas; and the free and unrestricted trade which the Dutch had hitherto enjoyed, was subjected to an arbitrary valuation of the import cargoes, and limited first with respect to the articles of merchandize, and afterwards with respect to its extent.

The loss of the island of Formosa in 1661, is supposed to have given the first shock to the credit of the Dutch at Japan. Not long after that event they experienced many instances of opposition, and several prejudicial alterations in the trade.

"They (the Japanese) were consequently," observes Mr. Imhoff, in his Memoir on the Japan Trade, "no longer under any apprehension of being annoyed by us, while, if we had remained in possession of Formosa, we were and might have continued masters of the navigation and trade between China and Japan. In that opinion I am still further confirmed, when I consider, in the first instance, that the prejudicial change with respect to our situation at Japan, although it took place only several years after the loss of Formosa, had been already in agitation some time before; and, secondly, that notwithstanding the confidence of the Japanese in their own superiority, which they always evinced, that arrogance did not conceal altogether a certain fear of us, very evident from their great precautions. This fear has, however, since decreased, and if we may trust to the records, has frequently been succeeded by brutality.[285] It is an undeniable truth, that if a nation renders itself respected and formidable it will flourish, and that otherwise it is but little esteemed."

The decline of the trade seems not at first to have been much attended to. "Whether the Japanese," says the same writer, "at that period obtained advice of the advantages we derived from the trade, or that the bad conduct of our servants gave occasion to further restrictions which succeeded each other, we do not know, yet it is undeniable, that first in the year 1685 our trade was limited to three hundred thousand tahils, of which two-thirds were to consist of piece goods and weighable[Vol II Pg xx] articles, and the other third of silks. This was confirmed in 1689, and we were allowed to export only twenty-five thousand pikuls of copper, whereas our exports of that article formerly had been regulated according to our requisition. In the year 1700, the number of our ships was limited to four or five, in lieu of six or seven as were formerly sent, according to circumstances."

The profits of the trade at this period would yet have deserved attention had not a change in the current coin rendered the year 1700 still more disadvantageous. In 1692 and 1693 and afterwards, rich cargoes were sent to Japan which returned considerable profits, and the funds were again laid out in copper, as far as thirty thousand chests or pikuls. The new stipulation of twenty-five thousand chests was of little importance with the Dutch, who knew how, as they confess, to obtain by bribes from the governors and their servants a still further quantity. In the year 1685, the system of receiving the Dutch merchandize by valuation was discontinued; and although it was introduced again in the year 1698, it was once more abolished in the following year.

Various causes are assigned for the change in the current coin which took place about this period; but whether, as was supposed by the Dutch, the knowledge of the Dutch profits upon the kobang opened the eyes of the Japanese, or that their long intercourse with Europeans rendered them more attentive to their own interest, or that the Chinese, who are known to be very expert in the art of coining, proposed that measure to them, or that the easy compliance of the Dutch in all former instances, and while they issued the most injurious orders against their commerce, made them believe that they might purchase their friendship at a cheaper rate than hitherto, or, as seems most probable, it was principally occasioned by other and more weighty causes not yet discovered, it is certain that in the year 1696 appeared, for the first time, a new kind of kobang, of one-third less in value than the old, although tendered to and received by the Dutch at the same rate. Here then was said to commence the iron age.

The new kobang was assayed at thirteen carats six or seven grains, while the old kobang was twenty carats eight and a half, nine, or even ten grains; yet the Dutch were obliged to receive the former at the rate of sixty-eight mas like the old, which weighed thirty-one stivers, and making a difference upon one thousand of seventy-two marks. The old kobang rendered a profit of twenty-five per cent., but the new produced a loss of fifteen or sixteen per cent. on the coast of Coromandel, where it was recoined. Some of the old kobangs being however estimated at the same rate with the new, the Dutch still continued to derive some profits from the gold, until the introduction of a third kind of kobang, denominated the small kobangs, took place.

