Size of the “Drawings and Descriptions.” Pseudonyms. Proposals. Contract with the British government. Was Fulton false to his principles in supporting Great Britain against France? His financial position under the contract.

The “Descriptions” that Fulton left in England were in two parts, of which the first is a recital of his negotiations and work, and the second a minute description of the boat and bombs. Both parts are wholly in Fulton’s handwriting and cover twelve double sheets of paper, five for the first and seven for the second part. The sheets are 14¾ inches high with a double or folded width of 19? inches. The writing is on both sides of the sheets, so that exclusive of the outside pages, which are left blank, except for the descriptive recital on page 1 of the first part, there are 43 pages of writing. There are from 26 to 28 lines to a page with a margin of 2 inches on the left-hand side, and about 8 words to a line. The paper is heavy hand-made linen, slightly off the white in color with gilt on the edges. One-half of each sheet is water-marked with a design composed of a crown and fleur-de-lys surmounting the letters P & B, the other half of the sheet being water-marked Portal & Co. 1796.

The drawings are water-colored and are on sheets of heavy Bristol paper measuring 22¼ × 18¾ inches. As will be seen each one is dated and signed by Fulton.

The “Bond and Contract” to which reference is made was found in 1812 among the papers of Lord Melville and was then deposited by his executors in the Public Record office. With the exception of the Admiralty CIRCULAR given on page 52, the contemporaneous archives of the government contain little concerning Fulton’s work, and are in this respect quite different from the French records. The explanation is that the British ministers were fearful lest information regarding the submarine should transpire to their detriment. They, therefore, treated all correspondence as confidential and kept letters and other documents in their personal rather than official files. In fact Fulton adopted the pseudonym of “Robert Francis,” a designation that was frequently, though not exclusively, used by both the Government officials and himself in correspondence during the years 1804–1806.

The “Contract” was Fulton’s own conception in form and substance, the government accepting the terms that he proposed. This is shown by his notes and copies of letters that still exist.

Lord Hawkesbury who had induced Fulton to leave France for England was Robert Banks Jenkinson (1770–1828). His father, created Lord Hawkesbury in 1786 and Earl of Liverpool in 1796, had served as Secretary for War from 1778 and therefore during the greater part of the American Revolution. The son, using his father’s junior title of Lord Hawkesbury, became Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1801 in the Addington ministry. As such Secretary, he would be the one to open negotiations with Fulton in Paris.

Fulton arrived in London on the 19th of May. Addington had been displaced by Pitt in the control of the government a few days before. Lord Hawkesbury, though no longer in charge of Foreign Affairs, continued in office, holding the portfolio of the Home Office in the new cabinet. In spite of his change of status, Fulton would naturally call on him as the only official with whom he was acquainted. In his note book, in which he copied in neat hand the letter of Lord Hawkesbury that the agent “Mr. Smith” had handed him in Paris, he writes at the bottom of the copy of the letter, “I had an interview with Mr. Hammond on the 21 when he desired me to give in proposals they were as follows.”

From this juxtaposition of names it is fair to assume that to Lord Hawkesbury he gave the name of Hammond. Fulton was fond of doing such things. His own attempt at personal disguise under the name of Francis was very thin. The coincidence that his real and temporarily assumed names began with the same letter will be noted. So do Hawkesbury and Hammond. The letters to “Mr. Hammond” are letters that would be written only to one who was high in authority. It was not in accordance with Fulton’s character to send such communications as are the Hammond letters to a subordinate. In “Mr. Hammond” can be seen Lord Hawkesbury who had just been made a peer in his own right and was Pitt’s leader in the House of Lords. This identification of “Mr. Hammond” will be borne in mind in connection with several letters given on pages 96 et seq. as well as those immediately below containing the proposals promised on May 21st.

Proposals for the examination of a System of Submarine navigation,

Having been invited to London by the late Administration to demonstrate the practicability of navigating under water and attacking and destroying ships of war by submarine operations I propose that government name a commission as they think proper to examine the following principles and give their decision for or against each article, which commission Should be composed of at least two able mechanecians and one Chymest,—

Then follows matter describing the plunging vessel almost verbatim with that given in the “Descriptions,” beginning with First principle on page 56 down to and including the demand for £100,000 on page 59, after which the proposals continue as follows:

What plans government may have in View to draw the power of Bounapart into governable limits Secure perminant peace and forever remove all Ideas from the Side of France I do not pretend to Conjecture.

