DEFEAT OF NEJUMI AT TOSKI, AND OF OSMAN DIGNA AT TOKAR.

The Khalifa's intentions regarding Egypt—Wad en Nejumi despatched north—Various operations on the Egyptian frontier—Battle of Toski—Defeat and death of Nejumi—Subsequent events in Dongola—Osman Digna's operations against Sawakin—Is defeated at Tokar—Emin Pasha and events in Equatoria—Recent events in Uganda and Unyoro.

Having briefly considered the Khalifa's operations within the Sudan, let us now turn and follow his movements and intentions regarding Egypt. Ever since the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's expedition the conquest of Egypt had been the dream of the Mahdi's life. Those of his followers who had seen Egypt described it in the most glowing terms to the Sudanese, whose cupidity was fully aroused. The immense wealth in Cairo, the lovely women in the harems, had excited their most ardent desires.

The Mahdi himself had decided on the Khedive's palace of Abdin as his place of residence, whence it was his intention to proceed to Syria, and after conquering it, to advance on Mecca. He had prophesied that the conquest of Egypt should be carried out by Khalifa Sherif's flag, and he himself had done all in his power to incite the Egyptians to revolt. He wrote numbers of letters to the leading sheikhs and principal people in Cairo, and had he not died, there is no doubt his influence would have permeated, in no small degree, into Egypt. Several people in Egypt believed in him as the true Mahdi, and besides, he was now the ruler of hundreds of thousands of people. With his death belief in Mahdiism began to decline. His successor, it is true, was a man of boundless energy, and had just as ambitious ideas as his predecessor in regard to the conquest of Egypt, but circumstances had entirely altered.

The Mahdi's death and the Khalifa's accession had caused Mahdiism to break up into two distinct parties, viz. the Baggara Arabs, who called themselves the Arabs of the Sudan, and the "Aulad Belad," or country people, such as the Danagla, Barabra, Jaalin, and other tribes on the White Nile. This division in Mahdieh considerably weakened it. Wad En Nejumi and his emirs belonged to the section opposed to the Khalifa, and who would like to have freed themselves from his control; in consequence Abdullah always arranged that a Baggara emir should be attached to Nejumi, to keep him informed of all the latter's doings.

The Mahdi had laid down the plan for invading Egypt, which should be by combined movements from Dongola towards Halfa, and from Abu Hamed towards Korosko; and accordingly, when the English evacuated Dongola in June 1885, Mohammed el Kheir, the conqueror of Berber, together with Abdel Majid, at once took possession of the province, and the first action which took place between these latter and the British and Egyptian troops occurred in December the same year at Giniss. El Kheir was defeated, and fixed his advanced camp at Kerma.

The fall of Sennar enabled the Khalifa to send forward more troops for his operations against Egypt, and the Mahdi's prophecy that the conquest of Egypt was to be carried out by Sherif's flag, entirely fell in with his own arrangements, for he entrusted the command of the advanced force to Wad En Nejumi, who belonged to Sherif's raya (flag), and thus succeeded in keeping this powerful emir, whom he regarded with great fear and jealousy, as far away from him as possible.[K]

Nejumi set out from Omdurman in November 1885, and marching along the river bank to Berber, robbed and pillaged as if he were advancing through an enemy's country. He seized the goods of merchants at Berber, giving them receipts signed to the effect that they should receive payment when he had taken Assuan. He captured two Egyptian spies, one of whom he decapitated, and the other had his hand and foot cut off. During his stay at Berber he robbed and pillaged in all directions, and used to boast of his approaching conquest of Egypt. He stopped all trade with the north, and drove on the entire population towards Dongola.

It was not, however, until the end of November 1886, that he reached Dongola, and there he began to organize his fighting force, which was continually increased by reinforcements sent from Omdurman.

