MADAM, I perceive, you take great delight in the study of Natural Philosophy, since you have not onely sent me some Authors to peruse, and give my judgment of their opinions, but are very studious your self in the reading of Philosophical Works: and truly, I think you cannot spend your time more honourably, profitably, and delightfully, then in the study of Nature, as to consider how Variously, Curiously, and Wisely, she acts in her Creatures; for if the particular knowledg of a mans self be commendable, much more is the knowledg of the general actions of Nature, which doth lead us to the knowledg of our selves. The truth is, by the help of Philosophy our minds are raised above our selves, into the knowledg of the Causes of all natural effects. But leaving the commending of this noble study, you are pleased to desire my opinion of a very difficult and intricate argument in Natural Philosophy, to wit, of Generation, or Natural Production. I must beg leave to tell you, first, that some (though foolishly) believe, it is not fit for Women to argue upon so subtil a Mystery: Next, there have been so many learned and experienced Philosophers, Physicians, and Anatomists, which have treated of this subject, that it might be thought a great presumption for me, to argue with them, having neither the learning nor experience by practice which they had: Lastly, There are so many several ways and manners of Productions in Nature, as it is impossible for a single Creature to know them all: For there are Infinite variations made by self-motion in Infinite Matter, producing several Figures, which are several Creatures in that same Matter. But you would fain know, how Nature, which is Infinite Matter, acts by self-motion? Truly, Madam, you may as well ask any one part of your body, how every other part of your body acts, as to ask me, who am but a small part of Infinite Matter, how Nature works. But yet, I cannot say, that Nature is so obscure, as her Creatures are utterly ignorant; for as there are two of the outward sensitive organs in animal bodies, which are more intelligible then the rest, to wit, the Ear, and the Eye; so in Infinite Matter, which is the body of Nature, there are two parts, which are more understanding or knowing then the rest, to wit, the Rational and Sensitive part of Infinite Matter; for though it be true, That Nature, by self-division, made by self-motion into self-figures, which are self-parts, causes a self-obscurity to each part, motion, and figure; nevertheless, Nature being infinitely wise and knowing, its infinite natural wisdom and knowledg is divided amongst those infinite parts of the infinite body: and the two most intelligible parts, as I said, are the sensitive and rational parts in Nature, which are divided, being infinite, into every Figure or Creature; I cannot say equally divided, no more, then I can say, all creatures are of equal shapes, sizes, properties, strengths, quantities, qualities, constitutions, semblances, appetites, passions, capacities, forms, natures, and the like; for Nature delights in variety, as humane sense and reason may well perceive: for seldom any two creatures are just alike, although of one kind or sort, but every creature doth vary more or less. Wherefore it is not probable, that the production or generation of all or most Creatures, should be after one and the same manner or way, for else all Creatures would be just alike without any difference. But this is to be observed, that though Nature delights in variety, yet she doth not delight in confusion, but, as it is the propriety of Nature to work variously, so she works also wisely; which is the reason, that the rational and sensitive parts of Nature, which are the designing and architectonical parts, keep the species of every kind of Creatures by the way of Translation in Generation, or natural Production; for whatsoever is transferred, works according to the nature of that figure or figures from whence it was transferred, But mistake me not; for I do not mean always according to their exterior Figure, but according to their interior Nature; for different motions in one and the same parts of matter, make different figures, wherefore much more in several parts of matter and changes of motion; But, as I said, Translation is the chief means to keep or maintain the species of every kind of Creatures, which Translation in natural production or generation, is of the purest and subtilest substances, to wit, the sensitive and rational, which are the designing and architectonical parts of Nature. You may ask me, Madam, what this wise and ingenious Matter is. I answer: It is so pure, subtil, and self-active, as our humane shares of sense and reason cannot readily or perfectly perceive it; for by that little part of knowledg that a humane creature hath, it may more readily perceive the strong action then the purer substance; for the strongest action of the purest substance is more perceivable then the matter or substance it self; which is the cause, that most men are apt to believe the motion, and to deny the matter, by reason of its subtilty; for surely the sensitive and rational matter is so pure and subtil, as not to be expressed by humane sense and reason. As for the rational matter, it is so pure, fine, and subtil, that it may be as far beyond lucent matter, as lucent matter is beyond gross vapours, or thick clouds; and the sensitive matter seems not much less pure: also there is very pure inanimate matter, but not subtil and active of it self; for as there are degrees in the animate, so there are also degrees in the inanimate matter; so that the purest degree of inanimate matter comes next to the animate, not in motion, but in the purity of its own degree; for it cannot change its nature so, as to become animate, yet it may be so pure in its own nature, as not to be perceptible by our grosser senses. But concerning the two degrees of animate Matter, to wit, the sensitive and rational, I say that the sensitive is much more acute then Vitriol, Aqua-fortis, Fire, or the like; and the rational much more subtil and active then Quicksilver, or Light, so as I cannot find a comparison fit to express them, onely that this sensitive and rational self-moving Matter is the life and soul of Nature; But by reason this Matter is not subject to our gross senses, although our senses are subject to it, as being made, subsisting and acting through the power of its actions, we are not apt to believe it, no more then a simple Country-wench will believe, that Air is a substance, if she neither hear, see, smell, taste, or touch it, although Air touches and surrounds her: But yet the effects of this animate matter prove that there is such a matter; onely, as I said before, this self-moving matter causing a self-division as well as a general action, is the cause of a self-obscurity, which obscurity causes doubts, disputes, and inconstancies in humane opinions, although not so much obscurity, as to make all Creatures blind-fold, for surely there is no Creature but perceives more or less. But to conclude, The Rational degree of Matter is the most intelligible, and the wisest part of Nature, and the Sensitive is the most laborious and provident part in Nature, both which are the Creators of all Creatures in Infinite Matter; and if you intend to know more of this Rational and Sensitive Matter, you may consult my Book of Philosophy, to which I refer you. And so taking my leave for the present, I rest, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
II. MADAM, I understand by your last, that you have read the Book of that most learned and famous Physician and Anatomist, Dr. Harvey, which treats of Generation; and in the reading of it, you have mark'd several scruples, which you have framed into several questions concerning that subject, to which you desire my answer. Truly, Madam, I am loth to imbarque my self in this difficult argument, not onely for the reasons I have given you heretofore, but also that I do not find my self able enough to give you such a satisfactory answer as perhaps you do expect. But since your Commands are so powerful with me, that I can hardly resist them, and your Nature so good that you easily pardon any thing that is amiss, I will venture upon it according to the strength of my Natural Reason, and endeavour to give you my opinion as well and as clearly as I can. Your first question is; Whether the action of one or more producers be the onely cause of Natural Production or Generation, without imparting or transferring any of their own substance or Matter. I answer: The sole co-action of the Producers may make a change of exterior forms or figures, but not produce another Creature; for if there were not substance or matter, as well as action, both transferred together, there would not be new Creatures made out of old Matter, but every production would require new Matter, which is impossible, if there be but one Matter, and that infinite; and certainly, humane sense and reason may well perceive, that there can be but one Matter, for several kinds of Matter would make a confusion; and thus if new Creatures were made onely by substanceless motion, it would not onely be an infinite trouble to Nature, to create something out of nothing perpetually, but, as I said, it would make a confusion amongst all Nature's works, which are her several Parts or Creatures. But by reason there is but one Matter, which is Infinite and Eternal, and this Matter has self-motion in it, both Matter and Motion must of necessity transmigrate, or be transferred together without any separation, as being but one thing, to wit, Corporeal Motion. 'Tis true, one part of animate or self-moving Matter, may without Translation move, or rather occasion other parts to move; but one Creature cannot naturally produce another without the transferring of its corporeal motions. But it is well to be observed, that there is great difference between the actions of Nature; for all actions are not generating, but some are patterning, and some transforming, and the like; and as for the transforming action, that may be without translation, as being nothing else but a change of motions in one and the same part or parts of Matter, to wit, when the same parts of Matter do change into several figures, and return into the same figures again. Also the action of Patterning is without Translation; for to pattern out, is nothing else but to imitate, and to make a figure in its own substance or parts of Matter like another figure. But in generation every producer doth transfer both Matter and Motion, that is, Corporeal Motion into the produced; and if there be more producers then one, they all do contribute to the produced; and if one Creature produces many Creatures, those many Creatures do partake more or less of their producer. But you may say, If the producer transfers its own Matter, or rather its own corporeal motions into the produced, many productions will soon dissolve the producer, and he will become a sacrifice to his off-spring. I answer; That doth not follow: for as one or more Creatures contribute to one or more other Creatures, so other Creatures do contribute to them, although not after one and the same manner or way, but after divers manners or ways; but all manners and ways must be by translation to repair and assist; for no Creature can subsist alone and of it self, but all Creatures traffick and commerce from and to each other, and must of necessity do so, since they are all parts of the same Matter: Neither can Motion subsist without Matter, nor quit Matter, nor act without Matter, no more, then an Artificer can work without materials, and without self-motion Matter would be dead and useless; Wherefore Matter and Motion must upon necessity not onely be inseparable, but be one body, to wit, corporeal motion; which motion by dividing and composing its several parts, and acting variously, is the cause of all Production, Generation, Metamorphosing, or any other thing that is done in Nature. But if, according to your Author, the sole action be the cause of Generation without transferring of substance, then Matter is useless, and of none or little effect; which, in my opinion, is not probable. Your second question is, Whether the Production or Generation of animals is as the Conceptions of the Brain, which the Learned say are Immaterial? I answer: The Conceptions of the Brain, in my opinion, are not Immaterial, but Corporeal; for though the corporeal motions of the brain, or the matter of its conceptions, is invisible to humane Creatures, and that when the brain is dissected, there is no such matter found, yet that doth not prove, that there is no Matter, because it is not so gross a substance as to be perceptible by our exterior senses: Neither will your Authors example hold, that as a builder erects a house according to his conception in the brain, the same happens in all other natural productions or generations; for, in my opinion, the house is materially made in the brain, which is the conception of the builder, although not of such gross materials, as Stone, Brick, Wood, and the like, yet of such matter as is the Rational Matter, that is, the house when it is conceived in the brain, is made by the rational corporeal figurative motions of their own substance or degree of Matter; But if all Animals should be produced by meer fancies, and a Man and a Woman should beget by fancying themselves together in copulation, then the produced would be a true Platonick Child; But if a Woman being from her Husband should be so got with Child, the question is, whether the Husband would own the Child; and if amorous Lovers (which are more contagious for appetite and fancy then Married persons) should produce Children by Immaterial contagions, there would be more Children then Parents to own them. Your third question is, Whether Animals may not be produced, as many Diseases are, by contagion? I answer: Although contagions may be made at a distance, by perception; yet those diseases are not begotten by immaterial motions, but by the rational and sensitive corporeal motions, which work such diseases in the body of a Creature, by the association of parts, like as the same disease is made in another body: Neither are diseases always produced after one and the same manner, but after divers manners; whereas animals are produced