(a) Brief introductions to the two editions of his Journal. (b) A few literary notices of the Journal by M. Scherer ("Études," III.), and Sainte Beuve ("Causeries du lundi," XII. and XIV.); and an admirable review by M. Aubertin in the "Esprit Public." (c) Incidental notices in the more general works which deal with d'Argenson's ministry. The most important are those by M. le duc de Broglie and M. Zevort. "Sixty thousand livres reward! Lost, between the Rue St. Antoine and the Palais Royal or the Palais des Tuileries an old black dog with a red collar" (the cordon rouge of the order of St. Louis), "who was to be seen about the neighbourhood. Anyone returning the same will receive the above reward. Apply the Abbey of La Madeleine de Traisnel, in the Faubourg St. Antoine" (Buvat, II. p. 102: cf. Marais, I. p. 320). "Il vient d'y avoir un grand changement entre plusieurs nobles dames et messieurs, tant de la ville que de la cour.... Madame d'Argenson, vacante par la mort du chevalier d'OppÈde, a choisi pour consolation le marquis d'Alleurs, jeune homme d'une discrÉtion au-dessus de son Âge" (December 27, 1717). As we have seen, her husband did not go comfortless. See p.16. This letter closes with the post-script: "Pardon; there was a great figure in optics on the other leaf; I have torn it off." The passages (Journal, Rathery, III. pp. 296, 299, 328) upon which this statement is possibly based cannot mean, as the historian would seem to imply, that d'Argenson was in favour of those engagements and opposed to their repudiation. He is merely exclaiming against Fleury because, by his iniquitous acceptance of those engagements, he had been driven to the further iniquity of violating them. D'Argenson, like everybody else, had thought the Pragmatic Sanction preposterous, and no one was more astounded than he at the calm which followed the death of Charles VI. Here is one passage which is chosen from a score: "Quelle conduite! Tout ne demanderait qu'À aller, animer et fortifier le plus faible, rompre la glace, diviser le grand morceau des États Autrichiens; voilÀ À quoi nous n'arriverons point, et quelle occasion perdue!" (Journal, Rathery, III. p. 230). When at last the ice was broken by Frederick, and there is talk of an offensive alliance between France and Prussia, it is true that d'Argenson For the whole episode see passages indicated in Appendix C. D'Argenson's real quarrel with Fleury was (1) that he had subscribed to the Pragmatic Sanction at all; (2) not that he had repudiated it, but that he had neglected to provide himself with a decent excuse for doing so (Ibid., III. pp. 296, 328, &c.). The occurrence of such suggestions is easily explained. M. de Broglie makes no secret of his strong approval of the campaign in Flanders, and of his strong antipathy to Frederick II. In both respects, though in the case of the Flemish campaign he would appear to have no suspicion of it, he is at absolute variance with the French Foreign Minister; and he is consequently constrained to regard him in a spirit which does not conduce to critical appreciation. In the view of the writer, his account of d'Argenson's share in the events of 1745 cannot be taken as even approximately just. Upon the merits of the rival policies it is not our business to decide. It is sufficient to show that d'Argenson's plans were sound and statesmanlike, and "En effet n'en aurions-nous tant fait en faveur de la libertÉ germanique que pour la revoir tombÉe dans son ancien esclavage." Only one hand could have written the word "esclavage." Upon this we remark that the above is based upon "the first instructions which he sends after the unforeseen event of Munich;" that that event destroyed a great system, and created what Frederick described as "a terrible crisis"; and that it was just because d'Argenson realised, with a statesman's breadth of view, the appalling consequences either at home or abroad, that he hesitated to take his choice of disasters. When grave issues are so nicely balanced, precipitation is a sign, not of strength, but of weakness. Frederick, it is true, did not hesitate; and M. de Broglie aptly supplies the reason. A man does not hesitate about the next move when he has no alternative but to throw up the game (De Broglie, "Marie ThÉrÈse," I. p. 219, &c., cf. Zevort, pp. 137, 138). The note may be read with equanimity, for it only marks the reappearance of an ideal regret, to be met with occasionally in d'Argenson's Journal—a regret for the policy of merely indirect interference which he sometimes mentions in connection with "un habile homme tel que M. Chauvelin." His "Il en arrivera ce qui pourra, bien, j'espÈre; mais pour la paix et un armistice dans le statu quo, il n'y faut plus penser" (De Broglie, "Marie ThÉrÈse." I. p. 211). It is admitted that d'Argenson was not the prime mover in the policy of the Council; he looked upon that policy as little short of desperate; but he accepted it as a choice between two evil alternatives; and, as we shall find, he did everything mortal man could do to make it a success. The writer believes that there is ample evidence to show where it might have been found; and also that, by M. de Broglie's own criterion, it should be one of the most important records of the time. The evidence is such as the historian, upon his own admission, would probably accept as conclusive. It is the critical question of d'Argenson's ministry, and is dealt with fully in Appendix A.