Early in 1887 four messengers were despatched with letters to Her Majesty the Queen of England, His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, and His Highness the Khedive. These envoys were permitted to come to Cairo, and to personally deliver their letters; but when they were opened, perused, and found only to contain a summons from the Khalifa to adopt Mahdiism, and submit to him, or the recipients would suffer the same fate as Gordon and Hicks, the messengers were at once sent back without any reply being given to them, and this was considered by Abdullah to be the greatest insult that could have been offered to him.

The Dervish advanced-guards continued to creep on towards the Egyptian Frontier, whilst Hassan Khalifa, the nephew of the former Mudir of Berber, occupied the desert wells, and made several incursions on the river to the north and south of Korosko. Mounted on dromedaries, these bold raiders made sudden descents on defenceless villages, carried off quantities of booty, and then disappeared into the desert.

At this time the Egyptians had retired to Wadi Halfa, and the Dervishes had occupied Sarras, a little to the south, from whence they constantly harassed the Egyptian outposts. A variety of circumstances, however, occurred to prevent Khalifa Abdullah from carrying out his projects against Egypt. The revolt in Darfur, the Abyssinian war, internal dissensions, all contributed to impede the despatch of troops north. Besides, the Dervish garrison in Dongola had already done much to destroy the well-being and prosperity of the province; they plundered the inhabitants, who, in their turn, became averse to the Dervish occupation; continued warfare had produced a famine; numbers died of small-pox.

Bahr el Karrar in 1888 occupied the wells of Haimar and Ongat, and from here was able to annoy the inhabitants on the Nile between Assuan and Korosko. He raided the village of Kalabsheh, some fifty miles south of Assuan, killed the Egyptian police guards, and carried off their officer a captive to Omdurman. All this time there was a great deal of talk in the capital about the conquest of Egypt, but we never received any very decisive news. The captured officer was paraded through the streets in triumph, and was then brought before the Khalifa, who received him kindly, and questioned him very fully about Egypt; but he quite understood what sort of replies to make to the Khalifa's questions, and only told him what he knew would please; so he was well treated, set at liberty, and now lives in Omdurman.

From time to time the Khalifa despatched reinforcements to Dongola which never returned, and this was the reason of the main road leading north out of Omdurman being called "Darb Esh Shuhada" ("The Martyrs' Road ").

The Egyptian Government had now confined itself to the defence of its own frontiers. In June 1888, Bishir Bey, a subsidized Government sheikh, turned Bahr Karrar out of Haimar; but on the other hand, the Sarras Dervishes made a sudden descent on the Dabarosa bazaar, killed a number of merchants, and escaped before the troops from Haifa could intercept them. Meanwhile, there was not much harmony between the big emirs. Nejumi and his followers were jealous of the masterful Baggaras, and it was only with the greatest reluctance that they brought themselves to show any respect to the Emir Mussaid of the Baggara Habbanieh, who had been sent to Dongola by the Khalifa to watch and report on Nejumi's doings.

The Baggaras hated Nejumi to such an extent that one of their number attempted to poison him; but he recovered after a long illness, though he never entirely got the poison out of his system. It is said that his eyesight was always bad afterwards. This constant bickering between the Baggara and Nejumi crippled his energy. Formerly he had been greatly feared by them, but now his own people were annoyed that he showed so much deference to the Khalifa and his emirs. As for the Khalifa, he was thoroughly exasperated by Nejumi's indolence, and summoned him to Omdurman.

During his absence from the province, a deserter from the Egyptian side led the Dervishes into the fort at Khor Musa, within five miles of Halfa, where they killed some of the garrison, but were unable to take the whole fort. Colonel Wodehouse having been informed of their attack, at once sent out help, and the Dervishes were surprised and annihilated.

Towards the end of 1888 Nejumi was in Dongola again. The Khalifa had threatened to throw him into chains unless he showed more energy in his operations against Egypt. He had already exhibited his displeasure by imprisoning Sheikh Idris and Makin Wad en Nur, who had shown a reluctance to go forward, for they had made up their minds that a successful attack on Egypt was an impossibility. They could not even capture Wadi Halfa. The desert roads were next to impassable owing to want of water, whilst the river was in the hands of the enemy, who had numbers of steamers, and could prevent any Dervish advance by water. All these difficulties were quite apparent to Nejumi and his emirs; but so self-confident was the Khalifa, that he could not believe there was any great difficulty in conquering Egypt; added to this, several sheikhs of Upper Egypt had assured him that when the Dervishes advanced they would be joined by the entire population.

