A complete argument consists of two kinds of proof: constructive proof and refutation. Constructive proof is that part of an argument which sets forth direct reasons for belief in a certain proposition; refutation is that part which destroys the reasons for belief in the opposite side.

In general, each of these divisions is of about equal importance, at times the value of one predominating and at times the value of the other. If one is addressing an audience unacquainted with his views or hostile towards them, he is not likely to make much progress in getting his own beliefs accepted until he has, at least in part, shattered the opinion already existing. If, however, the audience is predisposed or even willing to accept the doctrine advocated, very little but constructive proof may be necessary.

In debate, the side that has the burden of proof will usually have more use for constructive argument, and the opposite side will have more use for refutation. This statement will not always hold true, however, for the rule will vary under different circumstances; a debater must, therefore, hold himself in readiness to meet whatever contingencies arise. Debate may be likened to the play of two boys building houses with blocks; each boy builds the best house he can, and at times attempts to overthrow the work of his playmate. The one that has the better structure when the game ends comes off victorious. Thus it is in debate; each debater must do his best both to build up his own argument and to destroy his opponent's.

To handle refutation successfully, either in written argument or in debate, one must know what to refute and what to leave alone. The general rule governing this matter is: Refute only those arguments which are essential to the proof of the other side. All trivial ideas, even all misstatements which if refuted would not destroy any fundamental process of an opponent's proof, should pass unnoticed. To mention them means waste of time and effort. It is not uncommon for a debater to make trivial errors intentionally, in the hope that his opponent will consume valuable time in refuting them and thus allow his main argument to go unscathed. When this stratagem succeeds, the one who made the mistakes can acknowledge that he was wrong in those unimportant details, and yet show that his fundamental arguments have not been overthrown. While arguing on a political question, an intercollegiate debater once laid considerable stress on an opinion expressed by Woodrow Wilson, "President," as he stated, "of Harvard University." His opponent, of course, might have held this statement up to ridicule, but such an exposure would have been impolitic, in that it would have in no wise impaired the value of Mr. Wilson's opinion as evidence. Another debater, not so wise, once spent considerable time in correcting an opponent who had said that the Steel Trust was formed in 1891 instead of in 1901, as was the case. As these dates had no vital bearing on the question at issue, the error should have been allowed to pass. The temptation to point out the flaws that are most obvious is always great, but unless by so doing one can knock out the props on which an opponent's proof rests, such an attack accomplishes nothing.

Another common error in refutation consists in "answering one's self." A person is guilty of this fault whenever he misstates an opponent's argument, either because he does not understand it or through design, and then refutes this misstatement. The folly of such procedure is made apparent by merely calling attention to the fact that the original argument has been garbled but in no wise refuted, An opponent can convict the one who has "answered himself" either of unpardonable ignorance about the subject or of downright dishonesty.

To guard against these errors of refuting unimportant details and of "answering one's self," it is always well to reduce an opponent's argument to the form of a brief. If the argument is in print, this task is comparatively simple; if the argument is oral, the task will be harder but will still present no serious difficulties to one who is used to drawing briefs. When all the ideas have been arranged in the form of headings and subheadings, and the relation between the ideas has been indicated by means of numbers and letters, then the arguer can quickly decide what points he ought to refute and what ones he can refute.

It goes without saying that the headings marked with the Roman numerals contain the most important ideas, and should, therefore, be overthrown as far as possible. There are three ways of disposing of them: one way is to state that the headings are false and then bring on new proof to show their falsity; the second way is to call attention to the subheadings with which the opponent has bolstered up the main headings, and then, by proving these subheads false, allow the main heads to fall to the ground; the third way is to admit that the subheads are true and then show that the inferences drawn from them are unwarranted.

To illustrate: A part of an argument on the affirmative side of the proposition, "Resolved, That students in American colleges should be excused from final examinations in all subjects in which they have attained a daily grade of at least eighty-five per cent.," might be reduced to the following brief form:—

I. This rule would be of great intellectual benefit to college students, for

A. They would master their work more thoroughly, because

1. They would study harder during the term.

The first method of overthrowing the heading indicated by (I) would be to attack it directly. This attack might consist of opinions of prominent educators who, on theoretical grounds, do not believe an intellectual benefit would result from the adoption of such a rule; of the opinions of educators who have tried the rule and declare that it is an intellectual detriment; and of a course of reasoning which would show that this system would rob the students exempted of the great intellectual benefit that is derived from the preparation for an examination and from the taking of an examination.

The second method would be to show that (1) is not true; therefore (A) would be false, and (I) would be left entirely unsupported.

Under the third method the arguer would admit the truth of (1), but would deny that the truth of (A) is established by it; therefore (I) would be unsupported.

