BATTLE HONOURS FOR THE CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB

Moodkee—Ferozeshah—Aliwal—Sobraon—Chillianwallah—Multan—Goojerat—Punjab.

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The British conquest of the Punjab embraces two distinct phases—the one represented by the Sutlej Campaign of 1845-46, the other better known as the Punjab War of 1849. The extension of our dominions to the North-West, the gradual break-up and absorption of the hitherto independent principalities in Southern and Central India, had brought our frontiers conterminous with those of the powerful Sikh monarchy of Runjeet Singh. That monarch was a well-wisher—outwardly, at any rate—of his neighbours, and during the Afghan War he proved his loyalty to us. On his death the sovereignty of the Sikhs fell into the hands of a group bitterly hostile to the English, and it was evident that there were members of the Sikh Regency who believed that the overthrow of the British was a matter of comparative ease. Into the merits of the quarrel it is not my province to enter. Suffice it to say that on December 11 the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej, the boundary river between the two kingdoms, and that the crossing constituted an act of war.

In those far-off days our frontier stations were Ferozepore and Ludhiana, with Umballa in support. Ferozepore was the headquarters of a division, commanded by a sterling soldier, who had done good service in the Gwalior Campaign—Sir John Littler. It consisted of the 62nd (Wiltshire) Regiment, two batteries of horse, and two of field artillery, two regiments of native cavalry, and seven battalions of native infantry.

At Ludhiana, some eighty miles to the east, lay another division, under Brigadier Wheler, comprising the 50th (Royal West Kent), two batteries of horse artillery, three regiments of native cavalry, and five battalions of native infantry.

At Umballa, under Sir Walter Gilbert, a well-known soldier and equally well-known sportsman, were the 9th (Norfolks), 31st (East Surrey), and 80th (South Staffords), the 3rd Light Dragoons (now 3rd Hussars), two regiments of native cavalry, with the Governor-General's Bodyguard and five battalions of native infantry. At Kussowlie was the 29th (Worcesters), and at Subathoo the 1st Bengal Europeans (now the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers), both these battalions being at the disposal of Sir Walter Gilbert.

Thus, at the three frontier stations there was a total force of some 22,000 men ready to face the Sikh advance. At Meerut, which was the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery, there were three horse and three field batteries, the 9th and 16th Lancers, the 10th Foot (the Lincolns), and a considerable force of native infantry, with one regiment of native cavalry.

The Sikh army was known to be superior in every way to any army we had yet met in India, both in training and in material. There were a considerable number of foreign officers in the employ of the Sikhs, and the men had a high reputation, which they maintain to this day, of being equal to the best material of which any army, whether European or Asiatic, can boast. Of its numbers at that time we had no accurate estimate. The Chief Political Officer, Major Broadfoot, who fell gloriously at Ferozeshah, reported that it consisted of upwards of 100,000 men, and that the Sikh plan of campaign was to invade British India with two powerful armies of 50,000 each—with the one to overwhelm Littler at Ferozepore, with the other to attack Wheler at Ludhiana. Fortunately for us, at the moment when their services and their friendly co-operation were most needed, both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were on the spot. The Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, was a soldier of renown. He had served with Moore at Corunna, had rallied the men at Albuera with the now historic saying, "Die hard, my men—die hard!" and had lost an arm at Ligny, when attached to BlÜcher's army, the day before Waterloo. The Commander-in-Chief was a well-known fighter, and the forerunner of a family of equally heroic men. Sir Hugh Gough was an old comrade of the Governor-General's. He, too, had fought throughout the Peninsular War, but he had won his spurs at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope in 1805. At Barrosa under Graham, at Tarifa under Skerret, and in many a hard tussle under Wellington, Gough and the 87th (Royal Irish Fusiliers) had won imperishable renown. He had in more recent days shown himself as good a leader of an army as he had been commander of a regiment. In the China War of 1842 he had paved the way for the victory at Maharajpore. With two such soldiers in the field, the Khalsa army, despite its numbers, its organization, and the bravery of its men, was likely to meet its match.