I beg leave to propose one which will be prompt in execution and if Successful will forever Remove from the mind of Man the possibility of France making a descent on England. I propose a submarine expedition to destroy the fleets of Boulogne and Brest as they now lie. I am ready to exhibit the practicability of my plan or at least that the chances are many to one in favour of Success, and merits immediate attention as the Season is much advanced much is to be done and no time should be lost.

If government adopt my plan it must be organized nearly as follows,

One good Mechanecian must receive my drawings, take my orders and see to the execution of the Machinery. An Active Sea officer must have power to choose 100 hardy seamen out of the fleet who are good swimmers about 40 tons of powder and 7 thousand pounds for various expences will fit out the expedition.

If government give into this plan I demand the following terms.

A pay of 200 pounds a Month while I devote my time to the enterprise or till government notify that they have no further need of my exertions,

If Government appoint their own officers to make the Attack; from the directions I may give, without my going to Sea to direct it I demand only the monthly pay.

But if government think proper that I go on board a Ship of war off Boulogne and Brest to direct the time and mode of Attack I demand one fourth the Value of each Vessel burnt or destroyed, In either case if I do not succeed I demand nothing for my trouble but the monthly pay before mentioned, till government notify that my exertions are no longer necessary,

These proposals were sent under a covering letter to “Mr. Hammond” dated the following day.

Sir I herewith send you my proposals for examining the principles of submarine navigation, also my proposal for a submarine attack on Boulogne and Brest, in this period of our communications it is necessary we Should clearly understand each other, First Ministers will have the goodness to examine the mode I propose for investigating the properties and combinations of Submarine navigation, if they approve of it they will Sign it as a contract between them an me, then appoint a commission to decide which commission approving the reward follows; this part finished the expedition if thought proper is to commence on the terms specified

Without waiting for his proposals to be accepted, Fulton’s mind began working on the commission to be named. On June 12th he suggested to “Mr. Hammond” that the government and he should name an equal number, the majority to decide. On his part, he proposed Bishop Watson, Sir John Sinclair, Lord Stanhope and the Rev. Edmund Cartwright. Apparently Fulton had great faith in the efficacy of the church in this matter.

The Bond and Contract is on five pages wholly in Fulton’s handwriting with an outside sheet with two dockets, one reading

The other

This attested Counterpart of an agreement between His Majesty’s Government in 1804 & Mr. Robert Fulton was found among the papers of the late Lord Viscount Melville, 22nd Jan. 1812.

Articles of Agreement between the Right Honorable William Pitt, first Lord commissioner of his Majesty’s treasury and Chancelor of the Exchequer; and the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Melville first Lord of the Admiralty, in behalf of his Majesty’s government on the one part; and Robert Fulton citizen of the United States of America and inventor of a plan of attacking fleets by submarine Bombs, on the other part,

The said Robert Fulton agrees to disclose the principles of his scheme to Sir Home Popham and to superintend the execution of it on the following conditions

First, To be paid Two hundred pounds a month while he is employed on this Service for his personal trouble and Expences;

Second, To have a credit lodged from time to time for the payment of his Mechanical preperations, not to exceed Seven thousand pounds.

Third, That in His Majesty’s dockyards and Arsenals shall be made or furnished all such articles as may be required, which are applicable to this purpose.

Fourth, If any circumstance should arise to prevent government carrying this plan into execution then the parties are each to name two commissioners for the purpose of examining the principles; and trying such experiments as they may think proper, And if it should appear to the Majority of the Members that the plan is practicable and offers a more effectual mode of destroying the enemies fleet at Boulogne, Brest, or elsewhere, than any now in practice and with less risk, then government is to pay the said Robert Fulton the sum of Forty Thousand Pounds as a compensation for demonstrating the principles, and making over the entire possession of his submarine Mode of Attack.