Whenever a subheading is attacked, it is always very essential to show that the attack is made simply because this subheading serves as a foundation for the main heading. In this particular argument, refutation according to the second and third methods might read about as follows: "The contention of the affirmative that the eighty-five per cent. rule should be adopted because it would result in an intellectual improvement among college students, rests on the supposition that students would study harder during the term, and for that reason would more thoroughly master their subjects. This reasoning is erroneous because, in the first place, as I will show, but very few students, if any, would study harder during the term; and, in the second place, even if they did, those exempted would not have mastered their work so completely at the end of the year as they would have if they had taken an examination."

From the preceding, it is apparent that refutation consists of discrediting evidence and attacking reasoning. The ways to overthrow evidence will be considered first.

EVIDENCE.

It is taken for granted that the evidence mustered by the opponent is sufficient, if not overthrown, to establish his side of the discussion. Of course, if enough evidence for this purpose is lacking, one has only to call attention to this fundamental weakness in order to overthrow the argument then and there. The rules, therefore, for testing evidence assume that the opponent has cited facts that, if not combated, will establish his case.

These tests are the same as those given in Chapter VI; a hasty review of them, however, may be serviceable at this point.

I. Tests of the sources of evidence.

A. Is the witness competent to give a trustworthy account of the matter?

B. Is the witness willing to give an accurate account?

1. Does he have any personal interest in the case?

C. Is the witness prejudiced?

D. Does the witness have a good reputation for honesty and accuracy?

II. Internal tests of evidence.

A. Is the evidence consistent (a) with itself, (b) with known facts, (c) with human experience?

B. Is it first-hand evidence?

C. Can the evidence be classed as especially valuable?

1. Does it consist of hurtful admissions?

2. Is it undesigned evidence?

3. Is it negative evidence?

III. Test of argument from authority.

A. Is the witness an acknowledged authority on the subject about which he testifies?

To overthrow or weaken argument from authority, one may either discredit its source or bring to light some inconsistency in the statement itself. Usually the former method alone is possible. To accomplish this result, one may show that the witness spoke from insufficient knowledge of the matter, or was prejudiced, or had some personal interest in the case. Counter authority will also be of assistance. The following quotation taken from a college debate furnishes the student a good example of how to handle this sort of refutation.

"The argument has been advanced that the South does not need the foreign laborer, and this argument has been supported by the words of Mr. Prescott F. Hall. We would call the attention of the audience and the judges to the fact that since Prescott F. Hall is Secretary of the Immigration Restriction League, it would be to his interest to make this assertion. Why do not our opponents refer to impartial and unprejudiced men, men like Dr. Allen McLaughlin, a United States immigration official, who makes just the opposite statement?"

REASONING.

I. Induction.

A. Have enough instances of the class under consideration been
investigated to establish the existence of a general law?

B. Have enough instances been investigated to establish the
probable existence of a general law?

II. Deduction.

A. Are both premises true?

B. Is the fact stated in the minor premise an instance of the general law expressed in the major premise?

III. Antecedent probability.

A. Is the assigned cause of sufficient strength to produce the
alleged effect?

B. May some other cause intervene and prevent the action of the
assigned cause?

IV. Sign.

A. Argument from effect to cause.

1. Is the assigned cause adequate to produce the observed
effect?

2. Could the observed effect have resulted from any other
cause than the one assigned?

B. Argument from effect to effect.

1. Do the combined tests of argument from effect to cause and from cause to effect hold?

V. Example.

A. Is there any fundamental difference between the case in hand and the case cited as an example?

FALLACIES.

A fallacy is an error in reasoning. The preceding part of this chapter has already suggested tests that will expose many such faults, but there are a few errors which, because of their frequency or their inadaptability to other classification, demand separate treatment. This book follows the plan of most other texts on argumentation, and treats these errors under a separate head marked fallacies. To detect a fallacy in another's argument is to weaken, if not to destroy, his case; to avoid making a fallacy in one's own argument means escape from humiliation and defeat. Hence, a knowledge of fallacies is one of the most essential parts of a debater's equipment.

The classification given here does not pretend to be exhaustive; it does, however, consider the most common and insidious breaches of reasoning that are likely to occur, and the following pages should be studied with great care.

I. BEGGING THE QUESTION. (PETITIO PRINCIPII.)

1. MERE ASSUMPTION. Begging the question means assuming the truth of that which needs proof. This fallacy is found in its simplest form in epithets and appellations. The lawyer who speaks of "the criminal on trial for his life," begs the question in that he assumes the prisoner to be a criminal before the court has rendered a verdict. Those writers who have recently discussed "the brutal game of football" without having first adduced a particle of proof to show that the game is brutal, fall into the same error. An unpardonable instance of question-begging lies in the following introduction, once given by a debater who was attacking the proposition, "Resolved, That the federal government should own and operate the railroads in the United States":—

"We of the negative will show that the efficient and highly beneficial system of private ownership should be maintained, and that the impracticable system of government ownership can never succeed in the United States or in any similarly governed country."