as animals, that is, after one natural and proper way; for although all the effects in particular be not alike, yet the general way or manner to produce those effects is the same: As for example; there is no other way to produce a fruitful Egg, but by a Cock and a Hen; But a Contagious disease, as the small-Pox, or the like, may be produced by the way of Surfeits or by Conceit, which may cause the sensitive corporeal parts, through the irregular motions of the rational corporeal parts, to work and produce such a disease, or any other ways. But neither a disease, nor no creature else can be produced without matter, by substanceless motion; for wheresoever is motion, there is also matter, matter and motion being but one thing. Your fourth question is, Whether an Animal Creature is perfectly shaped or formed at the first Conception? I answer: If the Creature be composed of many and different parts, my opinion is, it cannot be. You may say, That if it hath not all his parts produced at there will be required many acts of generation to beget or produce every part, otherwise the producers would not be the Parents of the produced in whole, but in part. I answer: The Producer is the designer, architect, and founder of the whole Creature produced; for the sensitive and rational corporeal motions, which are transferred from the producer or producers, joyn to build the produced like to the producer in specie, but the transferred parts may be invisible and insensible to humane Creatures, both through their purity and little quantity, until the produced is framed to some visible degree; for a stately building may proceed from a small beginning, neither can humane sense tell what manner of building is designed at the first foundation. But you may say, That many Eggs may be made by one act of the producers, to wit, the Cock and the Hen, and those many Eggs may be laid at several times, as also hatched at several times, and become Chickens at several times. I answer; It may well and easily be so: for the rational and sensitive parts or corporeal motions which were transferred in one act, designed many produced through that one act; for those transferred corporeal motions, although they have not a sufficient quantity of themselves to make all the produced in their perfect shapes at once, yet they are the chief designer, architect and founder of all that are to be produced; for the corporeal motions which are transferred, joyn with those they are transferred to, and being associates, work to one design, the sensitive being the architect, the rational the designer, which together with the inanimate parts of matter, can never want materials, neither can the materials want labourers; for the degrees of matter are inseparable, and do make but one body or substance. Again you may say, That some parts of Matter may produce another Creature not like to the producer in its species, as for example, Monsters. I answer, That is possible to be done, but yet it is not usual; for Monsters are not commonly born, but those corporeal motions which dwell in one species, work according to the nature of the same species; and when the parts of Matter are transferred from Creature to Creature, that is, are separated from some parts, and joyned to other parts of the same species, and the same nature; those transferred parts of matter, although invisible in quantity, by reason of their purity and subtilty, begin the work of the produced according to its natural species, and the labourers in other parts of matter work to the same end; just as it is in the artificial building of a house, where the house is first designed by the Architect, or Master, and then the labourers work not after their own fancy, (else it would not be the same house that was designed, nor any uniformity in it) but according to the architects or surveyors design; so those parts of matter or corporeal motions that are transferred from the producer, are like the architect, but the labourers or workmen are the assisting and adjoyning parts of matter. But you will say, How comes it, that many creatures may be made by one or two? I answer: As one owner or two partners may be the cause of many buildings, so few or more transferred rational and sensitive corporeal motions may make and produce as many creatures as they can get materials and labourers; for if they get one, they get the other, by reason the degrees of matter, viz. animate and inanimate, are inseparably mixt, and make but one body or substance; and the proof of it is, that all animals are not constant in the number of their off-spring, but sometimes produce more, and sometimes fewer, and sometimes their off-spring is less, and sometimes larger, according to the quantity of matter. Again you may say, That in some Creatures there is no passage to receive the transferred matter into the place of the architecture. I answer: That all passages are not visible to humane sense; and some humane Creatures have not a sufficient humane reason to conceive, that most of Natures works are not so gross as to be subject to their exterior senses; but as for such parts and passages, whether exterior or interior, visible or invisible, as also for copulation, conception, formation, nourishment, and the like in Generation, I leave you to Physicians and Anatomists. And to conclude this question, we may observe, that not any animal Creatures shape dissolveth in one instant of time, but by degrees; why should we believe then, that Animals are generated or produced in their perfect shape in one instant of time, and by one act of Nature? But sense and reason knows by observation, that an animal Creature requires more time to be generated, then to be dissolved, like as an house is sooner and with less pains pull'd down, then built up. Your Fifth question is, Whether Animals are not generated by the way of Metamorphosing? To which I answer, That it is not possible that a third Creature can be made without translation of corporeal motions; and since Metamorphosing is onely a change of motions in the same parts of Matter, without any translation of corporeal motions, no animal Creature can be produced or generated by the way of Metamorphosing. Your Sixth question is, Whether a whole may be made out of a part? I answer: There is no whole in Nature, except you will call Nature her self a whole; for all Creatures are but parts of Infinite Matter. Your Seventh question is, Whether all Animals, as also Vegetables, are made or generated by the way of Eggs? I have said heretofore, That it is not probable, that different sorts, nay, different kinds of Creatures, should all have but one manner or way of production; for why should not Nature make different ways of productions, as well as different Creatures? And as for Vegetables, if all their Seeds be likened unto Eggs, then Eggs may very well be likened to Seeds; which if so, then a Peas-cod is the Hen, and the Peas in the Cod is the cluster of Eggs: the like of ears of Corn. And those animals that produce but one creature or seed at a time, may be like the kernel of a Nut, when the shell is broke, the creature comes forth. But how this will agree with your Author, who says, that the creature in the shell must make its own passage, I cannot tell; for if the Nut be not broken by some external means or occasion, the kernel is not like to get forth. And as for humane Eggs, I know not what to answer; for it is said, that the first Woman was made of a mans ribb; but whether that ribb was an egg, I cannot tell. And why may not Minerals and Elements be produced by the way of Eggs as well as Vegetables and Animals? Nay, why may not the whole World be likened unto an Egg? Which if so, the two Poles are the two ends the Egg; and for the Elements, the Yolk is the Fire, the White, the Water; the Film, the Air; and the Shell it self will very well serve for the Earth: But then it must first be broken, and pounded into one lump or solid mass, and so sink or swim into the midst of the liquid parts, as to the Center; and as for the several foetuses in this great Egg, they are the several Creatures in it. Or it might be said, that the Chaos was an Egg, and the Universe, the Chicken. But leaving this similizing, it is like, that some studious Men may by long study upon one part of the body, conceive and believe that all other parts are like that one part; like as those that have gazed long upon the Sun, all they see for a time, are Suns to them; or like as those which having heard much of Hobgoblins, all they see are Hobgoblins, their fancies making such things. But, Madam, to make a conclusion also of this question, I repeat what I said before, that all Creatures have not one way of production; and as they have not all one way of production, so they have neither one instant of time either for perfection or dissolution, but their perfection and dissolution is made by degrees. Your Eighth question is, Whether it may not be, that the sensitive and rational corporeal motions in an Egg do pattern out the figure of the Hen and Cock, whilest the Hen sits upon the Egg, and so bring forth Chickens by the way of patterning? I answer: The action of patterning, is not the action of Generation; for as I said heretofore, the actions of Nature are different, and Generation must needs be performed by the way of translation, which translation is not required in the action of Patterning; but according as the Producers are, which transfer their own matter into the produced, so is the produced concerning its species; which is plainly proved by common examples; for if Pheasants, or Turky, or Goose-eggs, be laid under an ordinary Hen, or an ordinary Hens-egg be laid under a Pheasant, Turky, or Goose, the Chickens of those Eggs will never be of any other species then of those that produced the Egg; for an ordinary Hen, if she sit upon Pheasants, Turky, or Goose-eggs, doth not hatch Chickens of her own species, but the Chickens will be of the species either of the Pheasant, or Turky, or Goose, which did at first produce the Egg; which proves, that in Generation, or Natural production, there is not onely required the action of the Producers, but also a Transferring of some of their own parts to form the produced. But you may say, What doth the sitting Hen contribute then to the production of the Chicken? I answer: The sitting Hen doth onely assist the Egg in the production of the Chicken, as the Ground doth the Seed. Your Ninth question is, Concerning the Soul of a particular Animal Creature, as whether it be wholly of it self and subsists wholly in and by it self? But you must give me leave first to ask you what Soul you mean, whether the Divine, or the Natural Soul, for there is great difference betwixt them, although not the least that ever I heard, rightly examined and distinguished; and if you mean the Divine Soul, I shall desire you to excuse me, for that belongs to Divines, and not to Natural Philosophers; neither am I so presumptuous as to intrench upon their sacred order. But as for the Natural Soul, the Learned have divided it into three parts, to wit, the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational Soul; and according to these three Souls, made three kinds of lives, as the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational Life. But they might as well say, there are infinite bodies, lives, and souls, as three; for in Nature there is but one life, soul, and body, consisting all of one Matter, which is corporeal Nature. But yet by reason this life and soul is material, it is divided into numerous parts, which make numerous lives and souls in every particular Creature; for each particular part of the rational self-moving Matter, is each particular soul in each particular Creature, but all those parts considered in general, make but one soul of Nature; and as this self-moving Rational Matter hath power to unite its parts, so it hath ability or power to divide its united parts. And thus the rational soul of every particular Creature is composed of parts, (I mean parts of a material substance; for whatsoever is substanceless and incorporeal, belongs not to Nature, but is Supernatural;) for by reason the Infinite and Onely matter is by self-motion divided into self-parts, not any Creature can have a soul without parts; neither can the souls of Creatures subsist without commerce of other rational parts, no more then one body can subsist without the assistance of other bodies; for all parts belong to one body, which is Nature: nay, if any thing could subsist of it self, it were a God, and not a Creature: Wherefore not any Creature can challenge a soul absolutely to himself, unless Man, who hath a divine soul, which no other Creature hath. But that which makes so many confusions and disputes amongst learned men is, that they conceive, first, there is no rational soul but onely in man; next, that this rational soul in every man is individable. But if the rational soul is material, as certainly to all sense and reason it is, then it must not onely be in all material Creatures, but be dividable too; for all that is material or corporeal hath parts, and is dividable, and therefore there is no such thing in any one Creature as one intire soul; nay, we might as well say, there is but one Creature in Nature, as say, there is but one individable natural soul in one Creature. Your Tenth question is, Whether Souls are producible, or can be produced? I answer: in my opinion, they are producible, by reason all parts in Nature are so. But mistake me not; for I do not mean that any one part is produced out of Nothing, or out of new matter; but one Creature is produced by another, by the dividing and uniting, joyning and disjoyning of the several parts of Matter, and not by substanceless Motion out of new Matter. And because there is not any thing in Nature, that has an absolute subsistence of it self, each Creature is a producer, as well as a produced, in some kind or other; for no part of Nature can subsist single, and without reference and assistance of each other, or else every single part would not onely be a whole of it self, but be as a God without controle; and though one part is not another part, yet one part belongs to another part, and all parts to one whole, and that whole to all the parts, which whole is one corporeal Nature. And thus, as I said before, productions of one or