In 1710 the Japanese resorted to this further change in the coin, by reducing the weight of the kobang nearly one half, the value being twenty-five kanderins, while that of the former was no less than forty-seven kanderins. This caused a loss of from thirty-four to thirty-six per cent., the Dutch being obliged to receive the same at the rate of sixty-eight mas;[Vol II Pg xxi] the former kobangs, of inferior alloy only, were in consequence still preferable. From 1710 to 1720, both sorts were in circulation; but the repeated complaints of the Dutch were at last, in 1720, so far attended to, that the old kobangs, of the same alloy and weight, were again introduced. The latter, however, were called double kobangs, and they were charged in the Dutch accounts at thirteen tahils six mas, which was twice as much as in former times, so that they became still less profitable than the small kobangs, of which two thousand weighed seventy-six marks, while one thousand of the old coin only weighed seventy-two marks, and would consequently, when received in lieu of two small kobangs, have produced a loss of thirty-seven seven-eights per cent.

When an attempt was made, in 1714, to oblige the Dutch to receive the small kobang at the same rate as the old, the exportation of copper was limited to fifteen thousand chests, as was the number of ships to two or three, according to the quantity of copper in store.

A fourth kind of kobang was introduced in 1730, about five per cent. better than the third or small kobang, but the trade continued rapidly to decline until the year 1744.

The loss of many valuable ships and cargoes,[286] a reduction in the selling price of the articles of merchandize which they imported, and an increase of charges attending the visits to the Imperial Court, and the maintenance of their establishment in Japan, contributed to render this period particularly disadvantageous to the Dutch trade. Their submissive conduct at the Emperor's Court was of no avail, nor did their presents of horses, dogs, and other curiosities, produce any better effect. There was no longer any possibility of exporting kobangs, as in former times, for the balance of their accounts. The quantity of copper which they were allowed to export annually had been fixed in 1721 at ten thousand chests, yet even that quantity they were unable to obtain in 1743, so that, together with the high exchange of the tahils, their establishment in Japan now actually subjected them to a loss, and it was accordingly proposed at this period that it should be abandoned, unless some favourable change could be effected.

The charges had considerably increased during the last year. The cargoes were of less value and of an inferior quality, so that their profits were reduced to less than one quarter of what they had been: their expences on account of the Japan trade were at the same time two hundred thousand florins annually. During the last thirty years their profits amounted to five hundred thousand, and for some years to six hundred thousand, but latterly not to two hundred thousand florins per annum.

Thus, to sum up the disasters of this trade, after having been allowed to remain free and unrestrained for a period of sixty years, the cargoes in the year 1672 were subjected to an arbitrary valuation, and about the same time the exchange of the kobang was altered. A tax was laid upon[Vol II Pg xxii] the cargoes in 1685, and further increased in 1689. In 1698 the new kobang was introduced: in 1700 they were limited to four ships annually: in 1710 an exchange still more disadvantageous was fixed: in 1714 their exportation was reduced to fifteen thousand pikuls of copper; in 1717 an order was issued, limiting the trade to two ships only: in 1710 the third, and in 1730 the fourth sort of kobangs were introduced: and in 1743 the Dutch were limited to one ship and to one-half of the cargo.

The Dutch, in deliberating upon the measure of abandoning the trade, in the year 1744, trace all their disasters in this commerce, to their having tamely submitted, in the first instance, to take the kobang of reduced value at the same rate as the old one. It then occurred to them, that if serious remonstrances had been made in the beginning, their firmness might have prevented the subsequent losses. "In the first instance," says Mr. Imhoff, "our commerce was carried on as by a people groping in the dark, neither knowing the actual price of purchase or sale; because the kobang being the standard coin of the country, that kobang ought to have been calculated in proportion to the value of the tahil, and it would have appeared that since 1710 for forty stivers inferior silver, thirty stivers superior silver were received, and all articles of trade not disposed of with a profit of sixty-three per cent. rendered a loss. And this being the case with most of the cargoes that were sent to Japan after the period above mentioned, we ought either to have relinquished that commerce, or had recourse to such means as might have tended to re-establish the affairs of the Company. Instead, however, of so doing, fruitless remonstrances and solicitations were employed, which finally produced this effect, that the Japanese, during the latter years, granted us, by way of charity, an additional sum of six thousand tahils upon the sale of our cargoes."

From the deliberations which took place at this period, it appears that the proposal then under consideration of relinquishing the trade, was rather intended as a provisional and political measure, to induce the Japanese to admit them to more favourable terms in future, than brought forward with the view of finally abandoning or relinquishing the trade altogether.

