  THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS 1917-1918 BY LIEUT.-COLONEL THE HON. R.M.P. PRESTON, D.S.O. With an Introduction by LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR H.G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. title BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 1921 Printed in Great Britain TO B INTRODUCTION It gives me great pleasure to write a few words of introduction to Lieut.-Col. Preston's History of the Desert Mounted Corps, which I had the honour to command. In writing this History Lieut.-Col. Preston has done a service to his country which I am sure will be fully appreciated, particularly, perhaps, by those who served in the Corps, and who feel that the part they played in the Great War is but little known to the general public. As a work on Cavalry Tactics, I trust it will be of some value to the student of Military History, and, if it does nothing else, it must demonstrate to the world that the horse-soldier is just as valuable in modern warfare as he ever has been in the past. Indeed, the whole of the operations in Palestine and Syria, under General Allenby, were text-book illustrations of the perfect combination of all arms, both in attack and defence, and the last operations in this theatre, which led to the total destruction of the Turkish Arms and the elimination of Germany's Allies from the War, could not have been undertaken without large masses of Cavalry. Lieut.-Col. Preston is well qualified to undertake the work. First of all in command of one of my finest Horse Batteries, and subsequently as C.R.A. of the Australian Mounted Division, he was often in touch with my Staff, being constantly employed on reconnaissance duties, in which he was peculiarly expert. He served throughout the whole of the operations of which he writes, and had considerable previous experience in the Sinai Campaign, in which the Horse Artillery of the Desert Column played so conspicuous a part. This History commences with the reorganisation of the British Troops in the Egyptian theatre of the War, on Sir Edmund Allenby taking over command in June 1917. The troops operating East of the Suez Canal had hitherto been known as the 'Eastern Force,' which had been successively commanded by Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir Charles Dobell and Sir Philip Chetwode, who were again directly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in Cairo. The advanced troops of 'Eastern Force,' viz., all the available Cavalry, Horse Artillery and Camel Corps, with from one to two Divisions of Infantry, had been organised into what was called 'The Desert Column.' Sir Edmund Allenby decided to take command of the troops in the Eastern Field himself. The available Infantry was formed into two Army Corps, and the Cavalry of the Desert Column was formed into a Cavalry Corps of three Divisions (subsequently increased to four on the arrival of the Indian Cavalry from France early in 1918). The name of the original Desert Column was preserved as far as possible in the title of the new Cavalry Corps, as most of the troops composing it had fought throughout the Sinai Campaign, and by them much had already been accomplished. The Turk had been driven from the vicinity of the Suez Canal, across the Sinai Desert to the Palestine Border and beyond, and several hard-won battles had been fought. Also, covered by these operations, a railway and pipe line had been constructed, without which, under modern conditions, the further invasion of Palestine could not have been attempted. The Desert Mounted Corps was composed of Australians, New Zealanders, British Yeomanry, and Territorial Horse Artillery and Indian Cavalry, with French Cavalry added for the last operations; and it says much for the loyalty of all, and the mutual confidence in each other, that the whole worked so harmoniously and efficiently to one end. It will be readily understood, too, that operations of the nature Colonel Preston describes could not have been carried out successfully without a highly efficient staff. I was peculiarly fortunate in the personnel of my staff and also in my Divisional Commanders, two of whom were Indian Cavalry Officers, one a British Cavalry Officer, and the fourth an Officer of the New Zealand Staff Corps. To a leader or a student of military history the campaign was intensely interesting, but at the same time there were many hardships—intense heat in the summer, with dust and insect pests inconceivable to those who did not go through the campaign, and cold and heavy rains in the winter. The fortitude and endurance of the troops was beyond all praise, but the summer of 1918 spent by the Corps in the Jordan Valley, at about 1200 feet below sea-level, with a temperature varying from 110 to 125 degrees, will not be forgotten by them. The occupation of this area was essential to the success of General Allenby's final operations; and everything possible was done to alleviate the conditions—with considerable success, as, though our wastage from malaria and other diseases was heavy, the greater bulk of the cases of malaria were contracted after leaving the areas which had been treated under the supervision of our Medical Staff. Our most serious losses occurred after reaching Damascus, and, on the farther advance to Aleppo, one division was brought to a complete standstill by the ravages of this disease. Though drawn from such widely different quarters of the Empire, the personnel of the Corps was well fitted for the class of warfare it was called upon to undertake. The horsemen of Australia and New Zealand were accustomed to wide spaces and long days in the saddle, and were full of initiative, self-reliance and determination to overcome every obstacle