Thus the Khalifa insisted, and Nejumi could not do otherwise than obey. He had already transferred to Dongola the entire Batahin tribe, which had showed a mutinous spirit, and early in 1889 he sent a further detachment, consisting of thirty flags, composed for the most part of Gehena Arabs, who are not warlike, and were most averse to fighting in the Dervish cause. Thus, like lambs to the slaughter, were these unwilling tribes driven forward to battle.

When the revolt in Darfur had been suppressed, and Abyssinia had been humbled, the Khalifa turned his attention more earnestly than ever to the invasion of Egypt. He despatched Yunis ed Dekeim to Dongola, and on his arrival, Nejumi was to begin his advance north.

Nejumi was now nominated Commander-in-chief, and being one of the Mahdi's most determined and fanatical emirs, he had given him the title of "Emir el Umara" ("The Emir of emirs"). He had under his command several brave emirs, such as Abdel Halim, Makin en Nur, Wad Gubara, Sheikh Idris, Osman Azrak, and several others. But the fighting conditions of these Dervishes had considerably changed during the last few years. The Ansar no longer fought for Mahdieh. All those promises of joys in paradise were no longer believed in, for by dying the Mahdi had proved himself to be false, and so were all his prophecies. They did not fight to obtain booty, for long experience had shown them that the booty was exclusively appropriated by the Khalifa and his emirs. It was now fear of the Khalifa's anger which drove them to fight, and numbers of them deserted when a favourable opportunity occurred for them to do so.

Not only were all these feelings at work in Nejumi's force, but also the conditions of the country in which he was operating were very different from those in which he had won all his early victories. Then he knew every path, almost every tree. It was his own country; the inhabitants were of his own race; volunteers flocked to his standards. He always largely exceeded his enemies in point of numbers; but now it was all entirely different. He knew nothing of the country through which he had to march; enormous difficulties blocked his every movement. Even had the population of Upper Egypt been desirous of joining him, they were much too carefully looked after by the troops and the Government to be able to do so. An enormous desert separated him from the position he desired to reach, and the result was that his force—just as Hicks's force had done—suffered greatly from want of water. As usual he was accompanied by numbers of women and children, and sometimes even five dollars would not purchase a drink of water.

Abdullah showed his mistrust of the men by permitting their wives and families to accompany them, for he thought that they could not well run away, leaving their wives and children behind, and therefore they would have to fight; but this great crowd of women and children hampered Nejumi's movements enormously, and still further increased the want which already prevailed in the Dervish camp. When in Dongola, the Gehenas were suffering so terribly from famine that they stole the Dervishes' sheepskins, on which they prayed, and ate them.

It was madness to attempt to invade Egypt with such a force as Nejumi then had, made up of almost every tribe and nationality, all huddled together, and yet absolutely wanting in cohesion. Then the enemy which they were going to fight was of an entirely different stamp to the one they had overcome in the Sudan. The Egyptian was not the same as in the old days. The army was now composed of well-trained battalions under English officers; and it is not out of place here to remark that the occupation of Egypt by England was a heavy blow to the Khalifa and his followers. Often have I heard him say, "If the English would only evacuate Egypt, I should very soon take possession of it."

Thus did Nejumi set out from Dongola with his force. At Sarras a parade was held, and some 14,000 souls counted; but of these nearly half were women and children. His intention was to avoid Halfa, and march direct on Bimban, as the inhabitants of that place had promised to join him; but in the village of Argin, he was attacked and defeated by Colonel Wodehouse. Here Nejumi lost about 1,000 men, amongst whom were several emirs, including Sheikh Idris and Abdel Kader Guru, besides many more wounded. On account of this victory, Wodehouse Pasha was known in the Sudan as "the vanquisher of Wad Nejumi."

