No right-thinking person has nowadays any doubt as to the profound injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and of all the treaties which derive from it. But this fact is of small importance, inasmuch as it is not justice or injustice which regulates the relations between nations, but their interests and sentiments. In the past we have seen Christian peoples, transplanted in America, maintain the necessity of slavery, and we have seen, and continue to see every day, methods of reasoning which, when used by the defeated enemy were declared to be fallacious and wrong, become in turn, when varied only in form, the ideas and the customary life of the conquerors in the War—ideas which then assume the quality of liberal expressions of democracy.

If appeals to the noblest human sentiments are not made in vain (and no effort of goodness or generosity is ever sterile), the conviction which is gradually forming itself, even in the least receptive minds, that the treaties of peace are inapplicable, as harmful to the conquerors as to the conquered, gains in force. For the treaties are at one and the same time a menace for the conquerors and a paralysis of all activity on the part of the conquered, since once the economic unity of Continental Europe is broken the resultant depression becomes inevitable.

If many errors have been committed, many errors were inevitable. What we must try to do now is to limit the consequences of these mistakes in a changed spirit. To reconstruct where we see only ruins is the most evident necessity. We must also try to diffuse among the nations which have won the War together and suffered together the least amount of diffidence possible. As it is, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, all go their own way. France has obtained her maximum of concessions, including those of least use to her, but never before has the world seen her so alone in her attitude as after the treaties of Paris.

What is most urgently required at the moment is to change the prevalent war-mentality which still infects us and overcomes all generous sentiments, all hopes of unity. The statement that war makes men better or worse is, perhaps, an exaggerated one. War, which creates a state of exaltation, hypertrophies all the qualities, all the tendencies, be they for good or for evil. Ascetic souls, spirits naturally noble, being disposed toward sacrifice, develop a state of exaltation and true fervour. How many examples of nobility, of abnegation, of voluntary martyrdom has not the War given us? But in persons disposed to evil actions, in rude and violent spirits (and these are always in the majority), the spirit of violence increases. This spirit, which among the intellectuals takes the form of arrogance and concupiscence, and in politics expresses itself in a policy of conquest, assumes in the crowd the most violent forms of class war, continuous assaults upon the power of the State, and an unbalanced desire to gain as much as possible with the least possible work.

Before the War the number of men ready to take the law into their own hands was relatively small; now there are many such individuals. The various nations, even those most advanced, cannot boast a moral progress comparable with their intellectual development. The explosion of sentiments of violence has created in the period after the War in most countries an atmosphere which one may call unbreathable. Peoples accustomed to be dominated and to serve have come to believe that, having become dominators in their turn, they have the right to use every kind of violence against their overlords of yesterday. Are not the injustices of the Poles against the Germans, and those of the Rumanians against the Magyars, a proof of this state of mind? Even in the most civilized countries many rules of order and discipline have gone by the board.

After all the great wars a condition of torpor, of unwillingness to work, together with a certain rudeness in social relations, has always been noticed.

The war of 1870 was a little war in comparison with the cataclysm let loose by the European War. Yet then the conquered country had its attempt at Bolshevism, which in those days was called the Commune, and the fall of its political regime. In the conquering country we witnessed, together with the rapid development of industrial groups, a quick growth in Socialism and the constitution of great parties like the Catholic Centre. Mutatis mutandis, the same situation has shown itself after the European War.

What is most urgently necessary, therefore, is to effect a return to peace sentiments, and in the manifestations of government to abandon those attitudes which in the peaces of Paris had their roots in hate.

I have tried, as Premier of Italy, as writer, and as politician, to regulate my actions by this principle. In the first months of 1920 I gave instructions to Italy's ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis della Torretta, to arrange a meeting between himself and Chancellor Renner, head of the Government of Vienna. So the chief of the conquered country came, together with his Ministers, to greet the head of the conquering country, and there was no word that could record in any way the past hatred and the ancient rancour. All the conversation was of the necessity for reconstruction and for the development of fresh currents of life and commercial activity. The Government of Italy helped the Government of Austria in so far as was possible. And in so acting, I felt I was working better for the greatness of my country than I could possibly have done by any kind of stolid persecution. I felt that over and beyond our competition there existed the human sorrow of nations for whom we must avoid fresh shedding of blood and fresh wars. Had I not left the Government, it was my intention not only to continue in this path, but also to intensify my efforts in this direction.

