Town of Sinope—Osman Pacha—The Mussulmans—The Black Sea Squadron—Exploit of Captain Drummond—Sebastopol Harbor—Achmet Pacha—Citate—The Battle—Turkey, as a Military Power—Christian Population—War in Asia—England and France—Declaration of War—Embarkation of Troops. We have alluded to the affair of Sinope, but not in terms sufficiently strong to stigmatize its atrocity. The fleet under the command of Osman Pasha was not cruizing in the Black Sea with any intention of provoking hostilities on the part of the Russians: its sole mission was to keep up communication between Constantinople and the army of Anatolia, the Turks, while thus engaged, relying upon the good faith of the Czar, who had undertaken to act only upon the defensive so long as the negotiations with the Western Powers were pending. Nor had Osman Pacha any reason for suspecting that so flagrant a breach of faith would be committed, although three Russian men of war had been observed on the 27th November reconnoitring off the post. Fatal, however, was this reliance on the honor of Nicholas; for, on the 30th November, about mid-day, and under cover of a dense fog, a Russian squadron, consisting of three three-deckers, three two-deckers, two frigates, and three steamers, entered the bay of Sinope, while several frigates Sinope is a town of some little importance, about one hundred miles from the Bosphorus, and nearly facing Sebastopol; its dockyards and arsenal, covering a considerable extent of ground, were ill protected by a few insignificant batteries. Resistance on the part of the Turks was almost hopeless, as their entire squadron mounted altogether only 406 guns, while the Russian ships carried no less than 760, and those mostly of very heavy calibre. As soon as he had entered the bay, the Russian admiral brought his ships deliberately to an anchor, sending at the same time an officer to demand the unconditional surrender of Osman Pacha’s fleet. He scarcely awaited the delivery of this message, but immediately opened fire on the enemy, whose force, if duly estimated, was at least three times greater than his own. So unequal was the contest, that it can only be regarded as a massacre: in three hours and a half the Turkish squadron was annihilated. The courage displayed by the Mussulmans in this affair cannot be too highly lauded. Most of the captains were killed, or blown up with their ships: out of 4,575 men composing their crews, 4,155 were killed in the engagement, 120 were taken prisoners, and 300 were wantonly slaughtered in the conflagration of the defenceless town,—a worthy consummation to this disgraceful act of piracy, the details of which aroused the universal execration of the world. The Emperor, on the other hand, was unable to dissemble his delight, and readily accepted this massacre as The news of the disaster occasioned great consternation at Constantinople. The crews of the allied squadron began naturally enough to inquire among themselves whether they had been summoned to the Bosphorus to be passive spectators of deeds such as we have detailed. At six o’clock on the morning of the 3d January, 1854, the Anglo-Gallic squadron entered the Black Sea. The English squadron was composed of nineteen ships, carrying 1,030 guns. The French, fifteen ships and 962 guns. They were accompanied by a few Turkish steamers, each carrying about 1000 troops, and a large supply of ammunition and provisions for the army in Asia. At this time the Russian force in the Black Sea was composed of six ships each of 120 guns, eight of 80 guns, and eight each of 50 or 60 guns, also three steamers, fifteen corvettes, and a few smaller vessels. At this conjuncture the representatives of the great Western Powers addressed a letter to the Governor of Sebastopol, announcing that the Anglo-Gallic fleet had been ordered to the Black Sea to protect the shores that fringe the Ottoman territory against any act of aggression: they, moreover, expressed a diplomatic hope that his This letter was deficient in one main essential, since it studiously avoided announcing that the combined fleet was engaged in convoying a Turkish squadron, laden with munitions of war, having, moreover, undertaken to defend it against any attack. There is something in this omission which might be characterized by a stronger designation than excessive caution. One copy of the epistle, however—such as it was—signed by General Baraguay d’Hilliers, was intrusted to a French officer, commissioned to deliver it to Prince Menschikoff in person. That officer embarked on board H. M. S. Retribution, whose captain (Drummond), with the copy bearing Lord Redcliffe’s signature, taking advantage of a dense fog, and without any pilot, boldly steamed into the very harbor of Sebastopol. Two shots were fired as a signal to bring to, but they were disregarded; whereupon a Russian officer, in a state of considerable excitement, hailed the frigate from a boat, emphatically announcing that no vessel of war could be permitted to enter the harbor, and that consequently the Retribution must forthwith retire. This requisition Captain Drummond refused to comply with until the object of his mission had been accomplished. He was then informed that the Governor was not in Sebastopol. The commander of the Retribution inquired for the deputy-governor, to whom he delivered his despatches; and it is said that this unfortunate officer was degraded to the ranks for permitting an English man-of-war to make her way without opposition into a port so jealously guarded. While the parley between the English commander and the deputy-governor was going on, the officers of the Retribution, by the aid of cameras and pencils, took a series of sketches of the works of Sebastopol, and thus made themselves masters of all the information which the Russians had any interest in concealing. On the 6th January, just as the allied fleets had taken possession of the Black Sea in order to retain a “material guarantee” equivalent to that of the Wallachian provinces, so unwarrantably seized by the Czar, the army of Abdul Medjid on the Danube was preparing to prove itself worthy of the important alliance he had just concluded. His soldiers had shown well enough at Sinope that they knew how to die: at Citate they satisfied Europe that they knew how to fight. Though, for the most part, inexperienced levies, they were more than a match for the veterans of the Czar, many of whom had for years past been inured to hard fighting in the Caucasus, while many more had seen something of warfare in the Hungarian campaign. The Russians having determined to attack Kalafat, where