in their way. The Yeomanry, though not so accustomed to hardships, had behind them the glorious traditions of the British Cavalry, in the annals of which their charges at Huj and El Mughar will live for all time. The Horse Artillery too, drawn from the Counties of England and Scotland and the City of London, lived through the whole of the campaigns in Sinai and Palestine with their comrades from overseas, and showed themselves no whit behind-hand in the matter of endurance. The value of their work is best shown by the esteem in which they were held by the other troops. The long apprenticeship of the Indian Cavalry to the trench warfare of the Western Front had robbed them of none of their dash and brilliancy in the open warfare to which they were so eminently fitted. The personnel of the Signal Service, Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Army Medical Corps, and Army Veterinary Corps came from the same sources as the other troops—units often being composed of mixed personnel—and to the efficiency of these the successes attained by the Corps were very largely due. HARRY CHAUVEL, Commonwealth of Australia, AUTHOR'S NOTE As regards both the numbers engaged and the results achieved, the campaign in Palestine and Syria ranks as the most important ever undertaken by cavalry. In the first series of operations our troops made a direct advance of seventy miles into enemy territory, and captured some 17,000 prisoners and about 120 guns. The final operations resulted in an advance of 450 miles, the complete destruction of three Turkish Armies, with a loss of about 90,000 prisoners and 400 guns, and the overwhelming defeat of what had hitherto been considered one of the first-class Military Powers. These remarks must not be taken, in any way, as underrating the value of the work of our infantry, who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting, while denied much of the interest and excitement of the long pursuits that fell to the lot of the cavalry. In both the main series of operations, the infantry prepared the way for the cavalry, and enabled them to complete the victory won, in the first instance, by the bayonets. General Allenby's campaign divides itself naturally into three phases. First, the Beersheba-Gaza battle and the subsequent pursuit over the Philistine Plain, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem; secondly, the operations in the Jordan Valley, and east of the river Jordan; and thirdly, the final series, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish Armies, and the capture of Damascus, Aleppo, etc., followed by the capitulation of the Turkish Empire. Though the Turks at their best are not to be compared in fighting value with the troops of the first-class fighting nations of Europe, such as the British, French, and Germans, they generally fought well against our infantry, attacking with vigour, and defending their entrenched positions most stubbornly. They were well supplied with all the appurtenances of modern warfare, and, in the first part of the campaign, were generally well led. At the commencement of the operations, the Turkish soldiers were of good morale on the whole, their physique was excellent, and their health satisfactory. There was a large proportion of seasoned soldiers among them, many with the Gallipoli medal. In the latter part of the campaign, however, their morale had deteriorated considerably, their physique was greatly undermined by disease, and there were few old soldiers left, nearly all having been killed or captured, or died of disease. Many units were full of untrained troops, ill-disciplined and demoralised. After the first day's fighting, there was little resistance by the enemy, except when stiffened by a large proportion of German troops, as at Semakh and Jisr Benat Yakub. There were doubtless many causes for this deterioration of morale among the Turkish troops, but, unquestionably, one of the chief was the constant friction that existed between Turkish and German officers, which spread downwards to the ranks of both nations. The hectoring stupidity of the Prussian was nowhere better exemplified than in his treatment of his Turkish Allies. German officers openly and constantly expressed their contempt for the Turks, whom they compared to niggers, and numerous instances came to our knowledge of German N.C.O.'s and privates beating and kicking Turkish officers. The three things which the Turks feared most were a threat to their communications, a charge of cavalry, and a heavy aerial attack. As regards the first, there was, I believe, no instance in the campaign when they fought on to the end after being surrounded, though, on several occasions, Turkish units continued to attack till annihilated. The losses of the Turks were much heavier than ours in every action of the campaign, even when they were successful, or partially so, as in the two trans-Jordan raids.