Private ownership and government ownership may possess these qualities attributed to them, but the debater has no right to make such an assumption; he must prove that they have these qualities.

2. ASSUMPTION USED AS PROOF. Such barefaced assumptions as the preceding usually do little damage except to the one who makes them. They are not likely to lead astray an audience of average intelligence; on the other hand, they do stamp the arguer as prejudiced and illogical. But when assumptions are used as proof, hidden in the midst of quantities of other material, they may produce an unwarranted effect upon one who is not a clear thinker, or who is off his guard. If, without showing that football is brutal, one calls it an extremely brutal game, and then urges its abolishment on the ground of its brutality, he has used an assumption as proof, and has, therefore, begged the question. The debater who stated, without proving, that vast numbers of unskilled laborers were needed in the United States, and then urged this as a reason why no educational test should be applied to immigrants coming to this country, furnished an example of the same fallacy.

3. UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF THE TRUTH OF A SUPPRESSED PREMISE. The student is already familiar with the enthymeme. The enthymeme constitutes a valid form of reasoning only when the suppressed premise is recognized as true. Therefore, whenever an arguer makes use of the enthymeme without attempting to establish a suppressed premise whose truth is not admitted, he has argued fallaciously. This is a third method of begging the question. To illustrate: In advocating the abolishment of football from the list of college athletic sports, one might reason, "Football should be abolished because it obviously exposes a player to possible injury." The suppressed premise in this case would be: All sports which expose a player to possible injury should be abolished. Failure to prove the truth of this unadmitted statement constitutes the fallacy.

4. ASSUMPTION EQUIVALENT TO THE PROPOSITION TO BE PROVED. It is not surprising that a man carried away with excitement or prejudice should make assumptions that he does not even try to substantiate, but that anyone should assume the truth of the very conclusion that he has set out to establish seems incredible. Such a form of begging the question, however, does frequently occur. Sometimes the fallacy is so hidden in a mass of illustration and rhetorical embellishment that at first it is not apparent; but stripped of its verbal finery, it stands out very plainly. The following passage written on the affirmative side of the proposition, "Resolved, That the college course should be shortened to three years," will serve as a particularly flagrant illustration:—

It is a well-known fact that in the world of to-day time is an essential factor in the race for success. No young man can afford to dawdle for four long years in acquiring a so-called "higher" education. Three-fourths of that time is, if anything, more than sufficient in which to attain all the graces and culture that the progressive man needs.

It is evident that the "argument" in this case consists of nothing more than a repetition of the proposition.

5. ARGUING IN A CIRCLE. Another phase of begging the question consists of using an assumption as proof of a proposition and of then quoting the proposition as proof of the assumption. Two assertions are made, neither of which is substantiated by any real proof, but each of which is used to prove the other. This fallacy probably occurs most frequently in conversation. Consider the following :—

A. "The proposed system of taxation is an excellent one."

B. "What makes you think so?"

A. "Because it will be adopted by the legislature."

B. "How do you know it will?"

A. "Because it is a good system and our legislators are men of sense."

This fallacy occurs when one proves the authority of the church from the testimony of the scriptures, and then establishes the authenticity of the scriptures by the testimony of the church. A similar fallacy has been pointed out in the works of Plato. In Phaedo, he demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity, and in the Republic, he demonstrates the simplicity of the soul from its immortality. The following fragment of a brief argues in a circle:—

I. This principle is in accordance with the principles of the
Democratic party, since

A. The leader of the Democratic party believes in it, for

1. As the leader of the party, he naturally believes in Democratic principles.

II. AMBIGOUS TERMS. (EQUIVOCATION; CONFUSION OF TERMS.)

The fallacy of ambiguous terms consists of using the same term in two distinct senses in the same argument. Thus if one were to argue that "no designing person ought to be trusted; engravers are by profession designers; therefore they ought not to be trusted," it is quite apparent that the term "design" means totally different things in the two premises. The same fallacy occurs in the argument, "Since the American people believe in a republican form of government, they should vote the Republican ticket." Again:—

"Interference with another man's business is illegal;

"Underselling interferes with another man's business;

"Therefore underselling is illegal."

J. S. Mill in his System of Logic discusses the fallacy of ambiguous terms with great care. In part he says:—

The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the phrase "scarcity of money." In the language of commerce, "money" has two meanings: currency, or the circulating medium; and capital seeking investment, especially investment on loan. In this last sense, the word is used when the "money market" is spoken of, and when the "value of money" is said to be high or low, the rate of interest being meant. The consequence of this ambiguity is, that as soon as scarcity of money in the latter of these senses begins to be felt,—as soon as there is difficulty of obtaining loans, and the rate of interest is high,—it is concluded that this must arise from causes acting upon the quantity of money in the other and more popular sense; that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought to be increased. I am aware that, independently of the double meaning of the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities, giving an apparent support to this error; but the ambiguity of the language stands on the very threshold of the subject, and intercepts all attempts to throw light upon it.