"It appears that the King of Poland, having always regarded the continuance of the French army in the neighbourhood of Frankfort as an obstacle to the success of the views which he has formed from the beginning in regard to the imperial crown, is on the point of declaring himself a candidate." It is absurd to suppose that d'Argenson really meant this, or looked upon the retreat as a subject of congratulation. It was simply one of the kaleidoscopic movements by which events, affected as they were by successive disasters, might still be made to look beautiful. The resource, perhaps, was a little ridiculous; but it is hard to see what he would have done without it. ' "It was not for general incapacity that the Marquis d'Argenson was dismissed, nor for having forgotten one day to open the despatches from Genoa. It was because he was obstinately attached to a false policy, to a policy disapproved by Maurice de Saxe, who at this moment was governing France" (p. 152). These letters are far from reflecting the very poor opinion of d'Argenson which is said to have been prevalent at Court. Such may have been the opinion of his political rivals and of the circle of Madame de Pompadour, to which d'Argenson, in person and principle, was consistently opposed. It might well have acquired the substance of a tradition, and have affected later criticism unduly. In and throughout that year France had but one competitor on the continent—Austria. The position of Prussia—if in connection with France and Austria we may assign her the dignity of a position—was in the highest degree precarious. No one knew it better than the Prussian king himself. There was probably not a moment in the course of the year when he did not feel himself to be within an ace of destruction; not an episode but betrays his anxiety for escape with honour. His efforts for peace in January; his desperate overtures at London after the death of the Emperor; his earnest, eloquent entreaties to maintain the Elector of Bavaria and the Prince of Conti; his dull bitterness and despair at the Convention of Augsburg and the withdrawal of the French from Germany; his continued pressure upon England, ending in the Treaty of Hanover; finally, his studious moderation when he appeared as a conqueror in Dresden; all point to but one conclusion. His position was, and he knew it be, desperate; and it was only the headlong courage of desperation that enabled him to see the year out safely. The definitive rise of Prussia is probably to be dated from the Peace of Dresden, and not one moment before. Moreover it cannot have been immediately apparent. One year after the treaty of peace d'Argenson fell; and during that year Prussia was recovering from the effects of the war, and her ambitions The truth of the matter appears to be this. Events were rapidly tending towards, though they had not yet reached, a condition of which d'Argenson had often dreamed. Prussia, if her power developed, might one day be strong enough to stand alone against the Austrian House; and France would be free to watch the contest, and might leave the rivals to ruin each other. But this was still in the future; and the time was yet apparently distant when a responsible French minister could entertain the idea of an Austrian alliance. It is true that there was already an Austrian party in the Council; there is always such a party in any council. There are men who cannot resist the fascination of cheap success, who are devoted to a policy of ease with honour. They are not prominent in the ranks of statesmen. "Ces rentes tournantes qu'a introduites ici Duverney, À l'imitation de l'Angleterre, sont des prÉcautions que le maÎtre prend contre le maÎtre; emprunteur, il fait impÔt, et destine tous les ans une partie de cet impÔt pour rembourser; par lÀ il charge davantage ses finances et ses peuples tout À la fois; et, comme il ne dÉpense pas avec moins de facilitÉ et de lÉgÈretÉ, il charge toujours davantage et les maltÔtes ne cessent plus. Un prince sage devrait prendre le fond d'amortissement sur ses Épargnes seules" (Journal, Rathery, V. p. 442). D'Argenson's ideas on economics are marked by his usual acuteness and independence. He was not a member of the physiocratic school; and though he joined the Economists in deploring the sacrifice of agriculture to manufacturing industry, he did not share their peculiar views as to the exclusive value of land. He was one of the earliest and soundest of Free Traders, maintaining that commerce should not be interfered with except for purely fiscal purposes.
