[113] See the remarks in defence of Palafox in Arteche, iv. 332-4.

[114] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, 121st, and 2nd Legion of Reserve were all formed in this way.

[115] These were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula, 44th and 14th of the line, and one battalion each of the 70th and 5th LÉger.

[116] See the table in Belmas, ii. 381.

[117] These were all detached from Moncey. The Alagon garrison consisted of four battalions of the 2nd Legion of Reserve, 2,500 strong. At Tudela were three battalions of the 121st regiment, 1,800 bayonets.

[118] Morlot’s division was short of the 121st and the 2nd Legion of Reserve, left behind at Alagon and Tudela, and had only nine battalions present.

[119] Moncey to Berthier, Dec. 23.

[120] Cavallero, pp. 89-90.

[121] See vol. i. p. 153.

[122] Belmas calls it a factory (ii. 151), but Palafox in his dispatch gives the name above.

[123] ‘Suizos de Aragon.’

[124] An officer of sappers named Henri, and one of his privates, tried to reopen communication by swimming the river on an ice-cold night. They reached the further bank, but died of exhaustion among the reeds, where their corpses were found next morning: thus the message was never delivered. Belmas, ii. 153.

[125] The two letters may be found in full in the appendices to Belmas, vol. ii.

[126] Junot to Berthier, Jan. 1, 1809.

[127] Belmas, ii. 175.

[128] Lacoste to Junot, Jan. 16, in Belmas, ii. 378.

[129] Was this a distorted rumour of the combat of Cacabellos, and the death of General Colbert, the commander of Ney’s corps-cavalry, on Jan. 3?

[130] For the description of these miserable and most insalubrious refuges, see Cavallero, pp. 90-100.

[131] I give the date of San Genis’ death from Arteche, iv. Belmas, on the other hand, puts it on Jan. 26, and Cavallero apparently on Jan. 28, for he says that it was three days before that of Lacoste, who was shot on Feb. 1.

[132] Belmas, ii. 198.

[133] Oddly enough, Belmas places this sortie on Jan. 21, on which day, as Arteche shows, none of the Spanish accounts speak of a sortie, while the latter give at great length details of the fighting on the twenty-third. Probably the Spanish date is the correct one.

[134] Belmas, ii. 203.

[135] Napier (i. 376) calls them ‘Catalonians’: but they were all Aragonese, sent to aid Catalonia in October.

[136] Report of General Laval (commanding-in the trenches this day) to Lannes, in Appendix xxvi, of Belmas, vol. ii. Cf. von Brandt, p. 34.

[137] There is a full account of his death in Legendre, i. 149; that officer was in the room with him, when he and his aide-de-camp, Lalobe, were simultaneously shot through the head as they peered out of a side window where they thought themselves unobserved.

[138] The ceilings in all the better sort of houses were made of vaulted arches, not of beams and boards.

[139] See Cavallero, p. 120, and compare Belmas, ii. 253.

[140] Belmas, ii. 294. Cf. Rogniat and Legendre.

[141] Berthier to Lannes, Paris, Feb. 10.

[142] Belmas, ii. 314, and before.

[143] In Lejeune, i. 169, the reader will find some horrible anecdotes of this explosion.

[144] Lejeune, i. 177.

[145] The ‘Suizos de Aragon,’ of which the unfortunate Fleury had been colonel, had not all perished on Dec. 21.

[146] Arteche, iv. 472, and Lejeune, i. 179.

[147] Their names can be found on p. 494 of Arteche, vol. iv.

[148] In Lejeune, i. 194-5, will be found a most picturesque account of the interview of the French envoy with the fever-ridden and despairing Junta, almost hysterical with rage and shame, but accepting the inevitable.

[149] It is notable that there was not a single churchman among them, though there were eight among the thirty-three members of the Junta. The clergy represented to the last the fighting section.

[150] Lejeune, in his interesting narrative of this interview, says that he saw one of the deputies pore over the map and recognize his own house among the mined buildings; he crossed himself five or six times, and cried in accents of bitter grief ‘Ah la Casa Ciscala.’ The name of Don Joachim Ciscala does occur among the eleven signatures, so the story is probably true. Lejeune, i. 198.

[151] Lejeune, i. 202.

[152] Von Brandt, Aus meinem Leben, pp. 43-4.

[153] For details, see Arteche, iv. 512-3.

[154] Lannes to Berthier, March 19, 1809.

[155] It seems quite clear that the ‘1,500 men in hospital’ which Belmas mentions on ii. 327 is a misprint for 15,000. For his own figures show that (p. 381) there were 13,000 invalids six weeks earlier, and before the deadly street-fighting had begun. How many died we cannot say, but Suchet in April had only 10,527 men present in nineteen battalions (MÉmoires, i. 331), with eight more battalions ‘on command,’ which would give another 4,000. Von Brandt (p. 50) carefully says that the total of 3,000 dead does not include ‘the thousands who perished in hospital.’

[156] The foundation for most of the stories against Palafox seems to be Lannes’ letter to Napoleon of 19 mars: ‘Ce pauvre misÉrable prÊtait seulement son nom aux moines et aux intrigants.’ I cannot find anywhere the source from which Napier draws his statement that Palafox hid himself in a bomb-proof, and lived ‘in a disgusting state of sensuality,’ shirking all the dangers of the siege (i. 389).

[157] Arteche, iv. 507-8.

[158] There are details in the diary of a citizen of Badajoz in the Vaughan Papers.

[159] For these operations compare Jourdan’s MÉmoires, pp. 178-9, and Arteche, v. 228-31.

[160] The cavalry regiment had only 264 sabres: the infantry battalions were Campomayor, Tiradores de Cadiz, Granaderos del General, militia of Cordova, Guadix and Osuna. Only the first-named was an old regular corps.

[161] He had his own original division of the 4th Corps (twelve batts.), Valence’s Poles (six batts.), the 3rd Dutch Hussars (part of his corps-cavalry), the regiment of Polish lancers, and Milhaud’s three regiments, the 12th, 16th and 21st Dragoons: apparently in all 12,744 men.

[162] It seems clear that the 2,000 killed and wounded, given by Jourdan (p. 186) and Victoires et ConquÊtes, is merely a rough estimate. Belmas’ figures (i. 69) are still more absurd: he makes the Spaniards lose 9,000 men from an army which did not exceed 16,500 all told, including the rear division of La PeÑa.

[163] See pp. 4-5 of this volume.

[164] This is the estimate of Jourdan (MÉmoires, p. 181), and exactly agrees with the figures which I give on p. 152.

[165] 26th and 10th Chasseurs and 9th Dragoons; the fourth regiment, the Polish lancers, was with Sebastiani (see pp. 146-7).

[166] The February figures for Victor’s men prÉsents sous les armes are:—

[167] One Hessian battalion was still absent, in garrison at Segovia, so the total of the division was not much over 3,000.

[168] Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 182.

[169] Apparently the Westphalian Chevaux LÉgers, which had hitherto been attached to Leval’s German division.

[170] Four more had to be left behind in the fortress.

[171] Jourdan, p. 182.

[172] Rocca, p. 268.

[173] See pp. 162-3.

[174] The Spanish statements that Cuesta had only 2,200 horse seem disproved by a letter from Cuesta’s camp, Col. D’Urban to Cradock (April 7), to the effect that Cuesta had already rallied, after Medellin, fully 3,000 horse, but only 6,000 or 7,000 foot [Record Office].

[175] Frankfort and the 1st of Hesse. See Sausez’s RÉgiment de Francfort, p. 30.

[176] The sixth regiment (1st Dragoons) was still absent at Miajadas.

[177] The division had started with nine battalions, but two (as will be remembered) were left behind at Truxillo, and two more at Merida. Those with Lasalle were the two Baden battalions, those with Latour-Maubourg a Nassau battalion, and one formed of the united light companies of the division. The second Nassau battalion was to the rear, with Villatte. See SÉmÉlÉ’s narrative, p. 463.

[178] 5th Chasseurs, of the corps-cavalry of the 1st Corps.

[179] These were the regiments Infante and Almanza (from Denmark) and the new cavalry regiment of Toledo. Letter of Sir Benjamin D’Urban to Cradock, April 8, 1809 (Record Office).

[180] Its remainder was garrisoning Badajoz. Those on the field were Badajoz (two batts.), and 3rd of Seville (one batt.).

[181] Apparently these regiments were Albuquerque’s regiment from the Andalusian army, with the Cazadores de Llerena (a new Estremaduran corps) and Del Rey (one of the Baltic regiments).

[182] These were the two hussar regiments, Voluntarios de EspaÑa, and Maria Luisa, the latter of which had been re-named ‘Hussars of Estremadura’.

[183] Rocca (of the 2nd Hussars), MÉmoires de la Guerre d’Espagne, 80.

[184] Cuesta in his dispatch mentions that General Henestrosa, Captain Yturrigarey, and the English Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin D’Urban were the first three into the battery.

[185] In a dispatch in the Record Office, Cuesta says that the particular corps which rode down himself and his staff was the raw ‘Toledo’ regiment.

[186] Half-a-dozen French authorities speak of the wrath of the chasseurs as justifiable, because their comrades at Miajadas had been murdered (ÉgorgÉs, or lÂchement assassinÉs). But the Spaniards had killed them in fair fight.

[187] Rocca, MÉmoires, p. 82.

[188] Ibid., p. 84.

[189] See the Table in Arteche, vi. 476.

[190] These were the hussar regiments ‘Volunteers of Spain’ and ‘Estremadura’ (late Maria Luisa). Cuesta says in his dispatch that they saved the battalions of Merida, and Provincial of Badajoz, which had been surrounded and nearly cut off.

[191] This is the figure given by Jourdan, and General SÉmÉlÉ, who ought to have known the facts. It is, of course, reproduced by Thiers, and the other historians. But I agree with Napier (ii. 71) in considering the figure ‘scarcely credible.’ Rocca says that the French lost 4,000 men, but from the context, I suspect this to be a misprint for 400. Schepeler, always a very well-informed and impartial writer, guesses at 2,000, and he may not be far wrong.

[192] By April 8 he had collected there 3,000 horse and 6,000 or 7,000 foot. Letter of D’Urban to Cradock, April 8.

[193] Rocca, MÉmoires, p. 86.

[194] Regiment of Velez-Malaga (three batts.), and 2nd battalion of Antequera, 3,600 bayonets in all.

[195] Also some stray squadrons of cavalry which had gone to the rear to get horses in Andalusia (Letter of Frere to Castlereagh in Record Office).

[196] Jourdan, MÉmoires, pp. 187-8.

[197] It was composed of the few battalions of the 8th Corps which had not been drafted into the 2nd.

[198] When the Emperor looked at the half-monthly returns of the army, which were forwarded to him as regularly as possible, and which pursued him wheresoever he might go, he must have seen the following statistics—those of Jan. 15 in the French War Office—for the 2nd Corps, taking the gross totals:—

Infantry: Merle 12,119; Mermet 11,810; Delaborde 5,038; Heudelet 6,592: Total 35,559.

Cavalry: Lorges 1,769; Lahoussaye 3,087; Franceschi 2,512: Total 7,368. Artillery and Train 1,468.

Total of the whole corps 44,395. By Jan. 30, it had risen to 45,820.

[199] The state of the cavalry of the 2nd Corps on Jan. 30 gives the following astounding result:—

The drain under the second column represents mainly the men who had dropped to the rear, from losing their horses or being unable to take them on.

[200] For the state of this squadron see the report by Admiral De Courcy in the Parliamentary Papers for 1809, Spain, March 29, 1809, p. 4.

[201] The marines had been taken away in July, 1808, and formed half a brigade in the division of the Army of Galicia. But the seamen were available.

[202] The Supreme Junta very properly condemned him and Alcedo, the governor of Corunna, to the penalties of high treason.

[203] Compare Instructions de l’Empereur of Jan. 17, with Berthier to Soult of Jan. 21.

[204] ‘Il faut croire,’ says St. Chamans, Soult’s senior aide-de-camp, ‘que NapolÉon, au moment oÙ il ordonna une pareille opÉration, Était possÉdÉ d’un esprit de vertige. Comment pouvait-il risquer, au milieu d’un royaume insurgÉ, un si faible corps d’armÉe, sans communication avec ses autres troupes d’Espagne?’ [MÉmoires, p. 117]. ‘Tout Était en erreur,’ says Le Noble, another 2nd Corps writer, ‘dans le projet de soumettre le Portugal en 1809 avec une armÉe si faible et dÉpourvue de moyens. L’Empereur a montrÉ une confiance aveugle’ (p. 65).

[205] The authors, English and French, who express a humanitarian horror at the shooting of 3,000 horses and mules before the embarkation of Moore’s army, forget what a godsend these would have been to Soult, if the English had left them to fall intact into his hands. The slaughter was dreadful, but perfectly necessary and justifiable.

[206] All these details come from Le Noble, who as Ordonnateur-en-Chef of the 2nd Corps, had full experience of the difficulty of equipping it for the Portuguese expedition.

[207] Most of these details are from two interesting dispatches of La Romana in the Foreign Office papers at the Record Office. They are dated from Chaves on Jan. 28 and Feb. 13. They are unpublished and seem to be unknown even to General Arteche, who has made such a splendid collection of the materials in the Spanish archives which bear on this obscure corner of the war. There was an English officer, Captain Brotherton, with the army of La Romana: but his reports, which Napier had evidently seen, are now no longer to be found. No doubt they were bound up in the January-March 1809 book of Portuguese dispatches, which since Napier’s day has disappeared from the Record Office, leaving no trace behind.

[208] These boats were brought to Campo Saucos overland, for a full mile and more. They came from La Guardia and other fishing-villages on the coast; but finding it impossible to get them over the bar of the Minho in such furious weather, and against the swollen stream, Soult dragged them from the beach north of the mouth to the crossing-point on rollers, much as Mohammed II did with his galleys at the famous siege of Constantinople in 1453. But Soult’s vessels were, of course, much smaller.

[209] Soult had got together a few dozen seamen, French prisoners of war, found at Corunna and Ferrol, who had been captured at sea by Spanish cruisers. They were not ‘marines’ as Napier calls them (ii. 38), but marins (see Le Noble, p. 75, and again p. 78).

[210] Letter of Captain Brotherton [now lost] quoted in Napier, ii. 438, and dated from Oimbra on Feb. 21.

[211] All the details of the Galician insurrection may be found in the very interesting Los Guerrilleros Gallegos de 1809, of Pardo de Andrade, reprinted at Corunna in 1892. It is absolutely contemporary and mainly composed of original documents written by men who shared in the rising. But naturally it contains errors and exaggerations.

[212] Long details of all this fighting may he found in the narrative of the Alcalde of Rivadavia, on pp. 130-44 of vol. ii. of Los Guerrilleros Gallegos. The details are probably exaggerated, but the reader can hardly refuse to believe that there is a solid substratum of truth. The Alcalde notes that the infantry were far better behaved than Lahoussaye’s dragoons, of whom he tells tales of quite incredible ferocity, even alleging that they burnt the wounded.

[213] Le Noble says (p. 96) that at Ginzo the peasants had with them General Mahy and La Romana’s vanguard division. But General Arteche gives documentary evidence (p. 347) to prove that on that day Mahy and his troops were at Baltar, twenty miles away behind the mountains. If there were regulars present they were only detachments or stragglers.

[214] For the bishop of Orense’s sarcastic reply see Arteche, v. 351. For the general effect of the proclamation see St. Chamans: of the atrocities of the French, Los Guerrilleros Gallegos give ample and sometimes incredible accounts.

[215] See Le Noble (p. 98) for this dispatch and its effect on the morale of the army.

[216] For the malcontents and their views see Le Noble, pp. 98-9. St. Chamans, on the other hand (p. 119), says that the army started in good spirits and with a great contempt for all insurgents, Spanish or Portuguese. As a trusted staff officer of the Marshal, he no doubt represents the optimistic view at head quarters.

[217] There was also a third road, that by Montalegre and Ruivaens, by which Soult ultimately evacuated Portugal; but as it was not available for wheeled traffic, it could not be used by an army with artillery.

[218] Compare the narrative of the colonel of the Barcelona Light Infantry, printed by Arteche in v. 359-61 of his Guerra de la Independencia, with the highly-coloured account in Le Noble, 104-5. The seven Spanish Corps engaged were Segovia, Zamora, Barcelona, Majorca, Orense, Betanzos, Aragon. None of them had more than 200 bayonets in line: the Galician regiments far less. The three last-named corps lost a flag each. [Betanzos should be substituted for Tuy in the list in Le Noble, p. 105, line 10.]

[219] Napier (ii. 47) is wrong in saying that La Romana escaped via Braganza; he did not enter Portugal, but kept on his own side of the frontier, on the Monterey-La Gudina-Puebla de Senabria road.

[220] List of Arms sent to Portugal on p. 9 of Parliamentary Papers for 1809.

[221] The Portuguese volume for December 1808 and January-February 1809 in the Record Office being mysteriously lost, Cradock’s correspondence and that of the other British officers in Portugal is no longer available. But Napier took copious notes from it, while it was still forthcoming; they will be found on pp. 425-31 of his vol. ii, and bear witness to a complete state of anarchy in Oporto.

[222] The first battalion used to call the second ‘Baron Eben’s runaways’ when they met again, as Mayne assures us in his History of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

[223] They were raised by a decree of Dec. 23, 1808.

[224] This was a proper precaution, as the sea-forts could be of no use for defending Lisbon from a land attack, while, if Lisbon got into French hands again, they would have been invaluable for resisting an attack from the side of the sea. But Cradock was far too precipitate in commencing an operation which betrayed such want of confidence.

[225] These were the 2/9th, 29th, 1/40th, 1/45th, 82nd, 97th, and 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th line battalions of the King’s German Legion.

[226] The 1/3rd and 5/60th. The last battalion was mainly composed of foreigners, and had received more than 200 recruits from the deserters of Junot’s army. Moore would not trust it, and sent it back. It afterwards did splendid service under Wellesley.

[227] The battalions that did not get up in time were the 1/45th and 97th.

[228] These were the 3/27th and 2/31st, which had sailed with Baird from Portsmouth, but were sent on from Corunna to Lisbon when the rest of Baird’s expedition landed in Galicia.

[229] The 14th Light Dragoons.