As countless words and expressions have several meanings, there is almost no limit to the confusion which this fallacy can cause. Some of the most common terms that are used ambiguously are right, liberty, law, representative, theory, church, state, student.

By carefully defining all terms that have more than one meaning and by insisting on a rigid adherence to the one meaning wherever the term is used, a debater can easily avoid fallacies of this sort in his own argument and expose those of his opponent.

III. FALSE CAUSE.

The fallacy of false cause occurs whenever that which could in no way bring about the effect that is being established is urged as its cause. This fallacy in its most obvious form is found only in the arguments of careless and illogical thinkers. Some college students occasionally draw briefs that contain such reasoning as the following:—

I. The Panama canal should be of the sea-level rather than of the
lock type, because

A. The Panama canal will do away with the long voyage around the
Horn.

I. Southerners are justified in keeping the franchise away from the
negro, for

A. Negroes should never have been brought to America.

B. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution ought not to have been passed.

The error of such plainly absurd reasoning as occurs in the preceding illustrations needs no explanation. There is one form of the fallacy of false cause, however, that is much more common and insidious and therefore deserves special treatment.

POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC. (After this, therefore, on account of this.) This phase of the fallacy consists of the assumption that since cause precedes effect what has preceded an event has caused it. The most frequent occurrence of the error is to be found in superstitions. If some one meets with an accident while taking a journey that began on Friday, many people will argue that the accident is the effect of the unlucky day. Some farmers believe their crops will not prosper unless the planting is done when the moon is in a certain quarter; sailors often refuse to embark in a renamed vessel. Because in the past, one event has been known to follow another, it is argued that the first event was the cause of the second, and that the second event will invariably follow the first.

But this fallacy does not find its only expression in superstitions. To post hoc reasoning is due much of the popularity of patent medicines. Political beliefs, even, are often generated in the same way; prosperity follows the passing of a certain law, and people jump to the conclusion that this one law has caused the "good times." Some demagogues go so far as to say that education among the Indians is responsible for the increased death rate of many of the tribes.

A slightly different phase of the post hoc fallacy consists in attributing the existence of a certain condition to a single preceding event, when at the most this event could have been only a partial cause of what followed, and may not have been a cause at all. A medicine that could not have effected a cure may have been of some slight benefit. A law that could not possibly have been the sole cause of "good times" may have had a beneficial effect. To avoid this fallacy, one must be sure not only that the assigned cause is operative, but that it is also adequate.

In the following passage, Harpers Weekly, for March 5, 1894, points out the error in the reasoning made by several college presidents who, after compiling statistics, stated that a college education increased a man's chance of success from one in ten thousand to one in forty:—

Not many persons doubt any longer that an American college education is an advantage to most youths who can get it, but in these attempts to estimate statistically what college education does for men there is a good deal of confusing of post hoc and propter hoc. Define success as you will, a much larger proportion of American college men win it than of men who don't go to college, but how much college training does for those successful men is still debatable. Remember that they are a picked lot, the likeliest children of parents whose ability or desire to send their children to college is evidence of better fortune, or at least of higher aspirations than the average. And because their parents are, as a rule, more or less prosperous and well educated, they get and would get, whether they went to college or not, a better than average start in life….

If one boy out of a family of four goes to college, it is the clever one. The boys who might go to college and don't are commonly the lazy ones who won't study. The colleges get nowadays a large proportion of the best boys of the strongest families. The best boys of the strongest families would win far more than their proportionate share of success even if there were no colleges.

An exposure of similarly fallacious reasoning is made by Edward M.
Shepard in The Atlantic Monthly for October, 1904.

The Republican argument is that the whole edifice of our prosperity depends upon high protective or prohibitive duties, and that to them is due our industrial progress. Is it not, indeed, a disparagement of the self-depending faculties of the American people thus to affirm that, in spite of their marvelous advantages, they would have failed in industrial life unless by force of law they could have prevented the competition with them of other peoples? It is only by the sophistry to which I have referred that this disparagement is justified. It is that old argument of veritable folly that, because event Z follows event W, as it follows events A and B and many besides A, therefore W is the sole cause of Z. Theory or no theory, the Republican says that we have in fact grown rich by protection, because in our country prosperity and protective duties have existed together. They ignore every inconvenient fact. They would have us forget that each of the industrial depressions of 1873-78 and 1893-96 followed long operation of a high protective tariff. They ignore the contribution of soil and climate to our prosperity, the vast increase which modern inventions and improved carrying facilities have, the world over, brought to the productivity of labor, and here in the United States have brought more than anywhere else. They ignore the superior skill and alertness of the American workman and the wonderful extent to which he has been stimulated by the conditions and ideals of our democracy. They ignore the freedom of trade, which, since 1789, the Federal Constitution has made operative over our entire country,— by far the most important area of free trade ever known,—and which everyone to-day knows to be a prime condition of the prosperity of our forty-five commonwealths.

