The first question that confronts the beginner in this science, and the one also that controls the whole scope of his inquiries to the very end, is: What is the precise subject of Political Economy? Within what exact field do its investigations lie? There is indeed a short and broad and full answer at hand to this fundamental and comprehensive question; and yet it is every way better for all concerned to reach this answer by a route somewhat delayed and circuitous, just as it is better in ascending a mountain summit for the sake of a strong and complete view to circle up leisurely on foot or on horseback, rather than to dash straight up to the top by a cog-wheel railway and take all of a sudden what might prove to be a less impressive or a more confusing view.

The preliminary questions are: What sort of facts has Political Economy to deal with, to inquire into, to classify, to make a science of? Are these facts easily separable in the mind and in reality from other kinds of facts perhaps liable to be confounded with them? Are they facts of vast importance to the welfare of mankind? And are the activities of men everywhere greatly and increasingly occupied with just those things, with which this science has exclusively to do? Let us see if we cannot come little by little by a route of our own to clear and true answers for all these questions.

If one should take his stand for an hour upon London Bridge, perhaps the busiest bit of street in the world, and cast his eyes around intelligently to see what he can see, and begin also to classify the things coming under his vision, what might he report to himself and to others? Below the bridge in what is called the "Pool," which was dredged out for that very purpose by the ancient Romans, there lie at anchor or move coming and going many merchant-ships of all nations, carrying out and bringing in to an immense amount in the whole aggregate tangible articles of all kinds to and from the remote as well as the near nations of the earth. All this movement of visible goods, home and foreign, is in the interest and under the impulse of Buying and Selling. The foreign goods come in simply to buy, that is, to pay for, the domestic goods taken away; and these latter go out in effect even if not in appearance to buy, that is, to pay for, the foreign goods coming in. At the same hour the bridge itself is covered with land-vehicles of every sort moving in both directions, loaded with salable articles of every description; artisans of every name are coming and going; merchants of many nationalities step within the field of view; and porters and servants and errand-boys are running to and fro, all in some direct relation to the sale or purchase of those visible and tangible things called in Political Economy Commodities. Moreover, vast warehouses built in the sole interest of trade on both sides the river above and below the bridge, built to receive and to store for a time till their ultimate consumers are found, some of these thousand things bought and sold among men, lift their roofs towards heaven in plain sight. Doubtless some few persons, like our observer himself, may be on the spot for pleasure or instruction, but for the most part, all that he can see, the persons, the things, the buildings, even the bridge itself, are where they are in the interest of Sales of some sort, mostly of Commodities. What is thus true of a single point in London is true in a degree of every other part of London, of every part of Paris and of Berlin, and in its measure of every other city and village and hamlet in the whole world. Wherever there is a street there is some exchange of commodities upon it, and wherever there is a market there are buyers and sellers of commodities.

If the curiosity of our supposed observer be whetted by what he saw on London Bridge, and if the natural impulse to generalize from particulars be deepened in his mind, he may perhaps on his return to America take an opportunity to see what he can see and learn what he can learn within and around one of the mammoth cotton mills in Lowell or Fall River or Cohoes. Should he take his stand for this purpose at one of these points, say Lowell, he will be struck at once by some of the differences between what he saw on the bridge and what he now sees in the mill. He will indeed see as before some commodities brought in and carried out, such as the raw cotton and new machinery and the finished product ready for sale, but in general no other commodities than the cotton in its various stages of manufacture, and those like the machinery and means of transportation directly connected with transforming the cotton into cloth and taking it to market.

But he sees a host of persons both within and without the mill, all busy here and there, and all evidently bound to the establishment by a strong unseen tie of some sort; he sees varying degrees of authority and subordination in these persons from the Treasurer, the apparent head of the manufactory, down to the teamsters in the yard and the common laborers within and without; he will not find the owners of the property present in any capacity, for they are scattered capitalists of Boston and elsewhere, who have combined through an act of incorporation their distinct capitals into a "Company" for manufacturing cotton; besides their Treasurer present, whose act is their act and whose contracts their contracts, he will see an Agent also who acts under the Treasurer and directly upon the Overseers and their assistants in the spinning and weaving and coloring and finishing rooms, and under these Operatives of every grade as skilled and unskilled; and lastly he will observe, that the direct representatives of the owners and all other persons present from highest to lowest are conspiring with a will towards the common end of getting the cotton cloth all made and marketed.

What is it that binds all these persons together? A little tarrying in the Treasurer's office will answer this question for our observer and for us. He will find it to be the second kind of Buying and Selling. At stated times the Treasurer pays the salary of the Agent, and his own. He pays the wages of the Overseers and the wages of all the Operatives and Laborers,—men and women and children. Here he finds a buying and selling on a great scale not of material commodities as before, but of personal services of all the various kinds. Every man and woman and child connected with the factory and doing its work sells an intangible personal service to the "Company" and takes his pay therefor, which last is a simple buying on the part of the unseen employers. Here, then, in this mill is a single specimen of this buying and selling of personal services, which is going on to an immense extent and in every possible direction in each civilized country of the world, and everywhere to an immensely increased volume year by year. Clergymen and lawyers and physicians and teachers and legislators and judges and musicians and actors and artisans of every name and laborers of every grade sell their intangible services to Society, and take their pay back at the market-rate. The aggregate value of all these services sold in every advanced country is probably greater than the aggregate value of the tangible commodities sold there. At any rate, both classes alike, commodities and services, are bought and sold under substantially the same economic principles.

The inductive appetite in intelligent persons, that is to say, their desire to classify facts and to generalize from particulars, almost always grows by what it feeds on; and our supposed observer will scarcely rest contented until he has taken up at least one more stand-point, from which to observe men's Buying and Selling. Suppose now he enter for this purpose on any business-day morning the New York Clearing-House. He will see about 125 persons present, nearly one half of these bank clerks sitting behind desks, and the other half standing before these desks or moving in cue from one to the next. The room is perfectly still. Not a word is spoken. The Manager of the Clearing with his assistant sits or stands on a raised platform at one end of the room, and gives the signal to begin the Exchange. No commodities of any name or nature are within the field of view. The manager indeed and his assistant and two clerks of the establishment who sit near him are in receipt of salaries for their personal services, and all the other clerks present receive wages for their services from their respective banks, but the exchange about to commence is no sale of personal services any more than it is a sale of tangible commodities. It is however a striking instance of the buying and selling of some valuables of the third and final class of valuable things.

At a given signal from the manager the (say) 60 bank messengers, each standing in front of the desk of his own bank and each having in hand before him 59 small parcels of papers, the parcels arranged in the same definite order as the desks around the room, step forward to the next desk and deliver each his parcel to the clerk sitting behind it, and so on till the circuit of the room is made. It takes but ten minutes. Each parcel is made up of cheques or credit-claims, the property of the bank that brings it and the debts of the bank to which it is delivered. Accordingly each bank of the circle receives through its sitting clerk its own debits to all the rest of the banks, and delivers to all through its standing messenger its own credits as off-set. In other words, each bank buys of the rest what it owes to each with what each owes to it. It is at bottom a mutual buying and selling of debts. There is of course a daily balance on one side or the other between every two of these banks, which must be settled in money, because it would never happen in practice that each should owe the other precisely the same sum on any one day; but substantially and almost exclusively the exchange at the Clearing-House is a simple trade in credit-claims. Each bank pays its debts by credits. A merchant is a dealer in commodities, a laborer is a dealer in services, and a banker is a dealer in credits. Each of the three is a buyer and seller alike, and the difference is only in the kind of valuables specially dealt in by each. In all cases alike, however, there is no buying without selling and no selling without buying; because, when one buys he must always pay for what he buys and that is selling, and when one sells he must always take his pay for what he sells and that is buying. This is just as true when one credit is bought or sold against a commodity or a service, and when two or more credits are bought and sold as against each other, as it is when two commodities or two services are exchanged one for the other.

But the Clearing-House is not by any means the only place where credits or debts (they are the same thing) are bought and sold. Every bank is such a place. Every broker's office is such a place. Every place is an establishment of the same kind where commercial rights, that is, claims to be realized in future time and for which a consideration is paid, are offered for sale and sold. The amount of transactions in Credits in every commercial country undoubtedly surpasses the amount in Commodities or that in Services.

Now our supposed observer and classifier, having noted on London Bridge the sale of material commodities, and in the Lowell Mill the sale of personal services, and within the New York Clearing-House the sale of credit-claims, has seen in substance everything that ever was or ever will be exhibited in the world of trade. He may rest. There is no other class of salable things than these three. Keen eyes and minds skilled in induction have been busy for two millenniums and a half more or less to find another class of things bought and sold among men, and have not yet found it or any trace of it. This work has been perfectly and scientifically done. The generalization is completed for all time.

The genus, then, with which Political Economy deals from beginning to end, has been discovered, can be described, and is easily and completely separable for its own purposes of science from all other kinds and classes and genera of things, namely, Salable things or (what means precisely the same) Valuable things or (what is exactly equivalent) Exchangeable things. In other words, the sole and single class of things, with which the Science of Political Economy has to do, is Valuables, whose origin and nature and extent and importance it is the purpose of the present chapter to unfold. We have fully seen already that this Genus, Valuables, is sub-divided into three species, and three only, namely, Commodities, Services, Credits. A little table here may help at once the eye and the mind:—

ECONOMICS.

If only these three species of things are ever bought and sold, then it certainly follows that only six kinds of commercial exchanges are possible to be found in the world, namely these:—

• 1. A commodity for a commodity.
• 2. A commodity for a personal service.
• 3. A commodity for a credit-claim.
• 4. A personal service for another service.
• 5. A personal service for a credit-claim.
• 6. One credit-claim for another.

Though the kinds of possible exchanges are thus very few, the exchanges themselves in one or other of these six forms and in all of them are innumerable on every business day in every civilized country of the globe. And this point is to be particularly noted, that while buying and selling in these forms has been going on everywhere since the dawn of authentic History, it has gone on all the while in ever-increasing volume, it is increasing now more rapidly and variously than ever, and moreover all signs foretell that it will play a larger and still larger part in the affairs of men and nations as this old world gains in age and unity.

Damascus is one of the very oldest cities of the world, and its very name means a "seat of trade." We are told in the Scriptures, that Abraham about 2000 years before Christ went up out of Egypt "very rich in cattle, in silver, and in gold," and the only possible way he could have acquired these possessions was by buying and selling. He afterwards purchased the cave and the field in Hebron for a family burial-place, and "weighed unto Ephron the silver which he had named in the audience of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant." We may notice here, that there were then "merchants" as a class, that silver by weight passed as "money" from hand to hand, and that in the lack of written deeds to land, as we have them, sales were "made sure" before the faces of living men, who would tell the truth and pass on the word. Abraham indeed seems to have given the pitch for the song of trade sung by his descendants, the Jews, from that day to this; for Jacob, his grandson, was a skilled trafficker, not to say a secret trickster, in his bargains; and wherever in the Old World or the New the Jews have been, there have been in fact and in fame busy buyers and sellers.

But the Jews have had no special privileges in the realm of trade; on the contrary, they have always been under special disabilities both legal and social. Even in England, the most liberal country in Europe, they were exiled for long periods, maltreated at all points of contact with other people, more or less put under the ban of the Common and the Statute law, often outrageously taxed on their goods and persons, and studiously kept out of the paths of highest public employment even down to a time within the memory of living men.[1] Yet so natural is the impulse to trade, so universally diffused, so imperative also if progress is in any direction to be attained, that the English and all other peoples were as glad to borrow money, that is, buy the use of it, of the persecuted Jews, as the latter were to get money by buying and selling other things, and then to loan it, that is, sell the use of it, under the best securities (never very good) for its return with interest, that they could obtain. Happily, the mutual gains that always wait on the Exchanges even when their conditions are curtailed, of course attended the mutilated exchanges between Jews and Christians: otherwise, they would not continue to take place.

Christianity, however, as the perfected Judaism, gradually brought in the better conditions, the higher impulses, and the more certain rewards, of Trade, all which, we may be sure, were designed in the divine Plan of the world. What is called the Progress of Civilization has been marked and conditioned at every step by an extension of the opportunities, a greater facility in the use of the means, a more eager searching for proper expedients, and a higher certainty in the securing of the returns, of mutual exchanges among men. There have been indeed, and there still are, vast obstacles lying across the pathway of this Progress in the unawakened desires and reluctant industry and short-sighted selfishness of individuals, as well as in the ignorant prejudices and mistaken legislation of nations; but all the while Christianity has been indirectly tugging away at these obstacles, and Civilization has been able to rejoice over the partial or complete removal of some of them; while also Christianity directly works out in human character those chief qualities, on which the highest success of commercial intercourse among men will always depend, namely, Foresight, Diligence, Integrity, and mutual Trust; so that, what we call Civilization is to a large extent only the result of a better development of these human qualities in domestic and foreign commerce.