The banal idea that there exist in Europe two groups of nations, one of which stands for violence and barbarism—the Germans, the Magyars and the Bulgarians—while the other group of Anglo-Saxons and Latins represents civilization, must not continue to be repeated, because not only is it an outrage on truth but an outrage on honesty.

Always to repeat that the Germans are not adapted for a democratic regime is neither just nor true. Nor is it true that Germany is an essentially warlike country, and therefore different from all other lands. In the last three centuries France and England have fought many more wars than Germany. One must read the books of the Napoleonic period to see with what disdain pacificist Germany is referred to—that country of peasants, waiters and philosophers. It is sufficient to read the works of German writers, including Treitschke himself, to perceive for what a long period of time the German lands, anxious for peace, have considered France as the country always eager for war and conquest.

Not only am I of the opinion that Germany is a land suited for democratic institutions, but I believe that after the fall of the Empire democratic principles have a wider prevalence there than in any other country of Europe. The resistance offered to the peace of Versailles—that is, to disorganization—may be claimed as a merit for the democratic parties, which, if they are loyally assisted by the States of the Entente, can not only develop themselves but establish a great and noble democracy.

Germany has accustomed us in history to the most remarkable surprises. A century and a half ago she was considered as a pacificist nation without national spirit. She has since then become a warlike country with the most pronounced national spirit. Early in the seventeenth century there were in Germany more than one hundred territories and independent States. There was no true national conscience, and not even the violence of the Napoleonic wars, a century after, sufficed to awaken it. What was required was a regular effort of thought, a sustained programme of action on the part of men like Wolff, Fichte and Hegel to mould a national conscience. Fifty years earlier no one would have believed in the possibility of a Germany united and compact in her national sentiment. Germany passed from the widest decentralization to the greatest concentration and the intensest national life. Germany will also be a democratic country if the violence of her ancient enemies does not drive her into a state of exaltation which will tend to render minds and spirits favourable to a return to the old regime.

To arrive at peace we must first of all desire peace. We must no longer carry on conversations by means of military missions, but by means of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives.

1.—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VANQUISHED

A great step towards peace may be made by admitting at once all ex-enemy States into the League of Nations. Among the States of European civilization millions of persons are unrepresented in the League of Nations: the United States, who has not wished to adhere to it after the Treaty of Versailles sanctioned violence; Russia, who has not been able to join owing to her difficult position; Germany, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria, who have not been permitted to join; the Turks, etc. The League of Nations was a magnificent conception in which I have had faith, and which I have regarded with sympathy. But a formidable mistake has deprived it of all prestige. Clauses 5 and 10 of its originating constitution and the exclusion of the defeated have given it at once the character of a kind of Holy Alliance of the conquerors established to regulate the incredible relations which the treaties have created between conquerors and conquered. Wilson had already committed the mistake of founding the League of Nations without first defining the nations and leaving to chance the resources of the beaten peoples and their populations. The day, however, on which all the peoples are represented in the League, the United States, without approving the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain or Trianon, etc., will feel the need of abandoning their isolation, which is harmful for them and places them in a position of inferiority. And the day when all the peoples of the world are represented, and accept reciprocal pledges of international solidarity, a great step will have been taken.

As things stand, the organism of the Reparations Commission, established by Schedule 2 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, is an absurd union of the conquerors (no longer allies, but reunited solely in a kind of bankruptcy procedure), who interpret the treaty in their own fashion, and can even modify the laws and regulations in the conquered countries. The existence of such an institution among civilized peoples ought to be an impossibility. Its powers must be transferred to the League of Nations in such a manner as to provide guarantees for the victors, but guarantees also for the conquered. The suppression of the Reparations Commission becomes, therefore, a fundamental necessity.