Fifth, When the Said Robert Fulton has destroyed by his submarine carcasses or Bombs one of the enemies deck’d Vessels, then Government is to pay him the sum of Forty Thousand pounds, provided commissioners appointed As in the previous article shall be of opinion that the same Scheme can be practically applied to the destruction of the enemies fleets,

Sixth, If the Arbitrators differ in opinion then they are to draw lots for the choice of an Umpire and the Majority of Voices to decide all points of reference within the construction of this agreement and that decision to be final

Seventh, One half the supposed Value of all Vessels destroyed by Mr. Fulton’s Submarine Mode of attack to be paid him by government as long as he superintends the execution of his plan; but when government has no further occasion for his service; or that he wishes to retire, then he is only to be paid one quarter of the supposed value of such vessels as may be destroyed by his scheme, and this remuneration to continue for the space of fourteen years from the date thereof

Eighth, In case the Vessels destroyed by this scheme should exceed in amount Forty thousand pounds, then the Forty Thousand pounds first stipulated to be paid, shall be considered as part payment of the whole sum which may become due to the said Robert Fulton,

Ninth, If in the course of practice any improvemt Should be Suggested that can only be esteemed as a collateral Aid to the general principles of Mr. Fulton’s mode of attack, then such improvements are not to deminish or set aside his claims on government,

Tenth, All monies which may become due to Mr. Fulton to be paid within six months from the time when they Shall be so adjudged according to the tenor of this agreement,

Eleventh, This agreement to be considered by both parties as a liberal covenant with a View to protect the Rights of the individual, and to prevent any improper advantages being taken of his Majesty’s Government.

Mr. Fulton having deposited the drawings and plans of his submarine scheme of attack; in the hands of a confidential friend with the View to their being delivered to the American government in case of his death, does hereby bind himself to withdraw all such plans and drawings and not devulge them or any part of his principles to any person whatever for the space of fourteen years; which is the term during which he is to derive all the advantages of their operation from the British Government,

The benefit of the foregoing agreement shall be extended to the heirs and executors of the said Robert Fulton, Signed this Seventeenth day of July one thousand eight hundred and four

The reading of these remarkable documents of such great historical interest, especially at this time when submarine navigation has been developed to the point of complete success, kindles many lively reflections.

The question is whether Fulton acted as a man of honor in abandoning the country for which he had volunteered to fight and where he had received such signal and loyal service from its citizens. Was he justified in transferring his support to another nation at war with France and thus help destroy the growing power of France for which country he had professed so much affection? This question has been debated by Fulton’s biographers, although apparently none of them knew exactly what it was that Fulton had done for the British Government. They were all under the impression that his work consisted chiefly in the demonstration of the efficacy of torpedoes, carcasses or bombs as Fulton vicariously called them, or mines as we would speak of them today. Cadwallader D. Colden gives several pages of his book to developing, with some labor, an excuse for Fulton. Dickinson finds some justification in the fact that Fulton had been only partially reimbursed by the French Government for his work, but more particularly in that the development of Napoleon’s ambitions was repugnant to Fulton’s ideas of republicanism. The last is without question the correct and only view to take.

A radical republican, hating blindly all forms of autocracy, he had remained in France believing that in France he would see the full flowering of his principles. He offered his inventions to the French Government, not for pecuniary gain, because his proposals show that he was willing to abide by their decision as to the monetary value to be determined only after he had achieved success, but because he thought that the French revolution was a real movement toward perfect liberty. To this end he offered not only his device, but also himself. He was anxious to be enrolled in the fighting force of France and go forth in his little boat to do battle against mighty England. When, therefore, he was refused by Bonaparte and his sincere offers scorned with absolutely unjustified insult, we can imagine his revulsion of sentiment and forgive any bitterness of feeling. In a moment his idol was shattered. He realized that those in control of the French Government were not actuated by a broad conception of world freedom, but solely by personal ambition and thirst for power. He makes this position quite clear in a letter to Lord Melville quoted by Colden as follows, though, before publishing, the latter must have edited the orthography: “In writing this letter, I feel no enmity to the people of France, or any other people; on the contrary, I wish their happiness; for my principle is, that every nation profits by the prosperity of its neighbours, provided the governments of its neighbours be humane and just. What is here said, is directed against the tyrannic principles of Bonaparte, a man who has set himself above all law; he is, therefore in that state which Lord Somers compares to that of a wild beast unrestrained by any rule, and he should be hunted down as the enemy of mankind. This, however, is the business of Frenchmen. With regard to the nations of Europe, they can only hold him in governable limits, by fencing him round with bayonets.”