The public opinion of the time was, that the Japanese had recourse to these measures of restriction for no other purpose, but to oblige the Dutch to depart from the country; but it occurred to the Dutch government, that a nation which treated strangers in so despotic a manner, had no need to resort to such shifts to dislodge them. Another opinion was, that the restrictions laid on the trade proceeded from political motives, of which the first and most important was their hatred against all the different persuasions of the Christian religion without exception;[287] but the government were inclined to consider these reasons as deserving of little notice. "There is no probability," observes Mr. Imhoff, "that, in the present enlightened age, it can be a consideration, even with the Japanese, of what persuasion merchants are, who neither attempt to [Vol II Pg xxiii]propagate their religion with a view to promote their interest, nor to endanger the safety of the state, of neither of which they appear ever to have been suspected." The governor-general was further of opinion, that the Japanese could derive no advantage from the expulsion of the Dutch, as they would thus be cut off from all correspondence with Europeans, and thereby become subject to greater inconveniences than at present, being exposed to the visits of others, whose great increase in those regions was not unknown to them; for, as he states, it is notorious that the Japanese government took annual information of all that passed in the world, and that the Dutch servants had orders to answer their queries faithfully, in order that contrary reports might not injure their credit, by which the Japanese were well aware that if the Dutch withdrew, others would soon settle in the country.[288] Instead, therefore, of attributing the conduct of the Japanese to either of these causes, the governor-general laid it entirely to the account of their interested desire to take every possible advantage of the weakness of the Dutch, who, by admitting the first imposition, laid themselves open to all that followed.

In his very able and interesting memoir "On the Trade of Japan and the Causes which occasioned its Decline,"?—"It is by no means surprizing," says Mr. Imhoff, "that the Japanese, when they altered the kobang, likewise made a change in the delivery of the copper, observing that our exchange remained always the same, and the prices of our merchandize unalterably fixed. We cannot pass unnoticed, that this wrong calculation has been the cause that, on our part, many valuable articles of commerce, which were from time to time tendered to us by the Japanese, were declined. Among those articles was yellow copper or brass, Japan porcelain, of which musters were sent in 1736, and camphor, which we might have exported from thence, if our return cargoes had not been complete. Whether the sovereign right to regulate the trade of their country is not equally vested in the government of Japan with any other nation, I will leave undecided. Seeing us patiently submitting to all kinds of restrictions, inattentive in keeping our accounts in a regular order, they were encouraged to put us to the last shift. I am not inclined to dwell upon our surprising indifference, which was concealed at the same time under the cloak of mystery, from whence so many evil consequences resulted. I am of opinion, that it cannot be either the interest or inclination of the Japanese to oblige us to relinquish all intercourse with their country, provided our trade be carried on within narrow bounds, and they are not losing upon the articles delivered to us in payment for our cargoes. It is not possible that they can have any profit on the copper, if it is sold for less than one kobang. The mines certainly cannot be worked at a cheaper rate than formerly; and what profit do the venders of the copper derive from our merchandize, after it has fallen into the hands of the interpreters to government and others? Nothing is more natural, therefore,[Vol II Pg xxiv] than that our exportation of copper from Japan should have become a burden to that class of people, and that their complaints contributed to the restrictions to which we are now subject. There is no doubt, that if the Japanese could keep up the communication without allowing us a single chest of copper, they would willingly grant us six thousand tahils as a gratification, over and above the stipulated price for our cargo."

In considering the reforms to be introduced into the management of the trade in future, the first point which attracted attention was a better calculation of the coin, with reference to the intrinsic value, and a calculation being made upon a new basis, allowed a higher price to be paid for the copper than before. It was estimated, that if the Dutch could annually procure twenty thousand pikuls of copper at twenty tahils, the Japan trade would still be lucrative, allowing the profits on the outward-bound cargoes to be merely sufficient for the support of the factory.

But in order to purchase and to pay for such a quantity of copper, the governor-general observes, "it is necessary that government should strictly comply with the requisitions from Japan, because our failures therein have brought us into such discredit with the Japanese, that they do not any longer place confidence in our promises. We have passed our word from year to year, that the quality and the quantity of our merchandize should be better assorted, without ever attending to it. Even at this moment, the supply differs so very much from the quantity required, that it will be extremely difficult to convince the Japanese that they shall be better served in future; and still it must be done, because if we wish to obtain the value of eight hundred or four hundred thousand tahils of copper annually, besides camphor and other articles, different measures must be resorted to. We are hardly able, at present, to supply one-third of that amount, and load the ships with coarse goods.