Contrary to a common conception in the premises, the sacred books of both Jews and Christians display no bias at all against buying and selling, but rather extol such action as praiseworthy, and also those qualities of mind and habits of life that lead up to it and tend too to increase its amount, and they constantly illustrate by means of language derived from traffic the higher truths and more spiritual life, which are the main object of these inspired writers. It is indeed true that the chosen people of God were forbidden to take Usury of each other, though they were permitted to take it freely of strangers, and that they were forbidden to buy horses and other products out of Egypt, for fear they would be religiously corrupted by such commercial intercourse with idolaters; but there is nothing of this sort in the law of Moses that cannot be easily explained from the grand purpose to found an agricultural commonwealth for religious ends, in which commonwealth no family could permanently alienate its land, and in which it was a great object to preserve the independence and equality of the tribes and families. Throughout the Old Testament there is no word or precept that implies that trade in itself is not helpful and wholesome; there were sharp and effective provisions for the recovery of debts; there were any number of exhortations to diligence in business, such as, "In the morning sow thy seed, and at evening withhold not thy hand"; King Solomon himself made a gigantic exchange in preparation for the temple with King Hiram of Tyre, by which the cedars of Lebanon were to be paid for by the grain and oil of the agricultural kingdom; chapter xxvii of the prophet Ezekiel is a graphic description of the commerce of the ancient world as it centered in the market of Tyre, a description carried out into detail both as to the nations that frequented that market and as to the products that were exchanged in it,—"silver, iron, tin, lead, persons of men, vessels of brass, horses, horsemen, mules, horns of ivory, ebony-wood, carbuncles, purple work, fine linen, corals, rubies, wheat, pastry, syrup, oil, balm, wine of Helbon, white wool, thread, wrought iron, cassia, sweet reed, cloth, lambs, rams, goats, precious spices, precious stones, splendid apparel, mantles of blue, embroidered work, chests of damask, and gold"; and chapter xxxi of Proverbs describes the model housewife in terms like these,—

Still more explicit and instructive are the words and spirit of the New Testament. There cannot be the least doubt that the whole influence of Christianity is favorable to the freest commercial exchanges at home and abroad, because these depend largely on mutual confidence between man and man, of which confidence Christianity is the greatest promoter. It may be conceded at once that our Lord "overthrew the tables of the money-changers and the seats of them that sold doves" within the sacred precincts of the temple, but this, not because it is wrong to change money or sell doves, but because that was not the place for such merchandising; so He himself explained his own action in the sequel; provincial worshippers coming up to Jerusalem must needs have their coins changed into the money of the Capital, and must needs buy somewhere the animal victims for sacrifice; but the whip of small cords had significance only as to the place, and not at all as to the propriety, of such trading.

One of our Lord's parables, the parable of the Talents, sets forth in several striking lights the privilege and duty and reward of diligent trading. "Then he that had received the five talents went and traded with the same, and made them other five talents." And when this servant came to the reckoning, and brought as the result of his free and busy traffic "five talents more," the prompt and hearty approval of his lord—"well done, thou good and faithful servant"—becomes the testimony of the New Testament to the merit and the profit and the benefit of a vigorous buying and selling. For this servant could not have been authoritatively pronounced good and faithful if the results of his action commended had been in any way prejudicial to others. The truth is, as we shall abundantly see by and by with the reasons of it, that any man who buys and sells under the free and natural conditions of trade, benefits the man he trades with just as much as he benefits himself. But the parable has a still stronger word in favor of exchanges. There was another servant also entrusted with capital by his lord at the same time, when the latter was about to travel "into a far country." We are expressly told that distribution was made "to every man according to his several ability," and thus this servant was only entrusted with a single talent, the size of the capital given to him being in just proportion to the size of the man,—the smallest share falling of course to the smallest man. But he had the same opportunity as the two others. The world was open to him. Capital was in demand, if not in those parts then in some other, to which, like his lord, he might straightway take his journey. But when his time of reckoning came, and he had nothing to show for the use of his capital, he upbraided his lord as a hard man for expecting any increase, and brought out his bare talent wrapped in a napkin, saying, "I was afraid, and I went and hid thy talent in the earth." His wise lord at once denounced this servant as "wicked and slothful," insisted that his money ought to have been "put to the exchangers," and said finally in a just anger "cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness."

It is moreover in incidental passages of the Scriptures, in which the methods of business are commended to the searchers after higher things, that we see their high estimate of those methods and gains. "Buy the truth, and sell it not; buy wisdom and understanding" (Prov. xxiii, 23). "Buying up for yourselves opportunities" (Col. iv, 5). "I counsel thee to buy of me gold refined by fire, that thou mayest be rich; and white garments, that thou mayest be clothed; and eye-salve to anoint thine eyes, that thou mayest see" (Rev. iii, 18). "But rather let him labor, working with his hands at that which is good, that he may have to give to him that is in need" (Eph. iv, 28). "But if any one provideth not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever" (1 Tim. v, 8).

Now, the universal test and proof of any truth is its harmony with some other truths. Does an alleged truth fall in with and fill out well some other demonstrated and accepted proposition, or a number of such other propositions? If so, then that truth is proved. Human reason can no further go. The mind rests with relish and content in a new acquisition. To apply this to the case in hand,—if men were designed of their Maker to buy and sell to their own mutual benefit and advancement, if mankind have always been buying and selling as towards that end and with that obvious result, and if the Future promises to increase and reduplicate the buying and selling of the Present in every direction without end, and all in the interest of a broad civilization and a true and lasting progress; and if, in harmony with these truths, the written revelation of God in every part of it assumes that buying and selling in its inmost substance and essential forms be good and righteous and progressive, and suitable in all its ends and methods to illustrate and enforce ends and methods in the higher kingdom of spiritual and eternal Life;—then these coÖrdinate truths will logically and certainly follow, (1) that Trade is natural and essential and beneficial to mankind; (2) that it constitutes in an important sense a realm of human thought and action by itself, separate from the neighboring realm of Giving, and equally from the hostile realm of Stealing; and (3) that a careful analysis of what buying and selling in its own peculiar nature is, a thorough ascertainment and a consequent clear statement of its fundamental laws, and a faithful exposure of what in individual selfishness and in subtle or open Legislation makes against these laws, must be of large consequence to the welfare of mankind.

Accordingly, let us now attempt such Analysis and Ascertainment and Exposure. This is precisely the task that lies before us in this book—just this, and nothing more. The term, "Political Economy," has long been and is still an elastic title over the zealous work of many men in many lands; but in the hands of the present writer during a life now no longer short, the term has always had a definite meaning, the work has covered an easily circumscribed field, and so the present undertaking concerns only Buying and Selling and what is essentially involved in that. This gives scope and verge enough for the studies of a life-time. This has the advantage of a complete sphere of its own. Terms may thus be made as definite as the nature of language will ever allow; definitions will thus cover things of one kind only; and generalizations, although they may be delicate and difficult, will deal with no incongruous and obstinate material.

1. The grandfather of the writer, an illiterate but long-headed farmer, was able to give good points to his three college-bred sons, by insisting that they look "into the natur on't." What, then, are the ultimate elements of Buying and Selling? What are the invariable conditions that precede, accompany, and follow, any and every act of Trade? Of course we are investigating now and throughout this treatise the deliberative acts of reasonably intelligent human beings, in one great department of their common foresight and rational action. We have consequently nothing to do here with Fraud or Theft or Mania or Gift. Acts put forth under the impulse of these are direct opposites of, or at best antagonistic to, acts of Trade. They tend to kill trade, and therefore they are no part of trade. These, then, and such as these, aside, we will now analyze a single Act of Exchange at one time and place,—which will serve in substance for all acts of exchange in all times and places, and just find out for ourselves what are the Fundamentals and Essentials of that matter, with which alone we have to do in this science of Political Economy.

Incidental reference was had a little way back to an Exchange once made between King Solomon of Jerusalem and King Hiram of Tyre. Let that be our typical instance. (a) There were two persons, Solomon and Hiram. Those two, and no more, stood face to face, as it were, to make a commercial bargain. They made it, and it was afterwards executed. The execution indeed concerned a great many persons on both sides, and occupied a long period of time; but the bargain itself, the trade, the exchange, the covenant, concerned only two persons, and occupied but a moment of time. It made no difference with the bargain as such, with the binding nature of it, with the terms of it, with the mutual gains of it, that each person represented a host of others, subordinates and subjects, who would have to coÖperate in the carrying of it out, because each king had the right to speak for his subjects as well as for himself, for commercial purposes each was an agent as well as a monarch, the word of each concluded the consent and the action of others as well as his own. Nor did it make any, the least, difference with this exchange or the advantages of it, that each party to it belonged to, was even the head of, independent and sometimes hostile Peoples. Commerce is one thing, and nationality a totally different thing. The present point is, in the words of the old proverb,—"It takes two to make a bargain." And it takes only two to make a bargain. When corporations and even nations speak in trade, they speak, and speak finally, through one accredited agent. We reach, then, as the first bit of our analysis of Trade, the fact, that there are always two parties to it, "the party of the first part and the party of the second part."

(b) There were two desires, Solomon's desire for cedar-timbers to build the temple with, and Hiram's desire for wheat and oil with which to support the people of his sterile kingdom. "So Hiram gave Solomon cedar-trees and fir-trees according to all his desire: and Solomon gave Hiram twenty thousand measures of wheat for food to his household, and twenty measures of pure oil." The desire of each party was personal and peculiar, known at first only to himself, but upon occasion became directed towards something in the possession of the other, and each at length became aware of the desire of the other, and also of his own ability to satisfy the want of the other. If Solomon could have satisfied his desire for timber by his own or his subjects' efforts directly, this trade would never have taken place; if Hiram or his subjects could have gotten the wheat and oil directly out of their narrow and sandy strips of sea-coast, this trade would not have taken place; and so there must be in every case of trade not only two desires each springing from a separate person, but also each person must have in his possession something fitted to gratify the desire of the other person, and each be willing to yield that something into the possession of the other for the sake of receiving from him that which will satisfy his own desire, and so both desires be satisfied indirectly.

Here is the deep and perennial source of exchanges. Men's desires are so many and various, and so constantly becoming more numerous and miscellaneous, and so extremely few of his own wants can ever be met by any one man directly, that the foundation of exchanges, and of a perpetually increasing volume of exchanges, is laid in the deep places of human hearts, namely, in Desires ever welling up to the surface and demanding their satisfaction through an easy and natural interaction with the ever swelling Desires of other men. Here too is a firm foundation (a chief foundation) of human Society. Reciprocal wants, which can only be met through exchanges, draw men together locally and bind them together socially, in hamlets and towns and cities and States and Nations, and also knit ties scarcely less strong and beneficent between the separate and remotest nationalities of the earth. It is certain that an inland commercial route connected the East of Asia with the West of Europe centuries before Christ, and that a traffic was maintained on the frontier of China between the Sina and the Scythians, in the manner still followed by the Chinese and the Russians at Kiachta. The Sina had an independent position in Western China as early as the eighth century before Christ, and five centuries later established their sway under the dynasty of Tsin (whence our word "China") over the whole of the empire. The prophet Isaiah exclaims (xlix, 12), "Behold! these shall come from far; and behold! these from the North and from the West; and these from the land of Sinim." The second bit of our analysis leads to Desires as an essential and fundamental element in every commercial transaction.

(c) There were two efforts, those of the Tyrians as represented by King Hiram and those of the Israelites as represented by King Solomon. It was no holiday task that was implied in the proposition of Solomon to the party of the other part,—"Send me now cedar-trees, fir-trees, and algum-trees out of Lebanon; for I know that thy servants are skilful to cut timber in Lebanon; even to prepare me timber in abundance, for the house which I am about to build shall be wonderfully great." On the other hand, the efforts insolved on the part of the people of Israel in paying for these timbers, and for their transportation by sea from Lebanon to Joppa, were equally gigantic. Solomon's offer in return for the proposed service of the Tyrian king was in these words,—"And behold, I will give to thy servants, the hewers that cut timber, twenty thousand measures of beaten wheat, and twenty thousand measures of barley, and twenty thousand baths of wine, and twenty thousand baths of oil."

The reason why two efforts are always an element in every act of traffic, however small or however large the transaction may be, is the obvious reason, that the things rendered in exchange, whether they be Commodities, Services, or Credits, invariably cost efforts of some kind to get them ready to sell and to sell them, and no person can have a just claim to render them in exchange, who has not either put forth these efforts himself or become proprietor in some way of the result of such efforts. Efforts accordingly are central in all trade. Every trade in its inmost nature is and must be either an exchange of two Efforts directly, as when one of two farmers personally helps his neighbor in haying for the sake of securing that neighbor's personal help in his own harvesting, or an exchange of two things each of which is the result of previous Efforts of somebody, as when a man gives a silver dollar for a bushel of wheat. The third bit of the present analysis brings us to Efforts, perhaps the most important factor in the whole list.

(d) There were also two reciprocal estimates, the estimate of King Hiram of all the efforts requisite to cut and hew and float the timber, as compared with the aggregate of efforts needed to obtain the necessary wheat and barley and wine and oil in any other possible way; and the estimate of King Solomon of all the labors required to grow and market these agricultural products, as compared with what would otherwise be involved in getting the much-wished-for timbers. Such estimates invariably precede every rational exchange of products. It is not in human nature to render a greater effort or the result of it, when a lesser effort or the result of it will as well procure the satisfaction of a desire. Efforts are naturally irksome. No more of them will ever be put forth than is necessary to meet the want that calls them forth. No man in his senses will ever put more labor on anything, with which to buy something else, than is necessary to get that something else by direct effort or through some other exchange. Here we are on ground as solid as the very substance of truth can make it. The Jews of Solomon's time were too shrewd and sparing of irksome labor to devote themselves for years to the toils of the field and of the vat to get by traffic the materials for their temple, if they could have gotten those materials by a less expenditure of toil in any other way. Those Phoenicians of Tyre and Sidon, the born merchants of the East, the founders of commercial Carthage in the West, if they could have extorted from the reluctant sands of their coast the cereals and the vines and olives requisite for their own support with only so much of exertion as was needed to get that to market with which to buy them, would never have taken the indirect in preference to the direct method. They took the indirect, because it was the easier, and therefore the better.

