The larger proportion of the arguments advanced in the Press or in public in favour of a restoration of our own canal system is derived from the statements which are unceasingly being made as to what our neighbours on the Continent of Europe are doing.

Almost every writer or speaker on the subject brings forward the same stock of facts and figures as to the large sums of money that are being expended on waterways in Continental countries; the contention advanced being, in effect, that because such and such things are done on the Continent of Europe, therefore they ought to be done here. In the "Engineering Supplement" of The Times, for instance—to give only one example out of many—there appeared early in 1906 two articles on "Belgian Canals and Waterways" by an engineering contributor who wrote, among other things, that, in view of "the well-directed efforts now being made with the object of effecting the regeneration of the British canal system, the study of Belgian canals and other navigable waterways possesses distinct interest"; and declared, in concluding his account thereof, that "if the necessary powers, money, and concentrated effort were available, there is little doubt that equally satisfactory results could be obtained in Great Britain." Is this really the case? Could we possibly hope to do all that can be done either in Belgium or in Continental countries generally, even if we had the said powers and money, and showed the same concentrated effort? For my part I do not think we could, and these are my reasons for thinking so:—

Taking geographical considerations first, a glance at the map of Europe will show that, apart from their national requirements, enterprises, and facilities, Germany, Belgium, and Holland are the gateways to vast expanses producing, or receiving, very large quantities of merchandise and raw materials, much of which is eminently suitable for water transport on long journeys that have absolutely no parallel in this country. In the case of Belgium, a good idea of the general position may be gained from some remarks made by the British Consul-General at Antwerp, Sir E. Cecil Hertslet, in a report ("Miscellaneous Series," 604) on "Canals and other Navigable Waterways of Belgium," issued by the Foreign Office in 1904. Referring to the position of Antwerp he wrote:—

Thus the canals and waterways of Belgium do not serve merely local, domestic, or national purposes, but represent the first or final links in a network of water communications by means of which merchandise can be taken to, or brought from, in bulk, "a large portion of North-Eastern Europe." Much of this traffic, again, can just as well pass through one Continental country, on its way to or from the coast, as through another. In fact, some of the most productive of German industrial centres are much nearer to Antwerp or Rotterdam than they are to Hamburg or Bremen. Hence the extremely keen rivalry between Continental countries having ports on the North Sea for the capture of these great volumes of trans-Continental traffic, and hence, also, their low transport rates, and, to a certain extent, their large expenditure on waterways.

Comparing these with British conditions, we must bear in mind the fact that we dwell in a group of islands, and not in a country which forms part of a Continent. We have, therefore, no such transit traffic available for "through" barges as that which is handled on the Continent. Traffic originating in Liverpool, and destined say, for Austria, would not be put in a canal boat which would first go to Goole, or Hull, then cross the North Sea in the same boat to Holland or Belgium, and so on to its destination. Nor would traffic in bulk from the United States for the Continent—or even for any of our East Coast ports—be taken by boat across England. It would go round by sea. Traffic, again, originating in Birmingham, might be taken to a port by boat. But it would there require transhipment into an ocean-going vessel, just as the commodities received from abroad would have to be transferred to a canal boat—unless Birmingham could be converted into a sea-port.

If Belgium and Holland, especially, had had no chance of getting more than local, as distinct from through or transit traffic—if, in other words, they had been islands like our own, with the same geographical limitations as ourselves, and with no trans-Continental traffic to handle, is there the slightest probability that they would have spent anything like the same amount of money on the development of their waterways as they have actually done? In the particular circumstances of their position they have acted wisely; but it does not necessarily follow that we, in wholly different circumstances, have acted foolishly in not following their example.

It might further be noted, in this connection, that while in the case of Belgium all the waterways in, or leading into, the country converge to the one great port of Antwerp, in England we have great ports, competing more or less the one with the other, all round our coasts, and the conferring of special advantages on one by the State would probably be followed by like demands on the part of all the others. As for communication between our different ports, this is maintained so effectively by coasting vessels (the competition of which already powerfully influences railway rates) that heavy expenditure on canal improvement could hardly be justified on this account. However effectively the Thames might be joined to the Mersey, or the Humber to the Severn, by canal, the vast bulk of port-to-port traffic would probably still go by sea.

Then there are great differences between the physical conditions of Great Britain and those parts of the Continent of Europe where the improvement of waterways has undergone the greatest expansion. Portions of Holland—as everybody knows—are below the level of the sea, and the remainder are not much above it. A large part of Belgium is flat; so is most of Northern Germany. In fact there is practically a level plain right away from the shores of the North Sea to the steppes of Russia. Canal construction in these conditions is a comparatively simple and a comparatively inexpensive matter; though where such conditions do not exist to the same extent—as in the south of Germany, for example—the building of canals becomes a very different problem. This fact is well recognised by Herr Franz Ulrich in his book on "Staffeltarife und Wasserstrassen," where he argues that the building of canals is practicable only in districts favoured by Nature, and that hilly and backward country is thus unavoidably handicapped.