But, in spite of his defeat, Nejumi still continued his advance, although the only food he had for his force was camels' and donkeys' meat, and his troops were more dead than alive. He was obliged to make his cavalry into a rear-guard to prevent desertion, but still large numbers succeeded in joining the Egyptian troops.

The Sirdar, General Grenfell Pasha, wrote a letter to Nejumi, in which he showed him that he understood the wretched state his troops had come to, and urging him not to expose uselessly the lives of so many of his people; but take the wise course and surrender. Nejumi, however, boldly replied that if Grenfell Pasha would adopt Mahdiism he would guarantee him happiness and contentment, otherwise he would sweep him and his troops off the face of the earth.

Only one of the two messengers who had been sent with General Grenfell's letter returned with this reply; the other—an Arab named Abdel Hadi—was sent on to Omdurman bearing the General's letter to the Khalifa, who was also informed by Nejumi, that Abdel Hadi had originally been on the Dervish side at Abu Hamed, but had deserted over to the "Turks."[L] On his arrival, Abdullah questioned him closely regarding the latest news of Nejumi and the condition of the opposing armies. Abdel Hadi replied that the "Turks" were very strong, and that it was probable that Nejumi would be defeated. For this saying, he was thrown into prison for months, and would have starved to death had not Neufeld, who was with him in prison, given him some help; he was eventually released through the intermediary of Hajji Saad, and permitted to return to Abu Hamed, whence he escaped back to Egypt.

Meanwhile Nejumi still continued his advance; he could not and would not submit. On the one hand he was of far too proud a nature to submit to the hated Egyptian troops; and on the other, his fear of the Khalifa added to his natural obstinacy. At Toski his advance was arrested by General Grenfell at the head of the Egyptian troops, and he had no other course open but to fight. He was utterly defeated, himself and most of his emirs killed, whilst a mass of men, women and children fell into the hands of the Egyptian force.

This battle took place on the 3rd of August, 1889; by it the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's expedition was avenged, and the project of invading Egypt, which had been maturing for the last three years, entirely collapsed. The news of this defeat caused great commotion in Omdurman; it was at first rumoured that every one had been killed; and the Khalifa was in despair. He hated the Europeans and Egyptians, and though we, in our hearts, were rejoiced at the news, we suffered no small anxiety as well, for we thought it quite possible that the Khalifa would appease his wrath to some extent by venting his annoyance on us. It was, indeed, a most crushing blow for him and his followers.

The Emirs Hassan en Nejumi—a relative of Wad Nejumi—and Siwar ed Dahab, who had escaped from the massacre, returned with all speed to Dongola, and thence to Omdurman. They reported that it was madness of Nejumi to have attempted what he did; that all his emirs were opposed to it, and that they had told Nejumi that they were sure, if the Khalifa were fully informed of all the circumstances, he would never have permitted him to advance. As it was, famine, want of water, and the unseasonable time of the year, ought to have been sufficient reasons for postponing the expedition; but Nejumi turned a deaf ear to all their protests, he feared the Khalifa; his plundering and cruelties cried to heaven for vengeance, and the instruments of that vengeance appeared in the persons of General Grenfell and Colonel Wodehouse.

Saleh Bey, the son of Hussein Pasha Khalifa, and a subsidized sheikh of the Egyptian Government, drove his nephew out of Murat, advanced almost to Abu Hamed, and we fondly hoped that the Government would at least advance to Dongola, which is the key of the Sudan; but we were again doomed to disappointment.

And now Mahdiism was far too exhausted to make any further attempts on Egypt. The province of Dongola had been utterly ruined, and Yunis's ill-treatment of the inhabitants was beyond description. Complaints of his evil deeds eventually reached the Khalifa's ears, and fearing that the inhabitants might be induced to join the "Turks," he relieved Yunis of his appointment, and replaced him by Zogal, who, in spite of his former fall from power, was known to be a just man, and the Khalifa trusted to him to restore the confidence of the people. Yet the Khalifa did not entirely trust Zogal, and still left Mussaid to watch him, he also sent another Baggara called Arabi with three hundred troops to observe his doings.