It may, accordingly, be laid down as a maxim, that men never buy and sell to satisfy their wants but when that is the easiest and best way to satisfy them. It saves effort. It saves time. It saves trouble. It divides labor. It induces skill. It propels progress. But in order to determine which may be the easier way, requires constant estimates on the part of each party to a possible trade. Shall I shave myself or go to the barber? Before I decide, I estimate the direct effort in the light of the effort to get that with which to pay the barber for his service. If I trade with him, it is because I deem it easier, cheaper in effort, more convenient in time. Trade means comparisons in every case—comparisons by both parties—and in the more recondite and complicated cases, elaborate comparisons and often comprehensive calculations involving future time.

Now these estimates inseparable from exchanges, and these calculations which are a factor in all the far-reaching exchanges, are mental activities. They quicken and strengthen the minds of men. Trade is usually, if not always, the initial step in the mental development of individuals and nations. Desires stir early in the minds of all children; efforts more or less earnest are the speedy outcome of natural desires; direct efforts, however, to satisfy these soon reach their limits; it is now but a step over to simple exchanges, by which the desires are met indirectly; exchanges once commenced tend to multiply in all directions, and the estimates that must precede and accompany these are mental states,—the more of them, the greater the mental development, the higher the education; consequently, commerce domestic and foreign is a grand agency in civilization, a constant and broadening impulse towards progress in all its forms; and Christianity, as we have already seen, is friendly to commerce in its every breath. Those, therefore, who talk and preach about Trade as tending to materialism, do not know what they are talking about. Because Commodities are material things, and because a portion of the trade of the world concerns itself with commodities, these shallow thinkers jump to the conclusion that trade is materialistic. It is just the reverse. Let us hear no more from Professor Pulpit or Platform that buying and selling is antagonistic to men's higher intellectual and spiritual culture, because the present careful analysis has brought us indubitably to mental Estimates and prolonged comparisons, which are activities of Mind, as the fourth and a leading factor among the radical elements of Sale.

(e) There were two renderings, King Hiram's rendering at Joppa the desired cedars from the mountains of Lebanon, and King Solomon's rendering in return at Tyre the food products grown in his fertile country. These renderings were visible to all men. Unlike the desires and the estimates, which were subjective and invisible; the actual exchange of the products, the culmination of the previous efforts, the stipulated renderings by and to each party, were outward and objective—"known and read of all men." This is the reason why public attention is always strongly drawn to this particular link of the chain of events which we are now unlocking and taking apart, while other links of the series, that are just as essential, almost wholly escape observation. The ports and the markets are apt to be noisy and conspicuous, when the desires and the estimates and the satisfactions, without which in their place there would be no market-places, work in silence, and leave no records except the indirect one of the renderings themselves.

It is of great moment to note here, that each of the two parties to an exchange always has an advantage over the other, either absolute or relative, in the rendering his own product, whatever it may be, as compared with his present ability to get directly or through any other exchange the product he receives in return. Take the example in hand. Cedars and sandal-wood were natural to Mount Lebanon; there were no other workmen in those regions of country that could "skill to hew timber like unto the Sidonians"; the Mediterranean afforded a level and free and easy highway from its northern coast to the Judean seaport at Joppa; and all these natural and acquired facilities put King Hiram into a posture of advantage in the rendering of timber, not only over the Jews, but also over all the other peoples in the basin of the midland sea. Still this advantage, great as it was, could only be made a real and palpable gain to themselves, the proprietors of the timber, by means of some exchange with somebody else, by which some wants of their own greater than their present want of timber, could be supplied by means of the timber. They had more of that commodity, and more skill to fashion and transport it, than their present and immediately prospective needs could make use of; and the only way in which they could practically avail themselves of their advantages, was, to sell their surplus timber and buy with it something that they needed more. Otherwise their very advantage perished with them. God has scattered such a diversity of blessings and capacities and opportunities over the earth on purpose, that, through traffic, on which his special benediction rests, the good of each part and people may become the portion of other parts and peoples.

So, on the other hand, of the southern neighbors of the Tyrians. There the earth brought forth by handfuls. There was an abundance of corn in the land, even to the tops of the mountains. Its fruit did indeed shake like Lebanon. But there were no cedars there, no fir-trees, no sandal-woods. How short-sighted, then, and futile, would it have been for the Jews, to try to hang on in their own behoof to all the natural advantages that God had given to them, and to say, We will not part with the direct results of any of them, we will build treasure-cities as they did in Egypt, we will store up all the fruits of these fat years against the possible coming of some famine years in the time to come. That is anything in ordinary times but the divine plan. It is anything but the letter and spirit of the divine injunction: "Him that keepeth back corn the people curse; but blessing shall be upon the head of him that selleth it" (Prov. xii, 26). Had they talked and acted thus, no temple could then have been built in Jerusalem, and the people of that generation would have lost the moral and religious impulse and uplifting of their service and sacrifice. Their grain would have become worthless from its very abundance, and would have decayed on their hands. They would have missed a great gain for themselves, and would have snatched away from their neighbors to the northward a providential opportunity for an equal gain.

The general truth must not be lost sight of here, even in passing, that all trade whatsoever is based upon a Diversity of relative Advantage as between the parties exchanging products. If, for example, the Hills of Judah and the Mountains of Israel had been covered with timber suitable for building the temple, and the coasts of Tyre and Sidon and the foot-hills of Lebanon had been fertile stretches of arable land, this particular trade would never have been thought of and could never have been realized. There would have been no gain in it for either party, and unless there be a valid gain for both parties at least in prospect, no trade will ever spring into being, because there would be no motive, no impulse, no reason, in it. Unless the Jews could get the timber easier by raising grain to pay for it, and the Tyrians get the oil and wheat and barley easier by cutting and floating timber to pay for them,—no trade; but the greater easiness to each actually came about, because each had an Advantage both natural and acquired over the other in his own rendering, and the mutual gain of the trade was wholly owing to that circumstance. So far as that matter went, the Tyrians had no cause to envy their neighbors the superior soil of the south, for they reaped indirectly but effectively a part of those harvests for themselves; and the Jews had no reason to be jealous of their northern neighbors on account of the noble forests crowning their mountains, because through trade they secured easily to themselves a share of that vast natural advantage. Diversity of Advantage both natural and acquired is the sole ground of Trade both domestic and foreign; and consequently by means of trade the peculiar advantages of each are fully shared in by all.

It is perhaps less obvious but surely equally true, that the greater the relative diversity of advantage as between two exchangers, the more profitable does the exchange become to each. If the Vale of Sharon had been twice as fertile as it was, and the cedars of Lebanon twice as large and lofty as they were, the easier and better would Israel have gotten its timber, and the more secure and abundant would have become the food of Tyre and Sidon; and, therefore, the more unreasonable, or rather the more absurd and wicked, would have been any envy or jealousy of either of the superior advantages at any point or points of the other. So universally. By the divine Purpose as expressed in the constitution of Nature, in the structure of Man, and in the laws of Society, Trade in good measure and degree imparts to each the bounties of all, arms each with the power of all, and impels each by the progress of all.

One other important matter is closely connected with these two Renderings, which is the fifth bit in succession of our present analysis, namely this, that traffic renderings always make necessary new and better routes of travel and transportation. It is mainly for this reason, that persons and things have to be carried to distances less or greater in order to consummate these Renderings of home and foreign commerce, that roads by land and routes by sea have been sought for and found, made and made shorter, improved as to method and facilitated as to force, from the dawn of History until the present hour. It was to get the goods of India, and so find a market for the goods of Europe, that the earliest land routes between the two were tried and maintained. The ground-thought of Columbus, meditated on for years, was to discover a new commercial way to India; Magellan with the same intent sailed westward through the Straits that wear his name, and so circumnavigated the globe; repeated searches mainly with the mercantile view, never long intermitted, have attempted ever since the North-West or the North-East passage to India; Vasco da Gama in 1497 boldly accomplished the East passage, and thus changed for all the Continents the channels of trade; the West now trades with all the East through the Suez Canal, dug for that express purpose; and the words, "Panama" and "Nicaragua" are upon everybody's lips, simply because through Central America is the shortest and safest route for men and goods to and from all the Oceans.

Quite recently Dr. W. Heyd has announced through the Berlin Geographical Society the discovery of two commercial routes from India to the West not hitherto described. Trebizond (on the Black Sea) and Tana (at the mouth of the Don) were the chief distributing points. Through Tana passed westward the pepper and ginger and nutmeg and cloves; and the price of spices is said to have doubled in Italy, when the Italians were for a time shut out of Tana in 1343. The chief overland route from India to Tana ran through Cabul to Khiva by the Oxus, and then by land through Astrakhan. The other route to Trebizond passed through Persia, and came out by Tabriz to the Black Sea. It may perhaps be pardoned, if a far homelier, more modern, and even local, illustration be given of the present point, that trade makes roads. The western wall of Williamstown is the mountain range of the Taconics, whose general height is about 2000 feet above tide water at Albany. Within the limits of this town are four natural depressions or passes over this range, which is also the watershed between the Hoosac River on the east and the Little Hoosac on the west. About the beginning of this century, the population was quite sparse in both these valleys, while the impulse to travel and traffic over the barrier was sufficient to build (wholly at local expense) wagon roads over each of the four passes, one of which soon after became a turnpike between Northampton and Albany; and another was built mainly to accommodate the medical practice on the west side of the mountain of Dr. Samuel Porter—a Williamstown surgeon of local eminence. So soon as railroads were constructed to run down these parallel valleys (railroads themselves are perhaps the best illustration of the point in hand), the mountain roads were relatively deserted, and only two of them are now open to transient travel.[2]

Lastly, (f) There were two satisfactions, the satisfaction of the southern king in actually obtaining the excellent timbers, without which the cherished national temple could not have gone up; and the satisfaction by the northern king in the easy receiving of the abundant food products for the daily maintenance of his court and kingdom. The simple story of these commercial transactions between Jew and Tyrian indicates clearly enough, what might have been anticipated and what always happens in such circumstances, not only a mutual satisfaction at the completion of each specific exchange, but also a general relation of contentment and peace in consequence of advantageous commercial intercourse. "And Hiram, king of Tyre, sent his servants unto Solomon; for he had heard, that they had anointed him king in the room of his father; because Hiram was ever a lover of David. And it came to pass, when Hiram heard the words of Solomon, that he rejoiced greatly, and said, Blessed be the Lord this day, which hath given unto David a wise son over this great people; and there was peace between Hiram and Solomon; and they two made a league together."

It is plain to reason and to all experience, that mutual Satisfactions are the ultimate thing in exchanges. Our present analysis can go no further, for the reason, that we have now reached in Satisfactions the end, for the sake of which all the previous processes have been gone through with. Persons do not engage in buying and selling for the mere pleasure of it, but always for the sake of some satisfactions derivable to both parties from the issue of it. Ordinary self-inspection and foresight and industry being presupposed, the issue of exchanges is just what was expected by the two persons, the satisfaction of each follows as a matter of course, and stimulates to new exchanges in ever-widening circles.

Since the desires of all men, which the efforts of other men can satisfy through exchange, are indefinite in number and unlimited in degree, there is no end of human Satisfactions to be reached along this road of reciprocal trade; and since the very object of all trade and the actual result of all trade (the exceptions are infinitesimal) is to multiply and reduplicate continually mutual Satisfactions among men; we can see right here what a loss and wrong it is, what a wanton destruction of possible human happiness it is, what a bar to progress among men in comforts and powers it is, for nations to impede and to prohibit commerce by legislation! As we shall see more fully in a later chapter, Governments can have no moral or constitutional right to restrict the trade of their people, except in the sole interest of revenue or health or morals.

Such is the constitution of the universe, that a really good thing is usually cognate with and inseparable from a good many other good things. Buying and selling, as we have now clearly seen, springs right out of the nature of men in the circumstances in which they are providentially placed on the earth, and ends in the satisfaction of innumerable wants common to all men. This makes trade a thoroughly good thing in itself; and consequently it is intimately associated with many other good things. The scriptural instance, that we have been examining, gives a neat illustration of this: "and there was peace between Hiram and Solomon; and they two made a league together." The mutually profitable exchange of commodities led to a feeling of amity between the two neighboring kings; the feeling of amity led to a treaty of Peace between the two adjacent nations; and the "league" so ratified not only kept out war from their borders, but also permitted the unhindered continuance of profitable exchanges between them.

So it is always. Peace waits on Commerce. Good-will among the nations is strengthened by the ties of interest and profit among their citizens. The mercantile classes as such are always averse to war, because war is the natural enemy of exchanges. Thus traffic leads to peace and tends to maintain it, and peace preludes increased prosperity, and commercial prosperity under freedom is wholly friendly to mental and moral progress, and Christianity walks before and all along this line of individual and national blessing. The commercial treaty of 1860 between France and England has tended powerfully, perhaps more powerfully than any other single cause, to keep those formerly inter-belligerent nationalities in peace and amity ever since.