Hard though the campaign was—and for some days the fate of our Indian Empire hung in the balance—no blame can be attached to the military authorities for any shortcomings that were disclosed during this campaign. On December 11 the Sikhs, crossing the Sutlej, cut in between Ferozepore and Umballa. On the following day the Commander-in-Chief moved out of Umballa to meet them. The din of battle was music in the ears of the war-worn Governor-General, and he blithely accompanied the army. On the 17th the Ludhiana division joined that of Umballa, and on the 18th the Sikhs and British met at Moodkee. Our troops had covered 150 miles in seven days, and, as Sir Charles Gough puts it in terse and soldier-like language, "wearied with long and incessant marching, the troops were enjoying a well-earned rest, when reports came in from the cavalry patrols that a large force of Sikhs was advancing upon them." Orders were at once given to fall in, and in a very few moments the force was formed in order of battle. The cavalry, with the horse artillery, immediately advanced, under Sir Hugh Gough's personal direction, and formed line in front of the Sikh position, the guns occupying the centre, with the cavalry on either flank. The infantry formed up in second line and moved forward. On the extreme right was Wheler's brigade, the next stood Bolton's, and then in succession a brigade of native regiments belonging to Gilbert's division, which had not yet been joined by the British battalions from Kussowlie; whilst to the left stretched Sir John McCaskill's division, which comprised the 9th (Norfolks) and the 80th (South Staffords), with three native battalions; and so commenced the opening scene in the drama which culminated at Goojerat two years later.

Moodkee, December 18, 1845.

This battle honour was conferred on the regiments present under Lord Gough at the stubbornly contested fight at Moodkee. It is now borne by the following regiments:

3rd Hussars.
Norfolk.
East Surrey.
Royal West Kent.
South Staffords.
Gov.-General's Bodyguard.
3rd Skinner's Horse.
6th K.E.O. Cavalry.
5th Light Infantry.
7th Rajputs.

Moving forward with his cavalry and horse artillery, Sir Hugh Gough opened a heavy fire on the Sikh line, in order to give time for his infantry to deploy and his field batteries to come up into line. Then the cavalry opened out and threatened both flanks of the enemy. The infantry pushed resolutely forward. They were received with equal resolution on the part of our gallant foes. Night put an end to the conflict, but the success was ours. Seventeen guns remained in our hands. Our losses had been most severe, numbering 872 of all ranks killed and wounded.

Casualties at the Battle of Moodkee.

The casualties in the native regiments which have disappeared from the Army List are not given.

Ferozeshah, December 21, 1845.

This battle honour is inscribed on the colours of the

3rd Hussars.
Norfolk.
Worcesters.
East Surrey.
Royal West Kent.
Wiltshire.
South Staffords.
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Governor-General's Bodyguard.
3rd (Skinner's Horse).
6th K.E.O. Cavalry.
1st P.W.O. Sappers and Miners.
4th Rajputs.
5th Rajputs.
7th Rajputs.

On the 20th, the day after Moodkee, the two battalions of British troops—the 29th (Worcesters) and 1st Europeans (Munster Fusiliers)—joined the army, and Gough at once advanced again to meet the Sikhs, and at the same time Sir John Littler moved out of Ferozepore to effect a junction with headquarters, leaving two native battalions to hold the cantonment. The force now at Sir Hugh Gough's disposal was as follows:

At 3 a.m. the force, under the Commander-in-Chief, struck its camp, and four hours later Littler also left his cantonments. It was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to attack the enemy without waiting for the junction of Littler's force, but the Governor-General vetoed the plan, so that it was nearly dusk before the Sikh entrenchments were attacked. The Sikhs fought even more stubbornly than at Moodkee. Littler's attack on the left was checked, the 62nd (Wiltshires) losing 20 officers and 281 non-commissioned officers and men in twenty minutes. The fault was not theirs; they were not properly supported by the Bengal regiments. As one eyewitness put it: "Jack Sepoy fights well enough on occasions, but this was not one of his fighting-days." The 12th and 14th Bengal Infantry, however, did show much courage and determination. It was the purely native brigade, under Ashburnham, which hung back, and this was attributed to the fact that it contained no British battalion to stiffen the sepoy corps. Littler's check took place before the Commander-in-Chief had delivered his attack. The Sikhs, triumphant in having driven back one British column, fought with more than usual determination. The main assault took place by echelon from the right, Sir Hugh Gough leading that column in person, whilst the Governor-General cheered on the centre, he having placed his services at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