[230] Napier (ii. 5) much under-estimates when he calls the whole ‘10,000 including sick.’ Cradock’s regiments add up to about 12,133 men including those in hospital. In addition there were all Moore’s sick, who, though many had died in the interim, presented on Feb. 18 in Portugal convalescents to the number of 2,000 men.

[231] The 1/3rd, 1/45th, 5/60th, and 97th.

[232] The 1/40th.

[234] The 2/9th and 29th.

[235] Sir John Moore himself ventilated this view in a letter to Lord Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 25, 1808. It is this fact that explains Napier’s very tender treatment of Cradock, who quoted Moore as his justifying authority. Moreover Cradock had been very obliging in placing all his papers at Napier’s disposal, a fact which prepossessed the historian in his favour.

[236] Castlereagh to Cradock, Dec. 24, 1808. Napier makes on this the curious remark that the ministry gave contradictory orders when they told Cradock to make a show of preparation for resistance, yet to get ready for embarkation if it should prove necessary.

[237] See p. 27.

[238] The 3/27th, 2/9th, 29th, and some small details of artillery, &c.

[239] Not only Mackenzie’s brigade, but also Tilson’s brigade, the 2/87th and 1/88th, and the stronger battalions of H. Campbell, which had gone to Cadiz directly from England—the first battalions of the 2nd (Coldstream) and 3rd (Scots Fusilier) Guards.

[240] In a letter of March 20 to Mr. Villiers, Cradock makes the astounding statement that after scouring all Portugal for horses for three months, he was still unable to provide them for four out of his six batteries.

[241] Cradock’s controversial letters to Lord Londonderry, printed in the latter’s history (ii. 286-7), do no more than bear out Londonderry’s accusations of torpidity against Sir John.

[242] Cradock contended that before the arrival of Hill and Sherbrooke and the return of Mackenzie from Cadiz, he had only 10,225 men, and, deducting sick and garrisons for the Lisbon forts, could only have marched out with 5,221. [Letter to Londonderry on p. 302, vol. ii. of the latter’s work.] He had sent 3,500 men to Cadiz and Seville, on Sir George Smith’s unhappy inspiration, or his force would have been much larger. As to the resolution to march against Soult, which he afterwards claimed to have made, it is sufficient to say that Wellesley on his arrival wrote to Castlereagh that ‘Sir John Cradock does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward: on the contrary he appears (by his letters to Mr. Villiers) to have intended to go no further till he should hear of Victor’s movements.’ [Well. Corresp., Lisbon, April 24.]

[243] All authorities agree as to the inferior character and status of a great part of the Portuguese officers. Dumouriez remarks [1766] that ‘their pay does not enable them to live better than the common soldiers, whose comrades and relatives they often are. The subaltern ranks are filled from the inferior classes, and their hatred of foreigners prevents their association with, or receiving any improvement from, them: hence it is that they remain in such ignorance and wretchedness’ (p. 17). Halliday remarks (p. 106) that ‘even captains had not the rank of gentlemen.’ Compare with this Patterson’s curious note (vol. i. p. 250), ‘The familiarity that subsists between the native officers and their men renders ineffective all the authority of the former, at the same time defeating the object to be attained by discipline. They eat, gamble, and drink together. I have even seen them waltzing and figuring off in the contra-danza, captains with corporals, majors with drumboys—all Jack-fellows well met, and excellent boon companions. They will not of themselves do anything, their good qualities must be elicited by strangers. I know of nothing that stamps the character of Lord Beresford as a man of energy and perseverance, more than the way in which he has organized them, and from a miserable undisciplined rabble produced, in course of time, a fair body of fighting troops, who performed (encouraged by their English officers) some spirited service during the war.’

[244] Of these, twelve squadrons were originally cuirassiers (Dumouriez, p. 18), but their armament had been discarded before 1800, and one regiment only was light horse.

[245]

Halliday gives an even larger figure, 52,204.

[246] Except two Lisbon regiments, named Viera Tellez and Freire, from former colonels of distinction [Nos. 4 and 16].

[247] It was intended, however, to give each cavalry regiment an extra squadron.

[248] Parliamentary Papers, 1309. Return No. 5, p. 9.

[249] The 8th and 22nd, both Alemtejo regiments, were entirely drafted off, and were raised again afresh with recruits in the autumn.

[250] The 2nd and 3rd, both Alemtejo regiments, were never horsed during the whole war, and did foot-service in garrisons of the interior.

[251] In September the 3rd, 5th, 15th, 21st, and 24th had not raised their second battalions. Of these the 5th and 15th were Alemtejo regiments.

[252] Report of Baron Decken, Sept. 13, 1808 (Record Office).

[253] Return of the Portuguese army, Nov. 26 (Record Office).

[254] Beresford to Wellesley, Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, vi. p. 774.

[255] These were the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th of the line, and the 1st, 4th, and 7th cavalry. Of the foot the 1st, 4th, 10th, and 16th were Lisbon regiments, the 7th was named from and belonged to Setubal, the 13th to Peniche, the 19th to Cascaes.

[256] These were the 6th, 9th, 12th, 18th, 21st, and 24th. The 6th and 18th belonged to Oporto, the 9th to Viana, the 12th to Chaves, the 21st to Valenza, the 24th to Braganza.

[257] The same story is told of General Robert Craufurd and his cazadores, in Costello’s Memoirs.

[258] For notes on the difficulties and friction caused by clashing pretensions of British and Portuguese seniority in rank, see Wellington Dispatches, vol. iv. pp. 368-81, 394-5, and several other letters to Castlereagh and Beresford.

[259] Largely from the 1/3rd foot. See Wellington Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 463. Other regiments also contributed.

[260] A few British officers had arrived, such as Col. Patrick who commanded the 12th of the line in Silveira’s army.

[261] Some of the muskets sent by the British were in the hands of the Oporto troops, but none had reached the Tras-os-Montes regiments of Silveira’s army.

[262] All this is analysed from the Portuguese historian Da Luz Soriano.

[263] For the local organization and nomenclature of the militia regiments, the reader is referred to the table of the Portuguese army in Appendix II. It will be seen that there were theoretically sixteen regiments in the provinces invaded by Soult, beyond the Douro.

[264] See Mayne, History of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, p. 231, and Wellington Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 350.

[265] Wellington Dispatches, vol. iv. pp. 389-90 and 478 [June, 1809].

[266] The 12th and 24th regiments—Chaves and Braganza.

[267] Militia of Chaves, Villa Real, Miranda, and Braganza.

[268] The 6th and 9th cavalry.

[269] Brotherton to Castlereagh, March 13.

[270] Entre-Douro-e-Minho had a population of 500,000 souls, Tras-os-Montes only 180,000.

[271] Of Lahoussaye’s division.

[272] Brotherton to Cradock, from Povoa de Aguiar, March 13.

[273] He was called Magelhaes Pizarro, but cannot be said to have shown either the endurance of the Portuguese seaman, or the reckless courage of the Spanish conquistador, whose historic names he bore.

[274] See Naylies, p. 81; St. Chamans, p. 120; Le Noble, p. 120; and Des Odoards, p. 213.

[275] Lorges’ other brigade, that of Fournier, had been (as it will be remembered) left behind in Galicia with Marshal Ney.

[276] Every French diarist of Soult’s army has tales of the stoic courage displayed by the Portuguese clergy. A story from Naylies of Lahoussaye’s dragoons may serve as an example. Near Braga he came on a cart escorted by a single priest with a gun on his shoulder. He was the chaplain of a convent, who was taking out of harm’s way a party of nuns. When he saw himself overtaken, he quietly waited in the middle of the road, shot the first dragoon dead, and was killed by the second as he was trying to reload his musket.

[277] St. Chamans, MÉmoires, pp. 119-21.

[278] For combats waged by Lahoussaye’s dragoons, who were in the middle of the long column, see the journal of Naylies (pp. 83-4). For attacks on Mermet, in the rear column, see Fantin des Odoards (p. 214).

[279] I agree with General Arteche in thinking that Eben’s dispatch to Cradock, from which this narrative is mainly drawn, does him no credit. Indeed, it is easy to adopt the sinister view that Eben was aiming at getting the command, did nothing to discourage the mob, and was indirectly responsible for Freire’s murder. As Arteche remarks ‘with a little more resolution and a little less personal ambition, the Baron could probably have prevented the catastrophe’ (vol. v. p. 393). But Freire’s conduct had been so cowardly and incapable that the peasants were reasonably incensed with him. Why had he not defended the rugged defiles of Venda Nova and Salamonde, and what could excuse his absconding and abandoning his army?

[280] Eben’s dispatch is in the Record Office, in the miscellaneous volume at the end of the Portugal 1809 series.

[281] Eben, in his report, says that at the moment of the French assault one of his guns in the battery commanding the high-road burst, and killed many of those standing about, and that the rout commenced with the stampede caused by this explosion.

[282] Naylies [of the 19th Dragoons], p. 87.

[283] Even while flying through the streets of Braga, some of the routed horde found time to pay a visit to the town gaol, and to murder the corregidor and the other prisoners who had been placed there on the eighteenth.

[284] Fantin des Odoards, p. 216.

[285] Eben, in his report to Cradock at the Record Office, says 1,000 only, of whom more than 200 belonged to the Lusitanian Legion.

[286] Le Noble, p. 142. St. Chamans, p. 121. Naylies and Fantin des Odoards, though both mentioning the slaughter in which they took part, do not give this justification for it. The latter says that the French gave no quarter save to men in uniform.

[287] Fantin des Odoards, p. 216.

[288] Le Noble (pp. 157-8), and Napier following him, say that the Portuguese murdered their commander, Brigadier-General Vallongo, when the bridges were forced, tore him in pieces, and buried his scattered members in a dunghill. It is a relief to know from Da Luz Soriano, the Portuguese historian, that nothing of the kind occurred, and that there was no officer of the name of Vallongo in the Portuguese army.

[289] Apparently the regiments of Oporto, Baltar, Feira, and Villa de Conde.

[290] I draw these deductions from Beresford’s and Eben’s reports in the Record Office. Beresford (writing to Castlereagh on March 29, the day of the storm) complains that he can get no proper ‘morning states’ out of the officers at Oporto, but says that the Bishop has there nos. 6 and 18 of the line, Vittoria’s two battalions and the wrecks of the 2nd Lusitanian Legion. He speaks of two or three militia regiments, 9,000 armed citizens, and an indefinite number of Ordenanza. Eben gives some details concerning his own doings. Da Luz Soriano mentions Champlemond and his battalion of the 21st of the line. As to the Ordenanza, 9,000 seems a high estimate for the local Oporto horde, for that town with 70,000 souls had already supplied two regiments of the line, two battalions of the Lusitanian Legion, and a militia regiment, 6,500 men in all.

[291] Le Noble, p. 161.

[292] Some of the French writers say that Foy was taken prisoner while carrying a flag of truce and a second letter for the Bishop’s eye. But what really seems to have happened was that he conceived a notion that one of the Portuguese outposts wished to surrender, rode in amongst them, and began to urge them to lay down their arms. But they seized him and sent him to the rear; his companion, the chef de bataillon Roger, drew his sword and tried to cut his way back to his men, whereupon he was bayonetted. One cannot blame the Portuguese, for officers, in time of truce, have no right to come within the enemy’s lines, still less to urge his troops to desertion. Foy proved that he was not Loison by holding up his two hands. Loison being one-handed (as his nickname Maneta shows), the populace at once saw that they had made a mistake. I follow the narrative in Girod de l’Ain’s new life of Foy (p. 78), corroborated by Le Noble (p. 162). Napier (ii. p. 57), of course, gives a version unfavourable to the Portuguese.

[293] Le Noble, and Napier following him, state that the breach in the bridge was caused merely by some of the central pontoons sinking under the weight of the passing multitude. Hennegan, who was present in Oporto that day, says the same. But it seems safer to follow Da Luz Soriano and other Portuguese witnesses, who state that no such accident occurred, but that the early fugitives pulled up the drawbridge in order to stay the pursuit, reckless as to the fate of those who were behind them. Historians telling a story to the discredit of their own party may generally be trusted.

[294] E.g. the 21st of the line had even in September, nearly six months after the storm, only 193 men under arms.

[295] Fantin des Odoards, Journal, April 28, p. 226.

[296] See p. 175.

[297] On Feb. 1 the force was, prÉsents sous les armes, 7,692 infantry, about 1,000 cavalry, and 200 gunners.

[298] Wellington, e.g., writes to him on August 5, 1809, ‘It is difficult for me to instruct you, when every letter that I receive from you informs me that you have gone further off, and are executing some plan of your own.’

[299] It is most unfortunate that while Wilson wrote and published admirable narratives of his doings in Prussia and Poland in 1806-7, and of his Russian and German campaign of 1812-3, he has left nothing on record concerning Portugal in 1808-9. Moreover the life, by his son-in-law, breaks off in 1807, and was never finished. My narrative is constructed from his dispatches in the Record Office, the correspondence of Wellesley and Beresford, and Mayne and Lillie’s Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

[300] It will he remembered that it was only the first division of the Legion that marched. The second, which could not go forward for want of uniforms and arms, was left behind in charge of Baron Eben. That officer had strict orders to move out to Almeida the moment that he should receive the muskets, &c. that were on their way from England. Eben, however, disregarded his instructions, became one of the Bishop’s clique, and involved his men in the campaign against Soult, thereby marring Wilson’s plans and depriving him of half his proper force.

[301] It consisted of the 45th and 97th regiments.

[302] Napier, who is very friendly to Cradock, makes no mention of this extraordinary dispatch. But it is fully substantiated by Mayne and Lillie, who were both present at Wilson’s council of war, and heard the matter discussed. See their History of the Lusitanian Legion, p. 43.

[303] See the Lusitanian Legion, p. 47.

[304] This fact comes from a letter of Ramon Blanco, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, dated Jan. 13, which Frere sent home to Castlereagh, and which is therefore now in the Record Office. Blanco complains that he is absolutely without trained artillerymen of any sort.

[305] Carlos d’EspaÑa, whose name we shall so frequently meet during the succeeding years, was no Spaniard, but a French ÉmigrÉ officer of the name of D’Espagne. Englishmen, on account of his name, sometimes took him for a prince of the Spanish royal family.

[306] Sir Robert Wilson to Frere, dated Jan. 29, in the Record Office. The regiment sent by Pignatelli was called ‘Volunteers of Avila.’

[307] Victor to King Joseph, from Toledo, Feb. 3, 1809.

[308] This is shown by a letter of March 23 from Solignac, one of Lapisse’s brigadiers, which was intercepted by guerrillas. The general writes to his friend Raguerie that the march on Abrantes is certain, and that letters for him had better be readdressed to Lisbon [Record Office].

[309] Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 189, show that he and Joseph authorized the move, at Victor’s instance, and prove that it was not made on Lapisse’s own responsibility, as Napier supposes [ii. 72], but in obedience to superior orders.

[310] This narrative is from Mayne and Lillie, supplemented by Jourdan and other French sources. Wilson thought that he had foiled a real attack on Rodrigo, but was mistaken: Lapisse was only feinting.

[311] It is impossible to make out why Alcantara was treated so much worse than other places taken by storm, but the facts are well vouched for. The report of the local authorities to Cuesta says that not only all peasants taken with arms in their hands, but more than forty non-combatants were butchered, and that not a woman who had remained in the place escaped rape. Lillie, the historian of the Lusitanian Legion, who was with the force that pursued Lapisse from Rodrigo, says that he saw the traces of ‘acts of barbarity that would disgrace the most savage and uncivilized of mankind’—corpses deliberately mutilated and laid out to roast on piles of burning furniture, with the bodies of domestic animals, such as pigs and dogs, placed on the top of the pile as if in jest [Lusitanian Legion, pp. 66-7]. The German historian Schepeler gives very similar details, adding the note about the dragging up of bones and coffins from the churches.

[312] All Napier’s criticism (ii. 85-6) on Lapisse’s movement to Alcantara is vitiated by his ignorance of the fact that Jourdan and the King, at Victor’s instance, had sent him orders to go there. But nothing can excuse his previous inaction in February and March. He ought to have attacked Rodrigo before the end of January, when it was still almost without a garrison, and in a state of great disrepair.

[313] See p. 188.

[314] Napier’s ‘Colonel Barrois.’

[315] Most of these details as to the fall of Vigo come from a contemporary account in Andrade’s collection, printed in Los Guerrilleros Gallegos, pp. 129-37. Le Noble asserts that only 794 men were captured, but Captain Mackinley says that he received nearly 1,300 prisoners, including 300 sick and many non-combatants. He had the best opportunities of knowing, and must be followed. Le Noble and the Spaniards do not give the French commander’s name, but I find that of Chalot as the senior officer among the prisoners in the list in the Record Office. Next to him is the paymaster-general Conscience. Toreno and Schepeler agree with Captain Mackinley in giving the number of the prisoners at over 1,200.

[316] Le Noble, though he mentions the formation of the legion (p. 120), omits to state that it was left at Chaves. But St. Chamans establishes this fact (p. 120); he calls the corps ‘les Espagnols et Portugais qui se disaient de notre parti.’ Des Odoards (p. 212) also speaks of the ‘legion,’ as does Naylies (p. 81). Its existence explains both the feebleness of Messager’s defence, and the large number of prisoners whom Silveira captured. The fighting force of the garrison was only the one company, plus some hundreds of convalescents, who in the fortnight since Soult’s departure had been able to resume their arms.

[317] Silveira to Beresford (Record Office). Cf. Foy’s dispatch to Loison (April 19), in which he owns that he failed to hold the convent, and retired with a loss of ninety-one men of the 17th regiment.

[318] Napier, ii. pp. 80-1, consistently mis-calls him Brochard.

[319] Either of these might easily have been fired by a casual shot, during the long cannonading which had been in progress. The Portuguese, therefore, avoided them.

[320] See Le Noble (Soult’s partisan and official vindicator), p. 207, and Fantin des Odoards, p. 227.

[321] See his conversation with his aide-de-camp, St. Chamans, in the latter’s MÉmoires, p. 139. The Marshal said that he was in a hazardous military position and that ‘je ne puis m’en tirer qu’en divisant les Portugais entre eux, et j’emploie pour cela le meilleur moyen politique qui soit en mon pouvoir.’ Compare Fantin des Odoards, p. 227.

[322] Fantin des Odoards, writing at Oporto under the date May 5, says that he had just read this proclamation on the walls, and was astounded at it, for the great bulk of the population was so hostile that the project seemed absolutely insane.