[1] This fact was largely due to their bad rifle shooting. While our troops were good enough shots to pick off Turkish soldiers showing their heads above rocks and trenches, the Turks, as a rule, could only hit our men when standing up during an advance. When the enemy made his great effort to retake Jerusalem, on the 26th of December 1917, the number of dead Turks found on the position after the battle was greater than our total casualties. As a set-off to their bad rifle shooting, the enemy troops were supplied with a far larger proportion of machine guns than we were. Their machine-gun companies, which were largely staffed by Germans, were generally effective, and caused us the major part of our casualties during the war. Their field artillery work in general was slow and inaccurate, but the heavy artillery, manned by Germans or Austrians, was almost invariably good. The above remarks as to morale should be borne in mind in estimating the tactics of General Allenby. It will be noticed that he took greater risks in the latter part of the campaign than he had done at the beginning. These risks were fully justified by the very complete knowledge of the reduced state of the enemy's morale which had been acquired by our Intelligence Staff. In spite of the indifferent morale of the enemy troops, the campaign is of great value to the student of cavalry tactics, being, as it is, the only instance in modern war of cavalry operating on a large scale. It demonstrated once more the soundness of the principles laid down in our training manuals, which appear to be immutable, in spite of aircraft and other devilish inventions of present day warfare. The value of aeroplanes and armoured cars acting in conjunction with cavalry was very clearly brought out, notably in the final series of operations. My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars, cavalry instructor at the Staff College Camberley, for very kindly reading the manuscript, and for many valuable suggestions and corrections. Also to Major A.F. Becke, R.A., in charge of the Historical Section, W.D., for much help in studying war diaries and maps. My thanks are also due to the many officers, too numerous to mention individually, who have very kindly lent me their private diaries, or given me information about obscure points. I have taken every care to make the narrative as accurate as possible, but, if any who read it notice inaccuracies, I shall be very grateful if they will point them out to me. I have also to thank those who have allowed me to use photographs taken by them as illustrations. A number of the photographs taken on the enemy side were obtained from Mr. C. Raad, photographer, of Jerusalem, who had secured the original negatives, and by whose permission they are reproduced in the book. Lastly, I desire to thank Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps throughout the campaign, for his help and encouragement, and for having very kindly written the preface to the book. FOOTNOTES:[1] Except in the two first battles of Gaza, April and May 1917, when our losses, in comparison with the numbers engaged, were as severe as in some of the hardest fought battles on the Western Front. CONTENTS
ILLUSTRATIONS Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS. Folding out. Full page. Diagram 1 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA, 1917-1918 THE COUNTRY AND THE OPPOSING FORCES When General Allenby arrived in Egypt in June 1917, and assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, British prestige in the East was at a very low ebb. The evacuation of Gallipoli in December 1915, followed by the fall of Kut el Amara four months later, and by our two unsuccessful attacks on Gaza in the spring of the following year, had invested the Turkish arms with a legend of invincibility which was spreading rapidly in all Moslem countries. For the first time in seven centuries, sang the journalistic bards of Stamboul, the followers of Islam had triumphed over the Infidel; Allah was leading the Faithful to victory; the Empire of the Moslems was at hand. The fall of Baghdad in March 1917 somewhat dashed these high hopes, it is true. But the Germans, to whom the city was, at the moment, of no more importance than any other dirty Eastern village, had little difficulty in persuading the Turks that its loss was a mere incident in the world war, which would be more than made good in the final, and glorious, peace terms. Nevertheless, the Turks insisted on making an effort to recapture the place, and for this purpose a special, picked force, known as the Yilderim, or Lightning, Army Group, was in process of formation in northern Syria at this time. The command of this group had been entrusted to the redoubtable von Falkenhayn, who was at Aleppo, directing the training and organisation of the troops. Comforted by highly coloured accounts of the efficiency and fighting value of this force, the Turks rapidly recovered from the effects of the loss of Baghdad. Bombastic articles, inspired by Potsdam, began to make their appearance in the Turkish press, chronicling the doings of the 'Lightning' armies. They were to recapture Baghdad, drive the British into the Persian Gulf, and then march to the 'relief' of India. Afterwards the presumptuous little force that had dared to oppose the Turks' advance into their own province of Egypt would be dealt with in a suitable manner; Egypt would be delivered; and the Suez Canal, 'the jugular vein of the British Empire,' would be severed. Aided by such writings, and supported by German money, Pan-Islamic emissaries were busily engaged in every Moslem or partly Moslem country, stirring up the Faithful to sedition and revolt. India, Afghanistan, Persia, and Egypt were all in a state of suppressed excitement and unrest, and it is probable that one more British reverse in the East would have been sufficient to set all these countries in a blaze. The least imaginative can form some idea of the tremendous consequences that such an upheaval would have had upon the war in general. Yet the newspapers of that time show clearly that there was a considerable, and vociferous, body of public opinion, both in England and in France, that regarded the Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns as useless and extravagant 'side-shows,' and clamoured insistently for the recall of the troops engaged in them. Thus, both for the purpose of re-establishing our waning prestige in the East, and of silencing the mischievous agitation at home, it was imperative that a signal defeat should be inflicted on the Turks as soon as possible. The capture of Jerusalem, which city ranks only after Mecca and Stamboul among the holy places of Islam, would set a fitting seal upon such a defeat, and would be certain to create a profound impression upon Moslems the world over. Jerusalem, therefore, became the political objective of the new British Commander-in-Chief. The strategical objective will be discussed later. The situation in Palestine in the summer of 1917 was not, however, at first sight, very encouraging. Our two abortive attempts on Gaza had shown the German commanders the weak points in the Turkish defences, and they had set to work, with characteristic energy and thoroughness, to strengthen them. 