Night fell on a scene of great confusion. On the extreme right Gilbert's division had carried the Sikh entrenchments, on the left Littler had been repulsed, and in the centre Sir Harry Smith's division had borne away to the left, and was cut off from the main army. Men and officers were worn out with fatigue and chilled with the bitter cold of a Punjab night. It was impossible to light fires without drawing down the fire of the enemy, who were much elated at the result of the engagement, and who throughout the night kept up an incessant artillery fire on our bivouac. One heavy gun in particular caused especial annoyance, and Sir Henry Hardinge called upon the 80th to silence it. The men nobly responded to the call. In perfect silence they advanced to the edge of the Sikh entrenchments, and then, headed by their Colonel, Bunbury, and supported by the "Dirty Shirts" (Royal Munsters), they dashed over the parapet with a cheer, bayoneting the gunners, spiking the gun, and driving off all the Sikhs in the vicinity. This little episode showed the Sikhs that the fight was not yet won. The Commander-in-Chief determined to renew it on the morrow, and the Governor-General, who felt that the fate of India hung in the balance, was equally firm in his resolve to support the Chief. "Better that our bones should bleach honourably on the field of battle than retire," was the response to a suggestion to fall back.

When dawn broke on the 22nd it was found that Sir Harry Smith, who had clung to the village of Ferozeshah during the night, had effected a junction with the division under Littler, and that both divisions were now in front of the extreme right of the Sikh position. They were too distant to join in the final attack on the entrenchments, which was delivered in the early dawn, the Commander-in-Chief leading the division on the right, the Governor-General that on the left. The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery fire, and under its cover the infantry, forgetting fatigue, cold, and hunger, swept forward with unhesitating devotion, and carried the entrenchments at the point of the bayonet. Our losses in this battle were terribly severe—not merely in numbers. Whole regiments were decimated, but amongst the dead were men who had helped to build up our Indian Empire, and whose names are imperishably engraved on the military history of our country. The total casualties amounted to 2,415 killed and wounded, including 115 British officers.

No means existed of ascertaining the enemy's losses, but that they were most severe was undoubted. They abandoned their entrenched position, and recrossed the frontier, leaving seventy-three guns in our hands. But the campaign was not over. Reinforcements were called up from Meerut, Delhi, and Cawnpore, and on January 6 Sir John Grey arrived at headquarters with the 9th and 16th Lancers, the 10th Foot (Lincolns), two regiments of native cavalry and three of native infantry, whilst the 53rd (Shropshire Light Infantry) was within a few days' march.

Casualties at the Battle of Ferozeshah.

The Sikhs, too, were by no means disheartened, and towards the middle of January a strong force crossed the Sutlej and threatened our line of communication at Ludhiana. Sir Harry Smith was detached to attack them, which he did at Aliwal, having fought a successful little action on January 20 at Buddiwal.

Aliwal, January 28, 1868.

The following regiments have been awarded this battle honour:

16th Lancers.
East Surrey.
West Kent.
Shropshire Light Infantry.
Gov.-General's Bodyguard.
3rd Skinner's Horse.
7th Rajputs.
13th Shekhawati Regiment.
1st Gurkhas.
2nd Gurkhas.

Sir Harry Smith, the hero of Aliwal, was an officer who had seen considerable service in the Rifle Brigade, having been present at practically every engagement during the Peninsular War, either as Adjutant of the Rifle Brigade or on the staff of the Light Division. He at this time wore only the Waterloo medal, for a grateful country had not as yet recognized the services of the Peninsular veterans. His division constituted a very efficient fighting force. There were four batteries of horse and one of field artillery. His cavalry was in two brigades—

—the two brigades being under a distinguished officer, Brigadier-General Cureton, who was to fall two years later at the head of the cavalry brigade at Ramnuggur.