Much, again, of the work done on the Continent has been a matter either of linking up great rivers or of canalising these for navigation purposes. We have in England no such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder, but the very essence of the German scheme of waterways is to connect these and other rivers by canals, a through route by water being thus provided from the North Sea to the borders of Russia. Further south there is already a small canal, the Ludwigs Canal, connecting the Rhine and the Danube, and this canal—as distinct from those in the northern plains—certainly does rise to an elevation of 600 feet from the River Main to its summit level. A scheme has now been projected for establishing a better connection between the Rhine and the Danube by a ship canal following the route either of the Main or of the Neckar. In describing these two powerful streams Professor Meiklejohn says, in his "New Geography":—

The construction of this proposed link would give direct water communication between the North Sea and the Black Sea, a distance, as the crow flies, and not counting river windings, of about 1,300 miles. Such an achievement as this would put entirely in the shade even the present possible voyage, by canal and river, of 300 miles from Antwerp to Strasburg.

What are our conditions in Great Britain, as against all these?

In place of the "great lowland plain" in which most of the Continental canal work we hear so much about has been done, we possess an undulating country whose physical conditions are well indicated by the canal sections given opposite this page. Such differences of level as those that are there shown must be overcome by locks, lifts, or inclined planes, together with occasional tunnels or viaducts. In the result the construction of canals is necessarily much more costly in Great Britain than on the aforesaid "great lowland plain" of Continental Europe, and dimensions readily obtainable there become practically impossible here on account alike of the prohibitive cost of construction and the difficulties that would arise in respect to water supply. A canal connecting the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe, in Germany, is hardly likely to run short of water, and the same may be said of the canals in Holland, and of those in the lowlands of Belgium. This is a very different matter from having to pump water from low levels to high levels, to fill reservoirs for canal purposes, as must be done on the Birmingham and other canals, or from taking a fortnight to accomplish the journey from Hull to Nottingham as once happened owing to insufficiency of water.

There is, also, that very important consideration, from a transport standpoint, of the "length of haul." Assuming, for the sake of argument (1) that the commercial conditions were the same in Great Britain as they are on the Continent; (2) that our country, also, consisted of a "great lowland plain"; and (3) that we, as well, had great natural waterways, like the Rhine, yielding an abundant water supply;—assuming all this, it would still be impossible, in the circumscribed dimensions of our isles, to get a "length of haul" in any way approaching the barge-journeys that are regularly made between, say, North Sea ports and various centres in Germany.

The geographical differences in general between Great Britain and Continental countries were thus summed up by Mr W. H. Wheeler in the discussion on Mr Saner's paper at the Institution of Civil Engineers:—

Passing from commercial and geographical to political conditions, we find that in Germany the State owns or controls alike railways and waterways. Prussia bought up most of the former, partly with the idea of safeguarding the protective policy of the country (endangered by the low rates charged on imports by independent railway companies), and partly in order that the Government could secure, in the profits on railway operation, a source of income independent of Parliamentary votes. So well has the latter aim been achieved that a contribution to the Exchequer of from £10,000,000 to £15,000,000 a year has been obtained, and, rather than allow this source of income to be checked by heavy expenditure, the Prussian Government have refrained from carrying out such widenings and improvements of their State system of railways as a British or an American railway company would certainly have adopted in like circumstances, and have left the traders to find relief in the waterways instead. The increased traffic the waterways of Germany are actually getting is mainly traffic which has either been diverted from the railways, or would have been handled by the railways in other countries in the natural course of their expansion. Whatever may be the case with the waterways, the railways of Prussia, especially, are comparatively unprogressive, and, instead of developing through traffic at competitive rates, they are reverting more and more to the original position of railways as feeders to the waterways. They get a short haul from place of origin to the waterway, and another short haul, perhaps, from waterway again to final destination; but the greater part of the journey is done by water.

These conditions represent one very material factor in the substantial expansion of water-borne traffic in Germany—and most of that traffic, be it remembered, has been on great rivers rather than on artificial canals. The latter are certainly being increased in number, especially, as I have said, where they connect the rivers; and the Government are the more inclined that the waterways should be developed because then there will be less need for spending money on the railways, and for any interference with the "revenue-producing machine" which those railways represent.

In France the railways owned and operated by the State are only a comparatively small section of the whole; but successive Governments have advanced immense sums for railway construction, and the State guarantees the dividends of the companies; while in France as in Germany railway rates are controlled absolutely by the State. In neither country is there free competition between rail and water transport. If there were, the railways would probably secure a much greater proportion of the traffic than they do. Still another consideration to be borne in mind is that although each country has spent great sums of money—at the cost of the general taxpayer—on the provision of canals or the improvement of waterways, no tolls are, with few exceptions, imposed on the traders. The canal charges include nothing but actual cost of carriage, whereas British railway rates may cover various other services, in addition, and have to be fixed on a scale that will allow of a great variety of charges and obligations being met. Not only, both in Germany and France, may the waterway be constructed and improved by the State, but the State also meets the annual expenditure on dredging, lighting, superintendence and the maintenance of inland harbours. Here we have further reasons for the growth of the water-borne traffic on the Continent.

Where the State, as railway owner or railway subsidiser, spends money also on canals, it competes only, to a certain extent, with itself; but this would be a very different position from State-owned or State-supported canals in this country competing with privately-owned railways.[9]

If then, as I maintain is the case, there is absolutely no basis for fair comparison between Continental and British conditions—whether commercial, geographical, or political—we are left to conclude that the question of reviving British canals must be judged and decided strictly from a British standpoint, and subject to the limitations of British policy, circumstances, and possibilities.