2.—THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES

When the public, and especially in the United States and Great Britain, become convinced that the spirit of peace can only prevail by means of an honest revision of the treaties the difficulties will be easily eliminated. But one cannot merely speak of a simple revision; it would be a cure worse than the evil. During the tempest one cannot abandon the storm-beaten ship and cross over to a safer vessel. It is necessary to return into harbour and make the transhipment where calm, or relative calm at any rate, reigns.

Inasmuch as Europe is out of equilibrium, a settlement, even of a bad kind, cannot be arrived at off-hand. To cast down the present political scaffolding without having built anything would be an error. Perhaps here the method that will prove most efficacious is to entrust the League of Nations with the task of arriving at a revision. When the League of Nations is charged with this work the various governments will send their best politicians, and the discussion will be able to assume a realizable character.

According to its constitution, the League of Nations may, in case of war or the menace of war (Clause 11), convoke its members, and take all the measures required to safeguard the peace of the nations. All the adhering States have recognized their obligation to submit all controversies to arbitration, and that in any case they have no right to resort to war before the expiration of a term of three months after the verdict of the arbiters or the report of the Council (Clause 12). Any member of the League of Nations resorting to war contrary to the undertakings of the treaty which constitutes the League is, ipso facto, considered as if he had committed an act of war against all the other members of the League (Clause 19).

But more important still is the fact that the Assembly of the League of Nations may invite its members to proceed to a fresh examination of treaties that become inapplicable as well as of international situations whose prolongation might imperil the peace of the world (Clause 19).

We may therefore revise the present treaties without violence and without destroying them.

What requires to be modified there is no necessity to say, inasmuch as all the matter of this book supplies the evidence and the proof. What is certain is that in Europe and America, except for an intransigent movement running strong in France, everyone is convinced of the necessity of revision.

It will be well that this revision should take place through the operations of the League of Nations after the representatives of all the States, conquerors, conquered and neutrals, have come to form part of it.

But in the constitution of the League of Nations there are two clauses which form its fundamental weakness, sections desired by France, whose gravity escaped Wilson.

Clause 5 declares that, save and excepting contrary dispositions, the decisions of the Assembly or of the Council are to be by the unanimous consent of the members represented at the meetings. It is difficult to imagine anything more absurd. If the modification of a territorial situation is being discussed, all the nations must agree as to the solution, including the interested nation. The League of Nations is convinced that the Danzig corridor is an absurdity, but if France is not of the same opinion no modification can be made. Without a change of this clause, every honest attempt at revision must necessarily break down.

Clause 10, by which the members of the League of Nations pledge themselves to respect and preserve from external attacks the territorial integrity and the existing political independence of all the members of the League, must also be altered. This clause, which is profoundly immoral, consecrates and perpetuates the mistakes and faults of the treaties. No honest country can guarantee the territorial integrity of the States now existing after the monstrous parcelling out of entire groups of Germans and Magyars to other nations, arranged without scruples and without intelligence. No one can honestly guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland as it stands at present. If a new-risen Russia, a renewed Germany, and an unextinguished Austria desire in the future a revision of the treaties they will be making a most reasonable demand to which no civilized country may make objection. It is indeed Clauses 5 and 10 which have deprived the constitution of the League of Nations of all moral credit, which have transformed it into an instrument of oppression for the victors, which have caused the just and profound disapproval of the most enlightened men of the American Senate. A League of Nations with Clauses 5 and 10 and the prolonged exclusion of the vanquished cannot but accentuate the diffidence of all the democracies and the aversion of the masses.

But the League of Nations can be altered and can become indeed a great force for renovation if the problem of its functioning be clearly confronted and promptly resolved.

The League of Nations can become a great guarantee for peace on three conditions:

(a) That it include really and in the shortest space of time possible all the peoples, conquerors, conquered and neutrals.

(b) That clauses 5 and 10 be modified, and that after their modification a revision of the treaties be undertaken.

(c) That the Reparations Commission be abolished and its powers be conferred upon the League of Nations itself.

As it exists at present the League of Nations has neither prestige nor dignity; it is an expression of the violence of the conquering group of nations. But reconstituted and renovated it may become the greatest of peace factors in the relations between the peoples.