Dongola now became a hotbed of spying and cross-spying. Matters became so serious that it seemed a fight between the rival parties was imminent, and every post brought letters from either section, accusing the other of malpractices. The Khalifa therefore summoned these two emirs—Mussaid and Arabi—to Dongola, and on their arrival they reported that it was Zogal's intention to deliver up the province to the Egyptian Government. Thereupon the Khalifa recalled Zogal, and replaced him by Yunis.

Zogal, on his arrival in Omdurman, was well received, and did not hesitate to refute the misstatements of the emirs; but he was not believed, and was thrown into chains, where he remains to this day. Zogal's only fault is, that he is a Dongolawi, and a relative of the Mahdi, whilst his opponents are all Baggaras, who are the governing party, and therefore he is not likely to receive any pity from them.

Besides Wad en Nejumi and Abu Anga, there yet remained one of the greatest of the Mahdi's old emirs. I mean Osman Digna, to whom I referred in the early pages of this work. He had been sent to the Eastern Sudan after the fall of El Obeid, and in July 1883, had taken up a position near Sawakin. The Mahdi had given him proclamations to distribute to all the tribes in the neighbourhood of Kassala and Sawakin, ordering them to rise against the Government. The summons was obeyed, and by the end of 1883 Osman Digna was in possession of all the principal posts in the vicinity. The most important work which Osman Digna performed for the Mahdi was cutting the communication between Sawakin and Berber, and thus blocking the shortest and best road into the Sudan. Fully alive to the importance of this route, the Government made repeated attempts to re-open it, but Osman, with his dauntless Hadendoas, caused every effort to fail.

On the 3rd of February, General Baker Pasha made a vain attempt, but was cut to pieces at El Teb, losing over two thousand men and all his arms and ammunition. After Baker's defeat, the English made another effort, and after General Graham had defeated Osman Digna at both Teb and Tamai, the proposal was made to open the road to Berber, and thus relieve Gordon, then besieged in Khartum; but it was thought impossible to fight Osman Digna's hordes, and to overcome the difficulties of the desert, so the idea was abandoned.

For seven long years Osman Digna continued alternately to harass and besiege Sawakin; but gradually numbers of the local Arabs—notably the Amarar—fell away from his cause, and intertribal conflicts ensued. When almost quite deserted, Osman Digna came to Omdurman. In January 1887, he returned vi Gedaref and Kassala, where he collected some four thousand men, eventually occupied Handub, and again besieged Sawakin. He also defeated the Amarar, and killed over seven hundred of them.

Kitchener Pasha, the Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral, was severely wounded during his attack on Handub; in March of the same year Abu Girgeh arrived with a force from Kassala, and thus Osman became almost as powerful as ever. He continued to harass Sawakin, and to devastate the neighbouring country. It was useless for him to attempt to take the town, he therefore received the Khalifa's orders to establish himself at Tokar in January 1889, and at the same time he was permitted to open commercial relations with Sawakin. A small post was established at Handub, and Dervish merchants were actually permitted to enter the town and purchase goods.

These commercial relations existed for about two years between Sawakin and the Dervishes, and, as a famine prevailed at Tokar, the enemy drew most of their supplies through the port of Trinkitat. Suddenly news reached Omdurman to the effect that the gates of Sawakin had been closed, and all traffic stopped between Tokar and Handub. In consequence the famine increased, and merchants arriving in Omdurman said that no doubt it was the intention of the Government to attack Osman Digna very soon.