[323] St. Chamans, aide-de-camp to Soult, speaks of the crowds assembled by Veloso and others (p. 134): BigarrÉ says that General Ricard threw money to the crowd for seven days running from the Marshal’s balcony, and then stopped because the harvest of vivas was not large enough (p. 245).

[324] See Fantin des Odoards, p. 229, and Jourdan, p. 218.

[325] This strange document will be found printed in the Appendix.

[326] See Chamans, pp. 134 and 140. He ends with observing that Soult ‘aurait voulu se faire demander pour roi de Portugal par les habitants, qu’alors, le premier pas fait, il aurait sollicitÉ les suffrages de l’armÉe, ils auraient ÉtÉ consignÉs sur des registres pour chaque corps, et il aurait mis toutes ces piÈces sous les yeux de l’Empereur, en lui demandant son approbation.’

[327] Napoleon to Soult from SchÖnbrunn, Sept. 26, Nap. Corresp., 15,871.

[328] Napier’s conclusions as to Soult’s conduct are wholly warped by his strong predilection for the Marshal—which dated back to the time when the latter dealt kindly with his wounded brother on the day after Corunna. He understates Soult’s encouragement of the movement, and will have us believe that it was purely the work of the Portuguese. He omits all mention of Ricard’s circular, and finally suppresses all mention of Napoleon’s angry upbraidings except the following (ii. p. 75): ‘The Emperor wrote to Soult that the rumour had reached him, adding, with a delicate allusion to the Marshal’s previous services, “I remember nothing but Austerlitz.”’ Now it was not a rumour which had reached SchÖnbrunn, but a copy of Ricard’s circular, which the Emperor quotes verbatim. Therefore Napoleon was writing with tangible evidence, not with camp reports, to guide him. How far Napier’s sentence above gives a fair impression of the tone of the dispatch which I have reproduced, I leave the reader to judge. It was a surprise to myself when I put the two together. Once and for all, it must be remembered that Napier can never be trusted when Soult is in question—the Marshal’s intrigues, his greed, his shameful plundering of Andalusian churches, are all concealed.

[329] Fantin des Odoards, p. 220.

[330] So writes Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, who, being absent at Amarante and elsewhere, never saw the doings in Oporto: ‘Il s’est rÉpandu dans l’armÉe qu’il aspirait À la souverainetÉ du pays: on en conÇut d’abord quelques inquiÉtudes, qui furent bientÔt dissipÉes’ (p. 119).

[331] Charles Nodier’s Histoire des conspirations militaires sous l’Empire is unfortunately quite untrustworthy. He was never among the Philadelphes, and writes as a credulous and ill-informed outsider. Nevertheless there is a basis of fact underlying his work.

[332] The names of Argenton, Lafitte, and Donadieu are public property. Napier gives them, as does BigarrÉ. The names of ‘Dupont’ and ‘Garis’ are in suppressed paragraphs of the Wellington Dispatches which Gurwood chose to omit, and are also found in the minutes of Argenton’s trial at Paris.

[333] The reader may trace this feeling in Foy’s diaries, and Naylies (p. 67).

[334] Napier and Le Noble both hint that Loison was in the plot, and perhaps Delaborde, though they do not actually name these officers. But I think that their innocence is proved by Argenton’s declaration to Wellesley (Wellesley to Castlereagh, May 7, Record Office), that Loison was attached to Bonaparte, and would certainly seize Soult if he proclaimed himself king for ‘ambitious abuse of his authority and disobedience to his master.’

[335] This, at the time, was Wellesley’s eminently sensible conclusion. He wrote to Castlereagh on April 27, ‘I doubt whether it will be quite so easy as their emissary thinks to carry their intentions into execution: I also doubt whether it follows that the successful revolt of this one corps would be followed by that of others, and I am convinced that the method proposed by M. D’Argenton would not answer that purpose.’ Wellington Dispatches, iv. 276.

[336] These are the names omitted in the printed version of the Wellington Dispatches: that of Moreau does not occur there, but is to be found in the confession which Argenton made to Soult: see Le Noble, p. 236.

[338] It is to these days, and probably to some date about May 4-7, that belongs General BigarrÉ’s curious story about the conspirators (see his MÉmoires, p. 235, and Le Noble, p. 238; the latter printed the story in 1821 without names, the former’s version was only given to the light a few years ago; they agree in every point). The story is too good to be omitted. BigarrÉ says that, walking the quay of Oporto on a moonlight night, he came on Lafitte and Donadieu, muffled in their cloaks and vehemently discussing something in a dark corner. He stole up to them unnoticed, slapped his friend Donadieu on the back, and suddenly shouted in their ears ‘Ah! je vous y prends, Messieurs les conspirateurs.’ Lafitte whipped out a pistol, and had nearly shot the practical joker, before Donadieu could reassure him that this was only a boisterous piece of fun and that BigarrÉ knew nothing. It was not till much later that the latter found out what had been brewing.

[339] In common fairness to Moore, it is necessary to quote Wellesley’s own words on their fundamental difference of opinion as to the possibility of defending Portugal. ‘I have as much respect as any man can have for the opinion and judgement of Sir J. Moore, and I should mistrust my own (if opposed to his) in a case where he had an opportunity of knowing and considering. But he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing of its existing state.’ Yet he says that ‘The greatest disadvantage under which I labour is that Sir John Moore gave an opinion that the country could not be defended by the army under his command.’ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, from Vizeu, April 2, 1810.

[340] The official notice is dated April 2 (Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, vi. p. 210), but several letters dated late in March show that the matter had been already settled.

[341] The troops from the abortive expedition to Cadiz, under Mackenzie, Sherbrooke and Tilson, turned up about the middle of March at Lisbon. But Hill, with the first body of the second batch of reinforcements, only appeared upon April 5.

[342] Of the first ten battalions to appear, seven were 2nd battalions—those of the 7th, 30th, 48th, 53rd, 66th, 83rd, 87th regiments. Some were very weak, with less than 750 bayonets, e.g. the 7th (628 men), 30th (698 men), 66th (740 men).

[343] This came from Beresford at Lisbon (see Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, vi. p. 219).

[344] Wellesley to the Duke of Richmond, April 14 (Supplementary Dispatches, vi. 227).

[345] Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, vi. 221-2. It is very creditable to Sir Arthur that, adverting to another possibility, viz. that Cradock may have plucked up courage to go out against the French, and have successfully beaten them off, he declares that ‘he could not reconcile it with his feelings’ to supersede a successful general. He remembered his own state of mind when supplanted by Burrard on the day of Vimiero.

[346] Castlereagh to Wellesley, Supplementary Dispatches, vi. 222 and 228.

[347] Memorandum of March 7, ‘As soon as the newspapers shall have announced the departure of officers for Portugal, the French armies in Spain will receive orders to make their movements towards Portugal, so as to anticipate our measures for its defence,’ &c.

[348] It is noteworthy that Wellesley, when he was placed in communication with Argenton three days later, considered that one of the few useful facts which he had got from the plotter was that Soult and his army had no knowledge of where Victor might be, or of what he was doing. This was a far more precious piece of information than any details as to the conspiracy, which Wellesley regarded from the first as doomed to failure: see Wellington Dispatches, iv. 274.

[349] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Lisbon, April 24. I have ventured to substitute ‘before bringing’ in the last sentence for the unmeaning ‘and to bring’ which is clearly a lapsus calami.

[350] Wellesley (to Mr. Frere, at Seville) from Lisbon, April 24. In many sentences this dispatch is only a repetition of that to Castlereagh. But in others Sir Arthur makes his meaning more clear, by a more detailed explanation.

[351] Wellesley to Frere, Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

[352] Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal, of March 7.

[353] If to MassÉna’s field army of 60,000 men we add the troops on his communications (viz. the 9th Corps and the garrisons of Rodrigo and Almeida) and also the force which Soult and Mortier brought up against Badajoz and Elvas—a force against which Wellesley had to provide, by making large detachments—the full number of 100,000 is reached.

[354] See, for example, the anecdote in Sir G. L’Estrange’s Reminiscences, p. 194. Picton was equally given to the use (or abuse) of mufti, and fought Quatre Bras in a tall hat!

[355] ‘Provided we brought our men into the field well appointed, and with sixty good rounds in their pouches, he never looked to see whether our trousers were black or blue or grey. Scarcely any two officers dressed alike. Some wore grey braided coats, others brown, some liked blue: many from choice or necessity stuck to the “old red rag.” We were never tormented with that greatest of bores on active service, uniformity of dress.’ Grattan’s With the 88th, p. 50.

[356] To find a humorous contrast to Wellington’s staff, the reader might consult Lejeune’s account of that of Berthier, who had allowed him to design a special and gorgeous uniform, all fur feathers and braid, for his aides-de-camp. Lejeune dwells with the enthusiasm of a tailor on his efforts and their glorious effect on parade [Lejeune, i. p. 95].

[357] Lord Roberts, in his Rise of Wellington, only slightly overstates his case when he observes that the more we study Wellesley’s life in detail, the more we respect him as a general and the less we like him as a man. If we come upon much that is hard and unsympathetic, there are too many redeeming traits to justify the statement in its entirety.

[358] The reader curious in such things may find as much as he desires of this sort of stuff in ThiÉbault, Marbot, Le Noble and Lemonnier Delafosse.

[359] These phrases are preserved in the notes of Soult’s aide-de-camp Baudus.

[360] Cantillon was the assassin who fired on Wellington in Paris on Sept. 10, 1818.

[361] Wellington to Castlereagh, Zambujal, Sept. 5, 1808, and London, March 7, 1809.

[362] The Fifth Division was not completed till Oct. 8, 1810, the Sixth and Seventh on March 8, 1811.

[363] Though even then the superiority, such as it was, consisted entirely of Spanish troops of doubtful quality.

[364] See pp. 114-22 of vol. i.

[365] The same idea is well marked in a conversation reported by Croker, which took place in London, on the eve of Wellesley’s departure to assume command of the troops at Cork with whom he was about to sail for the Peninsula. After a long reverie, he was asked the subject of his thoughts. ‘To say the truth,’ he replied, ‘I am thinking of the French I am going to fight. I have not seen them since the campaign in Flanders [1794-5] when they were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of victory under Buonaparte must have made them better still. They have besides a new system of strategy, which has outmanoeuvred and overwhelmed all the armies of Europe. ’Tis enough to make one thoughtful; but no matter, the die is cast: they may overwhelm me, but I don’t think they will outmanoeuvre me. First, because I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems to be; and secondly, because, if all I hear of their system be true, I think it a false one against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies are half beaten before the battle begins. I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand.’ Croker’s Diary and Correspondence, vol. i. p. 13, under the date June 14, 1808.

[366] See vol. i. p. 119.

[367] See Kincaid, chap. v, May 3, 1811.

[368] The feelings, expressed more or less clearly in a hundred memoirs, may be summed up in a paragraph by Wm. Grattan of the 88th. ‘In his parting General Order to the Peninsular army he told us that he would never cease to feel the warmest interest for our welfare and honour. How this promise was kept every one knows. That the Duke of Wellington is one of the most remarkable (perhaps the greatest) man of the present age, few will deny. But that he neglected the interests and feelings of his Peninsular army, as a body, is beyond all question. And were he in his grave to-morrow, hundreds of voices that now are silent would echo what I write’ (p. 332).

[369] Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 14. [Nov. 4, 1831.]

[370] It is often forgotten that there was a strong religious element in the rank and file of the Peninsular army. In a letter from Cartaxo [Feb. 3, 1811], Wellington mentions, with no great pleasure, the fact that there were three separate Methodist meetings in the Guards’ brigade alone, and that in many other regiments there were officers who were accustomed to preach and pray with their men. For the spiritual experiences of a sergeant in the agonies of conversion, the reader may consult the diary of Surtees of the 95th during the year 1812.

[371] Robert Craufurd and Hill were perhaps the only exceptions.

[372] Take, for example, his behaviour to Sir James MacGrigor, perhaps the most successful of his chiefs of departments. MacGrigor, being at Salamanca, while Wellesley was at Madrid [Aug. 1812], ordered on his own authority the bringing up of stores for the mass of wounded left behind there after the battle. He then came to bring his report to Madrid. ‘Lord Wellington was sitting to a Spanish painter [Goya] for his portrait when I arrived, and asked me to sit down and give him a detail as to the state of the wounded at Salamanca. When I came to inform him that for their relief I had ordered up purveying and commissariat officers, he started up, and in a violent manner reprobated what I had done. His Lordship was in a passion, and the Spanish artist, ignorant of the English language, looked aghast, and at a loss to know what I had done to enrage him so much. “I shall be glad to know,” he asked, “who is to command the army, I or you? I establish one route, one line of communications for the army; you establish another, and order up supplies by it. As long as you live, sir, never do that again; never do anything without my orders.” I pleaded that there was no time to consult him, and that I had to save lives. He peremptorily desired me “never again to act without his orders.” ... A month later I was able to say to him, “My Lord, recollect how you blamed me at Madrid for the steps which I took on coming up to the army, when I could not consult your Lordship, and acted for myself. Now, if I had not, what would the consequences have been?” He answered, “It is all right as has turned out; but I recommend you still to have my orders for what you do.” This was a singular feature in the character of Lord Wellington.’ MacGrigor’s Autobiography, pp. 302-3 and 311.

[373] Salisbury MSS., 1835. Quoted in Sir Herbert Maxwell’s Wellington, ii. 194.

[374] Take, as a rare instance of recognition of this fact, his remark in 1828 that ‘When the Duke of Newcastle addressed to me a letter on the subject of forming an Administration, I treated him with contempt. No man likes to be treated with contempt. I was wrong.’ Ibid. ii. 213.

[375] For a record of such an interview by an eye-witness see Gronow’s Reminiscences, p. 66.

[376] Sir James MacGrigor’s Memoirs, pp. 304-5.

[377] He honourably mentioned Murray in his Oporto dispatch, and Tripp in his Waterloo dispatch! Both had behaved abominably.

[378] Take, for example, the case of Baring of the K. G. L. at Waterloo. In a dispatch, not written immediately after the battle (when accurate information might have been difficult to procure), but two months later, Wellesley says that La Haye Sainte was taken at two o’clock, ‘through the negligence of the officer who commanded the post.’ Yet if anything is certain, it is that Baring held out till six o’clock, that his nine companies of the K. G. L. kept back two whole French divisions, and that when he was driven out, the sole cause was that his ammunition was exhausted, and that no more could be sent him because the enemy had completely surrounded the post. If Wellington had taken any trouble about the ascertaining of the facts, he could not have failed to learn the truth.

[379] See especially his charming letters to his niece, Lady Burghersh, lately published.

[380] His relations with the other sex were numerous and unedifying. From his loveless and unwise marriage, made on a point of duty where affection had long vanished, down to his tedious ‘correspondence with Miss J.,’ there is nothing profitable to be discovered. See Greville’s Diaries [2nd Series], iii. 476.

[381] When we read Wellington’s interminable controversies with the Portuguese Regency and the Spanish Junta, we soon come to understand not merely the way in which they provoked him by their tortuous shuffling and their helpless procrastination, but still more the way in which he irritated them by his unveiled scorn, and his outspoken exposure of all their meannesses. A little more diplomatic language would have secured less friction, and probably better service.

[382] Monro to Beresford, April 15, and MacKinley’s inclosure from Vigo of April 16, 1809.

[383] Excluding troops that arrived at Lisbon just after Wellesley’s arrival.

[384] The 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, 14th and 16th Light Dragoons, with one squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the K. G. L., and two of the 20th Light Dragoons.

[385] The 2/9th, 1/45th, 29th, 5/60th and 97th.

[386] Of Wellesley’s twenty-one British battalions, ten were 2nd battalions, [of the 7th, 9th, 24th, 30th, 31st, 48th, 53rd, 66th, 83rd, 87th], two were single-battalion regiments [the 29th and 97th], three first battalions [of the 3rd, 45th and 88th], two Guards’ battalions [1st Coldstreams and 1st Scots Fusiliers], two ‘battalions of detachments,’ one a 3rd battalion (27th), one a 5th battalion [60th].

[387] These regiments were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 19th, raised respectively at Lisbon (1st, 4th, 10th, 16th), Estremoz (3rd), Setubal (7th), Peniche (13th), Villa Viciosa (15th), Cascaes (19th), Campomayor (20th), the 1st, 4th and 5th Cazadores, and 1st, 4th and 7th Cavalry.

[388] It is fair to the Portuguese to note that other witnesses of May 1809 speak much more favourably of them. Londonderry (i. p. 305) writes that ‘they had applied of late so much ardour to their military education that some were already fit to take the field, and it only required a little experience to put them on a level with the best troops in Europe. There was one brigade under General Campbell (the 4th and 10th regiments), which struck me as being in the finest possible order: it went through a variety of evolutions with a precision and correctness which would have done no discredit to our own army.’

[389] Wellington Dispatches, iv. 273-5, 276. To Castlereagh. Wellesley says that the plot will probably fail, and that even if the 2nd Corps mutinied, they would not carry away the other French armies, as Argenton hoped. He had therefore refused to commit himself to anything.

[390] Wellington Dispatches, ii. 306.

[391] The regiments were, giving their force present with the colours from the return of May5:—

[392] The Portuguese regiments were:—1st Foot [La Lippe] one batt., 3rd and 15th Foot [1st and 2nd of Olivenza] each one batt., 4th Foot [Freire] and 13th Foot [Peniche] two batts. each. 1st, 4th and 5th Cazadores, one batt. each. Five squadrons of the 4th and 7th cavalry. Total, 6,000 foot, 700 horse, and three field-batteries, about 7,100 men.

[393] Viz. 2/87th, 669 bayonets, 1/88th, 608 bayonets, five companies of the 5/60th, 306 bayonets.

[394] Two battalions each of the regiments nos. 7 (Setubal), 19 (Cascaes), and one of no. 1 (La Lippe), as far as I can ascertain, composed this force.

[Erratum from p. xii: I found in Lisbon that the regiments which marched with Beresford to Lamego were not (as I had supposed) nos. 7 and 19, but nos. 2 and 14, with the 4th cazadores. Those which joined from the direction of Almeida were two battalions of no. 11 (1st of Almeida) and one of no. 9.]

[395] Regiment, no. 1.