more creatures, by one or more producers, without matter, meerly by immaterial motions, are impossible, to wit, that something should be made or produced out of nothing; for if this were so, there would consequently be an annihilation or turning into nothing, and those creatures, which produce others by the way of immaterial motions, would rather be as a God, then a part of Nature, or Natural Matter. Besides, it would be an endless labour, and more trouble to create particular Creatures out of nothing, then a World at once; whereas now it is easie for Nature to create by production and transmigration; and therefore it is not probable, that any one Creature hath a particular life, soul, or body to it self, as subsisting by it self, and as it were precised from the rest, having its own subsistence without the assistance of any other; nor is it probable, that any one Creature is new, for all that is, was, and shall be, till the Omnipotent God disposes Nature otherwise. As for the rest of your questions, as whether the Sun be the cause of all motions, and of all natural productions; and whether the life of a Creature be onely in the blood, or whether it have its beginning from the blood, or whether the blood be the chief architect of an animal, or be the seat of the soul; sense and reason, in my opinion, doth plainly contradict them; for concerning the blood, if it were the seat of the Soul, then in the circulation of the blood, if the Soul hath a brain, it would become very dizzie by its turning round; but perchance some may think the Soul to be a Sun, and the Blood the Zodiack, and the body the Globe of the Earth, which the Soul surrounds in such time as the Blood is flowing about. And so leaving those similizing Fancies, I'le add no more, but repeat what I said in the beginning, that I rely upon the goodness of your Nature, from which I hope for pardon, if I have not so exactly and solidly answered your desire; for the argument of this discourse being so difficult, may easily lead me into an error, which your better judgment will soon correct; and in so doing you will add to those favours for which I am already, Madam, Your Ladiships most obliged Friend and humble Servant.
III. MADAM, You thought verily, I had mistaken my self in my last, concerning the Rational Souls of every particular Creature, because I said, all Creatures had numerous Souls; and not onely so, but every particular Creature had numerous Souls. Truly, Madam, I did not mistake my self, for I am of the same opinion still; for though there is but one Soul in infinite Nature, yet that soul being dividable into parts, every part is a soul in every single creature, were the parts no bigger in quantity then an atome. But you ask whether Nature hath Infinite souls? I answer: That Infinite Nature is but one Infinite body, divided into Infinite parts, which we call Creatures; and therefore it may as well be said, That Nature is composed of Infinite Creatures or Parts, as she is divided into Infinite Creatures or Parts; for Nature being Material, is dividable, and composable. The same may be said of Nature's Soul, which is the Rational part of the onely infinite Matter, as also of Nature's Life, which is the sensitive part of the onely Infinite self-moving Matter; and of the Inanimate part of the onely Infinite Matter, which I call the body for distinction sake, as having no self-motion in its own nature, for Infinite Material Nature hath an Infinite Material Soul, Life, and Body. But, Madam, I desire you to observe what I said already, viz. that the parts of Nature are as apt to divide, as to unite; for the chief actions of Nature are to divide, and to unite; which division is the cause, that it may well be said, every particular Creature hath numerous souls; for every part of rational Matter is a particular Soul, and every part of the sensitive Matter is a particular Life; all which, mixed with the Inanimate Matter, though they be Infinite in parts, yet they make but one Infinite whole, which is Infinite Nature; and thus the Infinite division into Infinite parts is the cause, that every particular Creature hath numerous Souls, and the transmigration of parts from, and to parts, is the reason, that not any Creature can challenge a single soul, or souls to it self; the same for life. But most men are unwilling to believe, that Rational Souls are material, and that this rational Matter is dividable in Nature; when as humane sense and reason may well perceive, that Nature is active, and full of variety; and action, and variety cannot be without motion, division, and composition: but the reason that variety, division, and composition, runs not into confusion, is, that first there is but one kind of Matter; next, that the division and composition of parts doth ballance each other into a union in the whole. But, to conclude, those Creatures which have their rational parts most united, are the wisest; and those that have their rational parts most divided, are the wittiest; and those that have much of this rational matter, are much knowing; and those which have less of this rational matter, are less knowing; and there is no Creature that hath not some; for like as all the parts of a humane body are indued with life, and soul; so are all the parts of Infinite Nature; and though some parts of Matter are not animate in themselves, yet there is no part that is not mixt with the animate matter; so that all parts of Nature are moving, and moved. And thus, hoping I have cleared my self in this point, to your better understanding, I take my leave, and rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
IV. MADAM, In the Works of that most famous Philosopher and Mathematician of our age Gal. which you thought worth my reading, I find, he discourses much of upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards; but to tell you really, I do not understand what he means by those words, for, in my opinion, there is properly no such thing as upwards, downwards, backwards, or forwards in Nature, for all this is nothing else but natural corporeal motions, to which in respect of some particulars we do attribute such or such names; for if we conceive a Circle, I pray where is upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards? Certainly, it is, in my opinion, just like that, they name Rest, Place, Space, Time, &c. when as Nature her self knows of no such things, but all these are onely the several and various motions of the onely Matter. You will say, How can Rest be a motion? I answer: Rest is a word which expresses rather mans ignorance then his knowledg; for when he sees, that a particular Creature has not any external local motion perceptible by his sight, he says it resteth, and this rest he calls a cessation from motion, when as yet there is no such thing as cessation from motion in Nature; for motion is the action of natural Matter, and its Nature is to move perpetually; so that it is more probable for motion to be annihilated, then to cease. But you may say, It is a cessation from some particular motion. I answer: You may rather call it an alteration of a particular motion, then a cessation; for though a particular motion doth not move in that same manner as it did before, nevertheless it is still there, and not onely there, but still moving; onely it is not moving after the same manner as it did move heretofore, but has changed from such a kind of motion to another kind of motion, and being still moving it cannot be said to cease: Wherefore what is commonly called cessation from motion, is onely a change of some particular motion, and is a mistake of change for rest. Next, I find in the same Author a long discourse of circular and strait motions; to wit, That they are simple motions, and that all others are composed out of them, and are mixt motions; Also, That the Circular Motion is perfect, and the Right imperfect; and that all the parts of the world, if moveable of their own nature, it is impossible, that their motions should be Right, or any other then Circular: That a Circular motion is never to be gotten naturally, without a preceding right motion: That a Right motion cannot naturally be perpetual: That a Right motion is impossible in the World well ordered: and the like. First, I cannot conceive why natural Matter should use the Circle-figure more then any other in the motions of her Creatures; for Nature, which is Infinite Matter, is not bound to one particular motion, or to move in a Circle more then any other figure, but she moves more variously then any one part of hers can conceive; Wherefore it is not requisite that the natural motions of natural bodies should be onely Circular. Next, I do not understand, why a Circular Motion cannot be gotten naturally without a precedent right motion; for, in my opinion, corporeal motions may be round or circular, without being or moving straight before; and if a straight line doth make a circle, then an imperfect figure makes a perfect; but, in my opinion, a circle may as well make a straight line, as a strait line a circle; except it be like a Gordian knot, that it cannot be dissolved, or that Nature may make some corporeal motions as constant as she makes others inconstant, for her motions are not alike in continuance and alteration. And as for right motion, that naturally it cannot be perpetual; my opinion is, that it cannot be, if Nature be finite; but if Nature be infinite, it may be: But the circular motion is more proper for a finite, then an infinite, because a circle-figure is perfect and circumscribed, and a straight line is infinite, or at least producible in infinite; and there may be other worlds in infinite Nature, besides these round Globes perceptible by our sight, which may have other figures; for though it be proper for Globes or Spherical bodies to move round, yet that doth not prove, that Infinite Matter moves round, or that all worlds must be of a Globous figure; for there may be as different Worlds, as other Creatures. He says, That a Right motion is impossible in the World well ordered; But I cannot conceive a Right motion to be less orderly then a Circular in Nature, except it be in some Particulars; but oftentimes that, which is well ordered in some cases, seems to some mens understandings and perceptions ill ordered in other cases; for man, as a part, most commonly considers but the Particulars, not the Generals, like as every one in a Commonwealth considers more himself and his Family, then the Publick. Lastly, Concerning the simplicity of Motions, as that onely circular and straight motions are simple motions, because they are made by simple Lines; I know not what they mean by simple Lines; for the same Lines which make straight and circular figures, may make as well other figures as those; but, in my opinion, all motions may be called simple, in regard of their own nature; for they are nothing else but the sensitive and rational part of Matter, which in its own nature is pure, and simple, and moves according to the Nature of each Figure, either swiftly or slowly, or in this or that sort of motion; but the most simple, purest and subtillest part is the rational part of matter, which though it be mixed with the sensitive and inanimate in one body, yet it can and doth move figuratively in its own matter, without the help or assistance of any other. But I desire you to remember, Madam, that in the compositions and divisions of the parts of Nature, there is as much unity and agreement as there is discord and disagreement; for in Infinite, there is no such thing, as most, and least; neither is there any such thing as more perfect, or less perfect in Matter. And as for Irregularities, properly there is none in Nature, for Nature is Regular; but that, which Man (who is but a small part of Nature, and therefore but partly knowing) names Irregularities, or Imperfections, is onely a change and alteration of motions; for a part can know the variety of motions in Nature no more, then Finite can know Infinite, or the bare exterior shape and figure of a mans body can know the whole body, or the head can know the mind; for Infinite natural knowledg is incorporeal; and being corporeal, it is dividable; and being dividable, it cannot be confined to one part onely; for there is no such thing as an absolute determination or subsistence in parts without relation or dependance upon one another. And since Matter is Infinite, and acts wisely, and all for the best, it may be as well for the best of Nature, when parts are divided antipathetically, as when they are united sympathetically: Also Matter being Infinite, it cannot be perfect, neither can a part be called perfect, as being a part. But mistake me not, Madam; for when I say, there is no perfection in Nature, as I do in my Philosophical Opinions,[1] I mean by Perfection, a finiteness, absoluteness, or compleatness of figure; and in this sense I say Nature has no perfection by reason it is Infinite; but yet I do not deny, but that there is a perfection in the nature or essence of Infinite Matter; for Matter is perfect Matter; that is, pure and simple in its own substance or nature, as meer Matter, without any mixture or addition of some thing that is not Matter, or that is between Matter and no Matter; and material motions are perfect motions although Infinite: just as a line may be called a perfect line, although it be endless, and Gold, or other Mettal, may be called perfect Gold, or perfect Metal, although it be but apart, And thus it may be said of Infinite Nature, or Infinite Matter, without any contradiction, that it is both perfect, and not perfect; perfect in its nature or substance, not perfect in its exterior figure. But you may say, If Infinite Matter be not perfect, it is imperfect, and what is imperfect, wants something. I answer, That doth not follow: for we cannot say, that what is not perfect, must of necessity be imperfect, because there is something else, which it may be, to wit, Infinite; for as imperfection is beneath perfection, so perfection is beneath Infinite; and though Infinite Matter be not perfect in its figure, yet it is not imperfect, but Infinite; for Perfection and Imperfection belongs onely to Particulars, and not to Infinite. And thus much for the present. I conclude, and rest, Madam, Your Ladiships most obliged Friend and humble Servant. [1] Part. 1. c. 14.