3.—THE SAFETY OF FRANCE AND THE MILITARY GUARANTEES

In the state of mind in which France exists at present there is a reasonable cause of worry for the future. Since the conclusion of the War the United States of America have withdrawn. They concern themselves with Europe no more, or only in a very limited form and with diffidence. The Monroe doctrine has come into its own again. Great Britain watches the decadence of the European continent, but, girt by the sea, has nothing to fear. She is a country of Europe, but she does not live the life of Europe; she stands apart from it. Italy, when she has overcome the difficulties of her economic situation, can be certain of her future. The very fact that she stands in direct opposition to no State, that she may have competition with various peoples but not long-nurtured hatreds, gives Italy a relative security. But France, who has been in less than forty-four years twice at war with Germany, has little security for her future. Germany and the Germanic races increase rapidly in number. France does not increase. France, notwithstanding the new territories, after her war losses, has probably no more inhabitants than in 1914. In her almost tormented anxiety to destroy Germany we see her dread for the future—more indeed than mere hatred. To occupy with numerous troops the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads is an act of vengeance; but in the vengeance there is also anxiety. There are many in France who think that neither now nor after fifteen years must the territory of the vanquished be abandoned. And so France maintains in effective force too large an army and nourishes too great a rancour. And for this reason she helps the Poles in their unjustifiable attempt in Upper Silesia, will not allow the Germans of Austria to live, and seeks to provoke and facilitate all movements and political actions which can tend towards the dismemberment of Germany. The British and the Italian viewpoints are essentially different. France, which knows it can no longer count on the co-operation of Great Britain, of the United States, or of Italy, keeps on foot her numerous army, has allied herself with Belgium and Poland, and tries to suffocate Germany in a ring of iron. The attempt is a vain one and destined to fail within a few years, inasmuch as France's allies have no capacity for resistance. Yet, all the same, her attempt derives from a feeling that is not only justifiable but just.

France had obtained at Paris, apart from the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and all the military controls, two guaranteeing treaties from the United States and from Great Britain: in case of unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, Great Britain and the United States pledged themselves to defend France. The British Parliament, as we have seen, approved the treaty provisionally on the similar approbation of the United States. But as the latter has not approved the Treaty of Versailles, and has not even discussed the guarantee treaty, France has now no guarantee treaty.

If we are anxious to realize a peace politic two things are necessary:

1. That France has security, and that for twenty years at least Great Britain and Italy pledge themselves to defend her in case of aggression.

2. That the measures for the disarmament of the conquered States be maintained, maybe with some tempering of their conditions, and that their execution and control be entrusted with the amplest powers to the League of Nations.

No one can think it unjust that the parties who provoked the War or those who have, if not the entire, at least the greatest share of responsibility, should be rendered for a certain time incapable. The fall of the military caste in Germany and the formation of a democratic society will derive much help from the abolition, for a not too brief period of time, of the permanent army, and this will render possible, at no distant date, an effective reduction of the armaments in the victorious countries.

Great Britain has the moral duty to proffer a guarantee already spontaneously given. Italy also must give such a guarantee if she wishes truly to contribute towards the peace of Europe.

As long as Germany has no fleet, and cannot put together an artillery and an aviation corps, she cannot present a menace.

Great Britain and Italy can, however, only give their guarantees on the condition that they guarantee a proper state of things and not a continued condition of violence. The withdrawal of all the troops from the Rhine ought to coincide with a clear definition concerning the fate of the Germans of Austria and the Germans detached from Germany without motive. Such a retirement must coincide with the definition of the territory of the Saar, and the assigning, pure and simple, of Upper Silesia to Germany and the end of all the insupportable controls and the indemnity regulations.

Being myself contrary to any pledge binding Italy for too long a period, I am of opinion that it is perfectly right that Great Britain and Italy should make this sacrifice for the peace of Europe.

But no guarantee is possible, either for Great Britain or Italy, until the most essential problems be resolved in the justest manner by means of straightforward and explicit understandings.