[396] Wilson had been removed by Beresford from his own Lusitanian Legion, and told to take up the command of the Brigade at Almeida: it was, apparently, with two battalions drawn from the garrison of that fortress that he now joined Beresford.

[397] Wellesley to Beresford, Coimbra, May 7. Wellington Dispatches, iv. 309.

[398] Ibid. iv. 320.

[399] Wellington Dispatches, iv. pp. 270, 281, 305.

[400] The whole force consisted of the following, present with the colours:—

With Lawson’s battery of 3-pounders, and Lane’s, Heyse’s, and Rettberg’s of 6-pounders. Allowing 600 each for the Portuguese battalions, the total comes to 16,213 infantry, 1,504 cavalry, and 550 gunners, also sixty-four men of the wagon train, and thirty-nine engineers. Total, 18,370.

[401] Wellington to Beresford, from Coimbra, May 7, 1809.

[402] He told Wellesley that the general was ‘a man of weak intellect,’ and that he thought that he had won him over to the plot from the way in which he received the news of it. Wellesley to Castlereagh, May 15, from Oporto.

[403] This may be perhaps inferred from Soult’s letter to King Joseph, written after the retreat, in which he says that he had intended to pack off Lahoussaye and Mermet from the front: ‘À cette Époque j’ai voulu faire partir ces gÉnÉraux, qui n’ont pas toujours fait ce qui Était de leur pouvoir pour le succÈs des opÉrations; mais j’ai prefÉrÉ attendre d’Être arrivÉ À Zamora, afin de ne pas accrÉditer les bruits d’intrigues et de conspirations qui eurent lieu À Oporto, auxquels ils n’ont pas certainement pris aucune part.’ [Intercepted letter in Record Office.]

[404] Soult so far managed to forget the whole business that he, two years later, sent the younger Lafitte to present to the Emperor the English flags captured at Albuera! [See St. Chamans, p. 133.]

[405] Most of this comes from Argenton’s confession to Wellesley on May 13. See Wellington Dispatches, iv. p. 339. He said that he slipped away from the gendarmes at the advice of Lafitte, who told him that his friends would come to no harm if the chief witness against them vanished.

[406] The extraordinary clemency shown to the conspirators by Soult, the providential escape of Argenton, the favours which the Marshal afterwards lavished on Lafitte, and the trouble which he took to hush up the whole matter, led many of his enemies to suspect that he himself had been in the plot, and had intended to combine his scheme for Portuguese kingship with a rising against Bonaparte at the head of his corps d’armÉe: Argenton’s confession made this impossible.

[407] For further details on Argenton’s fate, see the Appendix.

[408] 1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs and Hanoverian Chevaux-lÉgers.

[409] For details of this fatiguing night march and its gropings in the dark see Tomkinson’s (16th Dragoons) Diary, pp. 4-5, and Hawker’s (14th Light Dragoons) Journal, p. 47.

[410] The Light Dragoons, says Hawker (Journal, p. 48), ‘finding ourselves opposed by a heavy column of cavalry, retired a little.’ Their total loss was one officer and two men wounded, and one man missing. On this slender foundation Le Noble founds the following romance (p. 240). ‘Le gÉnÉral Franceschi charge À la tÊte de sa division ceux qui l’attaquent en front, renverse la premiÈre ligne, et tandis qu’elle se rÉtablit, se retire, et fond avec 6 piÈces et deux rÉgiments sur la colonne qui le tournait par sa droite. L’ennemi est culbutÉ, la colonne recule, et le gÉnÉral se retire sur Oliveira avec quelques prisonniers.’ All this fuss produced four casualties in the two English regiments. See official report of casualties for May 10, 1809.

[411] Hawker, pp. 49-50. Tomkinson has words to much the same effect, ‘it was more like a field-day than an affair with the enemy: all the shots went over our heads, and no accident appeared to happen to any one’ (p. 6).

[412] The best account of this little skirmish is in the Journal of Fantin des Odoards of the 31st LÉger (p. 230). Napier does not mention that the reason why Hill did not move in the afternoon was simply that he was already ‘contained,’ and engaged with a force of French infantry of nearly his own strength.

[413] Wellesley to Mackenzie [the latter had written that he dared not trust his Portuguese battalions], Wellington Dispatches, iv. p. 350.

[414] See Fantin des Odoards. Le Noble (incorrect as always) says that the 47th brought up the rear.

[415] There are two excellent accounts of this charge in the diaries of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons and Fantin des Odoards of the 31st LÉger. The former (pp. 9-11) holds that the charge was indefensible, and blames Charles Stewart for ordering it, and Major Blake for carrying it out. A different impression is received from the French diarist, who speaks of it as a complete rout of his regiment and very disastrous. ‘Assaillis en dÉtail nous avons ÉtÉ facilement mis en dÉsordre, attendu notre morcellement et la confusion que des charges audacieuses de cavalerie mettaient dans nos rangs. Les trois bataillons ont lÂchÉ pied et se sont enfuis À vau de route. Si le pays n’avait pas offert des murs, des fossÉs et des haies, ils auraient ÉtÉ entiÈrement sabrÉs.... Peu À peu les dÉbris du rÉgiment se sont ralliÉs a la division, qui Était en position À une lieue de Porto. Notre perte a ÉtÉ considÉrable, mais notre aigle, qui a couru de grands dangers dans cette bagarre, a fort heureusement ÉtÉ sauvÉe.... Les dragons Étaient acharnÉs a nous poursuivre, et mal a pris ceux qui au lieu de gagner les collines out suivi le vallon et la grande route’ (p. 231). It seems probable (a thing extremely rare in military history) that Tomkinson and Des Odoards, the two best narrators of the fight, actually met each other. The former mentions that he chased an isolated French infantry man, fired his pistol at his head, but missed, and that he was at once shot in the shoulder by another Frenchman and disabled. Then turning back, he was again fired at by several men and brought down. Des Odoards says that he was chased by a single English dragoon, who got up to him, fired at him point blank and missed, whereupon a corporal of his company, who had turned back to help him, shot the dragoon, who dropped his smoking pistol at Des Odoards’ feet, and rolled off his horse. The narratives seem to tally perfectly.

[416] The officers killed were Captain Detmering of the 1st K. G. L., and a Portuguese ensign of the I/16th. Those wounded were Captain Ovens and Lieutenant Woodgate of the 1st Battalion of Detachments, Lieutenants Lodders and Lahngren of the K. G. L., Cornet Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a Portuguese lieutenant of the 1/16th. It would seem that some of the fourteen ‘missing’ were infantry killed in the woods, whose bodies were never found, but several belonged to the maltreated dragoon squadrons, and were taken from having pursued too fast and far.

[417] 1st and 2nd Line battalions of the K.G.L., also a detached company of rifles of the K.G.L.

[418] Lane’s and Lawson’s British guns, and one K.G.L., battery.

[419] Soult’s doings on this day are best told by his aide-de-camp St. Chamans, who was with him all the morning. No attention need be paid to the narrative of his panegyrist Le Noble, who tells a foolish story to the effect that a commandant Salel came at six o’clock (more than four hours before the Buffs began to pass), and assured some of Soult’s staff that the English were already crossing the river. ‘On hearing this,’ says Le Noble, ‘the Marshal sent for Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, and asked if there was any truth in the rumour. The latter denied it and Soult was reassured. If only Salel had been believed, all the English who had then passed might have been killed or captured,’ and a disaster avoided. As a matter of fact Quesnel was right, and not a British soldier had yet crossed [Campagne de Galice, p. 247].

[421] Viz. 1/3rd, fifty men, 2/48th, seventeen men, 2/66th, ten men, killed and wounded. The French 17th alone lost 177 [Foy’s Dispatch].

[422] All this is well described by Leslie of the 29th (p. 113), Stothert of the Scots Fusilier Guards (p. 41), and Cooper of the 2/7th, who crossed later.

[423] Leslie, ibid.

[424] So Hawker of that regiment, who took part in the charge, and describes it well. In Wellesley’s dispatch, two squadrons are wrongly named.

[425] The best account of this charge is the diary of Hawker; it runs as follows: ‘After going at full speed, enveloped in a cloud of dust for nearly two miles, we cleared our infantry, and that of the French appeared. A strong body was drawn up in close column, with bayonets ready to receive us on their front. On each side of the road was a stone wall, bordered outwardly with trees. On our left, in particular, numbers of the French were posted with their pieces resting on the wall, which flanked the road, ready to give us a running fire as we passed. This could not but be effectual, as our men (in threes) were close to the muzzles of their muskets, and barely out of the reach of a coup de sabre. In a few seconds the ground was covered with our men and horses. Notwithstanding this we penetrated the battalion in the road, the men of which, relying on their bayonets, did not give way till we were close upon them, when they fled in confusion. For some time the contest was kept up hand to hand. After many efforts we succeeded in cutting off 300, of whom most were secured as prisoners. But our loss was very considerable. Of fifty-two men in the leading troop ten were killed, and eleven severely wounded (besides others slightly), and six taken prisoners.’ (Of the last all save one succeeded in slipping off and got back.) Out of four officers engaged three were wounded: Hervey, the major in command, lost an arm. Foy called the attack ‘une charge incroyable.’

[426] Fantin des Odoards (p. 233) says that the French left 1,800 men in the hospitals. This is probably a little too high an estimate: there were only 2,150 French sick in Braga, Viana, and Oporto on May 10—five-sixths of them at Oporto. But many convalescents had marched with Mermet early on the eleventh. Wellington in his first dispatch merely says that he had taken 700 sick in the hospitals. But three days later, in a letter to Admiral Berkeley, he writes that he has 2,000 sick, wounded and captured French in his hands, and must send them to England at once (Wellington Dispatches, iv. 337). He therefore asks for shipping for them at the rate of two tons per man. Allowing for 300 unwounded prisoners at Oporto, and 100 at Grijon, there remain 1,500, or somewhat more, for the men in hospital.

[427] See Le Noble, Campagne de Galice, pp. 250-2.

[428] Loison reported to Soult that he lost only a chef de bataillon and eighty men, but that the horses of himself and Generals Heudelet and Maransin were killed under them. The figures given are probably an understatement.

[429] The British brigade of Tilson was to have led the attack. They were burning for a fight. ‘I never witnessed so much enthusiasm,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘as was shown by the men. The advance was a perfect trot, but on our arrival we found the enemy had fled.’ (From an unpublished letter of Lord Gough, then colonel of the 87th regiment, which has been placed at my disposal by the kindness of Mr. R. Rait of New College, who is preparing a life of that officer.)

[430] ‘Un de ces Navarrins, qui vont tous les ans en Portugal parcourir les villages pour y couper les cochons qu’on veut engraisser,’ says Le Noble [p. 254]. ‘Une espÈce de contrebandier que le gÉnÉral Dulauloi avait trouvÉ,’ says St. Chamans, Soult’s aide-de-camp (p. 147).

[431] Several of the French diarists relate this curious incident. ‘L’argent blanc ne tentait personne,’ says Fantin des Odoards, p. 234, ‘À cause de sa pesanteur et de son inutilitÉ momentaire. On permit le pillage des fourgons du payeur, et chose inouÏe, il n’y fut presque pas touchÉ. Les soldats regardaient en passant les sacs, secouaient la tÊte et s’Éloignaient sans y mettre la main. Pour moi, je m’emparai d’un sac de 2,400 francs; cette lourde somme m’embarassait: elle aurait blessÉ mon cheval, et aprÈs l’avoir portÉe pendant une lieue je l’abandonnai’ [p. 234]. ‘Les grenadiers du 70^e servaient d’escorte au trÉsor,’ says Le Noble, ‘l’intendant-gÉnÉral les invita de prendre des fonds. Ayant rencontrÉ leur officier, le lieutenant Langlois, À Toro, il lui demanda ce qu’avaient pu emporter ses soldats. “Rien,” rÉpliqua-t-il, “ils portaient la caisse À tour de rÔle pour quelque distance, et la jetÈrent ensuite.”’ Naylies also mentions the dispersion of the treasure. The reader will compare this incident with the rolling of Moore’s treasure down the cliffs of Herrerias during the Corunna retreat. Soult certainly scattered his cash more widely.

[432] When the troops got at the wine they drank only too well: Hartmann in his Journal records that twenty of his German Legion gunners drank forty-one bottles of port at a sitting (p. 71).

[433] Wellington Dispatches, iv. 327. To Marshal Beresford, from Oporto, night of the twelfth.

[434] A Captain Mellish, Wellington Dispatches, iv. 330 [to Murray] and 332 [to Beresford].

[435] Deposition of the Secretary to the late Governor of Oporto. Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, vi. 262 [May 13, afternoon].

[436] Wellington Dispatches, iv. 330, afternoon of May 13.

[437] Ibid. iv. 332, morning of May 14.

[438] It is astonishing to find that Murray succeeded in taking two light three-pounder guns over this difficult path. The fact reflects great credit on his gunners.

[439] The state of Amarante was dreadful. ‘I was never witness to such a scene of misery and horror as here presented itself,’ says Lord Gough in an unpublished letter to his father. ‘Every house and public building of every description, with the exception of a monastery which covered the passage of the bridge, a chapel, and about five detached houses, was burnt to the ground, with many of the late inhabitants lying dead in the streets.’

[440] The best testimony to Beresford’s good conduct is that Wellesley (Wellington Dispatches, iv. 343) says that he had exactly anticipated the instructions sent him, and carried them out on his own initiative. Napier’s criticism (ii. 116-7) is unfair and misleading.

[441] The best account of Beresford’s forced march is to be found in the unpublished letter of Lord Gough (then major of the 87th) which, as I have already mentioned, has been shown me by Mr. R. Rait of New College. He says: ‘The business of crossing the river took the Brigade (Tilson’s) four hours: the evening set in with a most dreadful fall of rain, which continued all night, and the next three days and nights. Our road lay over almost impassable mountains, made more so by the rain that swelled the mountain rivulets into rivers. In the dark many men lost the column, several fell into pits excavated by the falling water: many lay down in the road from fatigue and hunger, and the greater part lost their shoes.... Next day we pursued our melancholy march at five o’clock, the men nearly fainting with hunger: about twelve we fell in with some cars of bread belonging to a Portuguese division, which Gen. Tilson pressed for the men; this (with some wine) enabled us to proceed, and that night at twelve we reached Chaves, after a forced march of three days, with only twelve hours’ halt. The men were without a shoe to their feet, and hundreds fallen out from fatigue and hunger.... The 88th had, of 700 with which they joined us, only 150 in the ranks.... Part of the officers and nearly all the men had their feet cut to the bone for want of shoes.’

[442] The brigade had a company of the 5/60th attached, so had three instead of two light companies.

[443] ‘Il y avait À l’arriÈre-garde un excellent rÉgiment d’infanterie lÉgÈre, qui (vu la nature du terrain) pouvait facilement braver une armÉe entiÈre: et bien, À l’apparition de l’ennemi, il s’est dÉbandÉ sans qu’on ait pu lui faire entendre raison. La confusion qui a ÉtÉ le rÉsultat de cette terreur panique a ÉtÉ Épouvantable. Fantassins et cavaliers se prÉcipitaient les uns sur les autres, jetaient leurs armes, et luttaient À qui courrait le plus vite. Le pont Étroit et sans parapet ne pouvait suffire À l’impatience des fuyards, ils se pressaient tellement que nombre d’hommes furent prÉcipitÉs et noyÉs dans le torrent ou ÉcrasÉs sous les pieds des chevaux. Si les Anglais avaient ÉtÉ en mesure de profiter de cette Épouvante, je ne sais pas en vÉritÉ ce que nous serions devenus, tant la peur est contagieuse, mÊme chez les plus braves soldats.’ Fantin des Odoards, p. 236.

[444] Lord Munster’s Campaign of 1809, pp. 177-8.

[445] The French rearguard actually saw Silveira arriving. Naylies, p. 90.

[446] For this part of the pursuit see the diary of Hawker [of the 14th Light Dragoons], who returned to Montalegre with Silveira’s men.

[447] These details are mainly from the letter of Gough of the 87th, which I have already had occasion to quote, when dealing with Beresford’s movements. I cannot find any corroboration for Napier’s account of Beresford’s and Silveira’s pursuit in ii. pp. 112-3 of his history.

[448] See mainly Le Noble’s calculation on pp. 353-4 of his Campagne de 1809.

[449] The rest of Silveira’s prisoners were Hispano-Portuguese ‘legionaries,’ see p. 266.

[450] Napier (ii. 113) says, ‘1,800 at Viana and Braga, 700 at Oporto,’ figures that should be reversed, for at the two last places only the sick of Heudelet’s and Lorges’ divisions were captured, while at Oporto the main central hospital fell into the hands of the British. Le Noble says that there were 2,150 men in hospital altogether on May 10.

[451] See p. 341.

[452] The respective distances seem to be about 255 and 120 miles.

[453] Napier, ii. 113.

[454] See p. 321.

[455] ‘In respect to Soult, I shall omit nothing that I can do to destroy him—but I am afraid that with the force I have at my disposal, it is not in my power to prevent him retreating into Spain.’ Wellesley to Frere, May 9, 1809.

[456] From Montalegre, May 18, 1809.

[457] i.e. its sick and wounded.

[458] Napier, Arteche, and Schepeler all agree in this, the former only making the excuse that Silveira may not have fully understood Beresford’s orders, owing to the difficulty of language. But Beresford spoke and wrote Portuguese fluently.

[459] See p. 192.

[460] Napoleon to Ney, from Paris, Feb. 18, 1809.

[461] ‘Ne comptez sur aucun renfort: croyez plutÔt qu’on pourrait Être dans le cas de porter ailleurs une de vos divisions.’

[462] Acevedo’s division, deducting the regular troops [Hibernia (two batts.), and Provincial of Oviedo], had some 6,000 men: while 5,200 remained behind in Asturias. See pp. 632 and 637 of vol. i.

[463] Apparently consisting in February of three battalions and a Spanish Legion which Napoleon had organized out of the prisoners of Blake’s and La Romana’s armies: 2,998 men in all. The Legion waited till it had received arms and clothing, and then deserted en masse and went to join the insurgents. For angry correspondence on this incident see Napoleon to King Joseph, Feb. 20, and King Joseph to Napoleon, March 7, 1809.