We will now put into a little table the final results of the present analysis of Buying and Selling. The ultimate elements seem to be these:

The thoughtful reader will note in this table the fact, that three of these elements are objective, that is, outward and visible; and the other three are subjective, that is, inward and invisible. Persons, Efforts, Renderings, are seen and known of all men; Desires, Estimates, Satisfactions, can be directly known only to the persons who feel and make them. This is a peculiarity of Political Economy, that has been far too little observed even when it has been observed at all. Objective and subjective elements in it meet and mingle in each transaction. Indeed, they alternate, as is shown in the table above: first a Seen, and then an Unseen, Element throughout. It is this commingling of outward and inward, visible and invisible, that makes all the difficulty and gives all the fascination in Political Economy. Whatever carries us into the steady though billowy play of universal human nature is at once difficult and fascinating.

Quite contrary, however, to a common impression, the certainty both of action and prediction in all the other Sciences as well as in Economics lies rather in the unseen elements than in those that are seen. Take for an example the calculation of an eclipse: it is not so much from what is visible in the heavens and on the earth that the astronomer infers and predicts to the instant the shadow of one orb thrown upon another, as it is from the wholly hidden but ever-enduring forces of gravitation constantly relating these orbs one to the other. So it is of the Sciences generally; progress is made in them and certainties are reached in connection with them, "while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are but for a time; but the things which are not seen are everlasting." Invisible Desires and Satisfactions felt in connection with Exchanges are among the most constant elements of human nature; they, as it were, give birth to the relatively more transient (though visible) data of Efforts and Renderings; while inferences and conclusions and even predictions may be securely drawn from all of these, giving a solid ground for Political Economy to stand on,—almost as solid as the ground of the chief Physical Sciences.

2. We will next examine the inmost nature and the outward manifestations of Value. "Value" is by much the most important word in the Science of Economics; and we must, therefore, comprehend it thoroughly, root and branch. Nearly all the writers in English have used in place of this the word "Wealth" and those in other languages some equivalent and equally concrete word; but the present writer fully satisfied himself some twenty-five years ago, that it is impossible to use that word to any advantage in economical discussions, owing to its inherent ambiguities and concrete associations in the minds of men. He utterly discarded the word at that time, and has found not the least occasion to pick it up again since, and believes now that his substitution of the word "Value" in place of it will ultimately be seen to have been his greatest contribution to that Science, to which he devoted his life.

Even professed and excellent logicians, like John Stuart Mill, found the word "Wealth" an insoluble element in the science of Economics; he commenced his great work by writing, that it was not really needful to define the word which nevertheless he laid at the foundation of his discussions, that "every one has a notion sufficiently correct for common purposes of what is meant by Wealth"; he goes on, however, to give at least a half-dozen definitions of the word, no two of which are at all consistent with each other, only one of which embodies a clear and scientific conception, and even to this one he himself does by no means coherently adhere throughout his treatise. No wonder, that this great man died thoroughly dissatisfied with his own work in Economics, and wishing for longer life in which to recast and improve it! No wonder, too, that the crowd of writers both English and American, many of them able and thoughtful and otherwise logical, who have been content to continue to use this irreducible and utterly unscientific word at the bottom, have made a mess of it!

In dropping the word, "Wealth," accordingly, Political Economy has dropped a clog, and its movements are now relatively free and certain; and it is all the more incumbent on the Science for that very reason to define the good word that it substitutes for a bad one with absolute clearness, to explain it through and through until it become quite transparent, and then always to use it in its defined and economical sense, and none other, even though the same word be properly enough used in other senses in common speech and in other than scientific relations. Exactly that is what we are now going to attempt to do in a simple and consecutive order.

(a) Perhaps it will help us to find out precisely what Value is by seeing as clearly as possible at the outset what it is not. It is not easy, and never can be made so, to teach and to learn distinctly what Value is in its ultimate nature and constant changes. Here is the one unavoidable difficulty that lies at the very threshold of Political Economy; and this difficulty, which is not found as in the case of "Wealth" in the meaning of the word but in the complex character of that which the word describes, once overmastered, and one walks thereafter with ease and pleasure throughout the economic domain. It would be wrong and cruel to deny that just here is one hard place in the road for teacher and pupils to get over. It arises wholly from the nature of the subject, as we shall soon see, and not at all from the insufficiency of the word, Value. We have already seen fully, that Buying and Selling in each and every transaction is complex and relative, involving twelve elements every time; that Desires and Estimates and Renderings are especially relative,—each party to a trade desires something in possession of the other, estimates that something relatively to something in his own possession, and finally renders to the other his own something for the sake of receiving the other's something. Now everybody is used to all this and practically understands it perfectly, but it is complicated and reciprocal nevertheless, and Value, which is the single birth of the two Renderings, though perfectly intelligible to him that takes pains, is not a thing to be seized once for all at a passing trot.

Value, then, is not a quality of single things, belonging to them as if by nature, as hardness is a quality of a rock or gravity is an attribute of gold; because all physical qualities in physical things, all that which makes or helps to make anything such as it is, may be learned by a study of the things themselves by themselves; a careful examination and analysis of the mechanical and chemical properties of any physical thing will discover all its distinguishing characteristics, all that makes it that particular thing in distinction from all other things; but it is plain already, that the Value of anything (if it have value) cannot be found out by studying that particular thing by itself alone; the questioning of the senses however minute, the test of the laboratory however delicate, can never determine how much anything is worth, because that always implies a comparison between two things, or more strictly a comparison between two Renderings in exchange. Value is not an attribute of single things: not even if the things be physical and tangible.

Now two other kinds of things are bought and sold besides physical and tangible things, namely, personal services and commercial credits; and it is very plain, that Value cannot be a quality of any one personal service rendered, as looked at by itself, such as the service of a physician towards a fever patient, because the service in and of itself might be the same whether rendered to his own child or the child of one of his patrons, while in the former case there would be no value, and in the latter there would be; and so too the very name "commercial credit" implies an exchange of two Renderings, out of which Value always emerges, and not at all an attribute of one credit considered by itself. Value is no more a characteristic of single intangible services and claims than it is of single intangible commodities rendered.

And what makes all this still more certain is, that Value even in physical things, and perhaps still more in services and claims, is all the while changing under demand and supply, now rising and then falling, while the physical properties of things, that make them what they are, are fixed and unchangeable. A gold eagle, for example, has certain primary qualities as gold, without which it would not be gold; it is hard and heavy and colored: gold is gold the world over and in all ages: Value is not one of these primary qualities, nor even a secondary quality, nor any quality at all, of gold as such; because circumstances are readily conceived and have often occurred, in which gold has no Value even in exchange; for instance, among a crew abandoned at sea, a bag of gold belonging to one of the sailors might not buy even a biscuit belonging to another; all the natural qualities of the gold are present,—it is still yellow and weighty and solid,—but its Value has escaped altogether. Gold is always 19 times heavier than water: specific gravity is a quality and is constant in all physical things: Value is not a quality in this sense at all, inasmuch as it is something that is constantly changing, rising or falling, and not infrequently disappearing altogether, leaving no sign.

Ignorance of this vastly important truth has pecuniarily ruined thousands upon thousands of the people of this country during the last 20 years. They have gone into the mining of metals, gold and silver and copper, sometimes as individuals and more often as companies gathering in the driblets of investors, under the notion that if they could only get these metals out of the ground their Value would be just as secure and fixed as their physical qualities. They found out their mistake in bitterness of spirit. For example, the Value of an ounce of silver has gone down and down and down as the quantity of silver excavated has increased under zealous digging, in accordance with the universal and pitiless law of Supply and Demand. So of copper. And both these great monetary interests went to Congress and secured the passage of laws designed to lift artificially the Values that were sinking naturally under increased Supply, the silver men by a law requiring the United States to buy and mint at least $2,000,000 in silver each month whether the silver dollars were needed or not, and the copper men by a law imposing a tariff-tax on foreign copper that has actually lifted the price two cents a pound on the average of the whole 20 years above the average price of copper in the markets of the world.

Take another illustration of disappearing Values, this time in lands, long supposed to be the most stable in value of all human possessions. Whole tiers of farms in the writer's native town in New Hampshire, and for that matter all over New England as well, that in his boyhood supported large families, and when sold usually brought a fair price, are now abandoned of their owners as wholly or comparatively worthless, and are allowed to grow up into forest again, without a sign of present human habitation upon them. Value is something that needs to be studied carefully, if it is to be fully understood.

(b) Perhaps the origin of the word, "Value," will throw some light upon its nature and changes. Etymology can never be safely despised in scientific discussions, although words are perpetually changing their meaning in the mouths of men. No science can afford to build upon the transient meaning of a word; and yet it is clearly possible so to use words as to reach and describe ultimate and unchanging facts in science; and some knowledge of the original meaning of words is always a help in getting at those definitions and analyses of facts that are permanent in science. Let us hold fast to the cheering truth exemplified on all sides of every science, that a just analysis and exact description of ultimate facts in any department of knowledge are for all time, in spite of the transient meaning of current words.

The present word is derived from the Latin Valere, to pass for, to be worth. There is a strong hint of a comparison in the original meaning of the word, and the current use of it both in Latin and English develops the hint into a certainty. In common language, when the Value of anything is asked for, the answer always comes in the terms of something else. If the question be, How much is it worth? the answer is, So many dollars or cents. Now the cents or dollars are very different things from those whose value is thus inquired after; and so we see again from another point of view that Value is a relative matter, since it clearly implies a comparison between two distinct things; and, if so, it is clearly enough not a quality of any one thing, and of course it would be useless to try to ascertain the Value of anything by a study of that thing alone. Etymology thus easily brings us up to our present vital question, and will assist us to solve it completely.

(c) What is Value? Plainly it is the result of a comparison instituted between two things, using the word, "things," here in its broadest sense. But who institutes the comparison? And who is competent to announce the result of it in Value? A comparison is required in order to ascertain the length of a stick of timber in feet and inches, and a carpenter's square is the instrument by which the comparison is made, and it makes no difference in the result whose the square is or whose the stick of timber is, since the square and the stick have in common the physical quality of length, and a simple comparison of square with stick determines the length of the latter, and one man in this case may determine the result by himself alone, and it is not needful that he be the owner of either of the things compared.

But it is a different kind of comparison from this that issues in Value. Let us suppose an exchange of a bushel of wheat for a mason's trowel: there is no common physical quality, as length, between the wheat and the trowel; and it is evident, that no one man can measure in any form one of these two commodities by means of the other. It is a peculiar kind of comparison that is involved in any and every trade; and the first peculiarity of it is, as we have already seen in another connection, that it always requires "two persons" to make it; and each of the two persons must always be the virtual owner of one of the two things exchanged. A thief may indeed go through the motions of selling a stolen horse, but as he is not the owner of the horse there can be no sale, and the actual owner may take his horse wherever he finds it even in the hands of an innocent third party. In other words, there must ever be "two efforts" also, two legitimate efforts giving a valid claim of ownership to each of the two parties in the exchange.

And there is a second distinctive peculiarity in that comparison that ends in Value, namely, the two things to be exchanged are not compared directly with each other at all, as square and stick are compared, but in the light of the "two desires" with which we are already familiar, and in that of the "two estimates" resulting therefrom. The owner of the wheat desires a trowel, and the owner of the trowel desires a bushel of wheat; the former estimates the effort it has already cost him to procure the wheat in a sort of comparison with the effort that it would otherwise cost him to procure the trowel, and he does not trade unless the trowel seem more and better to him than does the wheat; the latter estimates the effort it has cost him to procure the trowel in a sort of comparison with the effort it would cost him to procure otherwise the wheat that he wants, and he does not trade unless the wheat then and there seem more desirable than the trowel, which he already has; and these two relative estimates of the two owners must coincide, that is, the owner of the wheat must think more of the trowel than of the wheat, and the owner of the trowel must think more of the wheat than of the trowel, before these two parties can ever trade. So of all traffic whatsoever.

Now the third and last distinctive peculiarity of that kind of comparison out of which Value emerges is this,—an action is necessary in order to complete the comparison. Desires and estimates may have been never so busy, but no Value can ever be born until an outward action takes place in the "two renderings" of our former analysis. Then first we come out upon plain and solid ground. We leave the play of the subjective elements, which yet are essential in the premises, and touch firmly objective realities. The trowel-maker passes over his tool in the sight of men to the wheat-grower in firm possession and ownership, and takes in return for it from him the grain, which the latter passes over to the former for the sake of receiving the trowel. The two "satisfactions" follow as a matter of course, and that whole transaction as a commercial exchange and as the sole subject of Political Economy is ended.

But where is the "Value," of which we have been in search? The answer is easy and certain and unevadible. The Value is in the Renderings, and nowhere else. The value of the trowel is the wheat, that is actually given in exchange for it; and the value of the wheat is equally the trowel, for the sake of getting which the wheat was rendered. What was the Value of King Hiram's cedar-timbers? The oil and wheat actually returned in pay for them. What was the Value of the oil and wheat sent northward by King Solomon? The timbers rendered in direct exchange for the same. This is not merely the only possible answer to the question, What is Value? but it is also a perfectly complete and satisfactory answer. Common language here corresponds exactly with scientific language. "How much did the horse cost?" "One hundred dollars." The dollars have nothing whatever in common with the horse, except that they express his Value at the time; the horse has nothing in common with the dollars, except that it expresses the Value of the dollars at the time. It is just as exact to say, it means precisely the same thing to say, the dollars are worth the horse, as to say, the horse is worth the dollars.