Achmet Pacha had resolved to establish himself in force, began to manoeuvre so as to reduce within the narrowest limits the Ottoman position: they threw up also a considerable number of field-works, so as to command almost every approach. Achmet Pacha felt that the moment had arrived when it was incumbent upon him to act with vigor, if he did not wish to break the spirit or lower the morale of his men. Till the last moment, however, he divulged his plans to no one; nor did he, till the hour had arrived, intimate his intention of Citate is little more than a village, situate upon a gradual slope commanding the surrounding plain, which is bounded by two ravines. That on the eastern extremity is steep, abutting upon a lake, to the rear of which is a long level tract, extending to the Danube. The western gully is less abrupt, and inclines gradually towards a hill behind the village. The main road to Kalafat lies in a north-westerly direction between these ravines. On a height above Citate, and to the left of the road, the Russians had thrown up a redoubt, which subsequently had the effect of preserving them from absolute destruction. Achmet Pacha selected for this enterprise three regiments of cavalry, thirteen battalions of infantry (altogether 11,000 men), and twenty guns. At sunset on the evening of the 5th January, the chosen band silently quitted Kalafat, reaching the village of Maglovit at eight o’clock. Some few found shelter in the deserted houses, but the greater part bivouacked without fire and without shelter. The ground was covered with half melted snow: the men were consequently compelled to keep on foot till daybreak, when the bugle summoned them to proceed to the scene of the impending action. Two Turkish battalions were posted, with two guns, on the road, one in the village of Maglovit, the other in that of Orenja, to keep up the communication with Kalafat. A reserve of seven battalions was stationed at the foot of the hill already alluded to, while the other four battalions, with six guns (under the command of Ismail Pacha, who At noon every dwelling in the village had been captured, and the Russians were retreating in tolerable order along the road; but they there found themselves confronted by two fresh regiments of Turkish cavalry, which had advanced unperceived along the ravine to the right of the village. Thus situated, the Russians had no alternative but to take shelter with their guns behind their redoubt. As might have been expected, the intelligence of this engagement had already reached the Russians quartered in the surrounding villages, and reinforcements to the extent of 10,000 men and sixteen guns, might be seen rapidly advancing in various directions upon the Turkish reserve, which was well prepared to receive them. The Russians were marching in the direction of Kalafat, so as to place the Turks between two fires. The Mussulman generals, however, though in a critical position, concerted measures well, and at the proper moment, after having again displayed the superiority of their artillery, led their gallant battalions against the enemy, who speedily took to flight, strewing the ground with an immense quantity of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. The Turks had now been eight hours under arms, besides having bivouacked, in the depth of winter, without fire, on the muddy ground; but they were still eager to attack the redoubt, where the Russians remained literally penned in like sheep. Achmet Pacha, however, sounded a retreat, which was executed in perfect order. The Turks left 338 We have been thus particular in the details of this action, because it was, in fact, one of the most important of the campaign. The Ottoman troops, elated with so decisive a victory over a detested foe, were now only anxious to be led again to battle. On the 7th, Omer Pacha, who had hastened to the spot on hearing of the achievement of this division of his army, gratified their wishes, and on that and the three following days engagements took place, each terminating in results favorable to the cause of the Sultan. Turkey thus at once resumed her position as a military power, and gave earnest, that when the ten or twelve millions, constituting her Christian population, shall have accepted the offer of the Sultan to bear arms like their Mahometan fellow-subjects, she will be in a position to protect herself against any aggression. Time of course must elapse before this takes place; but enough has been done to prove that the protection of England and France need not be always indispensable to the existence of the Turkish empire. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to follow the hostile armies on the Danube through all their operations. It will be sufficient to observe, that after the various engagements in the neighborhood of Kalafat, Omer Pacha resumed the plan on which he had previously proceeded While the events we have related were proceeding, the war was being carried on with vigor on the frontier of Asia: numerous conflicts took place, attended with much slaughter, but not with any very commensurate results. The most important battle was that of Akhaltzik, claimed by the Russian General, Prince Andronikoff, as a great victory. Like that of Sinope, it was celebrated at Petersburg by a solemn Te Deum; “The most pious Czar,” in the words of the Government organ, “thanking the Lord of lords for the success of the Russian arms in the sacred combat for the orthodox faith.” (!) The allied squadron in the Black Sea, after having escorted a Turkish squadron freighted with supplies to Batoum, Trebizonde, and Checkvetil, reconnoitred the Russian fleet in Sebastopol, and returned to the Bosphorus. England and France having announced to the world their intention of affording to Turkey both moral and material support, but their moral aid having failed to avert the invasion of the Danubian provinces, the massacre of Sinope, or the treachery of Austria, masked as it was under the guise of friendship, it became incumbent on the two Western Powers to abandon at once all further discussion, and to appeal to the stern but inevitable arbitrament of the sword. The Queen’s declaration of war appeared in the Gazette Great now was the activity displayed at the naval port, and arsenals of England and France. From Portsmouth and Southampton regiment after regiment were embarked—ships were commissioned faster almost than they could be got ready for sea—and additional reinforcements were despatched in all haste to Sir Charles Napier’s magnificent Baltic fleet, which sailed from Spithead on the 11th of March. |