"We have no doubt but other productions of Japan might also be procured at a cheaper rate than at present. Camphor may be purchased in abundance at thirty tahils the pikul, and it is probable the same could still be obtained on more favourable terms, if we advert to what it cost formerly; in which case it would become a profitable remittance to Holland, and render one hundred per cent., or thereabouts.

"The white copper (tutenague) has been tendered to us at sixteen tahils per pikul, but has not been accepted, the price being considered too high. If, however, we can dispose of it merely at the same price as the yellow copper (brass), which yields according to the price current before us 41-43 f. per 100 lb., it will not only be acceptable, but even render a reasonable profit of fifty per cent.

"Iron was formerly imported here from Japan, and might perhaps be procured at a moderate price, which for the sake of the small distance between us and that country would be very desirable.[289]

"Sulphur was also declined in 1726, on account of its being charged[Vol II Pg xxv] too high; yet it might still become an article worth attention, especially if it were purified in Japan. And who knows how many other valuable productions might be drawn from that extensive country, besides those already mentioned, and which would be very acceptable, in an economical as well as a mercantile point of view?"[290]

The following facts are collected from the considerations at this time.

That in former times the commerce of foreign nations at Japan amounted to ten millions of florins, and since then for many years to 3,150,000 florins, of which the Chinese share was two-thirds, and the Dutch one-third; and it was consequently presumed, that in so extensive a country as Japan, merchandize might still be disposed of to the value of one million, especially if it was paid for in the productions of the country.

That one of the causes of the decline of the trade was the conduct of the Company's servants, and the extent to which the private trade of individuals was carried. The directors of the trade at Japan had been selected from a very inferior class of society, and the peculations on overweight of the copper, &c. formed the subject of a regular complaint made by the Japanese to the Dutch government.

That the trade of the Chinese to Japan had been reduced from eighty to twenty junks in the year, the number then allowed.

In concluding his valuable and interesting Memoir, the Baron Van Imhoff declares it to be his firm belief, that Japan was, in every respect, what it had been formerly; that the same quantity of merchandize might be disposed of there as in former times, and that returns of equal value might be obtained; that although the profits should be less at present, there could be no reason to relinquish that trade; that the means of the Dutch were certainly inferior at that moment to what they had been, yet that if they adhered to the measures proposed (namely, clear accounts, correctness and honesty of conduct, and a good assortment of cargoes), which were easy, and could not expose them to any risk or danger, they might hope for a favourable issue.

In the course of all these deliberations, the Dutch seem to have concluded that the debasement of the coin was resorted to by the Japanese, solely with the view of affecting their trade, and never to have reflected that so important a change in the intrinsic value of the standard coin of the country, might have been occasioned by political causes, of far greater magnitude to the Japanese than the paltry gain to be obtained on the traffic of the Dutch cargoes. It is most probable that the empire of Japan, at the periods when these changes took place, wished to check the exportation of the precious metals of the country. In the first instance, we perceive a prohibition against the exportation of silver. The loss of this metal was first felt, because the principal exports were at first made in this coin; but it is never hinted that this prohibition was occasioned by any desire to take an undue advantage of the Dutch: on the contrary, this measure was not found to affect the Dutch trade at all. The same causes, however, which first led to a prohibition regarding silver, operated afterwards in an equal degree with respect to gold; and it is easy to[Vol II Pg xxvi] account for the rise in the value of this metal, and the consequent changes in the coin, by the scarcity which ensued. Let us but reflect on the enormous exportation of the precious metals, which took place from Japan at the period when the trade was unlimited, and we shall find abundant cause for these changes in the coin, without accusing the Japanese of resorting to the measure as an imposition on the foreign merchant. "The exports at one period," says Mr. Imhoff, "amounted to ten millions of florins." These were principally made in the precious metals and in the coin of the country; and when the trade fell exclusively into the hands of the Dutch, it had been usual to export at first from one hundred to one hundred and fifty chests of silver, and subsequently the trade admitted of no less than two hundred chests of gold coin being exported instead of the silver. On a moderate calculation, therefore, the exports of the former period were about one million sterling, and those continued by the Dutch could not be less than from half a million to a million sterling in each year; so that, during a period of sixty years, the total export would have amounted to from thirty to sixty millions of pounds sterling, and this does not include what found its way to China and other neighbouring countries.