From what has been said it is obvious that it is never safe to account for an occurrence or a condition by merely referring to something that accompanies it or precedes it. There must be a connection between the alleged cause and the effect, and this connection must be causal; otherwise, both may be the result of the same cause. The cause must also be adequate; and it must, moreover, be evident that the result has not been produced, wholly or partially, by some other cause or causes.

IV. COMPOSITION AND DIVISION.

COMPOSITION. The fallacy of composition consists of attributing to a whole that which has been proved only of a part. To condemn or to approve of a fraternity because of the conduct of only a few of its members, to say that what is advantageous for certain states in the Union would therefore be beneficial for the United States as a whole, to reason from the existence of a few millionaires that the English nation is wealthy, would be to fall into this fallacy. Furthermore, it is fallacious to think that because something is true of each member of a class taken distributively, the same thing holds true of the class taken collectively. It is not logical to argue that because each member of a jury is very likely to judge erroneously, the jury as a whole is also very likely to judge erroneously. Because each witness to an event is liable to give false or incorrect evidence, it is unreasonable to think that no confidence can be placed in the concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses.

DIVISION. The fallacy of division is the converse of the fallacy of composition. It consists of attributing to a part that which has been proved of the whole. For instance, Lancaster county is the most fertile county in Pennsylvania, but that fact by itself does not warrant the statement that any one particular farm is exceptionally fertile. Because the people of a country are suffering from famine, it does not follow that one particular person is thus afflicted. Again, it would be fallacious to say: It is admitted that the judges of the court of appeal cannot misinterpret the law; Richard Rowe is a judge of the court of appeal; therefore he cannot misinterpret the law.

V. IGNORING THE QUESTION. (IGNORATIO ELENCHI.)

An arguer is said to ignore the question, or to argue beside the point, whenever he attempts to prove or disprove anything except the proposition under discussion. This fallacy may arise through carelessness or trickery. An unskilled debater will often unconsciously wander away from his subject; and an unscrupulous debater, when unable to defend his position, will sometimes cunningly shift his ground and argue upon a totally new proposition, which is, however, so similar to the original one that in the heat of controversy the change is hardly noticeable. A discussion on the subject, "The boycott is a legitimate means of securing concessions from employers," which attempted to show the effectiveness of the boycott, would ignore the question. Likewise, in a discussion on the proposition, "The average college student could do in three years the work now done in four," any proof showing the desirability of such a crowding together of college work would be beside the point.

In the following passage Macaulay holds up to scorn certain arguments which contain this fallacy:—

The advocates of Charles, like the advocates of other malefactors against whom overwhelming evidence is produced, generally decline all controversy about facts, and content themselves with calling testimony to character.

We charge him with having broken his coronation oath; and we are told that he kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having given up his people to the merciless inflictions of the most hot-headed and hard- hearted of prelates; and the defence is, that he took his little son on his knees and kissed him! We censure him for having violated the articles of the Petition of Rights, after having, for good and valuable consideration, promised to obey them; and we are informed that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock in the morning!

Whenever an arguer avoids the question at issue and makes an attack upon the character, principles, or former beliefs or personal peculiarities of his opponent, he commits the special form of this fallacy known as argumentum ad hominem. It is obviously fallacious to reason that a principle is unsound because it is upheld by an untrustworthy advocate, or because it is inconsistent with the advocate's former beliefs and practices. Honesty is a worthy principle, even though advocated by a thief. The duty of industry is no less binding because it is advocated by an idler. Lawyers often commit this error by seeking to discredit the opposing attorney. Campaign speakers frequently attempt to overthrow the opposing party's platform by showing that it is inconsistent with the party's previous measures and declarations. To bring in such irrelevant matter is to ignore the question.

Closely allied to argumentum ad hominem is another phase of ignoring the question called argumentum ad populum. This fallacy consists of using before a certain audience statements which will strongly appeal to their prejudices and partisan views, but which are not generally accepted facts and which would undoubtedly meet with strong opposition elsewhere. A speaker who brings in this kind of argument makes use neither of reasoning nor of legitimate persuasion. He neglects his proposition and attempts to excite the feelings of his audience to such an extent as to render them incapable of forming a dispassionate judgment upon the matter in hand.