V. MADAM, The Author, mentioned in my former Letter, says, That Quietness is the degree of Infinite slowness, and that a moveable body passing from quietness, passes through all the degrees of slowness without staying in any. But I cannot conceive that all the Parts of Matter should be necessitated to move by degrees; for though there be degrees in Nature, yet Nature doth not in all her actions move by degrees. You may say, for example, from one to twenty, there are eighteen degrees between One, and Twenty; and all these degrees are included in the last degree, which is twenty. I answer; That may be: but yet there is no progress made through all those degrees; for when a body doth move strong at one time, and the next time after moves weak; I cannot conceive how any degrees should really be made between. You may say, by Imagination. But this Imagination of degrees, is like the conception of Space and Place, when as yet there is no such thing as Place or Space by it self; for all is but one body, and Motion is the action of this same body, which is corporeal Nature; and because a particular body can and doth move after various manners, according to the change of its corporeal motion, this variety of motions man call's Place, Space, Time, Degrees, &c. considering them by themselves, and giving them peculiar names, as if they could be parted from body, or at least be conceived without body; for the Conception or Imagination it self is corporeal, and so are they nothing else but corporeal motions. But it seems as if this same Author conceived also motion to be a thing by it self, and that motion begets motion, when he says, That a body by moving grows stronger in motion by degrees, when as yet the strength was in the matter of the body eternally; for Nature was always a grave Matron, never a sucking Infant: and though parts by dissolving and composing may lose and get acquaintance of each other, yet no part can be otherwise in its nature, then ever it was; Wherefore change of corporeal motions is not losing nor getting strength or swiftness; for Nature doth not lose force, although she doth not use force in all her various actions; neither can any natural body get more strength than by nature it hath, although it may get the assistance of other bodies joyned to it. But swiftness and slowness are according to the several figurative actions of self-moving matter; which several actions or motions of Nature, and their alterations, cannot be found out by any particular Creature: as for example, the motions of Lead, and the motions of Wood, unless Man knew their several causes; for Wood, in some cases, may move slower then Lead; and Lead, in other cases, slower then Wood. Again: the same Author says, That an heavy moveable body descending, gets force enough to bring it back again to as much height. But I think, it might as well be said, That a Man walking a mile, gets as much strength as to walk back that mile; when 'tis likely, that having walked ten miles, he may not have so much strength as to walk back again one mile; neither is he necessitated to walk back, except some other more powerful body do force him back: for though Nature is self-moving, yet every part has not an absolute power, for many parts may over-power fewer; also several corporeal motions may cross and oppose as well as assist each other; for if there were not opposition, as well as agreement and assistance amongst Nature's parts, there would not be such variety in Nature as there is. Moreover, he makes mention of a Line, with a weight hung to its end, which being removed from the perpendicular, presently falls to the same again. To which, I answer: That it is the appetite and desire of the Line, not to move by constraint, or any forced exterior motion; but that which forces the Line to move from the Perpendicular, doth not give it motion, but is onely an occasion that it moves in such a way; neither doth the line get that motion from any other exterior body, but it is the lines own motion; for if the motion of the hand, or any other exterior body, should give the line that motion, I pray, from which doth it receive the motion to tend to its former state? Wherefore, when the Line moves backwards or forwards, it is not, that the Line gets what it had not before, that is, a new corporeal motion, but it uses its own motion; onely, as I said, that exterior body is the occasion that it moves after such a manner or way, and therefore this motion of the line, although it is the lines own motion, yet in respect of the exterior body that causes it to move that way, it may be called a forced, or rather an occasioned motion. And thus no body can get motion from another body, except it get matter too; for all that motion that a body has, proceeds from the self-moving part of matter, and motion and matter are but one thing; neither is there any inanimate part of matter in Nature, which is not co-mixed with the animate, and consequently, there is no part which is not moving, or moved; the Animate part of matter is the onely self-moving part, and the Inanimate the moved: not that the animate matter doth give away its own motion to the inanimate, and that the inanimate becomes self-moving; but the animate, by reason of the close conjunction and commixture, works together with the inanimate, or causes the inanimate to work with it; and thus the inanimate remains as simple in its own nature, as the animate doth in its nature, although they are mixt; for those mixtures do not alter the simplicity of each others Nature. But having discoursed of this subject in my former Letters, I take my leave, and rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
VI. MADAM, It seems, my former Letter concerning Motion, has given you occasion to propound this following question to me, to wit, When I throw a bowl, or strike a ball with my hand; whether the motion, by which the bowl or ball is moved, be the hands, or the balls own motion? or whether it be transferred out of my hand into the ball? To which I return this short answer: That the motion by which (for example) the bowl is moved, is the bowls own motion, and not the hands that threw it: for the hand cannot transfer its own motion, which hath a material being, out of it self into the bowl, or any other thing it handles, touches, or moves; or else if it did, the hand would in a short time become weak and useless, by losing so much substance, unless new motions were as fast created, as expended. You'll say, perhaps, that the hand and the bowl may exchange motions, as that the bowls own motion doth enter into the hand, and supply that motion which went out of the hand into the bowl, by a close joyning or touch, for in all things moving and moved, must be a joyning of the mover to the moved, either immediate, or by the means of another body. I answer: That this is more probable, then that the hand should give out, or impart motion to the bowl, and receive none from the bowl; but by reason motion cannot be transferred without matter, as being both inseparably united, and but one thing; I cannot think it probable, that any of the animate or self-moving matter in the hand, quits the hand, and enters into the bowl; nor that the animate matter, which is in the bowl, leaves the bowl, and enters into the hand, because that self-moving substance is not readily prepared for so sudden a Translation or Transmigration. You may say, It may as easily be done as food is received into an animal body and excrement discharged, or as air is taken in, and breath sent out, by the way of respiration; and that all Creatures are not onely produced from each other, but do subsist by each other, and act by each others assistance. I answer: It is very true, that all Creatures have more power and strength by a joyned assistance, then if every part were single, and subsisted of it self. But as some parts do assist each other, so on the other side, some parts do resist each other; for though there be a unity in the nature of Infinite Matter, yet there are divisions also in the Infinite parts of Infinite Matter, which causes Antipathy as much as Sympathy; but they being equal in assistance as well as in resistance, it causes a conformity in the whole nature of Infinite Matter; for if there were not contrary, or rather, I may say, different effects proceeding from the onely cause, which is the onely matter, there could not possibly be any, or at least, so much variety in Nature, as humane sense and reason perceives there is. But to return to our first argument: You may say, that motion may be transferred out of one body into another, without transferring any of the Matter. I answer: That is impossible, unless motion were that which some call No-thing, but how No-thing can be transferred, I cannot imagine: Indeed no sense and reason in Nature can conceive that which is No-thing; for how should it conceive that which is not in Nature to be found. You'll say, perhaps, It is a substanceless thing, or an incorporeal, immaterial being or form. I answer: In my opinion, it is a meer contradiction, to say, a substanceless thing, form, or being, for surely in Nature it cannot be. But if it be not possible that motion can be divided from matter, you may say, that body from whence the motion is transferred, would become less in bulk and weight, and weaker with every act of motion; and those bodies into which corporeal motion or self-moving matter was received, would grow bigger, heavier, and stronger. To which, I answer: That this is the reason, which denies that there can be a translation of motion out of the moving body into the moved; for questionless, the one would grow less, and the other bigger, that by loosing so much substance, this by receiving. Nay if it were possible, as it is not, that motion could be transferred without matter, the body out of which it goes, would nevertheless grow weaker; for the strength lies in the motion, unless you believe, this motion which is transferred to have been useless in the mover, and onely useful to the moved; or else it would be superfluous in the moved, except you say, it became to be annihilated after it was transferr'd and had done its effect; but if so, then there would be a perpetual and infinite creation and annihilation of substanceless motion, and how there could be a creation and annihilation of nothing, my reason cannot conceive, neither is it possible, unless Nature had more power then God, to create Nothing, and to annihilate Nothing. The truth is, it is more probable for sense and reason to believe a Creation of Something out of Nothing, then a Creation of Nothing out of Nothing. Wherefore it cannot in sense and reason be, that the motion of the hand is transferr'd into the bowl. But yet I do not say, that the motion of the hand doth not contribute to the motion of the bowl; for though the bowl hath its own natural motion in itself, (for Nature and her creatures know of no rest, but are in a perpetual motion, though not always exterior and local, yet they have their proper and certain motions, which are not so easily perceived by our grosser senses) nevertheless the motion of the bowl would not move by such an exterior