Italy's tendency towards British policy on the continent of Europe depends on the fact that Great Britain has never wished or tolerated that any continental State should have a hegemony over others. And, therefore, she has found herself at different epochs ranged against France, Germany and Russia.

England is in the Mediterranean solely to secure her passage through it, not to dominate it. She continues to follow the grand policy by which she has transformed her colonies into dominions, and, in spite of errors, she has always shown the greatest respect for the liberty of other peoples.

But Europe will not have peace until the three progressive countries of the Continent, Germany, France and Italy, find a way of agreement which can reunite all their energies in one common force.

Russia has conceived the idea of having the hegemony of Europe; Germany has indeed had the illusion of such a hegemony. Now this illusion penetrates certain French elements. Can a people of forty million inhabitants, who are not increasing, who already find difficulties in dominating and controlling their immense colonies, aspire to hegemonic action, even taking count of their great political prestige? Can France lastingly dominate and menace a country like Germany, which at no distant date will have a population double that of France?

The future of European civilization requires that Germany, France and
Italy, after so much disaster, find a common road to travel.

The first step to be taken is to give security of existence and of reconstruction to Germany; the second is to guarantee France from the perils of a not distant future; the third is to find at all costs a means of accord between Germany, France and Italy.

But only vast popular movements and great currents of thought and of life can work effectively in those cases where the labours of politicians have revealed themselves as characterized by uncertainty and as being too traditional. Europe is still under the dominion of old souls which often enough dwell in young bodies and, therefore, unite old errors with violence. A great movement can only come from the intellectuals of the countries most menaced and from fresh popular energies.

4.—REGULATING INTER-ALLIED DEBTS, GERMANY'S INDEMNITY AND THAT OF THE DEFEATED COUNTRIES

These two problems are closely connected.

The victorious countries demand an indemnity from the conquered countries which, except Germany, who has a great productive force even in her hour of difficulties, are in extreme depression and misery.

Great Britain is in debt to the United States, and France, Italy and minor nations are in their turn heavy debtors to the Americans and to Great Britain.

The experience of the last three years has shown that, even with the best will, none of the countries owing money to the Entente has been able to pay its debts or even the interest. With an effort Great Britain could pay; France and Italy will never be able to, and have, moreover, exchanges which constitute a real menace for the future of each.

The fact that France and Italy, although they came out of the war victoriously, have not been able to pay their debts or even the interest on them is the proof that Germany, whose best resources have been taken away from her, can only pay an indemnity very different from the fantastic figures put forward at the time of the Conference of Paris, when even important political men spoke of monstrous and ridiculous indemnities.

The problem of the inter-allied debts, as well as that of the indemnity, will be solved by a certain sacrifice on the part of all who participated in the War.

The credits of the United States amount to almost 48 milliards of lire or francs at par, and the credits of Great Britain to 44 milliards. Great Britain owes about 21 milliards to the United States and is in turn creditor for some 44 milliards. She has a bad debt owing from Russia for more than 14 milliards, but 13 milliards are owing from France, about 12 milliards from Italy, and almost 2-1/2 milliards from Belgium. That is to say, that Great Britain could well pay her debt to the United States, ceding the greater part of her credits towards France and Italy.

But the truth is that, while on the subject of the German indemnities, stolid illusions continue to be propagated (perhaps now with greater discretion), neither France nor Italy is in a position to pay its debts.

The most honest solution, which, intelligently enough, J.M. Keynes has seen from the first, is that each of the inter-allied countries should renounce its state credits towards countries that were allies or associates during the War. The United States of America are creditors only; Great Britain has lent the double of what she has borrowed. France has received on loan the triple of what she has lent to others.

The credits of France are for almost two-thirds undemandable credits of Great Britain; more than 14 milliards being with Russia, they are for considerably more than one-third bad debts.

France and Italy would be benefited chiefly by this provision. Great
Britain would scarcely either benefit or lose, or, rather, the benefit
accruing to her would be less in so much as her chief credits are to
Russia.