The discovery of the mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about one-third of what it had before been:[291] and might not the extensive drain on Japan have produced in that country an opposite effect of the same magnitude? If the gold and silver annually imported into Spain and Portugal, which did not commonly exceed six millions pounds sterling, produced this effect on the circulating medium, and the price of the precious metals throughout all Europe, in one country of which alone the circulating gold and silver amounted, by some accounts to eighteen, and by others to thirty, millions.[292] Is it not easy to conclude, that a directly contrary and equally extensive effect must have been felt in Japan? and that this effect must have been felt in a still higher degree, while operating on the confined circulating medium of one nation, than while operating on that of the numerous nations of Europe, who again found means to dispose of large quantities by remittances to the eastern world?

The extensive circulation of money throughout the populous and rich empire of Japan, and the facility with which the drains upon it could be supplied from the mines, was perhaps the cause that, in the first instance, the exportation of the precious metals was not sensibly felt; but afterwards, when probably the mint could not keep pace with the demand, and what is not unlikely, the demand was even too heavy for the mines, the intrinsic value of the coins increased in proportion to the scarcity; and it is not surprising that the Japanese should have entertained an apprehension lest the mines would become exhausted. Whether there were any immediate grounds for such an apprehension is uncertain; but it is generally believed that an edict was issued to discontinue working, first the silver, and afterwards the gold mines, but not until the nominal, and perhaps the real, value of both metals, and particularly of the latter, had [Vol II Pg xxvii]been nearly doubled, as in the instance of the kobang of the original value being offered to the Dutch for two kobangs.

That the Dutch perhaps owe the loss of this valuable trade, in a great measure, to the incapacity and worthlessness of their own servants, cannot but be admitted; for had they, on these continued reductions in the value of the current coins, adverted to the political cause, and calculated their commercial transactions according to the intrinsic, instead of the nominal, value, they would not have subjected themselves, unknowingly, to a loss of sixty per cent. upon the proceeds of all their exports: nor would they have shewn their weakness and ignorance to the Japanese, but they would immediately have devised the advantage of other returns from Japan, in articles, the exportation of which might, at the same time, have improved the industry and prosperity of that empire; and the Japanese, finding them equally intelligent and enterprising under all circumstances, while they felt an interest in the continuance of the trade, would have respected the nation by whom it was carried on. If, however, by these means, the European character and the value of foreign trade thus declined in the estimation of the Japanese, how much lower must that of the Dutch nation have fallen, when after once dictating the prices of all articles both bought and sold, we find them obtaining at last an advance on their proceeds of the outward cargo, by way of charity, and the Japanese themselves appealing against the peculations and corruptions that were carried on! When we see the Dutch, without power and without respect, dictating in the mighty empire of Japan an arbitrary and extravagant price for their commodities, in the same manner as they did at home, is it surprising that we should find the Japanese having recourse to a fixed valuation? When we observe the illicit trade to Japan carried on by private individuals, to such an extent, that Valentyn, a Dutch author of the highest authority, says it was so interwoven with the constitution of the Company, and so extensive, that it formed the principal part of the trade, and could never be prevented, and that the Dutch ships were frequently lost by being overladen with cargoes of this kind, we cannot be astonished at the decline of the prosperity of the Company, or the degradations which were imposed upon its agents. The Dutch factory was, and is, in fact, a sink of the most disgraceful corruption and peculation which ever existed. The factor to obtain his own ends, submits to every possible degradation, and the government of Batavia knows only just as much of what is going on at Japan, as it is his interest to tell them. In this work it has become a painful duty to advert occasionally to the shameful scenes of fraud and corruption carried on under the very eyes of the government of Batavia, and in the dependencies in the more immediate vicinity of that metropolis, where their residents enjoyed such extensive powers, and were so removed from controul and responsibility, that their interests constantly interfered with their duties, and the struggle between principle and opportunity generally ended in a resolution to make fortunes, to connive at each other's peculations, and keep their own secret. If this was the case on the island of Java, the seat of government, what must it not have been in a country so remote as Japan, where the con[Vol II Pg xxviii]nection and intercourse were so peculiar? It is not surprising, that in the accounts of such a factory, the government at home should find nothing but intricacy and obscurity. It was the interest of the factor to keep every thing involved in mystery, and no where was there a better opportunity for doing so.