local motion, did not the motion of the hand, or any other exterior moving body give it occasion to move that way; Wherefore the motion of the hand may very well be said to be the cause of that exterior local motion of the bowl, but not to be the same motion by which the bowl moves. Neither is it requisite, that the hand should quit its own motion, because it uses it in stirring up, or putting on the motion of the bowl; for it is one thing to use, and another to quit; as for example, it is one thing to offer his life for his friends service, another to imploy it, and another to quit or lose it. But, Madam, there may be infinite questions or exceptions, and infinite answers made upon one truth; but the wisest and most probable way is, to rely upon sense and reason, and not to trouble the mind, thoughts, and actions of life, with improbabilities, or rather impossibilities, which sense and reason knows not of, nor cannot conceive. You may say, A Man hath sometimes improbable, or impossible Fancies, Imaginations, or ChymÆra's, in his mind, which are No-things. I answer, That those Fancies and Imaginations are not No-things, but as perfectly imbodied as any other Creatures; but by reason, they are not so grossly imbodied, as those creatures that are composed of more sensitive and inanimate matter, man thinks or believes them to be no bodies; but were they substanceless figures, he could not have them in his mind or thoughts: The truth is, the purity of reason is not so perspicuous and plain to sense, as sense is to reason, the sensitive matter being a grosser substance then the rational. And thus, Madam, I have answered your proposed question, according to the ability of my Reason, which I leave to your better examination, and rest in the mean while, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
VII. MADAM, Having made some mention in my former Letter of the Receiving of Food, and discharging of Excrements, as also of Respiration, which consists in the sucking in of air, and sending out of breath in an animal body; you desire to know, Whether Respiration be common to all animal Creatures? Truly, I have not the experience, as to tell you really, whether all animals respire, or not; for my life being, for the most part, solitary and contemplative, but not active, I please my self more with the motions of my thoughts, then of my senses; and therefore I shall give you an answer according to the conceivement of my reason onely, which is, That I believe, all animals require Respiration; not onely those, which live in the air, but those also, which live in waters, and within the earth; but they do not respire all after one and the same manner; for the matter which they imbreath, is not every where the same, nor have they all the same organs, or parts, nor the same motions. As for example: Some Creatures require a more thin and rarer substance for their imbreathing or inspiring, then others, and some a more thick and grosser substance then others, according to their several Natures; for as there are several kinds of Creatures, according to their several habitations or places they live in, so they have each a distinct and several sort of matter or substance for their inspiration. As for example: Some live in the Air, some upon the face of the Earth, some in the bowels Earth, and some in Waters. There is some report of a Salamander, who lives in the Fire; but it being not certainly known, deserves not our speculation. And, as in my opinion, all animal Creatures require Respiration, so I do verily believe, that also all other kinds of Creatures, besides animals, have some certain manner of imbreathing and transpiring, viz. Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, although not after the same way as Animals, yet in a way peculiar and proper to the nature of their own kind. For example: Take away the earth from Vegetables, and they will die, as being, in my opinion, stifled or smothered, in the same manner, as when the Air is taken away from some Animals. Also, take Minerals out of the bowels of the Earth, and though we cannot say, they die, or are dead, because we have not as yet found out the alterative motions of Minerals, as well as of Vegetables, or Animals, yet we know that they are dead from production and increase, for not any Metal increases being out of the Earth. And as for Elements, it is manifest that Fire will die for want of vent; but the rest of the Elements, if we could come to know the matter, manner, and ways of their Vital Breathing, we might kill or revive them as we do Fire. And therefore all Creatures, to my Reason, require a certain matter and manner of inspiration and expiration, which is nothing else but an adjoyning and disjoyning of parts to and from parts; for not any natural part or creature can subsist single, and by it self, but requires assistance from others, as this, and the rest of my opinions in Natural Philosophy, desire the assistance of your favour, or else they will die, to the grief of, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
VIII. MADAM, Th'other day I met with the Work of that Learned Author Dr. Ch. which treats of Natural Philosophy; and amongst the rest, in the Chapter of Place, I found that he blames Aristotle for saying, there are none but corporeal dimensions, Length, Breadth, and Depth in Nature, making besides these corporeal, other incorporeal dimensions which he attributes to Vacuum. Truly, Madam, an incorporeal dimension or extension, seems, in my opinion, a meer contradiction; for I cannot conceive how nothing can have a dimension or extension, having nothing to be extended or measured. His words are these: Imagine we therefore, that God should please to annihilate the whole stock or mass of Elements, and all concretions resulting therefrom, that is, all corporeal substances now contained within the ambit or concave of the lowest Heaven, or Lunar sphear; and having thus imagined, can we conceive that all the vast space or region circumscribed by the concave superfice of the Lunar sphere, would not remain the same in all its dimensions, after as before the reduction of all bodies included therein to nothing? To which, I answer: That, in my opinion, he makes Nature Supernatural; for although God's Power may make Vacuum, yet Nature cannot; for God's and Nature's Power are not to be compared, neither is God's invisible Power perceptible by Natures parts; but according to Natural Perception, it is impossible to conceive a Vacuum, for we cannot imagine a Vacuum, but we must think of a body, as your Author of the Circle of the Moon; neither could he think of space but from one side of the Circle to the other, so that in his mind he brings two sides together, and yet will have them distant; but the motions of his thoughts being subtiler and swifter then his senses, skip from side to side without touching the middle parts, like as a Squirrel from bough to bough, or an Ape from one table to another; without touching the ground, onely cutting the air. Next, he says, That an absolute Vacuum, is neither an Accident, nor a Body, nor yet Nothing, but Something, because it has a being; which opinion seems to me like that of the divine Soul; but I suppose Vacuum is not the divine Soul, nor the divine Soul, Vacuum; or else it could not be sensible of the blessed happiness in Heaven, or the Torments in Hell. Again he says, Let us screw our supposition one pin higher, and farther imagine, that God, after the annihilation of this vast machine, the Universe, should create another in all respects equal to this, and in the same part of space wherein this now consists: First, we must conceive, that as the spaces were immense before God created the world, so also must they eternally persist of infinite extent, if he shall please at any time to destroy it; next, that these immense spaces are absolutely immoveable. By this opinion, it seems, that Gods Power cannot so easily make or annihilate Vacuum, as a substance; because he believes it to be before all Matter, and to remain after all Matter, which is to be eternal; but I cannot conceive, why Matter, or fulness of body, should not as well be Infinite and Eternal, as his Conceived Vacuum; for if Vacuum can have an eternal and infinite being, why may not fulness of body, or Matter? But he calls Vacuum Immovable, which in my opinion is to make it a God; for God is onely Immoveable and Unalterable, and this is more Glorious then to be dependant upon God; wherefore to believe Matter to be Eternal, but yet dependent upon God, is a more humble opinion, then his opinion of Vacuum; for if Vacuum be not created, and shall not be annihilated, but is Uncreated, Immaterial, Immoveable, Infinite, and Eternal, it is a God; but if it be created, God being not a Creator of Nothing, nor an annihilator of Nothing, but of Something, he cannot be a Creator of Vacuum; for Vacuum is a pure Nothing. But leaving Nothing to those that can make something of it, I will add no more, but rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
IX. MADAM, That Learned Author, of whom I made mention in my last, is pleased to say in his Chapter of Time, that Time is the Twin-brother to Space; but if Space be as much as Vacuum, then I say, they are Twin-nothings; for there can be no such thing as an empty or immaterial space, but that which man calls space, is onely a distance betwixt several corporeal parts, and time is onely the variation of corporeal motions; for were there no body, there could not be any space, and were there no corporeal motion, there could not be any time. As for Time, considered in General, it is nothing else but the corporeal motions in Nature, and Particular times are the Particular corporeal motions; but Duration is onely a continuance, or continued subsistence of the same parts, caused by the consistent motions of those parts; Neither are Time, Duration, Place, Space, Magnitude, &c. dependents upon corporeal motions, but they are all one and the same thing; Neither was Time before, nor can be after corporeal motion, for none can be without the other, being all one: And as for Eternity, it is one fixed instant, without a flux, or motion. Concerning his argument of Divisibility of Parts, my opinion is, That there is no Part in Nature Individable, no not that so small a part, which the Epicureans name an Atome; neither is Matter separable from Matter, nor Parts from Parts in General, but onely in Particulars; for though parts can be separated from parts, by self-motion, yet upon necessity they must joyn to parts, so as there can never be a single part by it self. But hereof, as also of Place, Space, Time, Motion, Figure, Magnitude, &c. I have sufficiently discoursed in my former Letters, as also in my Book of Philosophy; and as for my opinion of Atoms, their figures and motions, (if any such things there be) I will refer you to my Book of Poems, out of which give me leave to repeat these following lines, containing the ground of my opinion of Atomes:[1] All Creatures, howsoe're they may be nam'd,
Are of long, square, flat, or sharp Atoms fram'd.
Thus several figures several tempers make,
But what is mixt, doth of the four partake.