In general terms, the Value of anything is something else received in return for it, when each owner renders the one for the sake of getting the other. This is the whole of it, so far as any specific valuable thing is concerned. We shall indeed need after a little, and shall have no trouble in finding, an abstract and universal definition of "Value," as an abstract and scientific term perfectly circumscribing the field of Economics. Here and now we are dealing with the simpler concrete question, What is the value of any specific valuable thing? The unvarying answer is, Some other specific valuable thing already exchanged for the first! There may be expected value, estimated value, but actual value there is none, until a real exchange has settled how much the value is. The value of anything is something else already exchanged for it. Value is not simply a relation subsisting between two things, the result of a careful comparison between them, but rather an actual fact established in connection with them. The universal formula of Value is quid pro quo, in which formula quid stands for one of the valuables and quo for the other, and pro unfolds the motive of each owner for the reciprocal receiving and rendering.

Here a caution is needful. Because nobody can tell what the value of anything is until something else has been put over against it in order to get it and actually received therefor, and because the only possible way to express the value of either is in the terms of the other,—the trowel is worth the wheat and the wheat is worth the trowel,—one must not therefore jump to the conclusion that the value of either is settled for all time or even for any future time. It is only settled for this time. In Economics as in Christianity, Now is the accepted time. There is nothing fixed in Values, and never can be from the nature of the case, because Desires are personal to individuals, and Efforts fluctuate with times and persons, and Estimates that wait on these vary from necessity, and the Renderings of to-day may not be the chosen renderings of other persons in the same articles to-morrow. Value is not a quality at all, still less is it a permanent quality, of anything; it is a relation established between two things when these are in the hands of two given persons; but now when these are in the hands of two different persons, whose views are pretty sure to differ from the former, and a new relation is sought to be established between these in the old way of Estimates, is it strange that a new balance is struck, and Value is expressed in quite different terms?

One of the chief charms of Political Economy is the open secret, that it deals not with rigidities and inflexible qualities and mathematical quantities and the unchanging laws of matter, but with the billowy play of desires and estimates and purposes and satisfactions, all of which are mental states, and all of which are subject in the general to ascertainable laws, though laws of a quite different kind from those of Mechanics. Values come and they go. Within certain limits and under certain conditions they may be anticipated and even predicted, but never with the precision of an eclipse or the result of a known chemical combination. There is a useful and fascinating Science of Value, as we shall see indubitably by and by in the present chapter; but it is a science that deals primarily with persons and only secondarily with things, with mind and not with matter, with the general undulations of the sea and not with the crests of the waves. And all this is so, because Values are relative, because the announcements in the market-place to-day may stand listed differently to-morrow and very differently next year, and because old values may disappear altogether and many new ones come in, all in accordance with the incessant changes in the wants and labors and fashions and projects of men.

We are now in a good place to see once for all the sharp distinction there is between Utility and Value. These two are often confounded to the deep detriment of our Science; and no clear thinking is possible in Economics without drawing this line sharp, and then holding it fast; for the hazard of this confusion is all the greater, because Utility is always connected with Value, although it is a totally different thing from Value. We will see. Utility is the simple capacity of anything to gratify the desire of anybody. This is at once the etymological as well as the popular signification of the word. It is derived from the Latin utor, to make use of, a word that is often conjoined in Latin with fruor, to enjoy; so much so, that the two verbs are often put together, utor et fruor, and also often without the conjunctive, utor fruor. Utility, then, is a quality of innumerable things. Anything that is good for anything, anything useful, anything that has the power to still the desires of any person, has Utility. But multitudes of things that have this capacity to gratify human desires are never bought and sold, and therefore can have no Value, since nobody will give anything for them. The air we breathe, the water we refresh ourselves with from spring or brook, the light of the sun and moon and stars, the fragrance of the flowers, the mountain prospect that delights the eye,—all these, and thousands more, possess the highest utility, but no value whatsoever. They are free. They are the bounty of God. They are never bought and sold. They are a vast class of things by themselves, with which Political Economy as such has nothing to do.

Nevertheless the element of Utility comes into every case of Value, because the element of Desire comes into every case of Value, and whatever merely satisfies the Desire of any person is Utility, whether that capacity be the direct gift of God or whether the Efforts of men have been employed to bring it about. It is just here that we see the precise function of our "two efforts" in each case of Value, in distinction from mere Utility in all cases: much of utility is absolutely free, no effort of men having been put forth to secure it, for example, the fragrance of the wild rose; much more of utility is the commingled bounty of Nature and the gratuitous effort of men, for example, the fragrance of the domestic rose brought by the householder himself into his own yard for the gratification of his own family; while by much the most of utility is commingled free gift of God and the compensated efforts of men, for example, the fragrance of the bank of roses cultivated and cared for by the hired gardener. It is important for our purposes to discriminate carefully the three kinds of Utility: (1) what is wholly disconnected from the efforts of men, and comes freely from the hand of God; (2) what is mingled with the unpaid efforts of men, so that the satisfaction of the desire comes partly from Nature and partly from unbought effort; and (3) the compound utility that is partly free gift and partly the result of compensated labor. The last is the only kind of Utility that stands in any connection with Value.

And even this is very different from Value. Utility in all three of its forms—now free, now onerous, now partly bought—is always a quality of one thing by itself, going straight to the satisfaction of some desire, and there an end. It is simplicity itself compared with Value, which is always a resultant of several things, and is specifically a relation of mutual purchase established between two "renderings," each of which expresses the value of the other, in each of which is embodied an "effort" made by each of the two "persons" rendering, and each of which excites a "desire" and an "estimate" before being passed over in ownership to another, and a "satisfaction" afterwards.

The utility in every valuable rendering comes partly from free Nature and partly from compensated effort, but it is remarkable, that a principle, with which we are to become very familiar later on, namely, Competition, eliminates for the most part from all influence upon Value that portion of the Utility that is the free gift of God. The great Father never takes pay for anything, and never authorizes anybody to take pay in his behalf; and, moreover, has arranged things so, that it is exceedingly difficult for any person to extort anything from another person on the strength of anything that God has made, and man has not improved. Take, for example, ten horses of any general grade, brought into the same market by their ten owners for sale. These men did not make these horses, but they have cared for and trained them, or at least have become proprietors by purchase or otherwise of the results of such care and training. The Utility in each horse is compound, consisting partly of what God has done for him and partly of what man has done for him,—the two parts inextricably interwoven,—and all ten are offered now for sale. Each of the owners would indeed be glad to get something for his horse on the ground of what God has done to make him sound and strong and fleet, in addition to a fair compensation for what he (and his predecessors) has done in raising and breaking him; but the cupidity of all is likely to be thwarted by the ultimate willingness of some to sell their horses for a price covering the element of human "efforts" involved, and the action of these tends to fix a general rate for the whole ten, and thus the gratuitous element is eliminated from influence on Value. Even if the ten owners should combine for a higher price, there are doubtless a plenty of horses of that general grade elsewhere, some of whose owners are content to get back an equivalent for their own and others' "efforts" expended on their horses; and so the action of these tends to fix the general price for horses of that kind for that time and place at a point not above a fair estimate of the onerous human elements involved; thus throwing out by the action of competition all effect of natural Utility upon the Value of horses then and there. So of all other products of that kind.

It is true, that in certain unique cases, in which competition has little or no play, because there is only one or a very few owners of such unique products, one cannot certainly say that free Utility may not influence the Value to lift it above the gauge of human efforts involved; but such cases are rare, and relatively unimportant; and the tendency is immensely strong, under the natural and beneficial condition of things, for Values to graduate themselves through the reciprocal estimates and renderings of commerce, down to the actual and onerous contribution of men to that Utility that underlies Value.

Thus we are brought again and again from differing points of view to the "two renderings" as central and determinative in Value, and also more specifically to the "two efforts" of persons rather than any free contribution of Nature as constituting that portion of the compound Utility, whose function it is to gratify the "two desires" that precede the realization of Value,—that portion of the utility in any rendering that must be compensated for by the other rendering. Now in order to reach in a moment more our final definition of "Value," a definition, it is believed, that will cover all the cases and take the life out of endless disputes, we need a scientific term to carry easily and exactly the meaning of any economic rendering. Let that word be Service. We must have it in its generalized meaning, to cover the renderings of all the three kinds, in distinction from the term "personal services," which we have already used and shall continue to use to designate one class only of things exchanged, in contradistinction to "commodities" and to "credits," the other two classes.

Value is the relation of mutual purchase established between two services by their exchange.

We offer this definition of "Value" to our readers in much confidence, that they will find it exact and adequate and altogether trustworthy. No one of them, however, is precluded from attempts to improve it in breadth and brevity and beauty; and all are invited to pick logical flaws in it, whether of ambiguity or superfluity or deficiency. Many minds and many hands in many lands have left their impress on parts of this definition, for example, Aristotle in Greece and Bastiat in France and Macleod in Great Britain; the present writer thinks, that he has bettered the definition of Bastiat, namely, "Value is the relation of two services exchanged," by precisely defining the relation as one of mutual purchase; and he is sure, that he has improved the definition of Macleod, namely, "The value of any economic quantity is any other economic quantity for which it can be exchanged," by making his definition at once more abstract and more general and more definite, and also by escaping the slight implication in the word, "quantity," that only material things are exchanged in economics.

The immense importance of securing first a clear and correct Definition of "Value," which is the foundation-word and the circumference-word of Political Economy, and then of using that term and all other scientific terms in the Science in their defined senses only, will certainly be appreciated by those who have wandered in the wide wilderness of the discussions on the undefinable word, "Wealth," and especially by those who have reflected most upon the vast and illimitable significance of economic Exchanges on the welfare of mankind. Associate Justice Miller of the Supreme Court of the United States, not an Economist in the technical sense, referred in 1888, in words that are worth remembering, to "the philosophical maxim of modern times, that of all the agencies of civilization and progress of the human race commerce is the most efficient." In August of that year John Sherman of Ohio, a man far enough from being a technical Economist, said in the Senate of the United States, that "it is almost a crime against civilization" to maintain commercial barriers between Canada and the United States.

There were tokens a plenty in the year of Grace just referred to, that the Science of Value in all the lands of the civilized world, and particularly in the United States, was drawing to itself a new and more popular esteem. It was seen more clearly and felt more deeply than ever before, that this science has a weighty word for every man and woman and child in the world; that there are certain Rights in every one inherent and inalienable to buy and sell for his own advantage; that most if not all of the Governments, under the lead of comparatively few selfish and powerful men, were infringing upon these Rights, and robbing under the forms of Law the masses of their citizens to immense amounts for the special benefit of these very men; that the only sure defences of the people against these abuses of all kinds were in the maintenance and diffusion of the scientific and consequently disinterested principles and maxims of a sound Political Economy; that such a science was only friendly to the broadest rights, to universal gains, to illimitable increase in human comforts and powers, to international fellowship, to peace on earth and good-will among men; that, accordingly, a science of such scope and tendencies must be encouraged and cultivated and improved; that what had been crude in it, and narrow, and merely national, must be sloughed off; that the English and insular and special speculations of a century ago, which regarded "Wealth" as consisting of material things only, excepting however considerable portions of Adam Smith's immortal book, were antiquated and unusable; that the Science had really moved into a broader and still a well-circumscribed field, new and more permanent foundations were being laid, and fresh contributions from all countries should be welcomed; and that the time had fully come, when the accepted truths of this Science, like those of the other developed sciences, should be practically and steadily applied to the betterment of mankind. Under these broadening and inspiriting and uplifting conditions Political Economy, as never before, thanked God and took courage.

3. Having now a satisfactory definition of Value, and knowing accordingly just what Valuables are in clear distinction from all other things in the world, we must examine with some care two or three of the most general facts and laws and limits of Value, before we pass in the next following chapters to study in detail each of the three kinds of Valuables, namely, material Commodities, personal Services, commercial Credits.

(a) Since Value in general is the relation of mutual purchase between two Services, and consequently the specific value of either can only be expressed by the other,—one Valuable being always measured by the Valuable exchanged against it,—it follows as a matter of course that such a thing as a general Rise or Fall of Valuables is an impossibility. The rise of one valuable involves of necessity a fall in the other, as the fall of one implies the rise of the other. If the articles exchanged be bushels of wheat and dollars of silver, and if a bushel buys a dollar to-day, then wheat is worth a dollar a bushel; but if wheat rises next week, so that a dollar will not buy a full bushel, that is precisely the same thing as saying, that the dollar has fallen in its purchasing-power as compared with the wheat. Such specific changes in the purchasing-power of one Valuable over another are incessant throughout the commercial world, and a merchant's sagacity consists in anticipating these so far as possible and in availing himself of them alertly and prudently; but each one of us must needs see clearly and hold firmly in mind, that each fall in the purchasing-power of a Valuable means a corresponding rise of power in the other Valuable,—if the first buys more of the second than before, then the second must buy less than before of the first; and, consequently, a general rise of Valuables is a contradiction in terms, and so of course is a general fall of Valuables.