France, his dearly beloved France, was no more liberal under the upstart clique of the consulate than was England under the rÉgime of her long established autocracy. This is the only explanation of how and why Fulton abandoned his allegiance to France, went to England and there worked to strengthen the British navy that it might the more easily smash the growing power of the French fleet with which he had once so ardently desired to serve. He had been cruelly stabbed by the hands of his friends in the most tender spot in his heart. This cruelty that served to clear his vision he could not forgive, much less forget.

Fulton had undoubtedly been unfairly and even cruelly treated by the French authorities. His cherished ideas into which he had thrown his whole soul had been rejected without fair or reasonable examination. His pride had been deeply wounded. But Fulton was magnanimous enough to have overlooked this treatment had France herself remained true to his conception of her own ideals. It was not that Fulton abandoned France, but that France deserted Fulton. From his arrival in 1797, he thought that he saw in France a great exponent of a new world liberty, with freedom of trade, freedom of men, freedom of the seas, and above all an enduring world-wide peace. In his enthusiasm he believed that such ideals, in which he firmly believed, were not only practically realizable, but that France was about to make them the guiding principles of every nation. It was for that reason that he so warmly espoused her cause.

In 1797, soon after his arrival in Paris, he wrote to his friend Lord Stanhope his views based on what he fancied to be the actuating theory of the French revolution:

Hoping every month to Return to England, together with the difficulty of transmitting Letters to London, has hitherto prevented my Writing to you Since my arrival In Paris. But at present I have troubeled you with a very Long Letter, the object of Which I will here explain,—Since my arrival In Paris I have been Very active In my Canal pursuits, And on this Subject I have Created a Revolution In the mind of all the french engeneers I have met with, who are now descidedly In favour of the Small System of Canals—Which are now Contemplated on an emmense Scale of extension which you will See explained in my Letter—It is Contemplated to Raise the Whole Revenue by a Single toll on Canals which System will Infinately Simplify the operations of Government, tend directly to Set trade free and annihilate a Mass of Political absurdities which have hitherto disturbed the peace of Nations—all of Which you will find explained in the annexed Letter, Which Letter will Shew you how much Frenchmen are turning their mind to the true fountain of Riches—viz home Improvement and Systems of Industry. With the true philosophic Ideas which the entertain of Foreign Possessions and Restricted trade—And I Can assure you that I find In them the most Resolute determination to establish the principles which you will find explained And Which to me appears of the Very first Importance to Lasting peace—and the Wellfare of all Nations—It is therefore of much Importance that English Men Should know the truth of these principles and Learn their true Interest by Giving up as the french mean to do, and will Compel others to do the System of foreign Possessions and Restricted trade they should also understand that Frenchmen are Realy thinking Like philosophers Which I hope my Letter will prove.

By 1801, when his offer of his talents and personal service were spurned, Napoleon was already leading France far afield from the altruistic but impossible programme of 1797. In 1802, Napoleon had made himself consul for life. In the spring of 1804, he was proclaimed Emperor of the French and the beautiful dream that had entranced Fulton for more than ten years had faded into nothingness, as dreams usually do. He saw that in the aristocracy of England he could find a truer democracy than in the demagogic leaders of France. Fulton was but human. His warm heart, artistic temperament and impetuous nature now asserted themselves and drove him back to the country whence his forebears had come, and away from the people whose governing powers had wounded his pride and had failed him in his ideals.

The “Descriptions” given above were written just prior to August 10th, 1806, and recite the course of events from the autumn of 1803. At the time they were signed, Fulton was arranging to return to America, and actually sailed about ten weeks later. His negotiations with the Government had not been satisfactory in that his devices had not been accepted and he had not received in money what he felt was due. The contract shows that Fulton, profiting perhaps by his French experiences not to put trust in princes, foresaw this contingency and provided against it in the Fourth article, that should any circumstance arise to prevent carrying the plan into execution commissioners should be appointed to determine whether the stipulated compensation had been earned. The “Descriptions” were prepared for submission to the arbitrators and were actually read to them, as is shown by a note attached to a copy of the manuscript reading as follows:

These papers I read to Sir Charles Blagden, Capt. Hamilton, the Rev. Dr. Cartwright and Alexander Davison, Esq., on the 18th of August 1806 these gentlemen being named Arbitrators to settle my Claims on Government under a contract which I made with Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville—the two last named acting for me.