[464] The total of French troops in Old Castile, garrisoning Valladolid, Soria, Palencia, and Burgos, &c., was only 5,342 men. Nothing was disposable for field operations save Kellermann’s division of dragoons. In Biscay, behind Bonnet, there were only 1,762 men, and in Alava 876. Practically nothing could have been sent to reinforce Leon or Santander, till Mortier’s corps came up.

[465] For this fiasco see Toreno, i. pp. 400-1.

[466] These dispositions of the Asturian army, which have never before been published, are taken from a dispatch from the Junta at Oviedo, which Mr. Frere sent to Lord Castlereagh on March 24 [Record Office]. The regiments were:—

• At Colombres, under Maj.-General F. Ballasteros:
• Luanco, Castropol, Navia, Luarca, Villaviciosa, Llanes, Cangas de OÑis, Cangas de Tineo, Don Carlos.
• At Pajares and Farna, under Brigadier Don Christoval Lili:
• Siero, Provincial of Oviedo, Covadonga.
• At La Mesa, under Brigadier Don F. Manglano:
• Riva de Sella, Pravia.
• At Castropol, under Colonel T. Valdez:
• Lena, Grado, Salas, Ferdinando VII.
• At Oviedo, under Lieut.-General Worster:
• Gijon, Infiesto.

The Junta report that they have over 20,000 men, the regiments being very strong, some of them reaching 1,200 bayonets, or even more.

[467] Carrol to La Romana, March 28, ‘The Junta, in fact, command the armies in every respect. They have absolute power, and have rendered themselves highly obnoxious to the people of the province, and are at present entirely guided by the will and caprice of three or four individuals...’

[468] Such also was the opinion of Captain Carrol, the British representative at Oviedo. He writes to Castlereagh on Feb. 10 in the following terms: ‘I am sorry to have to represent that the supplies hitherto granted to this province have not been applied (to use the mildest expressions) with that judgment and economy that might have been expected, and that the benefits resulting to this province and the common cause are by no means proportionate to the liberality with which those supplies were granted by the British Government’ [Record Office]. Toreno, as a patriotic Asturian, hushes up all these scandals.

[469] The number of unwounded prisoners was 574, that of killed and wounded nearly 700.

[470] The captives were sent off immediately into the Asturias. Carrol saw them arrive at Oviedo.

[471] There is a long dispatch of Mendizabal to La Romana in the Record Office, giving details of the storm of Villafranca, which was all over in four hours.

[472] Captain Carrol had written to him a few days before to beg him to hasten to Oviedo: ‘I strongly advise your Excellency’s repairing to this city (Oviedo), and adopting such plans and measures for the better government of the province and the active operations of the army as your Excellency shall think meet.’ There were similar appeals from Spanish officers discontented with the Junta.

[473] It may be worth while to quote the opening clauses of La Romana’s proclamation explaining his coup d’État; it is dated the day after his ‘purge’ of the Junta: a copy exists in the Record Office, forwarded to Castlereagh by Carrol:—‘Me es forzoso manifestar con mucho sentimiento que la actual Junta de Asturias, aunque de las mas favorecidas por la generosidad britannica en toda classe de subsidios, es la que menos ha coadyuvado a la grande y heroyca empresa de arrojar a los enemigos de nuestro patrio suelo. Formada esta Junta por intriga, y por la prepotencia de algunos sugetos y familias conexionadas, se propuse arrogarse un poder absoluto e indefinido: serven los individuos mutuamente en sus proyectos y despiques, desechan con pretextos infundidos y aun calumniosos al que no subscribiese a ellos, y contentan a los menesterosos con comisiones o encargos de interes,’ &c.

[474] Carrol, who was an eye-witness of the scene, thought that the Marquis ‘had re-formed the Junta in the most quiet, peaceable and masterly manner.’ The last epithet seems the most appropriate of the three. Carrol to Castlereagh, April 10, 1809 [in Record Office].

[475] Letters of La Romana to Mahy in Appendix to Arteche, vol. vi. p. 145.

[476] Ibid., p. 146.

[477] Napoleon to Joseph, from Paris, April 10, 1809.

[478] For details concerning the composition of this expedition see Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 196.

[479] The force that marched on the Asturias was composed of the 25th LÉger, 27th and 59th of Maurice Mathieu’s division, the 39th from Marchand’s, the 3rd Hussars, and 25th Dragoons.

Maucune’s detachment consisted of two battalions each of the 6th LÉger and the 76th, with the 15th Chasseurs and one battery.

Fournier’s detachment was composed of the 15th Dragoons, two battalions of the 69th, and one of the 76th.

[480] Carrol gives an excellent account of the French invasion in a long dispatch written from Vigo on June 3. He says that the Marquis only heard of Ney’s approach by the peasants flying from Cangas de Tineo on the morning of May 17. He himself was sent out to verify the incredible information, and came on the French as they were crossing the Navia, only thirty miles from Oviedo. He rode back in haste, and met one Asturian battalion coming up, and afterwards the regiment of La Princesa. Romana had no other troops, and only a few hundred half-armed peasantry joined in the defence of the bridge of Gallegos.

[481] ‘Ce dernier pont de Gallegos fut assez bien dÉfendu par le rÉgiment de la Princesse, mais nÉanmoins il fut enlevÉ, ainsi qu’une piÈce de douze.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21.

[482] ‘Les magasins et les plus riches maisons de la ville furent pillÉs par les paysans et la populace. Ces malheureux, ivres d’eau-de-vie, entreprirent de dÉfendre la ville et firent feu dans toutes les rues.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21.

[483] They were called the Pique and the Plutus. Carrol was nearly captured while burning the latter, and escaped in an open boat.

[484] The 116th and 117th of Morlot’s division.

[485] The plain from which Santiago gets its name of Santiago de Compostella.

[486] All this may be studied in two dispatches of Bonnet to King Joseph, dated Santander, June 12 and June 20.

[487] The phrase occurs in a dispatch of Jourdan’s written in August.

[488] There is clear evidence of this quarrel in the diaries and memoirs of the officers of both corps. ‘Nous fÛmes d’abord bien reÇus À Lugo’—writes Soult’s aide-de-camp St. Chamans—‘mais le MarÉchal Ney Étant arrivÉ, les choses changÈrent de face, et on eÛt dit que nous n’Étions plus un corps franÇais: tout nous Était refusÉ: mÊme nos malades mouraient en foule dans les hÔpitaux, faute d’aliments: car tout Était rÉservÉ, par les ordres de Ney, pour son corps d’armÉe, et on peut bien dire qu’on nous traita de Turc en Maure’ (p. 150). Des Odoards is equally precise: ‘Une fÂcheuse mÉsintelligence a ÉclatÉ entre les troupes de Ney et les nÔtres: les duels sont survenus, et peu s’en est fallu qu’oubliant que nous sommes, les uns et les autres, enfants de la France, il n’y ait eu engagement gÉnÉral. Le non-succÈs de notre entreprise, l’État de dÉlabrement de notre tenue, out servi de texte aux mauvaises plaisanteries, aux propos outrageants, dont des scÈnes sanguinaires ont ÉtÉ la suite. Les soldats seuls ont d’abord pris part À ces rixes, puis elles ont gagnÉ les officiers, et s’il faut croire certain bruits, les marÉchaux ont eu eux-mÊmes une entrevue fort orageuse’ (p. 240). According to the common report this ‘stormy interview’ actually ended in Ney’s drawing his sword upon Soult, and being only prevented by General Maurice Mathieu from assailing him. This tale was told to Captain Boothby (see his Memoirs, ii. p. 31) by a French officer who said that he had been an eye-witness of the scene.

[489] ‘Il se sÉpara de Ney, avec lequel il eÛt l’air d’arrÊter, pour la conservation de la Galice, un plan de campagne auquel tous les deux Étaient, je crois, rÉsolus d’avance de ne pas se conformer, car ils voulaient le moins possible se trouver ensemble.’ St. Chamans (p. 151). This represents the view of Soult’s staff.

[490] La Romana (June 1, in the Record Office) gives present at Orense 9,633 men—of whom 7,094 were old soldiers, including 381 cavalry and 379 artillery.

[491] Carrol to Castlereagh, from Vigo, June 11.

[492] For some notes concerning NoroÑa’s character see Arteche, vi. 188.

[493] Carrol, writing from Vigo two days later, says that the French infantry ‘seemed determined at any risk to cross the water at low tide,’ that they came on very boldly, but could not face the fire, and finally gave back.

[494] Carrol, in the letter just quoted, says that thirty-nine dead bodies were left before the bridge-head of Caldelas, which the French could not carry off because of the hot fire that played upon the spot. He estimates the French total loss at 300, while that of NoroÑa was only 111.

[495] ‘I have been assured,’ says Napier (ii. 127), ‘by an officer of Ney’s personal staff [Col. D’EsmÉnard] that he rashly concluded that personal feelings had swayed Soult to betray the 6th Corps. In this error he returned in wrath to Corunna.’ But was his conclusion rash, or wrong?

[496] Le Noble, p. 280.

[497] Fantin des Odoards, p. 242.

[498] ‘Le MarÉchal crut, ou feignit de croire, que Ney avait changÉ d’idÉe,’ says his aide-de-camp St. Chamans, p. 151.

[499] La Romana writes to Carrol from Orense, on June 9, to say that he had been intending to march by cross-roads to fall on Ney’s flank, and so aid the division of NoroÑa. But Soult’s appearance at Monforte with 12,000 men [an under-estimate] compels him to remain behind to observe that marshal [Record Office].

[500] Carrol was with this party. He had come out from Vigo to join La Romana, was at La Gudina on June 16, and retreated to Monterey when Franceschi attacked that point. The Marquis turned back when he saw Franceschi move off eastward, and retired to his old head quarters at Orense. If Soult had pushed westward, the Spaniards had the choice between the road to Chaves and that back to Orense, and were in no danger.

[501] ‘Il (Ney) m’engageait À rester en Galice, et me reprÉsentait qu’il pourrait rÉsulter pour lui de fÂcheuses consÉquences si j’en sortais. Cette proposition m’Étonna: il me parut que M. le MarÉchal Ney se conduisait À m’obliger À rester en Galice: car certainement rien ne l’empÊchait de manoeuvrer sur Orense, tandis que moi-mÊme j’agissais contre La Romana.... Je me crus encore plus obligÉ qu’auparavant de suivre mon premier projet.’ Soult to Joseph, June 25.

[502] On reaching Zamora, Franceschi handed over the charge of his division to General Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, and rode on towards Madrid with no escort but two aides-de-camp. They were captured near Toro by the celebrated guerrilla chief El Capuchino (Fray Juan Delica), who sent the important dispatches which they were bearing to Seville: Frere instantly forwarded a copy to Wellesley (July 9), who thus got invaluable information as to Soult’s situation and future intentions. In the Record Office there is a letter requesting that the news of Franceschi’s captivity may be sent to his wife in Paris, which was duly done. The unfortunate general was imprisoned first at Granada and then at Cartagena: in both places, it is said, he was treated with unjustifiable rigour, and kept in close confinement within four walls—it was the same usage that Napoleon meted out to Palafox. He died of a fever in 1811, after two years’ captivity.

[503] There is so much valuable information in these dispatches of Soult, dated June 25, from Puebla de Senabria, that I have printed the most important paragraphs as an Appendix—omitting the lengthy narrative of the operations on the Sil and the Bibey in which the Marshal vainly flattered himself that he had dispersed the armies of La Romana and ‘Chavarria’ (i.e. Echevarria).

[504] See sect. xi. chap. i. pp. 101-2.

[505] Toreno gives some curious details about the surrender of Jaca, which he says was largely due to the intrigues of a friar named JosÉ de Consolation, who preached resignation and submission to God’s will in such moving terms that the greater part of the garrison deserted! He was afterwards found to have been an agent of the French. The Central Junta sent the Governor Campos, the Corregidor ArcÓn, and the officers commanding the artillery and engineers before a court-martial, which condemned them all to death. Only the engineer was caught (he had openly joined the French) and shot. [Arteche, vi. p. 10.]

[506] Only the single regiment, America, whose cadre, sent back by Infantado from Cuenca, was being filled up with recruits from the Morella district. [Junot to King Joseph, from Saragossa, March 25.]

[507] See Joseph’s letter of April 6, and the Emperor’s orders, from Paris, of April 5 and April 10.

[508] See p. 378.

[509] See p. 378.

[510] It consisted of eight compagnies d’Élite, viz. the voltigeur companies of the 14th Line, and the 2nd of the Vistula, and the grenadier and voltigeur companies of the 116th of the Line, with half a squadron of the 13th Cuirassiers. [Von Brandt, p. 62.]

[511] This little campaign can be studied in detail in Von Brandt, pp. 60-8. He was serving as lieutenant in the 2nd of the Vistula, and gives many details which are not to be found in Suchet or Arteche. Toreno would seem (ii. 10) to be wrong in saying that Habert tried to storm Monzon, and got over the river there, but was beaten back by Baget. Von Brandt says that there was nothing but a hot fire across the water, and that the attack could not be pushed home.

[512] It is necessary to enter a protest against Napier’s statement (vol. ii. p. 252), that Valencia did not do its fair share in defending the general cause of Spain—that ‘from the very commencement of the insurrection its policy was characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of the country.’ The contribution of Valencia to the national armies raised in 1808-9, compares well with that of the other provinces. These troops, too, were not used for local defence, but employed in other parts of Spain. ArgÜelles’ answer to Napier on this point seems conclusive: (see the Appendix-volume of his Observaciones, &c.). The troops sent out by Valencia were:—

These figures are exclusive of cavalry and artillery, and in some cases are under-estimated, as no morning-states of the troops survive for the earlier months of the campaign of 1808, and these totals are taken from returns made late in the year, when the regiments had begun to run low in numbers. For the enormous monetary contribution made by Valencia in 1808-9, see the tables in ArgÜelles.

[514] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, and 121st of the line were all formed from the ‘Provisional Regiments’ of 1808.

[515] Suchet’s MÉmoires. i. p. 11.

[516] ‘Le 3^me corps avait beaucoup souffert au siÈge de Saragosse. L’infanterie Était considÉrablement affaiblie: les rÉgiments de nouvelle formation surtout se trouvaient dans un État dÉplorable, par les vices insÉparables d’une organisation rÉcente et prÉcipitÉe.... Des habits blancs bleus et de formes diffÉrentes, restes choquants de divers changements dans l’habillement, occasionnaient dans les rangs une bigarrure qui achevait d’enlever À des soldats dÉjÀ faibles et abattus toute idÉe de considÉration militaire. L’apparence de la misÈre les dÉgradait À leurs propres yeux ... Dans un État voisin du dÉcouragement, cette armÉe Était loin de compenser par sa force morale le danger de sa faiblesse numÉrique.’ Suchet, p. 16.

Von Brandt speaks to much the same effect, and says that some of the troops gave a bad impression, and that he saw battalions which looked as if they would not stand firm against a sudden and fierce attack, such as that which Mina and his guerrillas used to deliver [p. 61].

[517] From a casual reading of Suchet, i. 17-21, it might be thought that the general had been joined by Habert before the battle. But he certainly was not, as the Memoirs of Von Brandt, who was with Habert, show that this brigade was at Villafranca, forty miles from AlcaÑiz, on the twenty-third, and only started (too late) to join its chief on the twenty-fourth. The mention of the 2nd of the Vistula on p. 21 of Suchet is a misprint for the 3rd of the Vistula of Musnier’s division. Half the 13th Cuirassiers was also absent with Habert.

[518] According to Suchet’s own figures from his May 15 return, the forces engaged must have been:—

[519] The Spanish line-of-battle was as follows:—

[520] Napier, for example, following French sources, gives Blake 12,000 men.

[521] Three battalions of the 114th of the Line, and two of the 1st of the Vistula.

[522] Suchet gives a very poor account of AlcaÑiz in his MÉmoires. In spite of his many merits, he did not take a beating well, and slurs over this action, just as in 1812 he slurs over his defeat at Castalla. He does not even give an estimate of his killed and wounded, and has the assurance to say that he left the enemy only ‘l’opinion de la victoire’ (i. 20). Blake clearly makes too much of the French attack on his right in his dispatch.

[523] Suchet, MÉmoires, p. 20.

[524] The drafts were so large that the troops of Lazan’s division, which had numbered 3,979 in May, were 5,679 in June, those of Roca rose similarly from 3,449 to 5,525. The Valencian Junta claimed to have sent in all 11,881 men to reinforce Blake, and the returns bear them out. They also gave him 2,000,000 reals in cash—about £22,000—raised by a special contribution in fifteen days. Their report says that they had sent on every armed man in the province, and that the city was only guarded by peasants armed with pikes. (ArgÜelles.)

[525] Suchet, MÉmoires, p. 23.

[526] Von Brandt, Aus meinem Leben, i. 67.

[527] 44th of the Line, 1,069 bayonets, and 3rd of the Vistula, 964 bayonets, according to Suchet’s figures.

[528] Apparently a battalion of the 121st of the Line, the rest of which regiment was still in Navarre.

[529] The battalion of the 5th LÉger belonged to Morlot’s division, the rest of which was dispersed in Navarre or absent: that of the 64th was one which Suchet had brought from Valladolid as his personal escort, and which properly belonged to the 5th Corps.

[530] Suchet says the morning was occupied in mere ‘tiraillement’ of the Spanish skirmishers and the 2nd of the Vistula. This is not borne out by the narrative of Von Brandt, of that corps. He says that the enemy came on ‘sehr lebhaft,’ that both battalions of his regiment were deeply engaged, that a regiment of Spanish dragoons in yellow [he calls it Numancia, but it was really Olivenza] charged into the skirmishing-line and nearly broke it. The 2nd of the Vistula used up all its cartridges, and lost ground. ‘Die KavalleriezÜge wurden jedoch jedesmal zurÜckgewiesen, aber nichtsdestoweniger verloren wir allmÄhlich Terrain.’ The Spaniards were only driven off by a battery being drawn forward into the fighting-line. Then the fight stood still, but the regiment had suffered very heavily, and was finally drawn back and put into the reserve. (Aus meinem Leben, pp. 71-2.)

[531] The 2nd of the Vistula having been distracted to the centre, Habert had only the two battalions of the 14th of the Line, and one of the 5th LÉger from the reserve.