Thus, he denounces the "pernicious system" of the traffic in judicial positions; but in his definite Plan of 1764 (1737) he says not a word of it, owing to the practical difficulty of reimbursing those whose interests would be sacrificed to the reform. He goes no further than to provide, in Article 51, against the growth of the abuse in connection with the new municipal offices which he proposes to create. In course of time however he became convinced that the nation would be benefitted, and that funds might be raised for compensating office-holders, by the sale of the Crown lands; and accordingly in the Plan of 1784 (1755), the practical difficulty being overcome, the "pernicious system," untouched by the project of 1764 (1737), is swept away at a stroke. Again, as to the nobility. It is true that in Chapter VIII. Article 2, pp. 305-8 [1764 (1737)], d'Argenson formulates certain objections to the principle of a hereditary noble class; and further, that he dilates elsewhere upon the harm done by the survival of the vexatious feudal privileges exacted by the noblesse. Yet in his definite Plan he neither touches the nobility as a class, nor does he lay a finger upon any of the privileges pertaining to it. On the contrary, the continuance of the seigneurial jurisdictions, which are deliberately abolished in the later scheme of 1784 (1755), is incidentally recognised, p. 221 (1764). The facts with regard to the three classes mentioned by M. Martin may be stated as follows:— As to the destruction of the nobility, nothing could have been further No more cruelly keen-sighted man than d'Argenson ever lived. He only differs from most men of equal vision in that his clear perception of life as it was did not breed in him disgust and cynical acceptance. His mind could command two worlds, the real and the ideal; but only intimate knowledge can follow him at will into either, or avoid the critical gaucherie of mistaking aspiration for illusion. "Mardi, 8 avril, 1738, au Palais Roial. "M. de Fontenelle a lu plusieurs chapitres du manuscrit; il panse comme vous sur les elexions des officiers municipaux, et trouve que sans y panser vous parlez fort eloquemment et fortement, et souvent avec des alluzions trÈs justes et trÈs gracieuses. "Pour moi, je panse aussi trÈs souvent comme vous, et que vous pouvez aller loin si vous continuez À mÉditer et À Écrire. "Vous verrez dans le petit cahier (above referred to) les observations que j'ai faites en lizant vÔtre manuscrit, que je vous invite À perfexionner de plus en plus; et surtout À l'accusation de notre extrÊme indolence sur la pernicieuse mÉtode de la vÉnalitÉ des emplois publics. "M. de Fontenelle croit que M. d'Aube serait bien aize de lire vÔtre manuscrit; il en est digne, et est de vos amis; il Écrit aussi sur quelques matiÈres de gouvernement. "C'est À vous de juger de mes observations, at À les rectifier. "L'ABÉ DE ST. PIERRE." The origin of this, at first sight, astonishing suggestion is not very hard to discover. The historian happened to have read the "ConsidÉrations" in the edition of 1784. Unaware of the divergencies between the two editions, he of course assumed that it was the Plan published in 1784 in reference to which Voltaire was writing; and failing very naturally to understand how, in regard to it, Voltaire could have meant what he said, was driven to suggest that he said what he did not mean; that, in short, Voltaire thought d'Argenson a fool, and chose to flatter him for his own purposes. This is a grave imputation upon both men; and the grounds for it disappear entirely when Voltaire's letters are read in connection with the Plan of 1764 (1737), of which he was actually writing. His meaning at once becomes natural and clear. D'Argenson had been arguing against over-centralisation, and had advocated the introduction of local government upon a very modest scale. Voltaire replies that a system not dissimilar in effect, was already at work in England; that there local affairs proceeded without the intervention of a Council of State; and that the law-abiding character of the English people was largely due to their habit of local self-government. The argument is quite clear, and is simply destroyed by equivocal interpretation. Voltaire's feeling on receiving the book was one of keen surprise and warm admiration. For months afterwards his letters are witness to the impression it produced upon him. So cordial and frank are they that it was at first difficult to conceive by what process the idea of insincerity could have been fathered upon them. Had Voltaire really written in such a spirit, not only his reputation as a critic but his honour as a man would have suffered very gravely. For months past d'Argenson had been straining every nerve to defend him from "the literary police;" and to have written to his protector as the historian suggests, would have been an act of black dishonour. It is true that there were men before whom Voltaire could abase and debase himself; but d'Argenson the philosophe, his old school friend, was not one of them. With the exception of Count d'Argental, there is not one of his correspondents to whom Voltaire writes with such openness and freedom. "Cependant le Roi est trÈs mal conseillÉ; il se donne toujours tort et donne toujours raison au parlement. On le dÉgrade peu À peu, surtout dans le siÉcle lumineux et philosophique oÙ nous vivons. Si Henri III. fut obligÉ de se mettre À la tÊte de la Ligue, Louis XV. devrait se mettre À la tÊte de la philosophie, de la justice et de la raison pour rÉtablir son pouvoir et son bonheur; qu'il se constitue hardiment le chef des rÉformateurs de l'État pour conduire mieux qu'eux les rÉparations que demande la situation de la France" (Journal, Rathery, IX. p. 222). |
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