This brings us to Price. Price is Value reckoned in money; and this is the only difference in the meaning of the two terms. When one valuable is sold against another, even when one of the two is money, each is the Value of the other: Value is the general and universal term in Economics. When any other valuable is sold against money, the amount of money it buys is called its Price: Price is a specific and restricted term in Economics. Since we shall study Money thoroughly in a later chapter, and there explain the origin and extent of its functions throughout, it is only in order to remark here, that it is for convenience' sake, that is, to make easy the comparison of valuables one with another, that Value in commerce is commonly reduced to Price. Money becomes a sort of measure, by means of which to compare all other valuables with each other. In order to ascertain the Price of a Valuable, it only needs to be sold once against money; but in order to ascertain the Value of a Valuable, it would need to be sold once against all other valuables whatsoever. This last is clearly impracticable; and so Value for practical purposes is reduced to Price. The General is made Particular for convenience. Hence we have "Prices current," but never Values current.

Now it will be plain to all, how there may easily be and often is a general rise or fall of Prices while a rise or fall of Values is impossible. Price is a relative word as much as Value is, but it does not relate to so many things. Price is specific, and Value universal. Both equally involve buying and selling, but one sale of a single valuable against money leads to Price, while ten thousand sales of the same valuable against other than money would not conduct to complete Value. That would require a sale of this valuable against all other valuables in the world, and a complete statement of the comparative results.

General, or at least universal, changes of Prices in rise or fall in any given country are due to general and great changes in the Money current there. Subordinate changes in other valuables, money being supposed to remain uniform, will of course vary their Prices; but it is impossible that such changes should affect equally or even generally all the various and numberless valuables of a whole country; while some are coming easier, others are coming harder, while some are more desired than formerly others are less desired, and this will bring in of course altered prices, some higher and some lower; but a general rise of all prices, or a general fall in the same, can only come about by great changes of some kind in the circulating medium, that is, the money, of the country. For example, in the United States, between 1862 and 1878 inclusive, a government paper promise, called greenbacks, was the current money of the country; owing to its excessive issue, and to some doubt in the minds of the people whether the paper would ever be redeemed in gold, it soon became depreciated as compared with gold, the premium on which over the paper money varied at different times from 1 to 185 per centum; as all other valuables were then sold against greenback money, which had declined, their prices naturally rose in some sort of proportion as the medium fell; general values remained much as before, but general prices were much enhanced; and when, after the resumption of specie payments in January, 1879, gold became again the standard medium, general prices declined in full accordance with the same universal principle reversed.

(b) Prices, as we have now seen, are only a subordinate form of Values: the universal law that regulates all the variations of them both, within certain fixed limits to be examined shortly, is called the Law of Supply and Demand. This is perhaps the most comprehensive and beautiful law in Political Economy. We shall look at it now only in outline: the filling in will be the pastime and profit of all that is to come.

"Demand" is a technical term in Economics, and accordingly needs to be defined, and then always used in its defined sense. So is "Supply." Demand is the "desire" of a "person" for something in the hands of another person, coupled with the possession of something else capable of buying that something. Mere desire has no function in Political Economy: hungry and penniless children passing by the stalls of a great market, have no influence on the prices or values of the viands, on which they cast their eager glances: only desires accompanied by "efforts" competent to excite the desires and to pay for the efforts of another are a Demand. Supply is the same thing as Demand looked at from the other side. Supply is the correlative of Demand. The Supplyer is a person, who has in his possession something desired by the Demander, and who in turn desires something in the hands of the Demander, when both are willing to exchange their "renderings." There is no economical difference in the position of the Demander and the Supplyer. Each is equally a Demand and a Supply with reference to the other. It is the old and ever-recurring case of Value, the propositions being here stated in their most universal terms.

For simplicity's sake, however, and for convenience, without altering the substance of the definitions a particle, the valuables when looked at as a Demand are practically reduced in all markets to their equivalent in Money, so that Money offered or ready to be offered against any other exchangeable thing constitutes what is called in commercial language a Demand; and this is sufficiently accurate as well as current, although it must always be remembered that each valuable in any market in reality constitutes a Demand for another, and is equally a Supply in reference to that other. Supply is any exchangeable thing offered for sale against any other exchangeable thing. For example, corn in any market is at bottom a Demand and a Supply at once for every valuable offered in that market at that time, say, ploughs for one thing; but in the talk of the market, the presence of corn there, or its being ready to be immediately brought there and offered in exchange for money, constitutes what is called a Supply of corn; money offered, or ready to be offered, in exchange for corn, constitutes what is called a Demand.

On this account Money seems to play a much more important part in trade than it actually does play; the corn is sold in the terms of money, that is, for dollars and cents as denominations of Value; convenience dictates such a reduction of general Value to this particular form of it, because this is found to make easier the ultimate exchange; but there is not one chance in a hundred, as trade runs nowadays in the larger markets, that this seller of corn will take his pay for it in actual money whether metallic or paper; money is never an ultimate product, but only an intermediate one; this seller of corn wants perhaps a plough or some other farming implement, and ten to one he will take for his corn a bill or order in some form on the seller of ploughs, and it will be corn for a plough, each becoming a Demand and a Supply for the other, though money or rather its denominations has acted as an agent in bringing about the final trade; the details of all this in manner and result will be as plain as day when we come to study "Money" and "Credits" in following chapters; while the essential point to be noted here is, that all Valuables are a Demand and Supply as towards one another. In other words, the world over, A market for products is products in market.

What, then, is Market-Value returned in the terms of Money? And what is the universal Law of it?

Market-value is the present rate of exchange between dollars and cents and any other valuable, that can be fairly graded in a class made up of valuables similar to itself; and the law of market-value is the equation of Supply and Demand, that is, the current rate is adjusted when money enough is offered to take off within the usual times the valuables on hand and offered for sale. If Demand for any reason become quickened, and the Supply be not increased, there is competition among buyers for the stock in market, and the market-rate rises or tends to rise. If, on the other hand, Demand become sluggish, the Supply remaining the same, there is a like competition among the sellers to dispose of their stock, and market-value sinks or tends to sink. So far it is the simple action on Value of the element of one "desire" expressing itself through a money-demand, the elements of "desire" and of "efforts" expressing themselves through Supply being supposed to remain stable, and the pulsations in the market-rate follow accordingly.

How far can this simple action go? Demand increasing, Supply remaining as before, market-rate rises: how far can it rise from this cause? Here we must remember that Demand not only acts upon Value, but also Value reacts upon Demand. As Value rises, the number of those whose means or inclinations enable them to purchase at the new rate is constantly diminished: there are ten persons who may wish an article at one dollar, of whom not over four will wish it at two dollars, and perhaps only one at three dollars. Every rise in market-rate then, under the impulse of enlarged Demand, tends to cut off a part of that Demand, that is, to lessen the number of those who will purchase at the increased price; and the rate consequently can only rise to that point, whatever it be, where an equalization takes place between the Supply and Demand, between the quantity of flour, for example, offered at the enhanced rate, and the quantity of money in the hands of those willing to exchange it for flour at the higher rate.

Just so in the reverse way, when Demand is slackened, Supply continuing as before, the market-rate is sure to decline; but declining rates tend strongly in turn to increase the demand by bringing the article within the range of a larger number of purchasers; Society is like a pyramid, each lower stratum is broader than the one above; and so the decline of rates under a weaker Demand is arrested by a stronger Demand coming from a wider circle of buyers, and a new market-rate is determined at the point of equalization between the new Demand and the old Supply. Thus every rise or fall of Demand tends to check itself, and will check itself in all the great classes of valuables, even without any variations in the Supply; everything oscillates under the variations of Demand; while the point of stable equilibrium, if we may use the expression of anything so unstable as Market-value, is always the equation of Supply and Demand.

But all considerable variations of market-rate are commonly checked at an earlier point than the one just indicated by variations in the Supply. A sharper Demand carries up the market-rate, and a higher market-rate commonly acts upon Supply to enlarge it, and an increased Supply too checks the rise of market-rate. Per contra, a slacker Demand lowers market-rates, and lowered rates often lessen the Supply by the action of holders and speculators,—holders withdrawing their stock for a better market, and speculators buying now when the article is cheap to store away until it shall be dearer. Thus rise of market-rate from Demand growing stronger is checked doubly; first, by curtailing the number of would-be buyers, and second, by enlarging the Supply: the fall of market-rate from Demand growing weaker is checked doubly; first, by increasing the number of consumers of a now cheaper article, and second, by a diminution of Supply by the action of holders and speculators. This double and harmonious working of the law of the Equalization of Demand and Supply is one of the most comprehensive and beautiful laws in Political Economy.

Besides this, we must note the effect on Value of conditions in Supply only, Demand being supposed to continue steady. There are three classes of valuables in respect to the law of their Supply. (1) When the Supply is scant, and cannot be increased at all, as is the case with choice antiques and certain gems and paintings by the old masters, their value may rise to any point under the action of Demand, there is and can be in such cases no market-rate, and the individual value will be struck at the point of equalization of the demand then existing with the supply there offered. For instance, the French Government paid, in 1852, 615,300 francs for a painting by Murillo, which had belonged to Marshal Soult. The genuine Murillos are comparatively few, and their number cannot be increased, and their merit causes a strong "desire" to possess them, and their value rises in connection with the limitation of Supply to a point beyond which no one purchaser can be found. When this painting was offered in Paris for sale, many "persons" of course were anxious to buy it, there was but one painting, there could be but one purchaser, value rose under the influence of a sharp Demand, the rise could not be checked by any duplication of the Supply, and the equation was complete and the value for that sale determined when one party distanced all other competitors and offered a sum greater than any one else would give. The same principle controls all sales of this sort, and is practically the principle of the Auction, whose very name indicates its nature in this regard, that Demand becomes restricted to one party, and that the highest bidder.

(2) When the Supply, instead of being absolutely limited, can only be increased with difficulty or after the lapse of time, similar but less extreme results will be observed. Let us suppose, that pianos are selling in some rural community at $300 each, that there are twenty persons in the place who want a piano immediately, that there are but fifteen pianos on hand, and that the number cannot be increased for half a year. The market-rate will certainly rise above $300. How much above? To that point, at which only fifteen of the twenty will be willing to purchase at the new rate. The equation of Supply and Demand will be reached by a rising rate which cuts off five competitors. This is the principle, working only roughly in practice through the estimates and good judgment of dealers and purchasers. A better illustration of this second class of cases is, perhaps, the Grains and other agricultural products. When these have been gathered, there is no more home supply for a year; and any deficiency in the crops will raise their market-rate, not at all in the ratio of the deficiency, but according to the relations of the diminished Supply to a new Demand. Since the abolition of the Corn-Laws in England in 1846, and the resulting ease of grain-imports from abroad, a deficiency of home crops has no such effect on the price of cereals as it had before that time; when, according to Tooke's History of Prices, an expected falling-off of one third in the crops often doubled and sometimes quadrupled the usual prices; which shows that the world ought to become one country in respect to all food supplies, as indeed happily it is now for the most part, each country allowing them to be distributed freely everywhere in accordance with this law of Demand and Supply. Speculation is more busy in grain, in cotton, and in such things generally, because a new Supply can only be had once a year; early information is eagerly sought at the trade centres in regard to the prospects of the growing crops, and has its influence one way or the other on current prices; but the world is so wide and all the parts of it now so closely connected together by steamship and telegraph, that the prices of the great food staples are remarkably uniform over the earth, and Speculation has not the chance it once had to count and "corner."

(3) In the only remaining and by far most comprehensive class of cases, in which the Supply of Commodities and Services and Credits can be readily and indefinitely increased to meet enhanced Demand, and easily withdrawn from market and stored when Demand declines, each rise and fall of market-rate tends to be speedily checked through the mere action of Supply; and the doubly and harmoniously working Law but just now referred to keeps Value in this class of cases comparatively steady all over the world.

(c) It only remains in this branch of the general discussion on Value, to indicate the Limits, within which all oscillations of Value are contained. These extreme limits are specially to be found in the element of Value which we have called "Efforts." We have clearly seen already, that "efforts" (or Labor) are not, as has been often asserted, the cause of Value, but only one of several constituent causes; if Labor be asserted to be the sole cause of Value, the inquiry becomes instantly pertinent, what is the cause of the value of Labor; yet we know, that "efforts" always stand in preconnection with value, and, the mutual "desires" being presupposed, there must always be Limitations of Value lying partly in the efforts made by the person serving and partly in the efforts saved to the person served. In every valuable transaction, each of the parties is reciprocally serving and served, and it is clear, that the two would not exchange "renderings" unless the service which each renders to the other is less onerous than the "efforts" which each would have to make if each served himself directly. For example, it takes a certain effort for me to bring water from the spring for the use of my family; I am willing to pay a neighbor for bringing it for me, but I should not be willing to make a greater effort for him in return than the effort is to bring it myself; neither should I be willing to make an effort for him in return which I regarded just as onerous as the bringing the water myself; and unless there is some service which he will accept less onerous to me than that, I shall continue to bring the water. On the other hand, he will surely not render the service to me of bringing the water, unless it be less onerous to him to do so than the doing that for himself which I am ready to do for him.