The words “two last” refer, of course, to Dr. Cartwright and Mr. Davison. The “Descriptions,” therefore, give Fulton’s case as he saw it, and consequently are of intense interest and historical importance.

His vision for the United States that the population would increase from 5,500,000, as it then was, to 120,000,000 has already been almost realized, sooner, of course, than he expected, but the absence of colonies and lack of desire for them have hardly met an equally successful prophetic fate. Certainly he never foresaw Porto Rico, Panama, Samoa, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and other outlying possessions.

What a delightful picture Fulton unconsciously presents of the skillful and diplomatic way in which the British Ministry handled him from the beginning to the end! When the emissary, known only as “Mr. Smith,” stated to Fulton that the Government wished to use the submarine against the French fleet, Fulton pointed out that it was not the part of wisdom so to do, that the British with their superiority in sea power had more to lose than to gain by developing such a weapon. In so doing, he but anticipated Earl St. Vincent who, bluff old sea-dog like so many of his profession to whom innovations in naval warfare were anathema, exclaimed that “Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage a mode of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it.”

“Mr. Smith” was very clever and was not put off by any such argument. He saw clearly that whether England needed the device or not, they must have control of the man who possessed the secret. He evidently felt sure of Fulton’s sentiments because he told him quite frankly that they wished him “out of France and in England.”

On the financial side, Fulton appears to have had a proper estimate of himself and the value of his devices. The sum of £10,000 as a retainer would be no mean figure today, but owing to the difference in purchasing power it was comparatively a vastly greater figure in 1803. This retainer was in addition to his main fee or price for selling the explanation of his devices which he put at £100,000. The “Descriptions” read that he said “require” that sum. He first wrote “demand,” which word he erased, but not sufficiently to obliterate it, and then wrote “require.”

The rating of the value of his devices as being equivalent to a ship-of-the-line, or battle ship as a capital ship is now called, is certainly ingenious and not unreasonable. If his devices had any value at all they would increase the effective power of the fleet by much more than the addition of one first-class vessel.

But Fulton was dealing with men far abler than he in fixing values and making contracts. The negotiations were not broken off by abruptly refusing to pay the sums asked. That would have been a blunder that one selected for such a delicate mission would not be guilty of committing. The British representative apparently did not even suggest that the retainer was exorbitant, but only that it was “contrary to established rules” to pay in advance. Then, before giving an obligation to pay a sum commensurate with the value of the devices, the reasonable and unanswerable preliminary condition of an experimental demonstration was made a prerequisite.

The British diplomats unlike the French had avoided giving any offense to his amour propre. Though they refused to grant his financial requests, they succeeded in getting him to go to England, which was their main purpose. Not until they had him safe in London, did they take up the question of a contract. The original demand of £100,000 was reduced to £40,000. The retainer disappeared entirely except as it was represented by such portion of the £800 with which “Mr. Smith” was furnished in the first instance to pay his own and Fulton’s expenses. In lieu of the reductions, there appears in the contract an agreement to pay a salary of £200 a month. How deliciously clever! To one in the straightened circumstances in which Fulton always had been and still was, for even now any surplus of income of which he might have been possessed, but of which there is no evidence, was swallowed up by his steamboat experiments, this monthly payment must have been of inestimable importance. It guaranteed him comfort and at last a substantial excess for his other work, because his submarine disbursements were to be met entirely by the government up to a maximum limit of £7,000. On the other hand, the Government held secure the man, who as an enemy they feared, and who as such was a constant source of worry. This result was obtained at a cost that was to them a trifling figure.

Fulton appears to have concluded that his claim for £100,000 was perhaps too high because he voluntarily accepted the sum of £40,000 mentioned in the contract. Of this latter amount, he made to the arbitrators the ingenious suggestion that they pay him one-half in cash and the other half in an annuity based on his life, the annuity to be forfeit should the secret of his inventions in submarine warfare be divulged by him or his friends. It is regretted that Fulton did not disclose the names of his friends who were jointly interested with him, as they were probably the same who had financed his French experiments.

Fulton’s receipts on his own account amounted on balance to £13,391.. 16.. 10, leaving due as he claimed £1608.. 3.. 2, exclusive of any payment in part or whole of the £40,000. As it was, he did not do badly for two years’ work. In addition the Government furnished £11,353.. 3.. 2 to repay his expenditures.