But had the shameful and disgraceful conduct of these people been felt only in its effects upon the past, it would be trifling, compared to what they are calculated to produce on the future. The unmanly degradation to which these factors have submitted at the caprice, and often for the amusement of the Japanese, in order to gain their own ends, seem to have established an effectual bar against the future extension of the trade by the Dutch nation, who will find it difficult, if not impracticable, ever to be again respected in Japan. Unless, therefore, the Dutch have magnanimity enough to abandon this trade, when they find it of little comparative value to them, or when they see it must be conducted on principles derogatory to the dignity of the illustrious House of Orange, it is to be feared, that the day is far distant, when the opportunity will be afforded of opening a liberal and honourable communication between Europe and this interesting and important empire. Perhaps this will not happen until, according to Humboldt, the two great oceans shall be united by means of a channel across the Isthmus of Darien, when the productions of Nootka Sound and of China will be brought more than two thousand leagues nearer to Europe and the United States, and when alone any great changes can be effected in the political state of Eastern Asia; "for this neck of land," observes that writer, "the barrier against the waves of the Atlantic Ocean, has been for many ages the bulwark of the independence of China and Japan."[293]

From the year 1750 no essential alteration appears to have taken place in the trade: the utmost exertions of the Dutch were required to provide the cargoes, and whenever they succeeded, return cargoes were always provided, to the extent of two or three ships in the year. In order to afford a better view of the nature and extent of the restricted trade thus carried on, the accounts of two of these expeditions to Japan are annexed, from which it will appear, that in the voyage of 1804-5 the Company exported from Batavia to the Japan market commodities to the amount of 211,896 rix-dollars in value; that the charges attendant on the shipment and freight amounted to 167,500 rix-dollars (including 2,915 rix-dollars on account of customs), making the whole expenses of the voyage, with the prime cost of the articles, amount to 379,397 rix-dollars. These articles, when sold in Japan, brought 160,378 rix-dollars; but the expenses and disbursements at Japan in one year for the establishment, the loss on the weight of the sugar, and the expense of making the journey to Japan, reduced that sum to 92,426 rix-dollars. The return cargo brought to Batavia the sum of 886,554 rix-dollars, or a profit of 507,147 rix-dollars on the adventure. The cargo and return of 1806, and the expense of the establishment, cost the Company 393,582 rix-dollars, (including 2,846 for customs), and the sales and other receipts produced [Vol II Pg xxix]569,089, leaving a balance of 175,505 rix-dollars in favour of the adventure.

A more correct judgment may perhaps be formed from the result of the adventures undertaken from Batavia during the provisional authority of the British government. The first of these was intimately connected with a political object, to which the mercantile adventure was made subservient, and both were undertaken without those previous arrangements which would have insured a better assorted and cheaper cargo. The articles were purchased on the spot and at the moment, and the vessels engaged at a very high rate of freight. In the first, in particular, the sugar being of inferior quality, there was a loss in the weight, and it was otherwise less profitable than it would have been, had the assortment been of the same quality which the Dutch company were in the habit of sending. The freight alone amounted to the enormous sum of 82,309 Spanish dollars. From the outward-bound cargoes it was necessary to pay the debts of the former government, amounting to 48,648 Spanish dollars; and this, with other disbursements and necessary provisions, rendering the proceeds of the outward-bound cargo insufficient to furnish the amount requisite for the payment of the copper; the Dutch factor availed himself of the opportunity to supply the deficiency of fourteen hundred pikuls at the rate of twenty-five dollars per 120? pounds, amounting to 25,000 Spanish dollars; differing from the rate paid to the Japanese of 12.3.5 tahils, or ten rix-dollars per pikul, to an extent of fifteen rix-dollars against government. Besides this, the whole of the outward cargo was not sold: several articles of merchandize remained undisposed of at Japan, amounting to 19,688 Spanish dollars, to be accounted for in the ensuing year. All these operated essentially to reduce the profits of a voyage, which depended exclusively on the return cargo.

The results of these voyages, however limited as the profits were, appear fully sufficient to shew the importance of this trade to Batavia, even as it at present stands, considering that it affords a market for so large a quantity of the produce of the country, and that when the government seemed disinclined to send a further adventure on their own account, there were not wanting numerous individuals anxious to obtain a license to undertake the trade, and to run all the risks attached to it.[294] [Vol II Pg xxx]

In the year 1616, the English obtained a grant from the emperor, containing the privileges for a general trade with Japan, in consequence of which a commercial establishment was formed there by the Company.