The total strength was 3,000 cavalry and 7,100 infantry, with twenty-eight field-guns and two 8-inch howitzers. Covering his front with his cavalry and horse artillery, Sir Harry Smith, who was a consummate drill, advanced in true light division order against the Sikhs, who held a position with their rear resting on the River Sutlej, close by the village of Aliwal. On the extreme right was Stedman's cavalry brigade, then in succession Godby's and Hick's infantry, with three batteries and the howitzers in the centre; then came Wheler's and Wilson's brigades, with two batteries between them, and on the left the 16th Lancers, with the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry.

Casualties at the Battle of Aliwal.

The village of Aliwal was carried at the point of the bayonet by the brigades of Godby and Hicks, whilst those of Wheler and Wilson attacked the Sikh entrenchment. Cureton, a born cavalry leader, was watching his opportunity, and as the infantry swarmed over the entrenchments, the 16th swept down on the Sikh infantry through an opening on the extreme right. The Sikhs hurriedly threw themselves into squares. The Red Lancers charged ere they had time to complete their formation, and, reforming on the far side, charged again in splendid style. The infantry brigade gave effective support to Cureton's cavalry, never allowing the Sikhs a moment to rally, but pressing them back step by step to the river, into which at last they were driven in utter rout, with the loss of sixty-seven guns and all their camp equipage. Our total losses in this engagement were 580 men killed and wounded, but the results were far-reaching, for the whole of the Cis-Sutlej provinces of the Sikh Raj made their submission to the British, and passed away for ever from the domination of the Khalsa.

Sobraon, February 10, 1846.

This, the final defeat of the Sikhs on the banks of the Sutlej, is commemorated on the colours and appointments of the

3rd Hussars.
9th Lancers.
16th Lancers.
Norfolks.
Lincoln.
Worcesters.
East Surrey.
Royal West Kent.
Shropshire Light Infantry.
Wiltshires.
South Staffords.
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Gov.-General's Bodyguard.
2nd (Gardner's Horse).
6th K.E.O. Cavalry.
4th Rajputs.
5th Light Infantry.
6th Jat Light Infantry.
1st P.W.O. Sappers and Miners.
7th Rajputs.
8th Rajputs.
1st Gurkhas.
2nd Gurkhas.
9th Gurkhas.

The undoubted success gained by Sir Harry Smith at Aliwal infused fresh spirit into our troops, and now every preparation was made for the final bout with the Sikhs. On February 7 the siege-train arrived in the Commander-in-Chief's camp, and on the following day Sir Harry Smith rejoined headquarters. The Sikhs had not been idle. They had thrown up most formidable entrenchments at Sobraon, on the banks of the Sutlej, covering the ford on the direct road to Lahore. To attack this was no easy task, for the Commander-in-Chief had to provide against a counter-attack on the part of our gallant foes, who in point of numbers, as in mobility, were far our superiors. To avoid this contingency, Sir John Littler, with his division, watched the fords in front of Ferozepore; Sir John Grey, with three battalions of sepoys and a regiment of native cavalry, watched those midway between that place and Sobraon; whilst Brigadier-General Wheler fronted the Sutlej near Ludhiana.

The cavalry was now under the command of Sir Joseph Thackwell, an officer of the highest distinction, who had served throughout the Peninsular War, lost an arm at Waterloo, and finally added to his reputation in Kabul and at Maharajpore. He, with the 16th Lancers and three regiments of native cavalry, was to threaten the Sikh left above Sobraon. Next to him came the division led by Sir Harry Smith, consisting of the 31st (East Surrey), the 50th (West Kent), and four sepoy battalions. Our centre was composed of Sir Walter Gilbert's division, which contained the 29th (Worcesters), 1st Bengal Europeans (1st Munsters), and four sepoy battalions. On our left was a division commanded by another Peninsular and Waterloo veteran—Sir Robert Dick. This, which was to lead the attack, comprised the 10th (Lincolns), 53rd (Shropshire Light Infantry), 80th (South Stafford), with three battalions of sepoys; and in Dick's second line were the 9th (Norfolks), 62nd (Wiltshire), with one sepoy battalion. The artillery, which numbered sixty guns, was distributed throughout the whole front.