In general, it is necessary only to point out a fallacy to weaken an argument. Sometimes, however, the error is so involved and so hidden that, though it is apparent to one who is arguing, yet it is not easily made apparent to the audience. In overcoming this difficulty, arguers often resort to certain peculiar devices of arranging and presenting the material for refutation. Long experience has shown that the two methods given here are of inestimable value.

VI. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM. (REDUCING TO AN ABSURDITY.)

The method of refuting an argument by reductio ad absurdum consists of showing that the argument to be refuted, if true, proves not only the conclusion given, but also other conclusions which are manifestly absurd. For example, a debater once contended that colleges should not seek to root out professionalism in athletic sports, because, by coming in contact with college life, professional players receive considerable benefit. His opponent answered him by showing that the same argument carried out to its logical conclusion would prove that a college should encourage the attendance of criminals and degenerates on the ground that they will be benefited thereby. Thus he reduced the argument to a manifest absurdity.

At one time the officers of a national bank permitted their institution to be wrecked by certifying, and thereby practically guaranteeing, the checks of a firm of stock-holders when the brokers did not have the money represented by the checks deposited in the bank. This was distinctly a criminal offense. The brokers failed, and, the bank having closed its doors in consequence, the president of the bank was brought to trial. The Atlantic Monthly reduces to an absurdity the chief argument used for the defense.

A jury having been empaneled to try him, he pleaded guilty, his counsel urging, as a reason for clemency, that the violation of this statute was a habit of the New York banks in the Wall Street district, and that if the wrecked bank had not followed this law-breaking custom of its competitors the stock brokers would have withdrawn their account. The plea was successful, and the officer escaped with a small fine. Imagine a burglar or a pickpocket urging a plea for clemency based on the general business habits and customs of his criminal confrÈres! [Footnote: The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 94, p. 173.]

Mr. E. A. Freeman, the historian, once made the statement that English literature cannot be taught. His course of reasoning was to the effect that it is impossible to teach a subject in which one cannot be examined; and he maintained that it is impossible to hold satisfactory examinations in English literature, since this is a subject which is studied for the purpose of cultivating the taste, educating the sympathies, and enlarging the mind. If this reasoning proves anything, it has been pointed out, it proves too much. What Mr. Freeman says of English literature may equally well be said of Latin, Greek, and every other kind of literature. But as Latin and Greek literature have been successfully taught for hundreds of years, Mr. Freeman's argument is absurd.

College students are continually urging as a defense of professionalism in their own athletic teams the argument that since other colleges employ professional players it is necessary for them to do likewise. By carrying this argument a step farther, one could show, with equal reason, that since drinking, stealing and cheating are prevalent in other colleges, these same practices should also be indulged in at the college in question. In the same way one may refute by reductio ad absurdum all such arguments as, "Custom has rendered the spoils system desirable"; "The prevalency of the high license law shows its superiority to prohibition"; and "Since in the past all college students were required to study Latin and Greek, these subjects should be required at the present time."

II. THE DILEMMA.

Another device an arguer will often find useful in refuting an opponent's statement is the dilemma. In the dilemma the arguer shows that the statement he wishes to disprove can be true only through the truth of at least one of several possibilities. He then proves that these possibilities are untenable, and therefore the original statement is false. To represent the dilemma with letters: The truth of A rests upon the truth of either x or y; but as x and y are both false, A is false. Once when it was believed in certain quarters that Japan was about to undertake a war against the United States, many people maintained that if Japan desired to go to war she was amply able to finance such an undertaking. In reply to this contention, a certain newspaper, making use of the dilemma, said that since Japan had no money in the treasury she could meet the expenses of war in only three ways: either by contracting a large debt, or by increasing taxation, or by indemnifying herself at the expense of the enemy. The paper then went on to prove that Japan was not in a position to float a large loan, that taxes in Japan were already as heavy as the people could bear, and that she could not hope, at least for a long time, to secure any indemnity from the enemy. Therefore Japan was not in a financial position to enter upon a war with the United States.

In attempting to show that municipalities do not have the moral right to own and operate public utilities, T. Carpenter Smith uses the dilemma. He says:—

"Any commercial business is carried on either at a profit, or at a loss, or in such a way that the expenses equal the income. If the city business of gas or electric lighting is to be carried on at a profit, then those citizens who use gas or electric light will be charged a high price for that light, in order to pay the profit, not only to themselves, but also to those who do not use it. If the works are to be carried on at a loss, then the citizens who do not use the gas or electric light will pay taxes to furnish a convenience or economy to those citizens who do use it. If the works are to be operated exactly at cost, then the city will carry on a business from which it will get nothing, but in which it will have to take the labor and risk incident to such a business in order to benefit only some of its citizens, furnishing a commodity not desired by all."