In obtaining those privileges, one great object with the Company appears to have been to introduce themselves to a connection with the Chinese, and to carry on a general trade between India, China, and Japan; but finding themselves disappointed in their endeavours to form connections with China, and sustaining heavy losses in consequence of their trade with Japan, they determined, in 1623, to abandon their establishment there.

From that time, until the year 1673, no attempt appears to have been made by the English Company to renew their intercourse with Japan. The attempt made at that period entirely failed of success, owing, it was stated, to the king of England having married a daughter of the king of Portugal. About the same time the Company, with a view to the same object, formed an establishment on the Island of Hounan; but after struggling with great difficulties, sustaining heavy losses, and being totally disappointed in their expectations of communicating with Japan, the factory was ordered to be withdrawn in the year 1682.

At a subsequent period (in the year 1699), the Company having established a regular communication with China, their supra-cargoes were instructed to use every endeavour in their power to promote an intercourse with Japan, for the purpose of introducing woollens, &c. into that country, but without any appearance of success.

A select committee of the East-India Company, appointed in 1792 to take into consideration the export trade of Great Britain to the East Indies, after detailing the cargo of a Dutch ship from Japan in the year 1664, which consisted principally of copper, camphor, silk-stuffs, and china-ware, conclude their report by observing, that, in their opinion, the trade with Japan never can become an object of attention for the manufactures and produce of Great Britain; for supposing, they observe, that woollens, lead, and curiosities for a cargo to Japan, could be made to £8,000, what is to be required in payment? About £30,000 or £32,000 value in copper, an article which is also the produce of Great Britain, and which must be disposed of in India, to the prejudice of their own mines. Thus Great Britain would gain, on the one hand, £8,000, whilst the loss, on the other, would be £32,000. [Vol II Pg xxxi]

This opinion, however, would appear to have been formed on a very partial view of the subject, and with reference to the limited nature of the trade as it then existed; but it would be as unfair to judge of the value of the Japan trade to the British nation from this narrow view, as it would be to decide upon that subject merely from the result of the adventures to Japan undertaken during the recent provisional government of Batavia, which, besides other disadvantages, were, for political reasons, carried on with a scrupulous regard to the restrictions under which the trade of the Dutch had latterly laboured.

It is objected to a direct communication with Japan, and the consequent exportation of British merchandize by British ships, that, in all probability, it would entirely put a stop to the present exportation of woollens by the Chinese, and that, in proportion as the exports from Great Britain to Japan increased, those from Great Britain to China might be expected to diminish; the Japanese being, at present, almost exclusively supplied with British woollens by means of the Chinese: that, however, the demand for teas would continue the same, and therefore the defalcation in exports to China must be made up in bullion, or by drafts on Bengal.

It is admitted that the Bengal government might provide for this additional demand, by disposing of the copper brought from Japan in the Calcutta market; but this, it is stated, would prove a considerable check to the consumption of one of the most valuable articles of export from Great Britain, and therefore it has been inferred, that the final result of the trade with Japan would, in all probability, be the exchange of our woollens for copper, which we have already in abundance, instead of bartering them for teas, which, in the present state of Great Britain, will be always required.

But this argument seems evidently to have been grounded on a supposition that copper must always form the principal, if not only, article of commerce with Japan. An inference by no means borne out by the history of the Dutch trade; in the course of which, it is expressly stated by the Baron Van Imhoff, who appears to have given the subject the most mature and deliberate consideration, and to have been aided by much local information, that the Japanese would willingly pay a sum of money to be excused from the delivery of any copper at all.

But admitting that a connection between Great Britain and Japan might not be attended with all the commercial profits which might be expected from a consideration of the productions of the two countries, would it not, in a political point of view, be of the most essential importance to her interests in China, which are acknowledged by all to be so important? Might we not expect from the Chinese a more respectful and correct conduct than has been customary with them, if they knew that we were in some measure independent of our connection with them? and is it not important, that in case of our actual exclusion from China, there should still be a channel open for our obtaining commodities, with which we are at present supplied by that country? [Vol II Pg xxxii]