The United States would doubtless have to bear the largest burden. But when one thinks of the small sacrifice which the United States has made in comparison with the efforts of France and Italy (and Italy was not obliged to enter the War), the new sacrifice demanded does not seem excessive.

During the War the United States of America, who for three years furnished food, provisions and arms to the countries of the Entente, have absorbed the greater part of their available resources. Not only are the States of Europe debtors, but so are especially the private citizens who have contracted debts during or after the War. Great Britain during the War had to sell at least 25 milliards of her foreign values. The United States of America, on the contrary, have immensely increased their reserves.

But this very increase is harmful to them, inasmuch as the capacity for exchange of the States of Europe has been much reduced. The United States now risk seeing still further reduced, if not destroyed, this purchasing capacity of their best clients; and this finally constitutes for the U.S.A. infinitely greater damage than the renouncing of all their credits.

To reconstruct Germany, to intensify exchange of goods with the old countries of Austria-Hungary and Russia, to settle the situation of the exchange of goods with Italy and the Balkan countries is much more important for the United States and the prosperity of its people than to demand payment or not demand payment of those debts made for the common cause.

I will speak of the absurd situation which has come about. Czeko-Slovakia and Poland unwillingly indeed fought against the Entente, which has raised them to free and autonomous States; and not only have they no debts to pay, being now in the position of conquerors, or at least allies of the conquerors, but they have, in fact, scarcely any foreign debts.

The existence of enormous War debts is, then, everywhere a menace to financial stability. No one is anxious to repudiate his debts in order not to suffer in loss of dignity, but almost all know that they cannot pay. The end of the War, as Keynes has justly written, has brought about that all owe immense sums of money to one another. The holders of loan stock in every country are creditors for vast sums towards the State, and the State, in its turn, is creditor for enormous sums towards the taxpayers. The whole situation is highly artificial and irritating. We shall be unable to move unless we succeed in freeing ourselves from this chain of paper.

The work of reconstruction can begin by annulling the inter-allied debts.

If it is not thought desirable to proceed at once to annulment, there remains only the solution of including them in the indemnity which Germany must pay in the measure of 20 per cent., allocating a certain proportion to each country which has made loans to allied and associated governments on account of the War. In round figures the inter-allied loans come to 100 milliards. They can be reduced to 20, and then each creditor can renounce his respective credit towards allies or associates and participate proportionately in the new credit towards Germany. Such a credit, bearing no interest, could only be demanded after the payment of all the other indemnities, and would be considered in the complete total of the indemnities.

All the illusions concerning the indemnities are now fated to disappear. They have already vanished for the other countries; they are about to vanish in the case of Germany.

Nevertheless it is right that Germany should pay an indemnity. Yet, if the conquerors cannot meet their foreign debts, how can the vanquished clear the vast indemnity asked? Each passing day demonstrates more clearly the misunderstanding of the indemnity. The non-experts have not learned financial technics, but common sense tells them that the golden nimbus which has been trailed before their eyes is only a thick cloud of smoke that is slowly dissipating.

I have already said that the real damages to repair do not exceed 40 milliards of gold marks and that all the other figures are pure exaggerations.

If it be agreed that Germany accept 20 per cent. of the inter-allied debt, the indemnity may be raised to 60 milliards of francs at par, to be paid in gold marks.

But we must calculate for Germany's benefit all that she has already given in immediate marketable wealth. Apart from her colonies, Germany has given up all her mercantile marine fleet, her submarine cables, much railway material and war material, government property in ceded territory without any diminution of the amount of public debts, etc. Without taking account, then, of the colonies and her magnificent commercial organization abroad, Germany has parted with at least 20 milliards. If we were to calculate what Germany has ceded with the same criteria with which the conquering countries have calculated their losses, we should arrive at figures much surpassing these. We may agree in taxing Germany with an indemnity equivalent in gold marks to 60 milliards of francs at par—an indemnity to be paid in the following manner:

(a) Twenty milliards of francs to be considered as already paid in consideration of all that Germany has ceded in consequence of the treaties.

(b) Twenty milliards from the indemnity which Germany must pay to her conquerors, especially in coal and other materials, according to the proportions already established.