In conversation and debate, the dilemma is frequently introduced by means of a question. The debater, wishing to trap his opponent, asks him a pertinent question which previous investigation has shown can possibly be answered in only two or three ways, and which the opponent cannot afford to answer at all. A good illustration of this device occurs in the New Testament.

And it came to pass, on one of the days, as he was teaching the people in the temple, and preaching the gospel, there came upon him the chief priests and the scribes with the elders; and they spake, saying unto him, Tell us: By what authority doest thou these things? or who is he that gave thee this authority? And he answered and said unto them, I also will ask you a question; and tell me: The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or from men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why did ye not believe him? But if we shall say, From men; all the people will stone us: for they be persuaded that John was a prophet. And they answered, that they knew not whence it was. And Jesus said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things. [Footnote: Luke xx, 1-8.]

During the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, when both men were seeking the United States senatorship from Illinois, Lincoln, wishing either to kill Douglas's senatorial prospects or to head him off from the presidency two years later, asked him a question which put him in a dilemma. Ida M. Tarbell describes the question as follows:—

"Can the people of a United States territory in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?" Lincoln had seen the irreconcilableness of Douglas's own measure of popular sovereignty, which declared that the people of a territory should be left to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way subject only to the Constitution, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case that slaves, being property, could not under the Constitution be excluded from a territory. He knew that if Douglas said no to this question, his Illinois constituents would never return him to the Senate. He believed that if he said yes, the people of the South would never vote for him for President of the United States.

In the last example, Lincoln, by forcing Douglas to answer this question, sought to destroy, and, as history shows, did destroy, the popular conception of Douglas's fitness for public office.

Before one can safely use the dilemma he must carefully investigate every phase of the statement that he wishes to refute. If he is to use the dilemma directly, he must consider every possibility—commonly called the horns of the dilemma—upon which the truth of the statement may rest. If there is a single possibility which he is not ready to meet and overthrow, his whole effort is fruitless. For instance, a debater, in attempting to rebut the statement that college fraternities are harmful, said that his opponent must show that fraternities are either morally, socially, financially or intellectually detrimental to their members; he then proved as best he could that in these respects fraternities are beneficial rather than harmful, and sat down thinking that he had gone a long way toward winning the debate. His opponent then arose and admitting nearly everything that had been said, based his argument on the idea that fraternities were harmful to the college as a whole. The first speaker had not considered every alternative. If an arguer is to approach a dilemma through the medium of a question, he must be sure that he knows every reasonable answer that his opponent can make. When one has satisfied these conditions, he can use the dilemma with great effect.

By way of summary it may be said that the successful arguer must both build up his own proof and destroy his opponent's. To accomplish the latter one has to know what to refute and what to leave alone; he must distinguish between the important and the unessential, and he must take care not to "refute himself." Since proof consists of evidence and reasoning, the first step for him to take in refuting an argument is to apply the tests for each, and if possible show where his opponent has erred. In the next place, he should see whether he can discover and point out any of the more important fallacies; the ones mentioned here are begging the question, ambiguous terms, false cause, composition and division, and ignoring the question. Should the arguer find any of these fundamental weaknesses, it is ordinarily sufficient merely to call attention to them; for the sake of emphasis, however, one may make use of two especially effective methods of refutation, reductio ad absurdum and the dilemma.

EXERCISES.

A. Criticize the following arguments and point out the fallacies they contain:—

1. Four thousand men have taken examinations at Princeton under the honor system, and only six of these were found guilty of "cribbing." This record shows conclusively that the honor system restrains dishonest work in examinations.

2. Athletics do not injure a man's scholarship; one of the best players on last year's football team attained such a high grade that he was awarded a fellowship.

3. During the decade from 1870 to 1880, illiteracy among the negroes decreased ten per cent., but the race grew more criminal by twenty- five per cent.; from 1880 to 1890, illiteracy decreased eighteen per cent., but criminality increased thirty-three and one-third per cent. Who can now say that education does not injure the negro?

4. Since the honor system failed at Franklin and Marshall, it will fail at —— College.

5. Frequent athletic games benefit a college because they tend to take the students' attention away from their studies.

6. The fixed curriculum of studies is effective in making a specialist, because the specialist takes up only one kind of work.

7. Southerners are justified in keeping the franchise from the negro, because the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution ought never to have been passed.

8. Since the negro's devotion to the church is as great as that of most white people, he is of as high moral standing as the average unintelligent white.

9. Ireland is idle and therefore she starves; she starves and therefore she rebels.

10. Every one desires virtue, because every one desires happiness.

11. The present term of four years is so short a time that the President does not have opportunity to become acquainted with his duties, for just as he is becoming acquainted with them he has to step out of office.

12. This doctrine cannot be proved from the Gospels, nor from the Acts of the Apostles, nor from the Epistles, nor from the Revelation of St. John; therefore it cannot be proved from the New Testament.