This principle, applicable to all exchanges whatsoever, draws on the one side the outermost line, beyond which Value never can pass. It may be asserted with confidence, that no person will ever knowingly make a greater effort to satisfy a desire through exchange, than the effort needful to satisfy it without an exchange. Therefore, it follows, that all exchanges lessen onerous efforts among men relatively to the satisfaction of their desires, and tend to lessen these more and more as exchanges multiply in number and variety, otherwise the exchanges would not take place.

Moreover, within this outermost Limit of Value, which is made by the comparative onerousness of the respective "efforts," there is a second limitation of a similar kind to be found specially in the element which we have called "estimates." The estimate of each exchanger is based at once on his own effort about to be rendered and on his desire for the return service offered: the element of effort in the case of both being considered for the time as fixed, Value will vary according to the varying desire of each for the return service of the other, affecting of course the "estimate" of each, and furnishing also a secondary Limit of Value. To pursue the same illustration, suppose I regard the effort required to bring the water myself as 10; that there are several persons, who would be glad to do that service for me at a return service which I consider as 8; that there are two persons, who are willing to do it for something which I estimate at 6; and that there is only one person, who will do it for a return service which I regard as 5. It is evident, that the extreme limits of that service to me are 10 and 5. Higher than 10 it cannot go, lower than 5 it cannot sink. But why have I before me three possible classes of renderers? Because the persons in each class, while estimating their own efforts alike in the proposed rendering to me, have varying "desires" as towards a possible rendering from me to them, and consequently put differing "estimates" upon the possible transactions. The man who will bring the water for 5 has for some reason (no matter what) a stronger desire for the return than anybody else, and I should of course employ him so long as he would serve me on those terms; if he decline the exchange, I fall back on one of the two persons in the class above him, and Value rises now from 5 to 6, and will be steadier there than it was before; if each of these in turn should give out, I should fall back upon the larger class ready to serve me at 8, and Value would be very steady at that rate, because there are numerous competitors; and by no possibility could it rise above 10. Between 10 and 5 the value may fluctuate, but it cannot overpass these Limits in either direction under existing circumstances.

Therefore we may conclude, that the maximum Value of any Service in exchange will be struck at the point where the recipient will prefer to serve himself, or go without the satisfaction, rather than make the exchange; and the minimum Value of any Service in exchange is struck at the point below which the recipient cannot get himself served even by him who most highly estimates the return service offered.

(4) We come now to the last and most important Inquiry in this initial chapter, namely this, Can there be, and is there, a strict Science of Buying and Selling? Is there a Science by itself, clear and certain, that covers and controls Valuables?

Here we must go slowly, if we would go surely. We must first find out exactly what a Science is in general, and then ascertain in particular whether Political Economy bears all the marks and stands all the tests of the other genuine Sciences. What is a Science?

A Science is the body of exact definitions and sound principles educed from and applied to a single class of facts or phenomena.

The very first condition, accordingly, of any science is, that there be a single class of facts, objective or subjective, that can be separated from all other classes of facts, in the mind by a generalization and in words by a definition, and that such generalization and definition be clearly made and held; the second condition is, that the class of facts so circumscribed and defined be open to some or all of the logical processes of construction, of which the most important are Induction and Deduction; the third condition is, that the subordinate definitions and working principles within the inchoate Science be all educed from and applied to these circumscribed facts in strict accordance with these well-known logical processes; and the last condition is, that these definitions and principles have gradually become "a body," in which there is an organic arrangement of parts, all being placed in a just order and mutual interdependence. There is no old Science, and there can be no new Science, in which these four conditions do not meet and become blended; and the beauty of it is, that this Definition applies to any Science in all stages of its growth. No one of all the Sciences is as yet completed; but just so soon as any correct definitions and principles are drawn from and applied to any class of things clearly circumscribed as such, and these definitions and principles are orderly arranged in a body, there is an incipient Science; and its progress towards perfection will proceed in precisely the same manner in which its foundations have been laid; new facts and principles and definitions will gradually be discovered, and these when reapplied to the class of things out of which they have sprung, will lead to corrections and adjustments and enlargements of the Science; and no matter how far these logical processes may be carried, the general Definition with which we start will also be found ample at the end of the journey.

All of the Sciences without exception have been developed into their present position in just this manner; and they fall easily into three great classes, namely, the Exact, the Physical, and the Moral Sciences. The ground of this triple classification is partly the distinct subject-matter in the three classes of Sciences, and partly the distinctive prominence of one or more of the logical processes of construction in each.

Thus, the class of the Exact Sciences consists only of the formal Logic, and pure Mathematics. These two are distinct from all other sciences, because their logical method of procedure is wholly Deductive. Deduction is the process of the mind, by which we pass from a general truth to a particular case under it, that is to say, from more to less inclusive propositions. Stuart Mill argues at much length in his book on Logic, that even the axioms of pure Mathematics are originally gained by Induction, while others claim that the truth of these axioms is perceived intuitively, but no matter how this point is decided, the construction process of the Pure Mathematics is from the General to the Particular. So it is also with the Aristotelian logic, whose Major Premise, whether only supposed to be true or intuitively perceived or inductively proved is always General in its terms. This is the form of Aristotle's Syllogism:—All sinners deserve to be punished; John is a sinner; and therefore, John deserves punishment.

Physical Sciences are those concerned with the classifications and laws of action belonging to material substances. There are a great circle of these, of which Astronomy, Botany, and Chemistry, may serve as examples. They have been mostly developed since the time, and in accordance with the methods, of Lord Bacon; who, in strong reaction against the Deductive logic of Aristotle, exalted Induction or the mode of generalizing from particulars, as the true way of building up Sciences; and, as the subject-matter of each of the physical sciences is well open to observation and experiment, to Induction and Deduction, and to corrective verifications, both inductive and deductive, the new method proved remarkably pregnant and successful. Each of these sciences has a distinct Class of objects or phenomena to which its attention is directed; the class is circumscribed by the scientific Conception and Definition; its devotees as a rule are skilled in using the Baconian tools; and consequently, its conclusions receive the confidence and control the action of men. All of the Physical Sciences are constantly enlarging "the body of exact definitions and sound principles" connected with their several classes "of facts or phenomena."

Moral Sciences are those concerned with the classifications and laws of action belonging to beings having Thoughts and Desires and Will. The most developed of these sciences at present are Metaphysics, Ethics, and Economics. Each of these is concerned with a single class of phenomena, which may be exactly conceived of and defined, and is open to the logical processes by which alone Sciences can be built up. But Induction cannot march up with quite so sure a stride, nor Deduction descend with so large degrees of certainty, in relation to persons endowed with free-will, as in relation to physical substances held firm in the grip of unvaried law. Still, the doubt always attaches far more to the actions of an individual than to the actions of the masses of men. It is much easier to know human nature in general, than one man in particular, because many Inductions guided by observation and History make it almost certain how masses of men will act under a given set of conditions, while any one may act in a contrary way. Deduction, accordingly, cannot hold quite the same place in the Moral Sciences so far as individuals are concerned, as it holds in the Physical and Exact Sciences; but this lack is perhaps more than made up by other advantages. Experience in the moral sciences corresponds to Experiments in the physical sciences. Then there is the great advantage of Introspection; since each man has within himself the means of interpreting and testing the inductions of Metaphysics, Ethics, and Economics. Then also there is the great resource of Feigned Cases, which, provided only they be cases possible to occur, open up to Reasoning a new means of proving and correcting. Besides these, which it enjoys in common with them, Economics, as we shall soon see, possesses one other great advantage over and above the rest of the Moral Sciences.

Since, then, Political Economy deals primarily with Persons, and only quite secondarily with Things, it is, under the definition and on every ground, a "moral science"; yet it must not be confounded in the least with what is sometimes called the science of Morals, or Ethics. There is one word that marks and circumscribes the field of Ethics, and that word is Ought; there is one word also that marks and circumscribes the field of Economics, and that word is Value. Now, the idea of obligation, on which ethical science is founded, and the idea of gainful exchange, on which economical science is founded, are totally distinct ideas. The imperatives of ethical obligation rest upon the consciences of men, and Duty is to be done at all hazards; guilt is incurred if it be neglected; while pecuniary gains and losses, however large, do not, or at least ought not, weigh a feather against an intuition of Right and Wrong. Economics, on the other hand, does not aspire to place its feet upon this lofty ethical ground; no man is ever under any moral obligation to make a trade; he properly makes it or not, according to his present sense of its gainfulness to himself; and so economic science finds a solid and adequate footing upon the expedient and the useful. Ethics appeals only to an enlightened conscience, and certain conduct is approved because it is Right, and for no other reason; Economics appeals only to an enlightened self-interest, and exchanges are made because they are mutually Advantageous, and for no other reason; each of the two Sciences, therefore, has a basis and sphere of its own, and the grounds of the two are not only independent, but also incommensurable.

We will now apply seriatim to Political Economy the four fundamental conditions belonging to all recognized Sciences, and so determine for ourselves whether it be not a strict science, and thus worthy in its leading propositions of all acceptation.

(a) Every science must have to begin with a definite Class of facts, which lie in an easily circumscribable field, and which are not likely to be confounded with other facts of a differing nature. Economy has such a class of facts, that lie in such a field, and that cut themselves off by sharp lines from all other things. Valuables is its class of things. It has nothing to do with any other class of things. Its field is Value, or Sales, or Exchanges. This field is perfectly definite. Sales are never confounded with gifts, and are never confounded with thefts. They have a distinctive character of their own. They have always been in the world, will always be in the world in ever-multiplying volume, and no one ever mistakes their main features for anything else. Anything whatsoever that is salable, or is about to be made so, comes within the view of Economics, and scientifically it cares for nothing else. While it finds its field definite, it also finds it broad. It has no wish to encroach on other sciences, nor will it tolerate any encroachments on its own. Before anything is sold, or is being made ready to sell, it cares nothing what other science employs itself upon that thing; after the thing is sold, Economy loses its interest in it, and other sciences may take it up if they choose. Valuableness is the one quality that constitutes the Class of things with which the Science is conversant, and it claims complete jurisdiction over all things just so far forth as they have this one quality, and no farther. Now there is in the actual world such a Class of things; its exterior boundaries have been exactly ascertained by a long series of Inductions and Deductions, tentative, corrective, and confirmatory; and accordingly, Political Economy has now in full possession the first grand condition of a Science.

(b) This great class of facts, thus reached by logical Generalization and grasped and held by a mental Conception and fixed by an adequate verbal Definition, is remarkably open to all the logical processes of reasoning, by which alone sciences are constructed, and thus possesses in full measure the second grand condition of the Sciences. Not one logical resource is denied to the economists: all the tools of the scientific workshop are at their hands. Let us now catalogue these in their order.

(1) Induction. This is the logical and universal process, by which the mind naturally passes up from a certain number of observed cases, in which a certain quality appears, to a Generalization, which is a conception of the mind followed by a statement in words to the effect, that all possible cases of that kind will exhibit the quality already observed in the few cases. It has as its basis a confidence in the resemblances and uniformities of Nature; it proceeds upon the axiom that Nature throughout is consistent with herself; and this confidence has been ten thousand times justified in the issue, when it is found that Nature preordained the Sciences by causing grand analogies to run through each department of her works, including man and his works. The structure of the human mind corresponds with these objective resemblances; it seizes upon them, and delights in them, and naturally and joyfully infers and concludes that what has been observed of a part may be safely affirmed of the whole of that kind; accordingly, the world over, when certain things are found to be true in a considerable number of cases, the mind leaps over space and time to a whole class, and frames for itself a general rule or principle, which binds all the cases into one bundle, and thereafter confidently affirms what is known to be true of some to be probably true of all. This is inductive Generalization; and the strength and the joy of it is well expressed by Descartes: "I have thought that I could take as a just generalization that which I very clearly and vividly conceived to be true."

Experience in Economics corresponds to Experiment in the Physical Sciences, and furnishes to Induction all the fuel it can ask for to feed its logical furnace and to forge the chains that bind the Cases to the Classes. Personal experience in buying and selling, local experience in buying and selling, and national experience in buying and selling, with all that belongs to these, the records of which are full to overflowing, afford to the inductive inquirer in Economics an inexhaustible supply of material. Instances abound. Particulars may be gathered up one by one on every hand and linked into the inductive chain. If any doubt be felt about the strength of any one of these chains, another one may at once be linked in terms drawn from another field of Experience with a view to test the strength of the first. Most fortunate from this point of view is the United States, because here there are States with substantive powers of control over most matters of trade within their borders, as well as a Nation with sovereign powers of control over some points of trade within the country as a whole. This feature has given birth to commercial experiments as well as commercial experience of all kinds; and Induction rejoices in all these abundant materials for generalization thus furnished free of cost to Science, though unfortunately not free of cost to the People.

(2) Deduction. This is a logical process exactly the reverse of the first, in that it descends from a generalized statement reached by the inductive process to some particular, or subordinate class of particulars, ostensibly covered by the general maxim. Induction examines a number of particulars, and then makes a leap, it may be a long leap, over all intervening particulars, to its Generalization clamping them. The main use of Deduction is to make sure of any one of these overleaped particulars, which may come into importance, and thus confirm the generalization, or correct it. It is not strictly true, what is often alleged against deductive reasoning, that there is nothing new in its result, that the Induction had already passed through that particular in rising to its Generalization, and therefore to descend to any particular link to examine that, is something useless. The exact truth is, that it is useless to examine again deductively the very particulars that were carefully studied inductively, but on the other hand there is always much actually untraversed territory between these already examined particulars and the inductive generalization, and Deduction is often very useful in carrying us down to questionable points in this territory. Even Lord Bacon, who scorned the syllogism, admits this: "Axioms duly and orderly formed from particulars easily discover the way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active."