(c) Twenty milliards—after the payment of the debts in the second category to be taken over by Germany—as part of the reimbursement for countries which have made credits to the belligerents of the Entente: that is, the United States, Great Britain and France, in proportion to the sums lent.

In what material can Germany pay 20 milliards in a few years? Especially in coal and in material for repairing the devastated territories of France. Germany must pledge herself for ten years to consign to France a quantity of coal at least equal in bulk to the difference between the annual production before the War in the mines of the north and in the Pas de Calais and the production of the mines in the same area during the next ten years. She must also furnish Italy—who, after the heavy losses sustained, has not the possibility of effecting exchanges—a quantity of coal that will represent three-quarters of the figures settled upon in the Treaty of Versailles. We can compel Germany to give to the Allies for ten years, in extinction of their credits, at least 500 millions a year in gold, with privileges on the customs receipts.

This systematization, which can only be imposed by the free agreement of the United States and Great Britain, would have the effect of creating excellent relations. The United States, cancelling their, in great part, impossible debt, would derive the advantage of developing their trade and industry, and thus be able to guarantee credits for private individuals in Europe. It would also be of advantage to Great Britain, who would lose nothing. Great Britain has about an equal number of debits and credits, with this difference, that the debits are secured, while the credits are, in part, unsecured. France's credits are proportionately the worst and her debits largest, almost 27 milliards. France, liberated from her debt, and in a position to calculate on a coal situation comparable with that of before the War and with her new territories, would be in a position to re-establish herself. The cancellation of 27 milliards of debt, a proportionate share in 20 milliards, together with all that she has had, represent on the whole a sum that perhaps exceeds 50 milliards. Italy would have the advantage of possessing for ten years the minimum of coal necessary to her existence, and would be liberated from her foreign debt, which amounts to much more than she can possibly hope for from the indemnity.

Such an arrangement, or one like it, is the only way calculated to allow Europe to set out again on the path of civilization and to re-establish slowly that economic equilibrium which the War has destroyed with enormous damage for the conquerors and the certain ruin of the vanquished.

But, before speaking of any indemnity, the Reparations Commission must be abolished and its functions handed over to the League of Nations, while all the useless controls and other hateful vexations must be put an end to.

While the Allied troops' occupation of the Rhine costs Germany 25 milliards of paper marks a year, it is foolish to speak of reconstruction or indemnity. Either all occupation must cease or the expenses ought not to exceed, according to the foregoing agreements, a maximum of 80 millions at par, or even less.

We shall, however, never arrive at such an arrangement until the
Continental countries become convinced of two things: first, that the
United States will grant no credits under any formula; secondly, that
Germany, under the present system, will be unable to pay anything and
will collapse, dragging down to ruin her conquerors.

Among many uncertainties these two convictions become ever clearer.

If in all countries the spirit of insubordination among the working classes is increasing, the state of mind of the German operatives is quite remarkable. The workmen almost everywhere, in face of the enormous fortunes which the War has created and by reason of the spirit of violence working in them, have worked with bad spirit after the War because they have thought that a portion of their labour has gone to form the profits of the industrials. It is useless to say that we are dealing here with an absurd and dangerous conception, because the profit of the capitalist is a necessary element of production, and because production along communist lines, wherever it has been attempted, has brought ruin and misery. But it is useless to deny that such a situation exists, together with the state of mind which it implies. We can well imagine, then, the conditions in which Germany and the vanquished countries find themselves. The workmen, who in France, England and Italy exhibit in various degree and measure a state of intractability, in Germany have to face a situation still graver. When they work they know that a portion of their labour is destined to go to the victors, another part to the capitalist, and finally there will remain something for them. Add to this that in all the beaten countries hunger is widespread, with a consequent diminution of energy and work.

No reasonable person can explain how humanity can continue to believe in the perpetuation of a similar state of things for another forty years.

In speaking of the indemnity which Germany can pay, it is necessary to consider this special state of mind of the operatives and other categories of producers.