[532] ‘Ihr RÜckzug geschah in aller Ordnung und militÄrischer Haltung. Sie lagerten in der Nacht uns gegenÜber, und hielten am anderen Morgen die HÖhen von Botorrita ganz in der NÄhe des Schlachtfeldes.’ [Von Brandt, i. 73.]

[533] Suchet (i. 24) says that Blake had been reinforced by 4,000 Valencians, when he fought at Belchite. This seems to have been an error, his reinforcement being Areizaga’s 6,000 men picked up at Botorrita, who were all Aragonese.

[534] He had twenty-two battalions and eight squadrons at Belchite (as he says himself, MÉmoires, i. p. 34), while at Maria he had only fourteen battalions and seven squadrons.

[535] Certainly on reading Suchet’s report one would not be inclined to think that the whole matter was such a disgraceful rout as Von Brandt (i. 74-5) describes in the above paragraphs.

[536] MÉmoires, p. 36.

[537] Morlot’s division had been handed over to Habert, who resigned his brigade of Laval’s division to the Polish colonel Chlopicki.

[538] See p. 292.

[539] See the letter to Colonel Bourke, Wellington Dispatches, iv. 390-400.

[540] Napier (ii. 149) calls this alternative plan of campaign ‘a movement in conjunction with Beresford, del Parque, and Romana by Salamanca.’ This is a most inappropriate description of it: about June 10, when operations might have commenced, Del Parque’s army did not yet exist. There were only three or four of Carlos d’EspaÑa’s battalions at or near Rodrigo. La Romana, on the other hand, was at Orense facing Soult, and could not have reached Almeida or Rodrigo for weeks after the campaign would have begun.

[541] See the ‘Memorandum for Lieut.-Col. Bourke’ in Wellington Dispatches, iv. 372-3.

[542] Wellesley to Mackenzie, from San Tyrso, May 21.

[543] Compare the two dispatches of Victor to Jourdan of April 25 (acknowledging the receipt of Lapisse’s division) and of May 21.

[544] See King Joseph to Napoleon, of the dates April 22 and May 24, 1809.

[545] Compare Victor to Jourdan of May 21, with the account of the combat in Appendix I of Mayne and Lillie’s Lusitanian Legion.

[546] The exact losses of the L. L. L. were—killed, three officers and 103 rank and file; wounded, five officers and 143 rank and file; missing, fifteen rank and file. Of the Idanha militia, Mayne returned the whole as missing next morning.

[547] See Wellesley to Mackenzie, May 21, and also Wellesley to Frere on the same day. Wellington Dispatches, iv. 350-1.

[548] See Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 190.

[549] A move by which he flattered himself that he would not only ‘inquiÉter les Anglais,’ but also ‘dÉgager le duc de Dalmatie,’ an end which no raid with 8,000 or 10,000 men to Castello Branco could possibly have accomplished. Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

[550] He suggests in a letter of June 8, that Mortier’s corps should be brought up to Plasencia to help him. But this was wholly impracticable.

[551] Victor to Jourdan, from Torremocha, May 24.

[552] Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

[553] Jourdan to Victor, June 1.

[554] Victor to Jourdan, June 8. Oddly enough he was wrong in his statement by two days, for Mayne blew up the bridge on the tenth only.

[555] June 10, Joseph to Napoleon.

[556] Cf. Joseph’s letters of June 10 and June 16 to Napoleon: but there seems to be much vacillation in his decisions.

[557] Cuesta’s replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and June 6, i.e. ten and eight days respectively before Victor began his retreat beyond the Tagus on June 14.

[558] Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [Wellington Dispatches, iv. 402]: ‘At all events these two detachments on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak to produce any great effect upon the movements of Victor.... I think it would be nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the passage [of the Tagus] with a part only of his force, while with the other part he would beat one or both of the detachments sent round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been sent from La Serena toward Talavera, being between the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.’ Wellesley also points out that it is useless to expect that Victor would wait in his present cantonments: at the first news of the approach of the British army he will retire to Almaraz and Arzobispo.

[559] I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to Bourke, regarding Cuesta’s three plans of campaign.

[560] Wellesley to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14.

[561] Wellesley to Cuesta, from Abrantes, June 14.

[562] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abrantes, June 17. The real cause of Cuesta’s angry and impracticable attitude will be shown in the next chapter.

[563] Wellesley to Frere from the same place, June 14.

[564] With regard to these regiments [5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th], Wellesley writes in very bitter terms to Donkin on June 16, saying that the number of their stragglers was scandalous, and that the laggards were committing all manner of disorders in the rear of the army. It is fair to remember that the battalions had suffered exceptional hardships, as may be seen from the narratives of Gough of the 87th, and Grattan of the 88th.

[565] The main convoy only reached Abrantes when Wellesley had advanced to Plasencia, in Spain. See letter to the officer commanding Artillery at Castello Branco, dated July 8, from Plasencia.

[566] Cf. Wellesley to Frere, June 14, to Commissary-General Murray, June 16, both from Abrantes, and to Castlereagh, June 27.

[567] The 2/9th and 2/30th were sent to Gibraltar in May. The two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons and the one squadron of the 3rd Hussars of the K. G. L. were sent to Sicily at the same time.

[568] The 1/48th, 1/61st, and 23rd Light Dragoons.

[569] 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/95th. Of these three units only 1/43rd had been in Robert Craufurd’s old brigade, during the march to Sahagun. The other two had been in Anstruther’s brigade of Paget’s reserve; they had therefore fought at Corunna, while Craufurd and the ‘flank brigade’ which includes the 1/43rd, had been detached from the main army and had embarked at Vigo.

[570] A and I troops. The first joined in company with Craufurd. The second only appeared much later.

[571] Writing to Castlereagh on June 30, Wellesley remarks that ‘according to your account I have 35,000 men—according to my own I have only 18,000,’ but this was before he had been joined by the 1/61st, the 23rd Dragoons, and certain details. It is certain, from the careful table of troops engaged at Talavera which is to be found in the Record Office, that somewhat over 22,000 men entered Spain, and that after deducting sick left at Plasencia and elsewhere, just 20,600 fought at Talavera.

[572] These topics occur in many dispatches to Castlereagh. Perhaps the most notable is that of May 31, 1809, written at Coimbra.

[573] Wellesley’s anxiety to make examples may be traced in the series of letters concerning a private of the 29th which occur in his July dispatches. The man had been acquitted by a court-martial on the ground of insanity, but this did not satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who sends repeated orders that the award must be revised, and the man, if possible, executed.

[574] Viz. 2nd, Tilson and Richard Stewart; 3rd, Mackenzie and Donkin; 4th, A. Campbell and Kemmis.

[575] A and I batteries R. H. A. were both late for Talavera.

[576] Joseph to Napoleon, from Talavera, July 9, 1809.

[577] Joseph to Napoleon, from Almagro, July 2, 1809.

[578] Joseph to Napoleon, from Madridejos, July 3, 1809. It is fair to the King to say that in this letter he concludes that he had better call Mortier down into New Castile if the English are really on the move.

[579] The July strength of Sebastiani’s corps, prÉsents sous les armes, was 1st division (French) 8,118, 2nd division (Valence’s Poles) 4,784, Milhaud’s dragoons 2,249—total 15,151.

[580] Joseph to Napoleon, from Illescas, June 23: ‘Le gÉnÉral Sebastiani a devant lui des forces triples des siennes.’ Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral, July 1: ‘L’armÉe de 36,000 À 40,000 hommes qui menaÇait le 4^me Corps s’est enfuie et a repassÉ la Sierre Morena.’

[581] For all this see Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral [July 1], and from Almagro [July 2].

[582] Victor to King Joseph, from the head quarters of the 1st Corps, Calzada, near Oropesa, June 25. Intercepted dispatch in the Record Office.

[583] Napoleon to Clarke [Minister of War], from SchÖnbrunn, June 12, 1809.

[584] The Emperor’s dispatch contained many rebukes to Victor for not pushing towards the North, to join hands with Soult. Jourdan very truly remarks that if the 1st Corps had been sent in that direction, King Joseph must infallibly have lost Madrid.

[585] The Emperor’s stormy dispatch came in due course, but only in September, see pp. 276-7.

[586] Doyle, as his numerous letters in the Record Office show, was such a furious partisan of the family of Palafox, that he believed that all the Spanish authorities were in a conspiracy to keep them down. He especially hated Blake.

[587] On June 9, Frere writes to tell Wellesley that if he could only have destroyed Soult at Oporto, instead of merely chasing him across the frontier, it would have been possible to secure him the post of Generalissimo at once. This chance had gone by, but ‘your friends here (among whom you may count Mr. de Garay) are doing their best for you.’ [Record Office, from Seville, June 9, 1809.]

[588] Wellington to Frere, from Abrantes, June 16, 1809.

[589] I can nowhere find the date of the transference, but it took place before July: the old regiments of Calatrava, Sagunto, Alcantara, and Pavia, which were with Venegas’s army in March, had been transferred to Cuesta’s by June, as also the new regiments of Sevilla, and Cazadores de Madrid. My most valuable source of information is an unpublished dispatch of Cuesta’s in the Madrid War Office, which gives all the names of regiments, but not their numbers.

[590] These totals may be regarded as certain, being drawn from the dispatch of Cuesta’s alluded to above, which I was fortunate enough to find at Madrid. Unfortunately no regimental figures are given, only the gross total.

[591] Wellesley to Frere, Wellington Dispatches, iv. 524.

[592] That of Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) on pp. 382-3 of the first volume of his History of the Peninsular War.

[593] As to the equipment of the Spaniards, the following quotation from Leslie (p. 135) may be worth giving: ‘Their uniforms were of every variety of colour, the equipment and appointments of the most inferior description. One could not but lament these defects, for the men were remarkably fine, possessing all the essential qualities to make good soldiers—courage, patience, and soberness. Their officers, in general, were the very reverse! The line infantry were in blue uniforms with red facings. The Provincial Corps, called “Volunteers,” were mostly dressed in the brown Spanish cloth of the country, with green or yellow facings. Some had chakoes, others broad-brimmed hats with the rim turned up at one side: all had cap-plates of tin announcing their designation. Some had belts, others none. They had no pouches, but a broad belt of soft leather, in which were placed a row of tin tubes, each holding a cartridge, with a fold of leather to cover them, fastened round the waist. The cavalry were heavy and light dragoons, with some regiments of Hussars. Some were tolerably well dressed, in blue or yellow uniforms with red facings. Some had boots, but more long leather leggings, coming up above the knee. The horses were small, active, and hardy, of the Spanish Barbary breed.’

[594] They estimated him at only 10,000 men, but he had really 20,000, Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 15, from Plasencia.

[595] Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: ‘Je me propose de reposer les troupes trois ou quatre jours: pendant ce temps elles se prÉpareront des subsistances, on raccommodera la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrÉs, et je menacerai de nouveau le Portugal: peut-Être mÊme je ferai faire une incursion vers Bragance, afin d’opÉrer une diversion qui ne peut pas manquer de produire quelque effet.... Je me fais prÉcÉder À Zamora (oÙ je compte Être rendu le 2 juillet) par l’ordonnateur Le Noble, qui doit rÉclamer prÈs l’intendant-gÉnÉral de l’armÉe des moyens en tout genre qui me manquent—tel que l’habillement, chaussure, ambulance, officiers de santÉ, administration, transport militaire, payeurs, argent pour solde et dÉpenses extraordinaires, postes etc. J’ai l’honneur de supplier Votre MajestÉ de daigner donner des ordres pour qu’il soit fait droit a ses demandes: mes besoins sont trÈs grands.... Il y a plus de cinq mois que je n’ai reÇu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par consÉquent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.’

[596] Wellesley’s views at this moment appear in his correspondence, e.g. to Mr. Villiers, July 8: ‘I defy Soult to do Beresford or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its present situation—or any amelioration of that situation which can be produced in a short period of time.’ To Beresford, July 9: ‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything with his corps for some time, but I think that column ought to be watched.’ To Beresford, July 14: ‘I do not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia, at least we have not heard that he has. Soult can do nothing against Portugal, for he is in a most miserable state, without arms, artillery or ammunition, stores, &c.’

[597] Wellesley to Beresford, July 9: ‘I have not forgotten either the Puerto de BaÑos or the Puerto de Perales, and have called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already held, and the latter will be so in a day or two.’ [This was unfortunately not to be the case.]

[598] I cannot discover the names of the two very weak battalions, the smallest in Cuesta’s army, which were detached for this purpose under Del Reino. They are not the same as the two battalions which joined Wilson (Merida and 3rd of Seville).

[599] Wellesley to Frere, July 13: ‘You will see, in the accompanying letter, an account of my endeavour to prevail on General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila. I agree with you that it would be a great advantage from a military point of view ... but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider the movement to be necessary as a military measure.’ Frere and Wellesley had hoped that Albuquerque might be placed in command of this large detachment, and might distinguish himself at its head.

[600] Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville (810 bayonets).

[601] All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed in Cuesta’s Apologetic Manifesto, published after his resignation, than in Wellesley’s Dispatches to Castlereagh and Frere.

[602] Cuesta’s and Wellesley’s accounts of their joint plan on the whole agree wonderfully well.

[603] See Wellington to Castlereagh, from Ramalhal, Sept. 1808.

[604] ‘The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt for the Junta and the present form of government, great confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for the Junta, and will overturn that government. This sentiment appears to be so general that I conceive that the Duke of Albuquerque must entertain it equally with others: but I have not seen him.’ Wellesley to Frere from Plasencia, July 13.

[605] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Talavera, Aug. 1.

[606] Wellesley to his brother the Marquis Wellesley, Deleytosa, Aug. 8.

[607] See Jourdan’s MÉmoires, and his letter to Soult of July 17, in which no sign whatever appears of the knowledge of the advance of the British from Portugal.

[608] That food was coming in, but no transport, is clearly proved by Wellesley’s letter to the Junta of Plasencia on July 18: ‘Upon entering Spain I expected to derive that assistance in provisions and other means [i.e. transport] which an army invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed, more particularly when it has been sent to aid the people of that country. I have not been disappointed in the expectation that I had formed of receiving supplies of provisions, and I am much obliged to the Junta for the pains they have taken. I am convinced that they did everything in their power to procure us the other means we required [transport], although I am sorry to say that we have not received them.’

[609] See pp. 443 and 459.

[610] Wellesley to Frere, Plasencia, July 16.

[611] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Plasencia, July 16.

[612] The 1/61st Foot and 23rd Light Dragoons.

[613] ‘And,’ adds Lord Munster, from whom this quotation is taken (p. 199), ‘it is my belief that they would have continued till now if we had not aided them.’

[614] Londonderry, i. 392.

[615] Lord Munster, p. 200.

[616] Wellesley to Sherbrooke, Talavera, July 24.

[617] Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 24.

[618] Wellesley to Beresford, from Plasencia, July 14.

[619] Wellesley to Frere, Talavera, July 25.

[620] Ibid.; and also Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 25.

[622] Soult to Joseph, July 13. Compare with this Jourdan to Soult of July 17, the reply to these modest demands.

[623] Jourdan to Soult, July 17, 1809, from Madrid.

[624] ‘Le roi pense, comme vous, qu’il est important de s’emparer de Ciudad Rodrigo; cette place servira de place d’armes aux troupes qui seront dans le cas d’entrer en Portugal.’—Ibid.

[625] Compare Le Noble’s account of Soult’s proposals (pp. 312-3) with Jourdan’s MÉmoires, and with the Vie Militaire du GÉnÉral Foy, p. 83.

[626] For the controversy about the expected date of Soult’s arrival at Plasencia, see Joseph’s and Jourdan’s letter to Napoleon, in Ducasse’s MÉmoires du Roi Joseph, and on the other side Le Noble’s Campagne de 1809.

[627] The whole consisted of:

[628] ‘The cavalry regiment of Villaviciosa, drawn up in an enclosure with but one exit, was penned in by the enemy and cut to pieces without a possibility of escape. A British officer of engineers, present with them, saved himself by his English horse taking at a leap the barrier which the Spanish horses were incapable of clearing.’ Lord Munster, p. 208.

[629] He had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, 3,200 sabres, four regiments of Merlin’s Division, 1,007 sabres, two regiments of Beaumont’s (corps-cavalry of 1st Corps) 980—a total of over 5,000 men.

[630] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Cazalegas, July 25.

[631] Lord Munster, p. 210.

[632] Several eye-witnesses declare that Lapisse’s division escaped notice owing to a curious chance. Before abandoning the further bank of the Alberche, Mackenzie’s troops had set fire to the huts which Victor’s corps had constructed on the Cazalegas heights, during their long stay in that position. The smoke from the burning was driven along the slopes and the river bottom by the wind, and screened one of the fords from the British observers in the woods; over this ford came Lapisse’s unsuspected advance.

[633] Unfortunately the French returns do not separate the losses of the twenty-seventh from those of the twenty-eighth of July. Only the 16th LÉger can have suffered any appreciable damage.

[634] Lord Munster, p. 212.

[635] ‘The French troops during their stay had been guilty of great excesses: a number of houses were completely destroyed, and the furniture burnt for fuel. In every quarter were to be seen marks of the devastation they had committed. The Cathedral, a handsome modern building, was uninjured, the enemy having contented himself with carrying off all the splendid ornaments used in the ceremonies of religion. But in the church of San Antonio the French had destroyed everything, and converted it into a barrack,’ &c. Stothert’s Narrative of the Campaigns of 1809-11, pp. 81-2.

[636] The Spaniards had lost 1,000 men, mainly by dispersion, in the retreat from Torrijos on the twenty-sixth.

[637] Cf. Londonderry, i. 403; and Arteche, vi. 293.

[638] Thus, counting from right to left, the front of Sherbrooke’s brigade was composed as follows: 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, 61st, 83rd, 1st Line K. G. L., 2nd ditto, 5th ditto, 7th ditto.

[639] It would seem, on the whole, that the responsibility for the absence of the division from its destined fighting-ground lay with Hill, generally the most cautious and reliable of subordinates. He says, in a memorandum drawn up in 1827, in answer to an inquiry about Talavera, that he had gone to dine in Talavera, and then saw Mackenzie’s division come back into the line. Returning to his own troops, he found them moving out of their bivouac, but not on their fighting-ground. He was getting them into line, when the firing suddenly began in his front.

These details I give from the valuable (unpublished) map by Lieut. Unger of the K. G. L. artillery, which Colonel Whinyates has been good enough to place at my disposition. It carefully marks the emplacement of every British battery. Elliott was at this moment in command of the battery which had been under Baynes during the Oporto campaign, while Sillery had that which had been under Lane.