The onely cause, why things do live and die,
'S according as the mixed Atomes lie.
Thus life, and death, and young, and old,
Are as the several Atoms hold:
Wit, understanding in the brain
Are as the several atomes reign:
And dispositions, good, or ill,
Are as the several atomes still;
And every Passion, which doth rise,
Is as each several atome lies.
Thus sickness, health, and peace, and war,
Are as the several atomes are. If you desire to know more, you may read my mentioned Book of Poems whose first Edition was printed in the year, 1653. And so taking my leave of you, I rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
X. MADAM, I received the Book of your new Author that treats of Natural Philosophy, which I perceive is but lately come forth; but although it be new, yet there are no new opinions in it; for the Author doth follow the opinions of some old Philosophers, and argues after the accustomed Scholastical way, with hard, intricate, and nonsensical words: Wherefore I shall not take so much pains as to read it quite over, but onely pick out here and there some few discourses, which I shall think most convenient for the clearing of my own opinion; in the number of which, is, first, that of Matter, whereof the Author is pleased to proclaim the opinion that holds Matter to be Infinite, not onely absurd, but also impious. Truly, Madam, it is easily said, but hardly proved; and not to trouble you with unnecessary repetitions, I hope you do remember as yet what I have written to you in the beginning concerning the infiniteness of Nature, or natural Matter, where I have proved that it implies no impiety, absurdity, or contradiction at all, to believe that Matter is Infinite; for your Authors argument, concluding from the finiteness of particular Creatures to Nature her self, is of no force; for though no part of Nature is Infinite in bulk, figure, or quantity, nevertheless, all the parts of Infinite Nature are Infinite in number, which infinite number of parts must needs make up one Infinite body in bulk, or quantity; for as a finite body or substance is dividable into finite parts, so an Infinite body, as Nature, or natural Matter, must of necessity be dividable into infinite parts in number, and yet each part must also be finite in its exterior figure, as I have proved in the beginning by the example of a heap of grains of corn. Certainly, Madam, I see no reason, but since, according to your Author, God, as the prime Cause, Agent, and Producer of all things, and the action by which he produced all things, is Infinite; the Matter out of which he produced all particular Creatures may be Infinite also. Neither doth it, to my sense and reason, imply any contradiction or impiety; for it derogates nothing from the Glory and Omnipotency of God, but God is still the God of Nature, and Nature is his Servant, although Infinite, depending wholly upon the will and pleasure of the All-powerful God: Neither do these two Infinites obstruct each other; for Nature is corporeal, and God is a supernatural and spiritual Infinite Being, and although Nature has an Infinite power, yet she has but an Infinite Natural power, whereas Gods Omnipotency is infinitely extended beyond Nature. But your Author is pleased to refute that argument, which concludes from the effect to the cause, and proves Matter to be infinite, because God as the Cause is Infinite, saying, that this Rule doth onely hold in Univocal things, (by which, I suppose, he understands things of the same kind and nature) and not in opposites. Truly, Madam, by this he limits God's power, as if God were not able to work beyond Nature, and Natural Reason or Understanding; and measures Gods actions according to the rules of Logick; which whether it be not more impious, you may judg your self. And as for opposites, God and Nature are not opposites, except you will call opposites those which bear a certain relation to one another, as a Cause, and its Effect; a Parent, and a Child; a Master, and a Servant; and the like. Nay, I wonder how your Author can limit Gods action, when as he confesses himself, that the Creation of the World is an Infinite action. God acted finitely, says he, by an Infinite action; which, in my opinion, is meer non-sense, and as much as to say, a man can act weakly by a strong action, basely by an honest action, cowardly by a stout action. The truth is, God being Infinite, cannot work finitely; for, as his Essence, so his Actions cannot have any limitation, and therefore it is most probable, that God made Nature Infinite; for though each part of Nature is finite in its own figure, yet considered in general, they are Infinite, as well in number, as duration, except God be pleased to destroy them; nay, every particular may in a certain sense be said Infinite, to wit, Infinite in time or duration; for if Nature be Infinite and Eternal, and there be no annihilation or perishing in Nature, but a perpetual successive change and alteration of natural figures, then no part of Nature can perish or be annihilated; and if no part of Nature perishes, then it lasts infinitely in Nature, that is, in the substance of natural Matter; for though the corporeal motions, which make the figures, do change, yet the ground of the figure, which is natural matter, never changes. The same may be said of corporeal motions: for though motions change and vary infinite ways, yet none is lost in Nature, but some motions are repeated again: As for example; the natural motions in an Animal Creature, although they are altered in the dissolution of the figure, yet they may be repeated again by piece-meals in other Creatures; like as a Commonwealth, or united body in society, if it should be dissolved or dispersed, the particulars which did constitute this Commonwealth or society, may joyn to the making of another society; and thus the natural motions of a body do not perish when the figure of the body dissolves, but joyn with other motions to the forming and producing of some other figures. But to return to your Author. I perceive his discourse is grounded upon a false supposition, which appears by his way of arguing from the course of the Starrs and Planets, to prove the finiteness of Nature; for by reason the Stars and Planets rowl about, and turn to the same point again, each within a certain compass of time, he concludes Nature or Natural Matter to be finite too. And so he takes a part for the whole, to wit, this visible World for all Nature, when as this World is onely a part of Nature, or Natural Matter, and there may be more, and Infinite worlds besides; Wherefore his conclusion must needs be false, since it is built upon a false ground. Moreover, he is as much against the Eternity of Matter, as he is against Infiniteness; concluding likewise from the parts to the whole; For, says he, since the parts of Nature are subject to a beginning and ending, the whole must be so too. But he is much mistaken, when he attributes a beginning and ending to parts, for there is no such thing as a beginning and ending in Nature, neither in the whole, nor in the parts, by reason there is no new creation or production of Creatures out of new Matter, nor any total destruction or annihilation of any part in Nature, but onely a change, alteration and transmigration of one figure into another; which change and alteration proves rather the contrary, to wit, that Matter is Eternal and Incorruptible; for if particular figures change, they must of necessity change in the Infinite Matter, which it self, and in its nature, is not subject to any change or alteration: besides, though particulars have a finite and limited figure, and do change, yet their species do not; for Mankind never changes, nor ceases to be, though Peter and Paul die, or rather their figures dissolve and divide; for to die is nothing else, but that the parts of that figure divide and unite into some other figures by the change of motion in those parts. Concerning the Inanimate Matter, which of it self is a dead, dull, and idle matter, your Author denies it to be a co-agent or assistant to the animate matter: For, says he, how can dead and idle things act? To which, I answer: That your Author being, or pretending to be a Philosopher, should consider that there is difference betwixt a Principal and Instrumental cause or agent; and although this inanimate, or dull matter, doth not act of it self as a principal agent, yet it can and doth act as an Instrument, according as it is imploy'd by the animate matter: for by reason there is so close a conjunction and commixture of animate and inanimate Matter in Nature, as they do make but one body, it is impossible that the animate part of matter should move without the inanimate; not that the inanimate hath motion in her self, but the animate bears up the inanimate in the action of her own substance, and makes the inanimate work, act, and move with her, by reason of the aforesaid union and commixture. Lastly, your Author speaks much of Minima's, viz. That all things may be resolved into their minima's, and what is beyond them, is nothing, and that there is one maximum, or biggest, which is the world, and what is beyond that, is Infinite. Truly, Madam, I must ingeniously confess, I am not so high learned, as to penetrate into the true sense of these words; for he says, they are both divisible, and indivisible, and yet no atomes, which surpasses my Understanding; for there is no such thing, as biggest and smallest in Nature, or in the Infinite matter; for who can know how far this World goes, or what is beyond it? There may be Infinite Worlds, as I said before, for ought we know; for God and Nature cannot be comprehended, nor their works measured, if we cannot find out the nature of particular things, which are subject to our exterior senses, how shall we be able to judg of things not subject to our senses. But your Author doth speak so presumptuously of Gods Actions, Designs, Decrees, Laws, Attributes, Power, and secret Counsels, and describes the manner, how God created all things, and the mixture of the Elements to an hair, as if he had been Gods Counsellor and assistant in the work of Creation; which whether it be not more impiety, then to say, Matter is Infinite, I'le let others judg. Neither do I think this expression to be against the holy Scripture; for though I speak as a natural Philosopher, and am unwilling to cite the Scripture, which onely treats of things belonging to Faith, and not to Reason; yet I think there is not any passage which plainly denies Matter to be Infinite, and Eternal, unless it be drawn by force to that sense: Solomon says, That there is not any thing new: and in another place it is said, That God is all fulfilling; that is, that the Will of God is the fulfilling of the actions of Nature: also the Scripture says, That Gods ways are unsearchable, and past finding out. Wherefore, it is easier to treat of Nature, then the God of Nature; neither should God be treated of by vain Philosophers, but by holy Divines, which are to deliver and interpret the Word of God without sophistry, and to inform us as much of Gods Works, as he hath been pleased to declare and make known. And this is the safest way, in the opinion of, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XI. MADAM, Your new Author endeavours to prove, that Water in its own proper nature is thicker then Earth; which, to my sense and reason, seems not probable; for although water is less porous then earth in its exterior figure, yet 