Strange Methods of the E.E.F. Staff. It will be remembered that Lieutenant Jabotinsky was responsible for the idea of forming a Jewish Legion to help England in her great struggle for world freedom. The British Government was impressed with the possibilities he placed before it, and eventually he was summoned to the War Office by Lord Derby, then Secretary of State for War, and to the War Cabinet by General Smuts, to expound his proposals. These high officials did not disdain to meet and confer with Jabotinsky on the Jewish Legion question, although at that time he was merely a private soldier, serving in the 20th Battalion of the London Regiment. They knew that he held a very high place in the Zionist movement, and was looked up to by the Jewish masses the world over as one of its most brilliant young leaders. This fact was also known to the Staff of the E.E.F., but when, as an officer, in August, 1919, Lieutenant Jabotinsky sought an interview with the Commander-in-Chief, hoping that he might induce the local authorities to change their anti-Jewish policy in Palestine, he was not only refused a hearing, but methods were immediately Jabotinsky was, of course, pro-British to the core. During his service in Palestine he had been for a time specially attached to the Zionist Commission with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. While he was employed in this capacity he brought about the acceptance of a programme by the Jewish Colonists, expressly calling for a British Mandate for Palestine. All through his military service with the Battalion he, to my personal knowledge, did his utmost to allay the feelings of resentment felt by the Jewish soldiers at the bad treatment they received at the hands of the military authorities, treatment utterly undeserved and uncalled for, but apparently deliberately adopted to further what appeared to be the local policy of making the practical application of the Balfour Declaration an impossibility. Hostility to all things Jewish was so open, that only those who wilfully shut their eyes could fail to see the game that was being played by certain interested parties. Jabotinsky saw that the line of action adopted must inevitably lead to outbreaks against the Jews, and naturally wanted to ward off such a calamity. Do not let the reader imagine that there was bad blood between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists. That both had dwelt together in unity and concord for over forty years is proof to the contrary. The anti-Jewish outbreak, which actually took place later on, was carefully fostered, and the hooligan element amongst the Arabs openly encouraged to acts of violence There can be no doubt that it was assumed in some quarters that when trouble, which had been deliberately encouraged, arose, the Home Government, embarrassed by a thousand difficulties at its doors, would agree with the wire-pullers in Palestine, and say to the Jewish people that the carrying out of the Balfour Declaration, owing to the hostility displayed by the Arabs, was outside the range of practical politics. To these schemers it must have been somewhat galling, to say the least of it, to find certain men openly fighting them, foot by foot, and inch by inch, for the realisation of the ideals expressed in the famous Declaration. One of these men was Jabotinsky, a man with a notable name in Jewry, therefore a thrust at him would also be a blow to Jewish prestige in Palestine. He was a mere foreigner, a Jew from Russia, and presumably without influential friends—a man, surely, on whom officialdom could safely pour out the vials of its unjust wrath, without any fear of evil consequences to itself. At all events, contemptible methods were adopted in order to strike at the man who had dared to let the authorities know that their local policy was a menace to his people dwelling in the Holy Land, and a serious danger to the Restoration. When Jabotinsky saw that certain members of the Staff were adopting measures towards Jewish soldiers, and Jewish ideals in Palestine, which must inevitably result in disaster, and being loth to believe that the
I knew nothing whatever about the despatch of this letter, and although I am aware that red tape will hold up its hands in holy horror at the audacity of it, it must be remembered that Jabotinsky's position was an exceptional one. He was not a British subject, and not used to the routine of British red tape. Members of the It is an open, straightforward, honest letter, a heartfelt cry from a man who sees that the whole structure which he has been at such pains to build is in serious peril of being overthrown by the machinations of the anti-Jewish people on the Staff. And now a curious thing happened. It was known to the Staff that Jabotinsky was at the time staying in Jaffa, and that he was to be found almost daily at the house of a friend who was living there. About a week after he had sent his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, a Staff-Major from G.H.Q., E.E.F., appeared in Jaffa and took up his quarters in the same house as that in which Jabotinsky's friend dwelt. When the inevitable meeting took place, the Staff-Major, who, by the way, knew Jabotinsky well, remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had received his (Jabotinsky's) letter, and would probably send for him one of these days, but that, in the meantime, it would be well if Jabotinsky stated his grievances then and there to himself. "You can speak to me openly as to a friend," said the Major. "I have some influence at G.H.Q., and I shall be glad to assist in righting any wrong done to Jews." On hearing this, Jabotinsky unhesitatingly explained the situation, both as to its effects on the Regiment and Sometime afterwards, by a mere chance, I saw a copy of this report, and so far as it referred to Jabotinsky, it was practically untrue from beginning to end. If the responsible authorities at G.H.Q. knew of the method adopted to lure Jabotinsky into the "friendly conversation" which served as a pretext for a gross libel on his character, it reminds one of the good old days when Governments had recourse to "Agents provocateurs." What G.H.Q. certainly should have known was that the accusations levelled at Jabotinsky by a member of their Staff were absolutely untrue. They knew him to be a good and gallant officer who had done his duty, and much more than his duty, faithfully and well to England, but it would appear as if they were greedy for such a document and swallowed it with avidity without any reference to me or, so far as I know, to anybody else. I think that even the most prejudiced of my readers will admit that in fairness and justice to Jabotinsky this secret report should have been submitted to him for his information, and such explanation and refutation as he could give, before any action was taken against him. It is strictly laid down in the King's Regulations that all adverse reports must be shown to the officer whose reputation is affected, but, as I have shown over and over again, the Staff of the E.E.F. were apparently a law unto themselves and above even King's Regulations! I knew nothing whatever of all that had been going on; I knew nothing of Jabotinsky's letter to the Commander-in-Chief; I knew nothing of his interview with the Staff-Major from G.H.Q., and, needless to say, I knew nothing of the report which the latter had written. My first inkling of the situation was through an official letter emanating from the Deputy Adjutant-General, which stated that "the Commander-in-Chief has his own duly constituted advisers on matters of policy and is not prepared to grant an interview to a Lieutenant of the 38th Battalion Royal Fusiliers to discuss such matters." From this moment G.H.Q. lost no time in getting rid of Jabotinsky. On the 29th August, 1919, I received an urgent order to send this officer to Kantara for immediate demobilization. This took me by surprise, for I was very short of Jewish Officers, and stood much in need of Jabotinsky's services in the Battalion. I wrote and protested against his demobilization, stating that I needed his services, but the only result was the receipt of the following peremptory memorandum:
The above was signed by a Staff Officer. As a result of this piece of Prussianism, Jabotinsky had to proceed to Kantara, where at lightning speed he was demobilised. He wrote a protest to the Army Council, which I forwarded with my own views on the case. The appeal was a lengthy one, but I will merely quote the following passage:
A reply to this appeal was never received, and I do not know whether it ever reached the Army Council. Thus came about the victimization of Jabotinsky, the man who had done so much for England in her hour of need; who had over and over again in the firing line shown that he was prepared to make even the last great sacrifice itself in the cause for which England was fighting. As a reward for all his devotion to England he was, by strange and un-English devices, practically drummed out of the Army. I think my readers will agree with me that the scandalous course of action pursued by the Staff of the We know what the corrupt Bureaucrats have done for the once mighty Russian Empire. Had fair play and justice held sway there we would never have beheld the present orgy of Bolshevism which is sweeping through that unhappy country. Let all kings, princes, rulers and governors remember that to "do justice and ensue it" makes the stoutest barrier against Bolshevism, for, as it says in Ecclesiastes, "oppression maketh a wise man mad." |