The troops got under arms at 2 a.m., it being the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to attack at dawn; but such a dense fog hung over the river that the actual advance was delayed until nine o'clock, when the three horse batteries attached to Sir Robert Dick's division galloped to the front, and opened a very heavy fire on the Sikh entrenchments. Under cover of this, Stacey's brigade, which included the Lincolns and Shropshires, moved steadily forward. When within 300 yards of the entrenchments, they were threatened by a body of cavalry, and also came under the enfilading fire of a battery, which inflicted heavy loss on the 53rd. Then, cheering on his men, Dick carried the first line of trenches with a charge, the brave old General meeting his death-wound in the mÊlÉe. On the extreme right Sir Harry Smith's attack had been no less successful, but in the centre Gilbert's advance had been checked, owing to the nature of the breastworks in the front, which were from 8 to 10 feet in height, the men having to mount on each other's shoulders before they could force their way in. On Dick's left the 3rd Hussars had also found an entrance to the entrenchments, and were charging down on the enemy, driving them in confusion towards the one bridge which was their one and only chance of safety.

Casualties at the Battle of Sobraon.

By noon the day was ours, but our loss had been enormous. It is true that the Sikh army was in full retreat, and that sixty-seven guns, chiefly of large calibre, were in our hands, but our casualties amounted to close on 2,400 killed and wounded. The little graveyard at Ferozepore bears testimony to the severity of the fighting in the Sutlej Campaign. In no war in which Great Britain has been engaged have the Staff suffered so severely, and in none has the proportion of General Officers been so high, Generals Sir Robert Sale, Sir Robert Dick, and Sir John McCaskill, with Brigadier-Generals Taylor, Bolton, and Wallace, being killed, and no less than eight Brigadiers wounded, in the short campaign. The casualties amongst the British regiments were appalling. The Governor-General had spared neither himself nor his Staff, every single member of which was either killed or wounded.

Punjaub.

All regiments employed in the operations in the Punjab against the Sikhs in the year 1848-49 were awarded this distinction. Some bear it in addition to one of the three battle honours "Chillianwalla," "Mooltan," and "Goojerat," granted for this campaign. Others, which were not present at any of these general actions, but which were actually under fire, bear only the word "Punjaub." The following regiments carry this word on their colours and appointments:

3rd Hussars.
9th Lancers.
14th Hussars.
Lincolns.
South Wales Borderers.
Gloucester.
Worcester.
Cornwall Light Infantry.
Shropshire Light Infantry.
King's Royal Rifles.
North Staffords.
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
2nd Gardner's Horse.
5th Cavalry.
31st Lancers.
35th Scinde Horse.
36th Jacob's Horse.
Q.O. Corps of Guides.
1st P.W.O. Sap and Min.
2nd Sappers and Miners.
2nd Q.O. Light Infantry.
11th Rajputs.
51st Sikhs.
52nd Sikhs.
103rd Light Infantry.
104th Wellesley's Rifles.
109th Infantry.
119th Multan Regiment.
121st Pioneers.

The victory over the Sikhs at Sobraon had been complete. That battle had been fought on February 10; on the 20th of the month our troops entered Lahore, the capital of the Sikh kingdom. The conditions of peace were galling enough to a high-spirited and warlike race like the Sikhs, but they were indispensable for our security in India. Their army was reduced to reasonable dimensions, all the artillery was handed over to us, the whole of the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej were annexed by Great Britain, and a war indemnity of £1,500,000 was exacted. The conduct of the administration was placed in the hands of a Council of Regency, which was supposed to be favourable to our cause, and a British Resident was appointed at the Court of Lahore, in which city a strong British garrison was retained until all the terms had been complied with.