'tis not so thick as earth in its interior nature: Neither can I conceive it to be true, that water in its own nature, and as long as it remains water, should be as hard as Crystal, or stone, as his opinion is; for though Elements are so pliant (being not composed of many different parts and figures) as they can change and rechange their exterior figures, yet they do not alter their interior nature without a total dissolution; but your Author may as well say, that the interior nature of man is dust and ashes, as that water in its interior nature is as thick as earth, and as hard as Christal, or stone; whereas yet a man, when he becomes dust and ashes, is not a man; and therefore, when water is become so thick as earth, or so hard as stone, it is not water; I mean when it is so in its interior nature, not in its exterior figure; for the exterior figure may be contracted, when yet the interior nature is dilative; and so the exterior may be thick or hard, when the interior is soft and rare. But you may say, that water is a close, and heavy, as also a smooth and glossy body. I answer: That doth not prove its interior nature to be hard, dense, thick, or contracted; for the interior nature and parts of a body may be different from the exterior figure or parts; neither doth the close joyning of parts hinder dilatation; for if so, a line or circle could not dilate or extend: But this close uniting of the parts of water is caused through its wet and glutinous quality, which wet and sticking quality is caused by a watery dilatation; for though water hath not interiously so rare a dilatation as Air, Fire, and Light, yet it hath not so close a contraction as Earth, Stone, or Metal; neither are all bodies that are smooth and shining, more solid and dense, then those that are rough and dark; for light is more smooth, glossy, and shining, then Water, Metal, Earth, or Transparent-stones, and yet is of a dilative nature. But because some bodies and figures which are transparent and smooth, are dense, hard, and thick, we cannot in reason, or sense, say, that all bodies and figures are so. As for Transparency, it is caused through a purity of substance, and an evenness of parts: the like is glossiness, onely glossiness requires not so much regularity, as transparency. But to return to Water; its exterior Circle-figure may dilate beyond the degree of the propriety or nature of water, or contract beneath the propriety or nature of water. Your Author may say, Water is a globous body, and all globous bodies tend to a Center. I answer: That my sense and reason cannot perceive, but that Circles and Globes do as easily dilate, as contract: for if all Globes and Circles should endeavour to draw or fall from the circumference to the Center, the Center of the whole World, or at least of some parts of the World, would be as a Chaos: besides, it is against sense and reason, that all Matter should strive to a Center; for humane sense and reason may observe, that all Creatures, and so Matter, desire liberty, and a Center is but a Prison in comparison to the Circumference; wherefore if Matter crowds, it is rather by force, then a voluntary action. You will say, All Creatures desire rest, and in a Center there's rest. I answer; Humane sense and reason cannot perceive any rest in Nature: for all things, as I have proved heretofore, are in a perpetual motion. But concerning Water, you may ask me, Madam, Whether congeal'd Water, as Ice, if it never thaw, remains Water? To which, I answer: That the interior nature of Water remains as long as the Ice remains, although the outward form is changed; but if Ice be contracted into the firmness and density of Crystal, or Diamond, or the like, so as to be beyond the nature of Water, and not capable to be that Water again, then it is transformed into another Creature, or thing, which is neither Water, nor Ice, but a Stone; for the Icy contraction doth no more alter the interior nature of Water, which is dilating, then the binding of a man with Chains alters his nature from being a man; and it might be said as well, that the nature of Air is not dilating, when inclosed in a bladder, as that Water doth not remain Water in its interior nature, when it is contracted into Ice. But you may ask, Whether one extreme can change into another? I answer: To my sense and reason it were possible, if extremes were in Nature; but I do not perceive that in Nature there be any, although my sense and reason doth perceive alterations in the effects of Nature; for though one and the same part may alter from contraction to dilation, and from dilation to contraction; yet this contraction and dilation are not extremes, neither are they performed at one and the same time, but at different times. But having sufficiently declared my opinion hereof in my former Letters, I'l add no more, but rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XII. MADAM, My discourse of Water in my last Letter has given you occasion to enquire after the reason, Why the weight of a great body of water doth not press so hard and heavily as to bruise or crush a body, when it is sunk down to the bottom? As for example: If a man should be drowned, and afterwards cast out from the bottom of a great Sea, or River, upon the shore; he would onely be found smother'd or choak'd to death, and not press'd, crush'd, or bruised, by the weight of water. I answer; The reasons are plain: for, first, the nature of a mans respiration requires such a temperature of breath to suck in, as is neither too thick, nor too thin for his lungs, and the rest of his interior parts, as also for the organs and passages of his exterior senses, but fit, proper, and proportionable to those mentioned parts of his body: As for example; in a too thin and rarified air, man will be as apt to die for want of breath, as in a too gross and thick air he is apt to die with a superfluity of the substance he imbreaths; for thick smoak, or thick vapour, as also too gross air, will soon smother a man to death; and as for choaking, if a man takes more into his throat then he can swallow, he will die; and if his stomack be filled with more food then it is able to digest, if it cannot discharge it self, he will die with the excess of food; and if there be no food, or too little put into it, he will also die for want of food. So the eye, if it receives too many, or too gross, or too bright objects, it will be dazled or blinded, and some objects through their purity are not to be seen at all: The same for Hearing, and the rest of the exterior senses: And this is the reason, why man, or some animal Creatures are smother'd and choak'd with water; because water is thicker then the grossest air or vapour; for if smoak, which is rarer then water, will smother and choak a man, well may water, being so much thicker. But yet this smothering or choaking doth not prove, that water hath an interior or innate density (as your Authors opinion is) no more then smoak, or thick and gross air hath; but the density of water is caused more through the wet and moist exterior parts, joyning and uniting closely together; and the interior nature of smoak being more moist or glutinous then thin air, and so more apt to unite its exterior parts, it makes it to come in effect nearer to water; for though water and smoak are both of rare natures, yet not so rare as clear and pure air; neither is water or smoak so porous as pure air, by reason the exterior parts of water and smoak are more moist or glutinous then pure air. But the thickness of water and smoak is the onely cause of the smothering of men, or some animals, as by stopping their breath, for a man can no more live without air, then he can without food; and a well tempered or middle degree of air is the most proper for animal Respiration; for if the air be too thick, it may soon smother or choak him; and if too thin, it is not sufficient to give him breath: And this is the reason that a man being drown'd, is not onely smother'd, but choak'd by water; because there enters more through the exterior passages into his body then can be digested; for water is apt to flow more forcibly and with greater strength then air; not that it is more dilating then air, but by reason it is thicker, and so stronger, or of more force; for the denser a body is, the stronger it is; and a heavy body, when moved, is more forcible then a light body. But I pray by this expression mistake not the nature of water; for the interior nature of water hath not that gravity, which heavy or dense bodies have, its nature being rare and light, as air, or fire; but the weight of water, as I said before, proceeds onely from the closeness and compactness of its exterior parts, not through a contraction in its interior nature; and there is no argument, which proves better, that water in its interior nature is dilating, then that its weight is not apt to press to a point; for though water is apt to descend, through the union of its parts, yet it cannot press hard, by reason of its dilating nature, which hinders that heavy pressing quality; for a dilating body cannot have a contracted weight, I mean, so as to press to a Center, which is to a point; and this is the reason, that when a grave or heavy body sinks down to the bottom of water, it is not opprest, hurt, crusht, or bruised by the weight of water; for, as I said, the nature of water being dilating, it can no more press hard to a center, then vapour, air, or fire: The truth is, water would be as apt to ascend as descend, if it were not for the wet, glutinous and sticking, cleaving quality of its exterior parts; but as the quantity and quality of the exterior parts makes water apt to sink, or descend, so the dilating nature makes it apt to flow, if no hinderance stop its course; also the quantity and quality of its exterior parts is the cause, that some heavy bodies do swim without sinking: as for example; a great heavy Ship will not readily sink, unless its weight be so contracted as to break asunder the united parts of water; for the wet quality of water causing its exterior parts to joyn close, gives it such an united strength, as to be able to bear a heavy burden, if the weight be dilated, or level, and not piercing or penetrating; for those bodies that are most compact, will sink sooner, although of less weight then those that are more dilated although of greater weight: Also the exterior and outward shape or form makes some bodies more apt to sink then others; Indeed, the outward form and shape of Creatures is one of the chief causes of either sinking or swimming. But to conclude, water in its interior nature is of a mean or middle degree, as neither too rare, nor too grave a body; and for its exterior quality, it is in as high a degree for wetness, as fire is for heat; and being apt both to divide, and to unite, it can bear a burden, and devour a burden, so that some bodies may swim, and others sink; and the cause, that a sunk body is not opprest, crush'd, or squeesed, is the dilating nature and quality of water, which hinders its parts from pressing or crowding towards a point or center; for although water is heavy, and apt to descend, yet its weight is not caused by a contraction of its substance, but by a union of its parts. Thus, Madam, I have obeyed your commands, in giving you my reasons to your propounded question, which if you approve, I have my aim; if not, I submit to your better judgment: for you know I am in all respects, Madam, Your Faithful Friend to serve you.