We will illustrate this by a reference to Franklin's famous induction to prove the identity of lightning with electricity. Only one experiment, and that a very rude one, was needful in this case; although usually many experiments, or the careful observation of many particulars, are necessary in inductions; but the generalization having been gained, Deduction had a chance to try its hand; it had long been observed that electricity could be conducted from point to point, and if electricity and lightning be identical, then lightning can be so conducted; therefore, deduced Franklin, a pointed iron rod elevated above buildings will harmlessly conduct lightning from the clouds into the ground. Deduction gave mankind the lightning-rod, and so made one point of science "active," as Bacon phrased it; and it is noticeable, that Turgot's felicitous epigram turns on the deductive rather than the inductive side of Franklin's experiment: Eripuit coelo fulmen sceptrumque tyrannis.

Let us catch up another illustration from the science of Botany, to show how Deduction may strengthen and sharpen an inductive result. The botanists say, that apple-tree blossoms are always five-petaled, because blossoms from a large number of apple-trees in various localities have been observed to have just five petals to the blossom; so far, they affirm inductively, and indeed securely; but they have also reached by means of another induction a much broader law of plant-life, namely, that outside-growers, when they have petaled flowers at all, always have them five-fold; now apple-trees are outside-growers; and therefore, deductively also, and conclusively beyond shadow of question, apple-tree blossoms are five-petaled.

Political Economy is just as open to Deduction as it is to Induction, and the two continually are reaching each other the hands of economical reasoning, not always indeed pursuing each a separate and distinct path to the end, as in the botanical instance just adduced; because in practice the two processes mingle constantly, and neither is carried out in full and due form, since premises used by the mind are often dropped in the statement, and shortened forms of expression take the place of long-drawn-out formulas. But all good reasoning in Economics, as in all other sciences, is analyzable into one or other of these two processes, both based alike on the uniformities of Nature and the structure of the human mind.

Deduction has not quite the same scope and certainty in Economics as in the Physical Sciences, because any one may act contrary to the vastly probable action of many individuals; still, it is a safe and potent process in economics, since it may descend securely from the larger masses to the smaller, even though perchance the individual escape, because of the simplicity and universality and certainty of the impulses that lead men to exchange. John Bascom gives the reason well, why both Induction and Deduction have so firm a grasp upon this science: "Between one dollar and two dollars a man has no choice, he must take the greater; between one day and two days of labor he must take the less; between the present and the future he must take the present. This is not a sphere of caprice, nor scarcely even of liberty; the actions themselves present no alternative, and, if an alternative giving an opportunity for choice does arise, it arises from some partial or individual impulse, from some one of those transitory and foreign influences, which, while rippling the surface, neither belong to nor affect the current of the stream."

(3) Introspection. Everybody buys and sells, and almost everybody watches the action of his own mind enough to see what are his motives in buying and selling, and soon comes to know also that the other party has corresponding motives. Even the child knows perfectly, that it takes two to make a bargain, that each party renders something to the other, that each is glad to part with something for the sake of receiving something from the other, and that this higher esteem put by each on what is taken from the other makes for each the gain of the trade. A very little introspection tells anybody, that were this higher esteem wanting in the minds of either of the two, the trade would not take place at all. Everybody within the pale of compos mentis knows, that, were his own desire for the rendering of another to increase, he himself would offer more of his own rendering rather than forego the trade; and he rightly infers, that what is true of himself is true of all other men; and so, every seller rightly tries to display his wares in such a way as to increase the desire of buyers for them; knowing full well from his own experience in buying that, other things being equal, they will be willing to render him more for them in consequence.

The phrase above, "rightly infers," is based upon the truth, that all men are remarkably alike in certain great departments of action; and that, in no department are they so nearly alike as in this of buying and selling. Introspection, therefore, an easy self-knowledge open to all persons alike, and a personal experience in these matters that everybody gains, give most trustworthy answers to Inductive inquiry along these lines. Trade is natural and gainful, as any person can see, who stops to ask himself why he has made, or is about to make, a given trade; and if natural and gainful to him, equally so for precisely the same reasons to the party of the other part; hence no law or encouragement is needed to induce any persons to enter upon traffic; and any law, or artificial obstacle, that hinders any two persons from trading, who would otherwise trade, not only interferes with an inalienable right that belongs to both, but also destroys an inevitable gain that would otherwise accrue to both. Political economy is very fortunate, accordingly, in being able to make its appeal to the common sense of all men, giving sound starting-points through self-knowledge possessed by all men, guiding to safe steps by means of Induction all who like to generalize and prove, and especially breaking up current fallacies by asking the potent question, "How would you like it yourself?"

(4) Feigned Cases. There are two kinds of these, namely, those which might be realized in actual fact, and those which never can be so realized. The acute mind of the Greeks marked in their flexible language a decided difference between the class of suppositions that might possibly become facts, and another class of suppositions impossible to become facts, by developing a distinct form of expression for each. This distinction must always be borne in mind by those who use or note in economical discussions the expedient of Feigned Cases. Reasoning is always legitimate and often pregnant from suppositions, whenever these are such as might readily become facts of experience, because in that case the argument proceeds upon recognized and inductive resemblances; but otherwise, no inference at all can be drawn from them, because it is an universal truth in Nature and in Logic, ex nihilo nihil fit, out of nothing nothing can come. In plausible suppositions impossible to become facts is a nest of logical fallacies, that need to be watched. A good illustration may be found in the Monetary Conference at Paris in 1881. Delegates were there from all the nations of Europe, from the United States, and even the distant India. Some of these in their eagerness for a factitious ratio of value between gold and silver forgot the important distinction now in hand, and argued of the good results to flow from the realization of a supposition, which in fact never could be realized. Mr. Evarts voiced the French and American delegates in this declaration: "Any ratio now or of late in use by any commercial nation, if adopted by an important group of states, could be maintained; but the adoption of a ratio of 15½ silver to 1 of gold would accomplish the principal object with less disturbance in the monetary systems to be affected by it than any other ratio." The fallacy in this passage is in the words, "could be maintained," which are a supposition, and what is much worse, a supposition contrary to fact, from which all arguing is nugatory. Why it is contrary to fact will be seen at length in the following chapter on Money.

On the other hand, a supposition that may clearly become a fact is a substantive thing, and logical inferences may be drawn from it, just as geometrical inferences may be drawn from a supposed circle: the circle on the page is not a perfect circle—no such circle was ever drawn—but suppose it perfect, as it might possibly be, and argument becomes at once valid. Let us take another Monetary Conference at Paris in 1867 as an illustration: its judgment as voiced by Mr. Ruggles of New York was taken with logical propriety, when the great benefits of an international coinage of gold alone were argued and announced, because, while that was then a mere conjectural project, it was possible any day by mutual agreement among the nations to become a reality. An international coinage of gold is a simple question of equivalence of weights in the coins of different countries: an equivalence of values as between gold and silver coins for any great length of time is neither simple nor possible.

(5) Results measurable in numbers. The four preceding logical processes of proof and construction Political Economy is glad to share with the other Moral Sciences, but this fifth and last one it has to itself alone, and this is its chief scientific advantage over them, and is consequently the main reason why it is already more advanced and more symmetrically developed than any of them. In common with them it has important subjective elements, such as Desires, Estimates, and Satisfactions; in marked advantage over them it has also objective elements, that can be weighed and measured and even hardened into statistics. Economics has an ever ready objective test, which mere mental and ethical and other moral processes never can have from their very nature. The result of each and of all economic transactions may be measured by money, and put down in a ledger, and published to the world in the form of statistics. An economic blunder, whether in legislation or in private action, pretty soon proves itself to be such by the lessened gains of somebody, and these losses can be stated arithmetically; and similarly, an economic improvement evidences itself at once by increased gains coming to somebody; while it may take years and years to work out the results of an ethical mistake, and even then their amount can only be guessed at.

Theories in metaphysics can only be tested by the Reason of men, and reasonable men without apparent bias of motive take opposite views of Sensations and Intuitions and Volitions; while theories in economics, which can be even better tested by the Reason, have an additional and almost immediate and constantly recurring test through men's pockets and the tables of the Census. The people indeed sometimes deceive themselves, and are also too often deceived by others, in these matters of buying and selling; but it is none the less of the utmost consequence to this Science, that all the results of good and bad practice in Economics work themselves at last into a definite shape, into facts and figures that cannot lie. It is not, as in Ethics and Metaphysics, that tendencies and potencies only are ascertained, but everything speedily drifts into results measurable in numbers, which stand out like landmarks against the sky. It is just for this reason, as both the schools of the Roman lawyers admitted, namely, that we have in all cases the Return-Service as the outward expression and measure of the Desire and Effort of him who renders the service, and because it makes no difference which of two services exchanged be regarded as the return-service, that our Science is reared on the firm ground of objective realities, notwithstanding the strong subjective elements that have a constant part in it.

(c) The third condition of a recognized Science is, that the logical processes appropriate to its class of facts have been already carefully applied to them and a certain number of "exact definitions and sound principles" have been already "educed from and applied to" them. We do not hesitate a moment to claim, that this condition also is fairly and fully met by Political Economy, and that this is a "Science" under the definition from every point of view, and particularly from this third point of view; and a few examples will now be given as a specimen merely of the logical work already achieved in Economics. First, Induction more or less busy for two thousand years has given at last an exact and acceptable definition of the Science, and impliedly an exact description of the class of facts with which it is conversant, namely, the Science of Sales, or what is exactly equivalent, the Science of Value; and Deduction at all points along this slow road has helped to correct and to broaden successive imperfect inductions, which an inquisitive and tentative and cautious spirit—the mainspring of Constructive Science—has instituted from time to time.

Second, precisely the same processes often repeated have ascertained beyond question, that there are only three classes of Valuables and the exact differences between them, and that, consequently, only six cases of Value are possible to happen.

Third, so many nations at different times in all ages have lowered the standard of their Money under a misapprehension of its nature and in a vain hope of profit, and a general scale of rising prices following each attempt of this kind having been several times observed and no instance to the contrary, Economists came by Induction to assert the proposition, that falling Moneys cause rising Prices; the proposition stood secure on inductive grounds alone; but so soon as a perfect definition of Money, namely, a Measure of Services, had at last been reached both inductively and deductively, it became at once a safe Deduction from the definition, that rising Prices must succeed a falling Measure. Thus assurance became doubly sure.

Fourth, Introspection gives each buyer and seller such firm possession of his own motive in buying and selling, that he naturally and inductively concludes on the ground that men are substantially alike, that the motive is similar in the party of the other part; each further step of experience in traffic assures him of this beyond a doubt,—each wants to get and does get something from the other of more consequence to him than what he gives; every attempted deviation from rectitude in trade so far forth throws the trader out from opportunity to trade; opportunity to trade is nothing in the world but a market; a market is nothing in the world but men with products in their hands, desiring to buy other products with these; the more men anywhere with the more products in their hands of all sorts to buy with, the better market everywhere for other men (the more the better) with other products of all kinds to buy with; all the appropriate logical processes in action and reaction, all the commercial experience of all men everywhere, and all the true statistics of traffic ever gathered, do but assure the inductive assent to one of the best and broadest of all the Generalizations in Economics, namely this: A market for products is products in market.

(d) Are the definitions and principles already logically educed from and applied to the great class of Valuables orderly arranged in "a body"? This is the only inquiry that remains, in order to determine whether Political Economy is already a "Science" in the strictest sense of that term. It is admitted, that a jumble of even just definitions and principles do not constitute a science, but only these when placed in a just order and interdependence. A "body" implies an organic arrangement of parts. It has been well said of the human body, that all its parts are reciprocally means and ends; the same may be said of every living organic body, whether vegetable or animal; and the same may be said in the way of analogy of every developed and recognized Science. All the definitions and propositions and illustrations in any science should be so arranged, as to show the mutual relations and reciprocal dependence of all the parts, and as to display the whole in harmony and symmetry.

It is as certain as anything in the future can be in science, that new principles will be discovered in Economics as Time and Inquiry go on, and that these will find their place little by little in a fuller and more rounded "body" than is at present possible; while it is also as certain as anything in the future of science can be, that the Outline of economics is already perfectly drawn, that the great class of Valuables will never be enlarged nor be better described, that the category of Commodities, Services, Credits, is completed for all time, and that the analysis of each act of trade into two Desires and two Efforts and two Estimates and two Renderings and two Satisfactions will never yield additional elements. Political Economy is already a body of exact definitions and sound principles educed from and applied to a single class of facts. This body will indeed be enlarged by a future and finer scientific construction, the arrangement and interdependence of its parts will be better exhibited, the form and filling up of the Science within the outline already determined is sure to become more compact, more robust, and more beautiful, as the decades and centuries go by; while, as in the human body throughout all the changes of its growth and mature life, that future body of economic science in all its stages towards perfection will be but the continuation and fuller development of the present "body" of Political Economy.