442. An attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and properly used.
To gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as both sides will probably hold a strong firing line.
443. With large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. However, if the enemy is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results.
444. Owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable except in large forces.
445. If the attack can be so directed that, while the front is covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less obliquely (an enveloping attack) the advantages gained are a longer line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the enemy's diverging fire.
446. An envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a very decided superiority in numbers.
447. The enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. The advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its preponderance of rifles and its converging fire.
448. Cooperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is essential to success. Both should be pushed vigorously and simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire.
The envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves. The two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. The troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and practical manner.
The enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in small forces.
DEPLOYMENT FOR ATTACK.
449. Where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it may be necessary to make the deployment 2 miles or more from the hostile position.
The foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. If the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering troops must drive them back.
450. To enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and to deploy at night. In such case the area in which the deployment is to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops before dark.
The deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground has been studied by daylight. The deployment gains little unless it establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's main position. (See Night Operations.)
451. Each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for advancing in close order. In the firing line, intervals of 25 to 50 yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. In the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be pointed out on the ground.
452. The reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand at the decisive stage. It is posted with reference to the attack, or to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept intact.
Supports are considered in paragraphs 225 to 228, inclusive, and 298 to 302, inclusive.
ADVANCING THE ATTACK.
453. The firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it is justified in opening fire. It can not combat the enemy's artillery, and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range rifle fire. Hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing position at the shortest range possible.
Formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered in paragraphs 212 to 220, inclusive. These and other methods of crossing such zones should be studied and practiced.
454. The best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the enemy's view.
455. Each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain ground.
The position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in paragraphs 306 to 308, inclusive.
456. It will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the attack to pass through deployed artillery. This should be done so as to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. As far as practicable, advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. An understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had, so as to effect the movement to the best advantage.
457. In advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or to clear the foreground of the enemy. Fire on the hostile main position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing line can join in the fire.
THE FIRE ATTACK.
458. At the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire for a long time. The object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction rushing.
459. To advance without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the apparent success barren of results.
460. Diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the firing line can advance.
461. The men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn back in daylight.
If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.
Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with difficulty.
462. Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or diverted from their true missions on this account.
463. Paragraphs 309 to 317, inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire attack.
THE CHARGE.
464. Fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him.
The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide.
465. The defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the charge begins. On the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat. Hence the distance over which the charge may be made will vary between wide limits. It may be from 25 to 400 yards.
The charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises success; otherwise the full advantage of victory will be lost.
466. The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order, before the charge is made. Subordinate commanders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge signal that fact to the commander. It may be necessary for them to wait until other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the necessary reserves arrive.
At the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and reserves rush forward. See paragraphs 318 and 319.
The charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units participating therein, but, once committed to the assault, battalions should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment.
467. Before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. Local reserves joining the firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong impetus. Too dense a mass should be avoided.
468. The line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable, and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in, unless it is very apparent that it can do no good.
469. To arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable value.
470. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is any prospect of success. Under exceptional conditions a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be signaled to the rear.
471. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the promise of success.
472. If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others.
473. The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. If the captured position is part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once.
The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counterattack.
474. If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy.
475. If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available.
See Night Operations.
PURSUIT.
476. To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable.
477. The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found.
The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly re-form, and become a new reserve.
478. If the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity.
479. After the pursuit from the immediate battle field, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned.
480. Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit.
ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS.
481. Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire.
482. If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles.
483. If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night Operations.)
484. In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods.
HOLDING ATTACK.
485. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.
The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack.
486. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves.
487. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear.
488. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed.