It was soon evident that the Council of Regency was unable to govern the country. Spasmodic outbursts of anti-British fanaticism culminated in the murder of two English officers at Multan, and in the early summer of 1848 it was clear that we must be prepared to conquer and to administer the Punjab. Multan was in the hands of men opposed, not only to the British, but also to the nominal rulers of the kingdom (the Council of Regency), and a British force, under General Whish, was despatched to retake the fortress. This was composed of two troops of horse artillery and a siege-train manned by four companies of English gunners. Five companies of sappers, under Major Robert Napier, later known as Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, the 10th (Lincoln) and 32nd (Cornwall Light Infantry), with four sepoy battalions, made up the regular forces. To these must be added some 15,000 native levies, who had flocked to the call of a subaltern—Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes—and some loyal Sikhs. A column was under orders from Bombay to assist Whish. This comprised the King's Royal Rifles, the 1st Bombay European Regiment (now the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers), and four sepoy battalions. The task before Whish was more than his force, without the aid of the Bombay troops, could encompass, and the check to his operations had a disastrous effect throughout the Punjab. All the malcontents threw in their lot against us, and on December 16 Lord Gough crossed the Ravi River, and commenced the final conquest of the Land of the Five Rivers. His army was composed as under:

Distribution of the Army of the Punjab, 1849.

Commander-in-Chief: General Lord Gough, G.C.B.

Ever since the advance from Sobraon we had retained a strong force at Lahore, as well as at Ferozepore, but no success had attended our efforts to keep down the numbers of the Sikh army; in fact, at that time the Sikhs were a race of warriors, every man carrying arms, and every second man had undergone military training. Lahore, it is true, was no longer the headquarters of their army, but Lord Gough soon found that the Sikh forces drawn up on the far side of the Chenab were no whit inferior to those he had met and with difficulty overthrown on the banks of the Sutlej. On November 23 the opening action of the campaign took place at Ramnuggur,[23] where the 14th Hussars showed themselves worthy of the high reputation they had made in the Peninsula; and on the 30th of the month Sir Joseph Thackwell, in command of the cavalry, fought the successful action of Sadoolapore.[24]

Chillianwallah, January 13, 1849.

This battle honour, which commemorates one of the hardest fights ever waged in India, is borne by the following regiments:

3rd Hussars.
9th Lancers.
14th Hussars.
South Wales Borderers.
Gloucesters.
Worcesters.
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
2nd Q.O. Light Infantry.
11th Rajputs.

On January 10 Lord Gough received orders from the Governor-General to attack the Sikhs. Up to this date it had been the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to await the arrival of General Whish's division from Multan, the fall of which was daily expected. On January 13 Gough found the enemy in a strongly entrenched position at Chillianwallah, and attacked them in his usual formation, with his cavalry on the flanks, the advance being preceded by a heavy artillery fire. The Sikhs far outnumbered our forces, and their front, it is said, extended to a distance of no less than six miles, so that a turning movement with the small numbers at his disposal would have exposed Lord Gough to the piercing of his line by a counter-attack. The ground was much broken and covered with thick jungle, which rendered it exceedingly difficult for any General to exercise efficient control over even one brigade. Some confusion was the inevitable result, for it must be borne in mind that the only means of communication then known was by mounted orderlies, and I am afraid it must be admitted that this was not one of the Bengal sepoys' fighting-days. The Sikhs had abandoned their stereotyped plan, and had advanced from their entrenched position, and literally forced the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They relied on the nature of the ground to hide their dispositions, and in this they were to a certain extent successful. The result of the day was by no means satisfactory. Our losses were abnormally heavy, amounting to 2,338 officers and men killed and wounded. The Sikhs, it is true, were driven from their position and fell back during the night, but they retired unmolested and carried off all their artillery.

The Commander-in-Chief was subjected to a great amount of harsh criticism for his conduct of the operations—criticism based on but a very partial knowledge of the real facts—and in deference to public opinion, too often the offspring of the fertile brains of armchair critics, Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Scinde, was sent out to India to relieve the brave Gough. It is but fair to state that the Commander-in-Chief had never lost the love or confidence of the officers and men under him, and the stars fought for the genial Irishman. Multan fell; Whish, with his own and the Bombay division, joined headquarters, and before the new Chief arrived Gough had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sikhs at Goojerat, and the Punjab had passed into our hands for ever.

Casualties at the Battle of Chillianwallah, January 13, 1849.

Note.—I have not given the casualties in the native regiments which no longer exist.