But the mere announcement of the settling of the indemnity, of the immediate admission of the vanquished nations into the League of Nations, of the settling the question of the occupation of the Rhine, and of the firm intention to modify the constitution of the League of Nations, according it the powers now held by the Reparations Commission, will improve at once the market and signalize a definite and assured revival.

The United States made a great financial effort to assist their associates, and in their own interests, as well as for those of Europe, they would have done badly to have continued with such assistance. When the means provided by America come to be employed to keep going the anarchy of central Europe, Rumania's disorder, Greece's adventures and Poland's violences, together with Denikin's and Wrangel's restoration attempts, it is better that all help should cease. In fact, Europe has begun to reason a little better than her governments since the financial difficulties have increased.

The fall of the mark and Germany's profound economic depression have already destroyed a great part of the illusions on the subject of the indemnity, and the figures with which for three years the public has been humbugged no longer convince anyone.

5.—FORMING NEW CONNEXIONS WITH RUSSIA

Among the States of the Entente there is always a fundamental discord on the subject of Russia. Great Britain recognized at once that if it were impossible to acknowledge the Soviet Government it was a mistake to encourage attempts at restoration. After the first moments of uncertainty Great Britain has insisted on temperate measures, and notwithstanding that during the War she made the largest loans to the Russian Government (more than 14 milliards of francs at par, while France only lent about 4 milliards), she has never put forward the idea that, as a condition precedent to the recognition of the Soviet Government, a guarantee of the repayment of the debt was necessary. Only France has had this mistaken idea, which she has forced to the point of asking for the sequestration of all gold sent abroad by the Soviet Government for the purchase of goods.

Wilson had already stated in his fourteen points what the attitude of the Entente towards Russia ought to be, but the attitudes actually assumed have been of quite a different order.

The barrier which Poland wants to construct between Germany and Russia is an absurdity which must be swept away at once. Having taken away Germany's colonies and her capacities for expansion abroad, we must now direct her towards Russia where alone she can find the outlet necessary for her enormous population and the debt she has to carry. The blockade of Russia, the barbed wire placed round Russia, have damaged Europe severely. This blockade has resolved itself into a blockade against the Allies. Before the present state of economic ruin Russia was the great reservoir of raw materials; she was the unexplored treasure towards which one went with the confidence of finding everything. Now, owing to her effort, she has fallen; but how large a part of her fall is as much due to the Entente as to her action during the War and since. For some time now even the most hidebound intelligences have recognized the fact that it is useless to talk of entering into trade relations with Russia without the co-operation of Germany, the obvious ally in the vast task of renovation. Similarly, it is useless to talk of reattempting military manoeuvres. While Germany remains disassociated from the work of reconstruction and feels herself menaced by a Poland that is anarchical and disorderly and acts as an agent of the Entente, while Germany has no security for her future and must work with doubt and with rancour, all attempts to reconstruct Russia will be vain. The simple and fundamental truth is just this: One can only get to Moscow by passing through Berlin.

If we do not wish conquerors and conquered to fall one after the other, and a common fate to reunite those who for too long have hated each other and continue to hate each other, a solemn word of peace must be pronounced.

Austria, Germany, Italy, France are not diverse phenomena; they are different phases of the same phenomenon. All Europe will go to pieces if new conditions of life are not found, and the economic equilibrium profoundly shaken by the War re-established.

I have sought in this book to point out in all sincerity the things that are in store for Europe; what perils menace her and in what way her regeneration lies. In my political career I have found many bitternesses; but the campaign waged against me has not disturbed me at all. I know that wisdom and life are indivisible, and I have no need to modify anything of what I have done, neither in my propaganda nor in my attempt at human regeneration, convinced as I am that I am serving both the cause of my country and the cause of civilization. Blame and praise do not disturb me, and the agitations promoted in the heart of my country will not modify in any way my conviction. On the contrary, they will only reinforce my will to follow in my own way.

Truth, be it only slowly, makes its way. Though now the clouds are blackest, they will shortly disappear. The crisis which menaces and disturbs Europe so profoundly has inoculated with alarm the most excited spirits; Europe is still in the phase of doubt, but after the cries of hate and fury, doubt signifies a great advance. From doubt the truth may come forth.