[640] All these details are from the report drawn up by SÉmÉlÉ, the chief of the staff of the 1st Corps, at Talavera on Aug. 10.

[641] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 25: ‘Two thousand of them ran off on the evening of the twenty-seventh, not 100 yards from where I was standing, who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, and who were only frightened by the noise of their own fire. They left their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers went with them, and they plundered the baggage of the British army, which had been sent to the rear. Many others went, whom I did not see.’

[642] The panic-stricken regiments were Leales de Fernando VII, which had been garrisoning Badajoz when Medellin was fought, Badajoz (two batts.) which had been in the battle, and Toledo.

[643] ‘I wish I could assert with truth that this retrogression was confined to our Spanish allies. But the truth must be told, and I regret to say that stragglers from the British army were among them, taking a similar direction to the rear. As they passed, they circulated reports of a most disheartening nature.’ Col. Leach’s Rough Sketches, p. 81. He was with Craufurd’s brigade, then coming up by forced marches from Plasencia, which met the fugitives near Oropesa on the morning of the twenty-eighth. ‘The road was crowded with fugitives, Spaniards innumerable, and lots of English commissary clerks, paymasters and sutlers, to say nothing of a few soldiers who said they were sick.’ Autobiography of Sir George Napier, p. 108.

[644] ‘Early in the morning some twenty-five Spanish soldiers, dressed in white, attended by several Popish priests, were marched up to the front of our regiment and shot. One, a young lad of nineteen or twenty years, dropped before the party fired, but to no use. For after the volley at ten paces, the firing party ran forward and shooting them in the head or breast completed their horrid work. These unfortunates belonged to regiments that had given way in the late battle.’ Diary of Cooper (of the 7th Fusiliers), pp. 25-6.

[645] That the panic took place at dusk, and not during the night attack, is completely proved by the Journal of General SÉmÉlÉ, where it is noted as occurring in consequence of Victor’s earliest demonstration; as also by Wellesley’s note.

[646] The Battalion of Detachments was decidedly checked. They got somewhat into confusion, and halted. ‘The soldiers seemed much vexed,’ writes Leslie of the 29th, ‘we could hear them bravely calling out “There is nobody to command us! Only tell us what to do, and we are ready to dare anything.” There was a fault somewhere.’ Leslie, p. 144.

[647] Though the French official reports of casualties do not give any officers of the 9th LÉger as prisoners, it is certain that Colonel Meunier was taken. See Leslie, p. 143. Being recovered, along with the other wounded prisoners, when Talavera was evacuated, his name did not get down among the list of missing, which was only drawn up on Aug. 10.

[648] See the Diary of Boothby of the R. E., one of the victims of this unhappy fusilade, p. 5.

[649] There are admirable narratives of the night-vigil and the dawn of Talavera, in the narratives of Leslie, Leith-Hay, and Lord Munster.

[650] ‘Le duc de Bellune rendit compte au roi du rÉsultat de sa premiÈre attaque, et le prÉvint qu’il la renouvellerait au point du jour. Peut-Être aurait on dÛ lui donner l’ordre d’attendre.... Mais ce marÉchal, Étant restÉ longtemps aux environs de Talavera, devait connaÎtre parfaitement son terrain, et il paraissait si sÛr du succÈs, que le roi le laissait libre d’agir comme il le dÉsirait.... Il sentait que s’il adopterait l’avis du MarÉchal Jourdan le duc de Bellune ne manquerait pas d’Écrire À l’empereur “qu’on lui avait fait perdre l’occasion d’une brillante victoire sur les Anglais”.’ Jourdan’s MÉmoires, pp. 256 and 259.

[651] Eliott’s Narrative, in his Defence of Portugal, p. 238.

[652] Lord Munster, p. 226.

[653] Leslie, p. 147. The other occasion on which Hill used strong language was at the battle of St. Pierre in 1814, when Wellington remarked: ‘If Hill is beginning to swear we had better get out of the way.’

[654] Ruffin had 5,200 men, minus about 300 lost on the previous night, while Hill had 3,853, minus 138 lost in that same battle in the dark.

[655] This operation is described in the narrative of the K. G. L. officer, printed by Beamish (p. 212). The narrator, however, mistakes the French regiment’s number, and says twenty-six for ninety-six.

[656] These losses can be accurately ascertained. Ruffin’s whole loss in the two days of fighting was 1,632, of whom 300 of the 9th LÉger had fallen on the night of July 27. He was not seriously engaged during the rest of the day, so must have lost 1,300 in this fight. Hill’s total loss on July 28 was 835, but much of it was suffered in the afternoon, when (though not attacked by infantry) his division was under a heavy shell fire.

[657] See Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 260.

[658] Their order from left to right was as follows: Frankfort-Hesse (two batts.), Baden (two batts.), Holland (two batts.), Nassau (two batts.).

[659] There is a legend which occurs in all French narratives of Talavera—starting with the contemporary accounts, and including Desprez’s and Jourdan’s MÉmoires. It is to the effect that Leval’s division, in its first advance, came upon an English battalion, which several writers call the 45th, lying in front of the rest of the allied line. It is alleged that the Nassau regiment surrounded and almost captured it—that they would have taken it prisoner indeed en masse, if the troops on their left (Holland and Baden) had held firm. But at least ‘on lui prit une centaine d’hommes, le major, le lieutenant-colonel, et le colonel—ce dernier mourut de ses blessures’ (Jourdan). No such incident can have occurred, for (1) no English regiment lost more than twenty-one ‘missing’ on this side of the field. (2) No English officer of higher rank than a captain was taken prisoner in the battle. (3) Only one officer was killed in the whole of Campbell’s division, and he was a lieutenant of the 7th Fusiliers. (4) The 45th was not engaged with Leval’s men, but lay to the left and supported the Guards in resisting Sebastiani: it lost one officer (a captain) and twelve men missing, but this was in the great mÊlÉe in the centre, at the end of the day’s fighting: it had no officer killed. I am driven to conclude that the whole is some gross exaggeration of the surprise of Campbell’s pickets in the vineyards, and that instead of a ‘battalion’ we should read the light companies of the division. Cooper of the 7th Fusiliers, who was in the skirmishing line, says that the Germans got close among them by calling out ‘EspaÑoles’ and pretending to be Spaniards. A few prisoners (twenty-six in all) were lost in this way.

[660] This was the Myers who fell in storming the famous hill of Albuera in 1811. See Cooper (of the 7th), p. 22.

[661] ‘Another lull in the storm, and fresh formation. “Here they come again” said many voices: so they did, but we were ready and gave them such a warm reception that they speedily went to the right-about. As in their first attack they now left behind several pieces of cannon, which we secured as before. After these two attacks and sharp repulses we were not troubled with their company any more.’ Cooper, p. 23.

[662] There can be no rational doubt that the total number of guns taken was seventeen, as set forth in Charles Stewart’s report to Wellesley, as Adjutant-general, viz. ‘four eight-pounders, four six-pounders, one four-pounder, one six-inch howitzer, taken by Brigadier-general A. Campbell’s brigade, with one six-inch howitzer and six other guns left by the enemy and found in the woods’ of which four were in the hands of the Spaniards. Wellesley, in his dispatch, made the error of stating that twenty guns had been taken, being under the impression that the Spaniards had captured seven pieces, while they themselves only claim four—a Captain PiÑero was mentioned in Eguia’s dispatch for causing them to be brought back to the Spanish line. The British took thirteen guns: three days after the battle Wellesley made them over to his allies. He writes to O’Donoju [Talavera, Aug. 1]: ‘We have got thirteen pieces of French artillery, which I wish to give over to the Spanish army—the other seven [four] you have already got. I shall be obliged if you will urge General Cuesta to desire the commanding officer of his artillery to receive charge of them from the officer commanding the British artillery.’ This is surely conclusive as to the numbers.

Jourdan in his MÉmoires acknowledges the loss of apparently all Leval’s guns—three batteries. ‘L’artillerie du gÉnÉral Leval, qu’on avait imprudemment engagÉe au milieu des bois, des vignes et des fosses, ayant eu la plupart de ses chevaux tuÉs, ne put pas Être retirÉe; ÉvÉnement fÂcheux qu’on eut le tort impardonnable de cacher au roi’ [p. 261]. Desprez says that six pieces only were lost: Thiers allows eight.

But the most interesting point of the controversy comes out in Napoleon’s correspondence with his brother Joseph. On Aug. 25, the Emperor writes in hot anger to say that he sees from the English newspapers that Joseph had lost twenty guns, a fact concealed in the King’s dispatch. He desires to be told at once the names of the batteries that were captured and the divisions to which they belonged. Jourdan replies in the King’s behalf on Sept. 15, that no guns have been lost—four pieces of Leval’s artillery had been for a moment in the hands of the British, but they were recaptured. Joseph himself writes to the same effect next day: ‘Wellesley n’a pris aucune aigle, il n’en montrera pas plus que de canons.’ On the nineteenth, Jourdan writes to Clarke, the Minister of War, to say that he has just found out that two guns had been lost by Leval. SÉnarmont, the artillery chief of the 4th Corps, explains to Jourdan, in a letter of September 27, that ten pieces had been lost in the olive groves, but that all were recovered save two, one Dutch six-pounder, and one French eight-pounder. The truth comes out in Desprez’s narrative. He says that the King, hearing that Leval had left guns abandoned in front of the Pajar de Vergara, ordered Sebastiani to have them brought in: ‘Le gÉnÉral assura que dÉjÀ elles avaient ÉtÉ reprises. Cette assertion Était inexacte. Le gÉnÉral Sebastiani Était-il lui-mÊme en erreur? Ou les ordres donnÉs lui paraissaient-ils inexÉcutables? Je n’ai jamais eu le mot de l’Énigme: quoi qu’il en soit, les piÈces tombÈrent le lendemain au pouvoir de l’ennemi. Le GÉnÉral SÉnarmont, qui commandait l’artillerie, ne rendit pas compte de cette perte. Le gÉnÉral Sebastiani l’avait priÉ avec instance de la cacher. Aussi dans son rapport sur la bataille Joseph dÉclara-t-il positivement qu’on n’avait pas perdu un canon. Plus tard les journaux anglais firent connaÎtre la vÉritÉ. L’Empereur, qui savait apprÉcier leur exactitude, reprocha À son frÈre de l’avoir trompÉ. Joseph eut assez de dÉlicatesse pour accepter ces reproches et ne point dÉclarer de quelle maniÈre les choses s’Étaient passÉes’ [p. 491].

In short, Sebastiani and SÉnarmont conspired to hide the truth, and Joseph, who liked them both (see his letters in Ducasse, especially vi. 456, where on Sept. 30 he sends SÉnarmont a gold box as a sort of ‘consolation prize’), hushed the matter up in their interests. The most curious part of the matter is that on Sept. 27, SÉnarmont was able to say with literal exactness that only two pieces were missing, for fifteen of the lost guns had been retaken on August 5, behind the bridge of Arzobispo, during the retreat of Cuesta’s army. They had been given back to their owners long before September, so were no longer missing. But this can hardly be called ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth.’

[663] The losses were killed: officers six, men ninety-seven: wounded, officers twenty-four, men 803: prisoners, seventy-seven men. Campbell lost killed: officers one, men thirty-two: wounded, officers six, men 171: missing, officers one, men twenty-five—a total of 236. The Spaniards may have had 150 casualties—it is difficult to see that they can have suffered much more, as they had only two hostile regiments in front of them.

[664] Lord Munster, p. 231.

[665] General Desprez, relating the doings of Sebastiani’s division, says that the 75th were cut up by Spanish light horse: but there were no cavalry of that nation in this part of the field, and it would seem that the French were misled by the blue uniforms of the Light Dragoons.

[666] Except that he mentioned the colonels of the 31st and 45th among the officers who had done well in the battle.

[667] The only place where a good account of the doings of Mackenzie’s brigade is to be found is in the excellent regimental history of the 24th. I fully share the indignation expressed by its author at the unmerited oblivion in which its splendid doings have been lying for so many years. [See Paton’s Annals of the 24th Regiment.]

[668] In most modern English narratives of Talavera it is stated that the 1/48th supported the Guards. This must be a mistake, caused by a misreading of Wellesley’s dispatch. It is certain that the Guards fell back on Mackenzie’s brigade. Contemporary accounts by officers of the 2/24th speak of the Coldstreams passing through them to re-form: the Scots Fusiliers therefore must have had the 2/31st and 1/45th behind them. Donnellan and the 1/48th really supported Langwerth’s German battalions, as Lord Londonderry (the only historian who has got the facts right) clearly shows (i. p. 410). It is curious that the historians of the battle have not seen that the Germans, in their dreadfully mauled condition, could not have been rallied without external aid: this aid was given by Donnellan, while Mackenzie was saving the Guards.

[669] The figures are (after deducting the losses of the earlier combats): Low’s brigade 964, Langwerth’s 1,315, Cameron’s 1,306, 1/48th 700, a total of 4,285. The losses were: Low 326, Langwerth 721, Cameron 547, 1/48th about 100, a total of 1,694, including officers. (See tables in Appendix.)

[670] For a description of the sufferings of the 88th, whose battalion companies did not fire a single shot, during the cannonade of the afternoon, see Grattan’s Connaught Rangers, vol. iii. p. 91.

[671] For these losses, see the Talavera Appendix.

[672] Hartmann of the K.G.L. artillery has a note on these pieces: they were useful because of their heavy calibre, none of the British guns being heavier than six-pounders. They were bright new brass cannon from the arsenal at Seville: their machinery for sighting and elevation was of a most primitive type—a century out of date. The lieutenant in command seemed unable to hit anything with them, whereupon Hartmann got off his horse, himself laid a gun, and had the luck to dismount a French piece in the valley. After this the Spaniards fired better and did very good service.

[673] That the charge of Anson’s light dragoons came after victory had been secured in the centre is clear from several eye-witnesses, e.g. Leith-Hay of the 29th, who was on top of the Cerro, and close to Wellesley, writes: ‘The favourable termination of the battle in the centre created great excitement: the cheer, which had been re-echoed from the height had hardly died away, when a scene of another character was in preparation. The movements of the divisions Ruffin and Villatte had during the late contest been vacillating and uncertain. Formed to all appearance to attack the height, they had even advanced some distance towards its base. Sir Arthur crossed with rapid steps from the right of the 29th to the part of the hill looking down on Anson’s brigade. It was immediately known that a charge would take place’ (i. p. 158).

[674] Leith-Hay, p. 159.

[675] Napier, ii. 176, has a story that Col. Arentschildt of the German dragoons discovered the ravine in time, and checked his line, crying, ‘I will not kill my young mans’—thereby saving his regiment and taking no part in the charge. This is entirely disproved by the narratives of the officers of the 1st K.G.L. Dragoons, quoted in Beamish’s History of the King’s German Legion. The evidence of Colonel von der Decken alone suffices to show that the regiment fell into the trap, suffered severe losses therein, and then executed a disorderly and ineffective charge on Ruffin’s squares, after which it returned to its old position, with a loss of nearly forty men. Napier seems to have been misled by the statement of Major Ponsonby of the 23rd, to the effect that the Germans turned back at the ravine. He also says that Seymour, Colonel of the 23rd, was wounded, but that officer’s name does not appear in the casualty list.

[676] In this charge they carried away with them, and almost captured, Generals Villatte and Cassagne, who had failed to take refuge in the square of the 27th, and were caught outside it. [SÉmÉlÉ’s Report.]

[677] In the French official reports it is said that General Strolz, the brigadier, drew aside the 10th Chasseurs, in order to fall upon the British dragoons from the flank. Rocca (p. 104) says that the regiment was charged and broke, but rallied again. Victoires et ConquÊtes has: ‘le 10^me de chasseurs ne pouvait soutenir cette charge, ouvrit ses rangs, mais bientÔt ralliÉ il chargea ses adversaires en queue.’ As the regiment only lost five killed it does not seem likely that it was broken. The French records do not give the number of its wounded.

[678] This was the Westphalian Chevaux-lÉgers regiment.

[679] Among the other officers who cut their way through was Lord George William Russell, desperately wounded by a cut on the shoulder. Only three officers (two wounded) were taken prisoners from these two squadrons: two others were killed: it would seem therefore that out of twelve present with the two right squadrons, several succeeded in getting out of the trap. Elley says that the whole body that followed him did not exceed 170 sabres, and that seven or eight only cut their way through the enemy.

[680] The best account of all this comes from the MÉmoire of General Desprez, who was riding with the head-quarters staff at this moment.

[681] All this is again derived from Desprez, who both carried the King’s orders to Victor, and bore back Victor’s remonstrances to the King.

[682] Lord Munster, p. 235; Leith-Hay, p. 162.

[683] See Jourdan’s MÉmoires, p. 262.

[684] These ‘missing’ do not include the French wounded taken on the field, and recovered when Victor came back to Talavera on Aug. 6 and captured the British hospitals. The French return was drawn up only after Aug. 18, when these men had been released.

[685] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 1, Wellington Dispatches, iv. p. 553.

[686] For excellent accounts of this forced march see Col. Leach (95th), Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier (pp. 81-2), and Sir George Napier’s Autobiography, pp. 108-10. The distance was forty-three miles, not as W. Napier states sixty-two. That all the stragglers met on the way were not Spaniards is unfortunately evident from both narratives. Nor were all the British stragglers non-combatants.

[687] Wellington to Beresford, Talavera, July 29, 1809.

[688] On July 14 Wellesley writes to Beresford that he does not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia [Wellington Dispatches, iv. 510], because of the tenour of the captured dispatches of Soult to King Joseph. These, of course, had been written under the idea that the 6th Corps was still holding on to Corunna and Lugo: it was not till some days later that Soult learned of his colleagues’ unexpected move. But Wellesley knew of Ney’s move before the battle of Talavera, as is shown by Wellington Dispatches, iv. 545.

[689] ‘The enemy have on the Douro and in the neighbourhood not less than 20,000 men, being the remains of the Corps of Soult, Ney, and Kellermann.’ To Frere, July 30.

[690] To Beresford, from Talavera, July 29, 1809.

[691] Wellesley to Frere, July 30. ‘My first duty is to attend to the safety of Portugal: at all events if my flank and communication with Portugal are not secured for me, while I am operating in the general cause, I must move to take care of myself, and then the general cause will suffer.’