'Gaza itself had been made into a strong, modern fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, and offering every facility for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Abu el Hareira-Abu el Teaha trench system (near Sharia), and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1500 to 2000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about four and a half miles.... By the end of October these strong localities had been joined up so as to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sharia. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.'[2] The Turkish forces were thus on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about thirty miles, but a well-graded, metalled road, which they had made just behind their line, connecting these two places, afforded good lateral communication, and any threatened point of their front could be very quickly reinforced. From July onwards continual reinforcements of men, guns, and stores had arrived on the enemy's front, and he had formed several large supply and ammunition depots at different places behind his lines. He had also laid two lines of railway from the so-called Junction Station on the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, one to Deir Sineid, just north of Gaza, and the other to Beersheba, and beyond it to the village of El Auja,[3] on the Turko-Egyptian frontier, some twenty-five miles south-west of Beersheba. It was evident that the Turks intended to hold on to the Gaza-Beersheba line at all costs, in order to cover the concentration and despatch of the Yilderim Force to Mesopotamia. This Junction Station was to be the strategical objective of our operations. From the junction a railway ran northwards, through Tul Keram, Messudieh, Jenin and Afule, to Deraa on the Hedjaz Railway, whence the latter line continued to Damascus, Aleppo, and the Baghdad Railway. With the junction in our hands, any enemy force in the JudÆan hills, protecting Jerusalem, would be cut off from all railway communication to the north, and would be compelled to rely for its supplies on the difficult mountain road between Messudieh and Jerusalem, or on the longer and still more difficult road from Amman station on the Hedjaz Railway, thirty miles east of the Jordan, via Jericho to Jerusalem. Our own position extended from the sea at Gaza to a point on the Wadi Ghuzze near El Gamli, some fourteen miles south-west of Sharia and eighteen miles west of Beersheba. The opposing lines thus formed a rough 'V,' with its apex at Gaza, where the lines were, in some places, only a couple of hundred yards apart. From here they diverged to El Gamli, which was about nine miles from the nearest part of the Turkish positions. The intervening space was watched by our cavalry. The right flank of our line being thus 'in the air' out in the desert, it was a comparatively easy matter for enemy spies, disguised as peaceful natives, to pass round it under cover of darkness, and approach our positions from the rear in daylight. Native hawkers, other than those with passes from the Intelligence Staff, were forbidden to approach our lines, but it was impossible to control all the natives in such a scattered area, and much can be seen, with the aid of a pair of field-glasses, from the top of a hill a mile away. There were also at least two very daring Germans, who several times penetrated our lines disguised as British officers. They were both exceedingly bold and resourceful men, and it is probable that they obtained a good deal of useful information, before they met the almost inevitable fate of spies. Before the end of our time of preparation, however, methods were evolved to deal with this nuisance, and the enemy was kept in ignorance of our movements and intentions with that success which always attended the efforts of General Allenby in this direction. An enemy staff document, subsequently captured by us, and dated just prior to the commencement of the operations, stated that: 'An outflanking attack on Beersheba with about one infantry and one cavalry division is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front.' How far wrong was this appreciation of the situation will be apparent later on. The same document also stated that we had six infantry divisions in the Gaza sector, whereas at the time there were only three. The Royal Air Force was an important factor in denying information to the enemy during the latter part of our time of preparation. One of the first things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his arrival at the front, was to re-equip the force completely. Hitherto the German Flying Corps had done what it liked in the air over our lines. For several months on end our troops had been bombed, almost with impunity, every day. Our own pilots, starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for repairs, gingerly manoeuvring their antiquated and rickety machines, fought gallantly but hopelessly against the fast Taubes and Fokkers of the German airmen, and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that