The wealthiest of these merchants was a certain Omar Kisha, who had smuggled quantities of lead and powder through Sawakin. The news they brought was soon confirmed, and in February 1891, Handub was occupied. In March a message was received from Zogal, in Dongola, to the effect that a salute had been fired at Halfa to announce the occupation of Tokar by the Government, and the complete defeat of Osman Digna. This news created almost a panic in Omdurman, and what made it worse was the uncertainty, for no news had been received either through Berber or Kassala. It was not until eight days later that a Shukrieh Arab arrived from Kassala, and said that he had heard much talk about the defeat at Tokar, but the fate of Osman Digna was uncertain, some said that he had been killed, others, seriously wounded. A month afterwards letters arrived from Osman himself confirming the news of the defeat. This caused great consternation, and the Khalifa at once assembled a council.

It was said that an Egyptian expedition had already reached Berber, and every day it was thought news would arrive of the capture of Dongola. It was decided to make a camp at Metemmeh. The whole of Omdurman was secretly rejoicing at the approaching downfall of the Khalifa, but again we were all doomed to the most bitter disappointment. News came from Berber that the "Turks" had no intention of advancing further, and were content to have occupied Tokar, where they had built a fort and securely established themselves. But, though thus temporarily relieved, the loss of Tokar was a very severe blow to the Khalifa, as the Government was now in immediate contact with the tribes on the Sawakin-Berber road, and the way was clear.

On the last Muled (the anniversary of the Prophet's birth) Osman Digna arrived at Omdurman, accompanied by a few followers. During his flight from Tokar towards Kassala his followers had nothing to eat but wild figs, and many had starved. The Khalifa received Osman very coldly, and reproached him for his defeat; he afterwards sent him to cultivate on the Atbara, where he now lives at a place called Adaramab.

Of all the opponents to Government, Osman Digna was perhaps the most bitter; he had done great things at Sawakin, Kassala, and on the Abyssinian frontier, but by his ruthless cruelty he had alienated the Arabs from his cause. In his present seclusion he has, probably, occasion to think of all his evil and bloodthirsty deeds, which have ended in the ruin of his country and the death of his followers. Almost all the Arabs who espoused his cause with so much zeal are now dead, and his present humiliation is a fitting reward for his blind adherence to a false and ruthless tyrant.

Scarcity of money in the beit et mal at Omdurman was the main reason for the despatch of an expedition up the White Nile. Since 1885 Emin had not been disturbed by the Dervishes, and Karamallah had long since retired to Bahr el Ghazal, from whence no news had been received of him for years.

There was no Dervish post south of Fashoda, which was the market to which the blacks brought their cattle for sale. The negro tribes all along the White Nile had been left quite undisturbed by the Dervishes, but now it occurred to the Khalifa to send an expedition to collect ivory and slaves and to subdue Emin Pasha. Omar Saleh was appointed to command, and was given three steamers and a number of sailing vessels; he was also the bearer of a letter to Emin informing him of the various events which had occurred in the Sudan, and calling on him to surrender to Omar. To add weight to his letter, he also ordered the Syrian Stambuli to write in a similar sense; also some of the Copts in Omdurman were ordered to write to the Copts who were known to be in Emin's service.

Omar Saleh left Omdurman in July 1888, and a whole year passed without any information of his movements reaching Omdurman; it was thought that Emin must have annihilated the expedition and captured the steamers. The Khalifa became restless, but at length one of the steamers returned, laden with ivory and slaves.

We were all naturally most anxious to hear about Emin, and the men who brought the despatches informed us that they had arrived at Regaf in October; this place they took by storm, and had sent down to Omdurman one of the clerks they had taken prisoner there. As to Emin, they stated that he and an Englishman (we thought this Englishman must be the intrepid Stanley) had been put in chains by the mutinous soldiers, because the Englishman wanted to bring Emin to Egypt, as the Khedive had sent him there for that purpose. Omar Saleh had seized this opportunity to take possession of the province, but he had been driven back by the mutineers; this last news was not told the Khalifa, but we heard it in confidence. Omar had begged the Khalifa to send back the steamer without delay, and in consequence it went south again a few days afterwards.

A NATIVE WOMAN OF MAKARAKA, THE WIFE OF ONE OF EMIN PASHA'S OFFICERS, WHO REACHED EGYPT FROM UGANDA IN JUNE 1892.