13. Crime is a violation of the laws of our country; piracy is a crime; this man belongs to a band of lawless men, and this band has been taken in the very deed of piracy. Therefore he has violated the laws of our country.

14. Since all presuming men are contemptible, and since this man presumes to believe his opinions are correct, he is not worthy of our consideration.

15. To prove to you that our standing army should be permanently enlarged, I will show that every nation of any prominence whatsoever keeps a standing army.

16. The elective system of studies is preferable to the prescribed system, because

A. The student can elect those studies which will do him the most
good, for

1. He can elect what he pleases.

17. Strikes benefit the working man, because

A. They benefit him financially, for

1. If they did not, he would not strike.

18. When thirteen sit at table together, one of them always dies within the year.

19. To decide whether or not strikes are justifiable it is necessary to see if they have for the most part been successful in the past.

20. All the trees in the park make a thick shade; this is one of them, therefore this tree makes a thick shade.

21. Italy is a Catholic country and abounds in beggars; France is also a Catholic country, and therefore abounds in beggars.

22. Pitt was not a great and useful minister; for though he would have been so had he carried out Adam Smith's doctrines of free trade, he did not carry out those doctrines.

23. All criminal actions ought to be punished by law. Prosecutions for theft are criminal actions, and therefore ought to be punished by law.

24. Books are a source both of instruction and of amusement; a table of logarithms is a book; therefore it is a source both of instruction and of amusement.

B. On each of the following arguments from authority write a paragraph that will weaken its effect:—

1. "The Senate for more than a century has demonstrated the wisdom of the mode of its constitution." Senator G. F. Hoar.

2. "Mine disasters are largely due to the intoxication of miners, or to carelessness caused by the after effects of a 'spree,'" says Dr. Jesse K. Johnson, superintendent of one of the largest mines in the Pittsburg district.

3. Both Mark Hanna and Grover Cleveland have stated that a six year Presidential term would be of great benefit to the United States.

4. Senator La Follet, who has made a thorough study of many of the principal monopolies in the country, states that the Standard Oil trust charges exorbitant rates.

5. Mr. Francis Walker, in the Political Science Quarterly, Volume twenty, page fourteen, says that legislation against trusts has improved conditions, and would therefore improve conditions in the United States.

6. President Hadley, of Yale University, has said that the subsidizing of ships on a large scale has been detrimental to France.

7. "The Indian who is not obliged to labor for his maintenance becomes a lazy vagabond." Lyman Abbott.

C. Put the following article into the form of a brief and show exactly what methods of refutation are used:—

THE OLD FRIGATE "CONSTITUTION."

The pretexts for removal of "Old Ironsides" from the waters in which that historic ship had her birth are now reduced to two.

One of these is that the old boat takes up room at the Navy Yard which is needed for the work of that establishment.

The other is that since the money expended in the restoration of the frigate—less than $200,000—came out of the Federal Treasury, the people of distant States ought to have the pleasure of seeing what their money paid for without coming to Boston in order to enjoy it.

As for crowding the Navy Yard, that is an absurdity. His Excellency Curtis Guild, Jr., in his letter to the Navy Department protesting against the removal, quoted the officers in command at the Navy Yard as declaring that "the ship in no way interferes with the work of the yard, taking up no space that is needed for other purposes." The Governor would not make such a statement in an official communication without the clearest authority. "Indeed," he adds as his own opinion, "the strip of wharf occupied is but a trivial portion of the long water front controlled by the government."

There is the other pretext, namely, that because the "Constitution" has been repaired at national cost, therefore any special claim that Massachusetts may have upon this relic of Massachusetts patriotism is removed. This idea has found crude and unmannerly expression in the words of one of the committee of Congress looking over our navy yards. "The agitation to keep the ship in Boston seems selfish," he is quoted as saying. "It was the money of the whole people of the United States that paid for its repair, and the people in other sections are as justly entitled to see the ship as in Boston."

Coming from a representative of the State of Kansas, this is almost amusing. His proposition to tow the ship around from place to place, as it may be wanted for a show, suggests the practicability of a canal, say, to Topeka, or to Fort Hayes.

The alternative proposition, namely, that Massachusetts shall repay to the general government the cost of the repairs of the "Constitution," would have some standing were it a commercial affair. Massachusetts has expended many times the cost of the repairs of "Old Ironsides" in preserving for the nation the revolutionary sites and monuments upon our soil. Payment for the repair and restoration of "Old Ironsides" would be a bagatelle if the people of the United States were to demand that this monument also shall be purchased by the people of Massachusetts under threat of its removal.

But it is not a question of money; that is a contemptible suggestion. Nor is it a question of bureaucracy. It is a simple, reasonable, entirely practical demand of the historic sentiment of patriotism which still warms the hearts and inspires the souls of Massachusetts men.