[692] Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 31, 1809.

[693] A few lines of this astounding document may be worth quoting—‘Sire, hier l’armÉe anglaise a ÉtÉ forcÉe dans ses positions. Outre les 25 À 30 mille Anglais de Wellesley, nous avons eu affaire À l’armÉe de Cuesta, qui s’Élevait de 35 À 40 mille hommes. Le champ de bataille sur lequel nous sommes Établis (!) est jonchÉ de leurs morts.... Je me mets en marche pour secourir Madrid, qui est menacÉ par un corps de Portugais arrivÉs À Navalcarnero, et par l’armÉe de Venegas, qui tente de pÉnÉtrer par Aranjuez.... J’ai un regret, sire, c’est celui de n’avoir pas fait prisonniÈre toute l’armÉe anglaise.’ MÉmoires de Joseph, vi. 284. Napoleon, not deceived for a moment by this rhodomontade, sent back a scathing rebuke to his brother for endeavouring to hide the truth from him. (Napoleon to Jourdan, Aug. 21.)

[694] For these operations I am relying on General Arteche’s excerpts from the Vindicacion de los Agravios, published by Venegas in his own defence.

[695] Jourdan to Belliard, Aug. 3, from Illescas: ‘Le duc de Belluno dit que toute l’armÉe anglaise marche sur la rive droite de l’Alberche, et qu’hier elle Était À une lieue d’Escalona.’

[696] There are two letters of Wellington to Castlereagh, written on Aug. 1; both indicate that Wellesley was still unconvinced as to Soult’s intention, and the second states that he does not believe that the French will pass the Puerto de BaÑos. The definite news came at night.

[697] Napier seems to have the dates wrong here: he says that the 5th Corps seized Plasencia on July 31 [vol. ii. p. 184], But Soult’s official report to the Minister of War, dated Aug. 13, says that his vanguard forced the Puerto de BaÑos on the twenty-ninth, but only captured Plasencia on Aug. 1. If Plasencia had fallen on the thirty-first, Wellesley and Cuesta would have known the fact on the second: but as it was captured on the first only, they were still in ignorance when their conference took place.

[698] Wellesley’s letters in these critical days are full of complaints as to his colleague’s impracticability: ‘I certainly should get the better of everything,’ he writes to Castlereagh, ‘if I could manage General Cuesta: but his temper and disposition are so bad that this is impossible.’ Wellington Dispatches, iv. p. 553.

[699] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Oropesa, afternoon of Aug. 3.

[700] Orders of Napoleon from SchÖnbrunn, June 12: ‘Les trois corps doivent fournir 50 À 60 mille hommes. Si cette rÉunion a lieu promptement les Anglais doivent Être dÉtruits; mais il faut se rÉunir, et ne pas marcher par petits paquets. Cela est le principe gÉnÉral pour tous les guerres, mais surtout pour un pays oÙ l’on ne peut pas avoir de communication.’

[701] By the return of July 15, the 5th Corps had 16,916 men, the attached brigades of dragoons, 1,853: the 2nd Corps had 18,740 (deducting Lorges and Lahoussaye): the 6th Corps 15,700, of whom one brigade of infantry (3,200 bayonets) was left behind. The total then was 50,009.

[702] The Marshal had dissolved one of his four divisions, that of Mermet, making over the 122nd of the line, reduced to two battalions, and the Swiss units to Kellermann, and distributing the other regiments between Merle, Delaborde, and Heudelet.

[703] Cuesta, in a dispatch in the Deposito de la Guerra, which seems unpublished, says that Del Reino fought with four battalions. He had started with no more than two, so must have rallied two others. I can find no trace of what they were, but conclude that they must have been some of those battalions of the Army of Estremadura which are not named in the Ordre de Bataille of the divisions present at Talavera. As I have shown in my Talavera Appendix, there were eight regiments which had belonged to Cuesta’s army in March but do not appear in the divisional return of July. Most of these were in garrison at Badajoz: but two or three may well have been sent to guard the passes when the army advanced from the Guadiana in the end of June.

[704] For details of Mortier’s march see the memoir of Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, who was with the vanguard. According to the Diary of Fantin des Odoards, Soult pushed his kindness to the British invalids so far as to leave with them a small supply of muskets, with which to defend themselves against guerrillas.

[706] See Arteche, vi. 342, and Wellington Dispatches, iv. 561; the letter itself is not published by Gurwood, but Lord Londonderry, then on Wellesley’s staff, gives an analysis of it. It contained, according to him, orders to Soult to hasten his march, and to bring up Ney’s corps with all speed, while the king himself undertook to threaten Talavera again with Victor’s forces [Londonderry, i. p. 416].

[707] Wellesley to Bassecourt, from Oropesa, August 3. So confident was the British commander at this moment, that he wrote to Beresford on the same morning, telling him that Soult when assailed would probably retire at once, either by the pass of Perales or that of BaÑos. He wished his lieutenant to send Portuguese troops to the outlets of those defiles, to intercept the retreating enemy.

[708] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Aug. 3, 1809.

[709] I am bound to say that after reading the Spanish narratives, I doubt whether Cuesta had at his disposal the large amount of spare vehicles of which Londonderry and Napier speak.

[710] Boothby, A Prisoner of France, p. 40. For the adventures of two wounded officers on their weary way to Truxillo see the Diary of Hawker, and the narrative of Colonel Leslie. The latter made a personal appeal to Cuesta, whose carriage he had met by the roadside. The old general sent for the Alcalde, and made him provide a mule—though it turned out to be a very bad one—for the wounded officer. This small fact to his credit needs recording, after the copious abuse heaped on him.

[711] The invalids were admirably cared for by the enemy. See Boothby.

[712] The Marquis del Reino (it will be remembered) had broken the boat-bridge of Almaraz on August 2, after abandoning the Puerto de BaÑos.

[713] See for example, Le Noble, pp. 339-40.

[714] ‘As usual, General Cuesta wanted to fight general actions,’ writes Wellesley to Beresford, from Arzobispo, on the afternoon of this same day.

[715] ‘M. le MarÉchal duc de TrÉvise crut qu’il serait attaquÉ,’ says Soult in his report of August 13. He therefore held back, and sent for the 2nd Corps. Hence came Cuesta’s salvation.

[716] General Arteche, who has examined the ford, notes that the main channel, narrow but with a rocky bottom, is close under the northern, i.e. the French, bank. The remaining two-thirds of the breadth of the river has a hard sandy bottom and is in August extremely shallow. If once, therefore, the deep water under the nearer bank was crossed, the French had no difficulties before them.

[717] For details of these privations see the diary of Leach of the 95th, p. 92.

[718] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Deleytosa, Aug. 7.

[719] Beside his own thirty guns he had the seventeen captured French pieces which had been won at Talavera. Wellesley, it will be remembered (p. 543), had handed them over to him.

[720] The fact that these guns were actually French explains Le Noble’s statement that the captured pieces were largely ‘de modÈle franÇais.’ Napier has a strange statement, whose source I cannot discover, to the effect that ‘Cuesta on his march to Meza d’Ibor left fifteen guns upon the road, which Albuquerque’s flight uncovered. A trumpeter attending an English flag of truce treacherously or foolishly made known the fact to the French, who immediately sent cavalry to fetch them off.’ Napier, ii. 189.

[721] It will he remembered that on March 17, Victor turned Del Parque’s division out of the Meza de Ibor position. But the latter had only 5,000 men, not enough to man the whole line, while the Duke of Belluno had two divisions for the frontal attack, and turned the Meza with another, that of Villatte. Cuesta had 30,000 men and more, quite sufficient to hold the entire position.

[722] Wellesley went to visit his allies on the Meza upon the morning of Aug. 10, and found that half the guns and baggage had been dragged up on the ninth, but that there was still a great accumulation at the foot of the steep slope, between the Ibor river and the lower edge of the plateau. He was in great distress at the notion that the French might come up at any moment, drive in the rearguard, and capture the rear sections of the Spanish train; see Wellington Dispatches, v. 22, to Lord Wellesley, from Deleytosa, Aug. 10.

[723] From Soult’s dispatch of Aug. 13, it appears that a Colonel Ornano, with a regiment of dragoons, was detailed to examine the banks of the Tagus in search of the ford, but failed to find it. The cause is not hard to seek, for it crosses the river diagonally on a narrow shelf of rock with deep water on either side. It is not less than four feet deep, and Leach of the 95th, who was on guard at its southern end, describes it as ‘not exactly practicable for infantry even at the driest season of the year’ (p. 94). The English, knowing its exact course, were established in positions from which they could concentrate upon it in a few minutes. We may rationally suppose, therefore, that Ney would have found the Tagus not less difficult to pass on Aug. 9, than the Oitaben had been on June 8.

[724] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 9, from Arzobispo: ‘Je serai disposÉ soit À marcher sur Lisbonne pour dÉtruire les Établissements anglais avant que leur armÉe ne puisse y arriver, et À lui rendre son embarquement difficile, soit À marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo pour en faire le siÈge.... Dans le cas du premier mouvement (qui produira infailliblement de grands rÉsultats) j’aurai l’honneur de prier V. M. d’avoir la bontÉ de faire connaÎtre À MM. les marÉchaux ducs de TrÉvise et d’Elchingen que telle est son intention, afin que toute observation soit ainsi prÉvenue, et qu’on ne puisse m’attribuer aucun sentiment d’amour-propre.’

[725] Joseph, exaggerating the enemy’s force, was under the impression that they had fully 100,000 men: see his letter to Napoleon of July 31.

[726] Ney has been accused of deserting Soult, and retiring from Almaraz and Navalmoral on his own responsibility, and contrary to the orders of his immediate superior. But Jourdan’s dispatch of Aug. 9 to the Minister of War shows that the Duke of Elchingen was obeying directions sent to him from the royal head quarters. ‘Le roi a pensÉ,’ he writes, ‘qu’on ne devait pas, quant À prÉsent, chercher À pÉnÉtrer ni en Andalousie ni en Portugal.... Le duc de Dalmatie renverra promptement le 6^me corps sur Salamanque pour en chasser les ennemis, et couvrir la Vieille Castille conjointement avec le GÉnÉral Kellermann.’ Ney then was strictly correct in stating in his dispatch of Aug. 18, that he had acted in obedience to his orders.

[727] Joseph to Napoleon, from Valdemoro, August 7.

[728] Jourdan to Belliard, from Bargas, August 8.

[729] See Wellesley’s letter of Aug. 14 to Beresford, concerning the departure of the French. Robert Craufurd estimated the force that had marched on Plasencia at 15,000 men, Donkin at 25,000. If the latter had judged the numbers correctly, Wellesley supposed that both Ney and Soult must have gone by this road: this was actually the case.

[730] Wellesley to Villiers, Aug. 12: ‘The French having been moving since the ninth towards Plasencia.... I can form no decided opinion respecting their intentions. I think, however, that if they meditated a serious attack on Portugal they would not have moved off in daylight, in full sight of our troops. I suspect these movements are intended only as a feint, to induce us to separate ourselves from the Spaniards, in order to cover Portugal.’

[731] These regiments were, Line infantry, nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, all (save no. 15) two battalions strong, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Cazadores, with no. 2 of the Lusitanian Legion, and the ‘Voluntarios AcadÉmicos’ of Coimbra.

[732] Viz. 2/5th, 2/11th, 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/42nd, 2/39th, 2/88th.

[733] See Wellesley to Beresford, Aug. 14.

[734] That this official did something, if not so much as Wellesley required, is shown by the letter to Cuesta of Aug. 11, in which it is said that ‘the British army has received no provisions since it was at Deleytosa, excepting some sent from Truxillo by SeÑor Lozano de Torres,’ while again on Aug. 8, Wellesley says that ‘we have had nothing since the third, save 4,000 lbs. of biscuit, and that was divided among 30,000 [say 23,000] mouths.’

[735] On Aug. 12, Wellesley writes from Jaraicejo to say that the dÉpÔt at Abrantes is much too large, and that some of the flour ought to be sent back to Santarem, or even to Lisbon, till only 300,000 rations should be left.

[736] Wellesley to his brother Lord Wellesley, at Seville, Aug. 8.

[737] See Wellesley to Cuesta from Jaraicejo, Aug. 11.

[738] Lord Munster (p. 251) confesses that ‘so pressing were our wants that one of our commissaries took from them (the Spaniards) by force a hundred bullocks and a hundred mule loads of bread.’ Cuesta needs no further justification. But it is clear that his own men were doing things precisely similar.

[739] See the above-quoted dispatch to Cuesta of Aug. 11.

[740] See especially the remarks of Leach, George Napier, Leith-Hay, Stothert, and Cooper.

[741] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Truxillo, Aug. 21, 1809.

[742] In his dispatch to the Marquis Wellesley, from Merida, Aug. 24, he observes that he had considered himself in honour bound to continue his co-operation unless (1) Soult should invade Portugal, or (2) the Spaniards should move off towards another theatre of war, i.e. La Mancha, or (3) he should himself be starved out, as actually happened.

[743] Eguia’s unhappy phrase was ‘If notwithstanding this answer [to the effect that the Truxillo magazines should be placed in charge of a British commissary] your Excellency should persist in marching your troops into Portugal, I shall be convinced that other causes, and not only the want of subsistence, have induced your Excellency to decide on taking such a step.’ [From Deleytosa, Aug. 19.]

[744] ‘I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency’s letter of this day’s date, and I feel much concerned that anything should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As however your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further correspondence between us appears unnecessary, and accordingly this is the last letter which I shall have the honour of addressing to you.’ Wellesley to Eguia, Aug. 19.

[745] ‘It is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army, upon which I have only to observe that I had already trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents, and I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de Calvo. At the moment when he was assuring me that the British army should have all the food the country could afford, I had in my possession an order from him directing the magistrates of Guadalupe to send to the Spanish head quarters provisions which a British commissary had prepared for the magazine at Truxillo.’ Oct. 30, to Marquis Wellesley.

[746] ‘I have no provisions, no horses, no means of transport, I am overloaded with sick; the horses of the cavalry are scarcely able to march, or those of the artillery to draw their guns. The officers and soldiers alike are worn down by want of food and privations of every description.’ Wellesley to Marquis Wellesley, Miajadas, Aug. 22.

[747] Lord Wellesley to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, Aug. 22.

[748] The Armistice of Znaim was signed July 12. The Falmouth packet with the news reached Lisbon only on Aug. 9. Yet Wellesley had heard rumours of peace as early as Aug. 4 [Well. Disp. iv. 560].

[749] Canning to Lord Wellesley, London, Aug. 12: ‘The question which first arises is whether the state of things in Spain be such as that a British army of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation with the Spanish armies, could be reasonably expected either to effect the deliverance of the whole Peninsula, or to make head against the augmented force which Bonaparte may now be enabled to direct against that country. Upon this question your Excellency will receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley, to whom a copy of this dispatch is transmitted. If the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley shall be that, with so limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive operations in Spain could not prudently be attempted, and if he shall conceive that the utmost object to which such an army would be adequate is the defence of Portugal, your Excellency will then only have to state to the Spanish Government the nature of the instructions under which Sir A. Wellesley now acts.... If on the other hand Sir A. Wellesley shall entertain the opinion that with an effective British army of 30,000, combined with the Spanish and Portuguese armies, it might be possible either to expel the French from Spain, or to resist even their augmented force with a reasonable prospect of success ... your Excellency will then also receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley as to the conditions necessary to be obtained from the Spanish Government, as a preliminary to entering on any concerted system of joint military operations.’

[750] For Wellesley’s answer to Canning see his reply to his brother on Sept. 5, containing his ‘Observation on Mr. Secretary Canning’s Dispatch of Aug. 12,’ combined with the reference to his own dispatch of Aug. 24, which (as he writes to Castlereagh on Sept. 4) ‘gives the government my opinion upon all the points referred to in Mr. Canning’s dispatches.’ The quotation above comes from this last-named document of Aug. 24.

[751] The French force at Almonacid stood as follows:—4th Corps; Sebastiani’s division 6,000 men, Valence’s 4,000, Leval’s 3,000, and corps-cavalry (Merlin) 1,000. Milhaud’s dragoons had 2,200 men present; the King had brought up 600 horse and about 4,800 foot of his guards and of Dessolles’ division. The total therefore was about 3,800 cavalry and 17,800 foot.

[752] This remark I find in the narrative of General Bouligni, the commanding officer of engineers in the Army of La Mancha [Arteche, vi. 370]. Venegas was aiming his sneer at CastaÑos and at La Romana, who had got the nickname of ‘Marquis de la Romeria’ from his perpetual strategical movements to the rear.

[753] But see General Arteche’s calculation in vi. 392 of his Guerra de la Independencia.

[754] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 18, from Plasencia.

[755] Ney to Jourdan, from Salamanca, Aug. 22.

[756] See Joseph to Clarke, Aug. 22, and Napoleon to Clarke, Sept. 7.

[757] For a presentment of Joseph’s case see Chapter xii. of Jourdan’s MÉmoires.

[758] Though named from Olivenza these regiments were actually raised in Northern Beira, with head quarters at Lamego, Olivenza having been ceded to Spain in 1801 at the treaty of Badajoz.

[759] Ces passe-ports devaient Être dÉlivrÉs aux noms supposÉs de Dupont et Garis, d’aprÈs les dÉclarations d’Argenton lui-mÊme, du m^al Soult, du g^al Ricard, &c. L’un de ces passe-ports devait Être utilisÉ par le cap^e Favre, aide de camp du g^al Lefebvre, qui voulait rentrer en France pour dÉmissionner. L’autre devait servir À un officier supÉrieur qu’Argenton ne nomme pas, qui devait aller rendre compte de la situation À l’Empereur.

[760] The official report gives three missing officers here. But one of them was not a prisoner but turned up at Oropesa next morning, nominally sick. For this distressing story, see Leslie, pp. 155-6.

[761] Many of the casualties of the 5/60th were in the companies detached from the head quarters of the regiment, and not serving in Donkin’s brigade. It is unfortunately impossible to distinguish them, as all the regimental losses are given en bloc in the return.

[762] On arrival in Portugal, No. 6 company, 7th batt., was under 2nd Captain H. B. Lane; Captain C. D. Sillery joined shortly after the occupation of Oporto.