might have been so easily avoided grew longer. In four months all this had changed. Our pilots, equipped with new, up-to-date and fast machines, met the Germans on level terms, and quickly began to obtain supremacy in the air. By the end of October this supremacy was definitely established, and the few enemy pilots who crossed our lines at that time flew warily, ever on the look-out for one of our fighting machines. The country occupied by the opposing armies varied considerably in character. The district near the coast consisted of a series of high dunes of loose, shifting sand, impassable for wheeled traffic. Farther east the ground became harder, but it was still sandy and heavy going for transport. Eastwards again, towards Beersheba, the country changed to a wilderness of bare, rocky hills, intersected by innumerable wadis (dry river beds). These wadis were, for the most part, enclosed between limestone cliffs, sometimes 100 feet or more in height, and impassable except where the few native tracks crossed them. The whole of this part of the country was waterless, except for three very deep wells at Khalasa and one at Asluj (all of which had been destroyed by the Turks), and some fairly good pools in the Wadi Ghuzze at Esani and Shellal. In Beersheba itself there were seven good wells. Northwards of the enemy's positions, between the JudÆan mountains and the sea, stretched the great plain of Philistia, a strip of rolling down-land fifteen to twenty miles wide, admirably suited for the employment of mounted troops. The appointment of General Allenby, himself a cavalryman, to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, presaged the employment of cavalry on a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. From his first study of the problem before him, the new Commander-in-Chief realised the predominant part that cavalry would play in the operations, and devoted himself, with his customary energy, to organising a force suitable for the work in prospect. For the advance across the Sinai Desert from the Suez Canal, a special force had been organised, under the command of Sir Philip Chetwode. This force, which was known as the Desert Column, consisted of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (which then included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Brigade), the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry), and the 42nd and 52nd Infantry Divisions. The 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, which had arrived in Egypt in April 1915, had been sent to Gallipoli dismounted. After the evacuation of the peninsula, part of this division had been remounted. The 5th Mounted Brigade had taken part in the advance across Sinai, and other units of the division had been employed in the campaign against the Senussi, and in the Fayoum and other parts of Egypt. Most of these scattered units had been collected prior to the first battle of Gaza, and organised into two divisions of four brigades each, including a new brigade of Australian Light Horse (the 4th) which had been formed, partly out of Light Horsemen who had returned from Gallipoli, and partly out of reinforcements from Australia. General Allen by now remounted the remainder of the Yeomanry in Egypt, and formed out of them two new brigades. The ten brigades thus available were organised as a corps of three divisions: the Australian and New Zealand (1st and 2nd A.L.H. Brigades and the New Zealand Brigade), generally known as the Anzac Mounted Division; the Australian Mounted Division (3rd and 4th A.L.H. and 5th Mounted Brigades); and the Yeomanry Division (6th, 8th, and 22nd Mounted Brigades). The corps reserve consisted of the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, while the (Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade[4] formed part of the Army troops. Only the Yeomanry Division and the 7th Mounted and Imperial Service Cavalry Brigades were at this time armed with swords. It was originally intended to call this force the 2nd Cavalry Corps, but General Chauvel, who was appointed to command it, asked that the name of the Desert Column might be perpetuated in that of the new force. It was accordingly named the Desert Mounted Corps.[5] The infantry of the Expeditionary Force, largely augmented by troops in Egypt, was formed into two corps of three divisions each, the 20th under Sir Philip Chetwode, and the 21st commanded by Lieutenant-General Bulfin, with one other infantry division. The 20th Corps (10th, 53rd, and 74th Divisions, with the 60th Division attached) was in the eastern sector of our line, while the 21st Corps (53rd, 54th, and 75th Divisions) held the trenches opposite Gaza.[6] The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was attached to the 21st Corps during the operations. This brigade had not yet seen any serious service, and its fighting qualities were rather an unknown factor. Later on in the campaign, however, all three regiments distinguished themselves greatly, and established a fine reputation for dash. Our total forces numbered some 76,000 fighting men, of whom about 20,000 were mounted, with 550 guns. The enemy troops opposed to us consisted of nine Turkish divisions, organised in two armies, the VIIth and VIIIth, and one cavalry division, a total of about 49,000 fighting men, 3000 of whom were mounted, with 360 guns.[7] Our superiority in numbers, though considerable, thus fell short of the Napoleonic minimum for the attack of entrenched positions, but our large preponderance of cavalry promised great results, if we could succeed in driving the Turks out of their fortifications. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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