XIII. MADAM, I am glad, you are pleased with my reasons I gave to your propounded question concerning the weight of Water; and since you have been pleased to send me some more of that subject, I shall be ready also to give my answer to them, according to the capacity of my judgment. First, you desire to know, How it comes, that Water will by degrees ascend through a narrow pipe, when the pipe is placed straight upright; or perpendicular? The reason, in my opinion is, that Water, having a dilative nature, when it finds an obstruction to descend or flow even, will dilate it self ascendingly, according as it hath liberty, or freedom, and strength, or quantity; the truth is, water would be more apt to ascend then to descend, were it not for the close uniting of its liquid Parts, which causes its exterior density, and this density makes it of more weight then its nature is; and the proof that water is apt in its nature to ascend, is, that some sorts of vapours are made onely by the dilation and rarefaction of ascending Water. Your second question is, Why the surface of water seems to be concave in its middle, and higher on every side? I answer, The interior figure of water is a circular figure, which being a round figure, is both concave, and convex; for where one is, the other must be; and the motions of ebbing and flowing, and ascending or descending, are partly of that figure; and so according to the exterior dilating strength or weakness, the exterior parts of water become either concave or convex; for in a full strength, as a full stream, the exterior parts of water flow in a convex figure, but when they want strength, they ebb in a concave figure. Your third question is, What makes frozen water apt to break those Vessels wherein it is contained, in the act of freezing or congealing? I answer: The same cause that makes water clear, as also more swell'd then usually it is: which cause is the inherent dilative nature of water; for water being naturally dilative, when as cold attractions do assault it, the moist dilations of water in the conflict use more then their ordinary strength to resist those cold contracting motions, by which the body of water dilates it self into a larger compass, according as it hath liberty or freedom, or quantity of parts; and the cold parts not being able to drive the water back to its natural compass, bind it as it is extended, like as if a beast should be bound when his legs and neck are thrust out at the largest extent, in striving to kick or thrust away his enemies and imprisoners: And so the reason why water breaks these vessels wherein it is inclosed, in the act of its freezing or congealing is, that when the cold contractions are so strong as they endeavour to extinguish the dilating nature of water, the water refilling, forces its parts so, as they break the vessel which incloses them: The same reason makes Ice clear and transparent; for it is not the rarefaction of water that doth it, but the dilation, which causes the parts of water to be not onely more loose and porous, but also more smooth and even, by resisting the cold contractions; for every part endeavours to defend their borders with a well ordered and regular flowing or streaming, and not onely to defend, but to enlarge their compass against their enemies. Your fourth question is, How it comes that Snow and Salt mixt together doth make Ice? The reason, in my judgment, is, that Salt being very active, and partly of the nature of fire, doth sometimes preserve, and sometimes destroy other bodies, according to its power, or rather according to the nature of those bodies it works on; and salt being mixt with snow, endeavours to destroy it; but having not so much force, melts it onely by its heat, and reduces it into its first principle, which is water, altering the figure of snow; but the cold contractions remaining in the water, and endeavouring to maintain and keep their power, straight draw the water or melted snow into the figure of ice, so as neither the salts heat, nor the waters dilative nature, are able to resist or destroy those cold contractions; for although they destroy'd the first figure, which is snow, yet they cannot hinder the second, which is Ice. Your last question is, How the Clouds can hang so long in the Skie without falling down? Truly, Madam, I do not perceive that Clouds, being come to their full weight and gravity, do keep up in the air, but some of them fall down in showres of rain, others in great and numerous flakes of snow; some are turned into wind, and some fall down in thick mists, so that they onely keep up so long, until they are of a full weight for descent, or till their figure is altered into some other body, as into air, wind, rain, lightning, thunder, snow, hail, mist, and the like. But many times their dilating motions keep or hinder them from descending, to which contracting motions are required. In my opinion, it is more to be admired, that the Sea doth not rise, then that Clouds do not fall; for, as we see, Clouds fall very often, as also change from being Clouds, to some other figure: Wherefore it is neither the Sun, nor Stars, nor the Vapours, which arise from the Earth, and cause the Clouds, nor the porosity of their bodies, nor the Air, that can keep or hinder them from falling or changing to some other body; but they being come to their full weight, fall or change according as is fittest for them. And these are all the reasons I can give you for the present; if they do not satisfie you, I will study for others, and in all occasions endeavour to express my self, Madam, Your constant Friend, and faithful Servant.
XIV. MADAM, Since in my last, I made mention of the Congealing of Water into Ice and Snow, I cannot choose, but by the way tell you, that I did lately meet with an Author, who is of opinion, That Snow is nothing else but Ice broken or ground into small pieces. To which, I answer: That this opinion may serve very well for a Fancy, but not for a Rational Truth, or at least for a Probable Reason; For why may not the cold motions make snow without beating or grinding, as well as they make Ice? Surely Nature is wiser then to trouble her self with unnecessary labour, and to make an easie work difficult, as Art her Creature doth, or as some dull humane capacities conceive; for it is more easie for Nature to make Snow by some sorts of cold contractions, as she makes Ice by other sorts of cold contractions, then to force Air and Wind to beat, grinde, or pound Ice into Snow, which would cause a confusion and disturbance through the Irregularity of several parts, being jumbled in a confused manner together. The truth is, it would rather cause a War in Nature, then a natural production, alteration, or transformation: Neither can I conceive, in what region this turbulent and laborious work should be acted; certainly not in the caverns of the Earth, for snow descends from the upper Region. But, perchance, this Author believes, that Nature imploys Wind as a Hand, and the Cold air as a Spoon, to beat Ice like the white of an Egg into a froth of Snow. But the great quantity of Snow, in many places, doth prove, that Snow is not made of the fragments of Ice, but that some sorts of cold contractions on a watery body, make the figure of snow in the substance of water, as other sorts of cold contractions make the figure of ice; which motions and figures I have treated of in my Book of Philosophy, according to that Judgment and Reason which Nature has bestowed upon me. The Author of this Fancy, gives the same reason for Snow being white: For Ice, says he, is a transparent body, and all transparent bodies, when beaten into powder, appear white; and since Snow is nothing else but Ice powder'd small, it must of necessity shew white. Truly, Madam, I am not so experienced, as to know that all transparent bodies, being beaten small, shew white; but grant it be so, yet that doth not prove, that the whiteness of snow proceeds from the broken parts of Ice, unless it be proved that the whiteness of all bodies proceeds from the powdering of transparent bodies, which I am sure he cannot do; for Silver, and millions of other things are white, which were never produced from the powder of transparent bodies: Neither do I know any reason against it, but that which makes a Lilly white, may also be the cause of the whiteness of Snow, that is, such a figure as makes a white colour; for different figures, in my opinion, are the cause of different colours, as you will find in my Book of Philosophy, where I say, that Nature by contraction of lines draws such or such a Figure, which is such or such a Colour; as such a Figure is red, and such a Figure is green, and so of all the rest: But the Palest colours, and so white, are the loosest and slackest figures; Indeed, white, which is the nearest colour to light, is the smoothest, evenest and straightest figure, and composed of the smallest lines: As for example; suppose the figure of 8. were the colour of Red, and the figure of 1. the colour of White; or suppose the figure of Red to be a z. and the figure of an r. to be the figure of Green, and a straight l. the figure of White; And mixt figures make mixt colours: The like examples may be brought of other Figures, as of a Harpsichord and its strings, a Lute and its strings, a Harp and its strings, &c. By which your Reason shall judg, whether it be not easier for Nature, to make Snow and its whiteness by the way of contraction, then by the way of dissolution: As for example; Nature in making Snow, contracts or congeals the exterior figure of Water into the figure of a Harp, which is a Triangular figure with the figure of straight strings within it; for the exterior figure of the Harp represents the exterior figure of Snow, and the figure of the strings extended in straight lines represent the figure of its whiteness. And thus it is easier to make Snow and its whiteness at one act, then first to contract or congeal water into Ice, and then to cause wind and cold air to beat and break that Ice into powder, and lastly to contract or congeal that powder into flakes of Snow. Which would be a very troublesom work for Nature, viz. to produce one effect by so many violent actions and several labours, when the making of two figures by one action will serve the turn. But Nature is wiser then any of her Creatures can conceive; for she knows how to make, and how to dissolve, form; and transform, with facility and ease, without any difficulty; for her actions are all easie and free, yet so subtil, curious and various, as not any part or creature of Nature can exactly or throughly trace her ways, or know her wisdom. And thus leaving her, I rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XV. MADAM, I have taken several questions out of your new Author, which I intend to answer in this present Letter according to the conceptions of my own sense and reason, and to submit them to your censure; which if you vouchsafe to grant me without partiality, I shall acknowledg my self much obliged to you for this favour. The first question is, Why wet Linnen is dried in the Air? I answer; That, according to my sense and reason, the water which is spred upon the linnen, being not united in a full and close body, dilates beyond the Circle-degree of water and wetness, and so doth easily change from water to vapour, and from vapour to air, whereby the linnen becomes as dry, as it was before it became wet. The second question is, Why Water and Wine intermix so easily and suddenly together? I answer: All wet liquors, although their exterior figures do differ, yet their interior natures, figures and forms are much alike, and those things that are of the same interior nature, do easily and suddenly joyn as into one: Wherefore Wine and Water having both wet natures, do soon incorporate together, whereas, were they of different natures, they would not so peaceably joyn together, but by their contrary natures become enemies, and strive to destroy each other; but this is to be observed, that the sharp points of the Circle-lines of Wine, by passing through the smooth Circle-lines of Water, help to make a more hasty and sudden conjunction. The third question, is, Why Light, which in its nature is white, shining through a coloured Glass, doth appear of the same colour which the Glass is of, either Blew, Green, Red, or the like? I answer: The reason is, that though Light in its nature be white, and the Glass clear and transparent, yet when as the Glass is stained or painted with colours, both the clearness of the glass, and the whiteness of the light, is obstructed by the figure of that colour the glass is stained or painted withal, and the light spreading upon or thorow the glass, represents it self in the figure of that same colour; indeed, in all probability to sense and reason, it appears, that the lines or beams of light, which are straight, small, even, and parallel, do contract in their entrance through the glass into the figure of the colour the glass is stained or painted with, so that the light passes through the glass figuratively, in so much, as it seems to be of the same colour the glass is of, although in it self it is white, lucent, and clear; and as the light appears, so the eye receives it, if the sight be not destructive. The fourth question, is, Whether (as your Authors opinion is) kisses feel pleasing and delightful by the thinness of the parts, and a gentle stirring and quavering of the tangent spirits, that give a pleasing tact? I answer: If this were so, then all kisses would be pleasing, which surely are not; for some are thought very displeasing, especially from thin lips; wherefore, in my opinion, it is neither the thinness of the parts of the lips, nor the quavering of the tangent spirits, but the appetites and passions of life, reason, and soul, that cause the pleasure; Nevertheless, I grant, the stirring up of the spirits may contribute to the increasing, heightening, or strengthning of that tact, but it is not the prime cause of it. The fifth question, is, Whether the greatest man have always the greatest strength? I answer, Not: for strength and greatness of bulk doth not always consist together, witness experience: for a little man may be, and is oftentimes stronger then a tall man. The like of other animal Creatures: As for example, some Horses of a little or middle size, have a great deal more strength then others which are high and big; for it is the quantity of sensitive matter that gives strength, and not the bigness or bulk of the body. The sixth question, is, Whether this World or Universe be the biggest Creature? I answer: It is not possible to be known, unless Man could perfectly know its dimension or extension, or whether there be more Worlds then one: But, to speak properly, there is no such thing as biggest or least in Nature. The seventh question, is, Whether the Earth be the Center of Matter, or of the World? As for Matter, it being Infinite, has no Center, by reason it has no Circumference; and, as for this World, its Center cannot be known, unless man knew the utmost parts of its circumference, for no Center can be known without its circumference; and although some do imagine this world so little, that in comparison to Infinite Matter, it would not be so big as the least Pins head, yet their knowledg cannot extend so far as to know the circumference of this little World; by which you may perceive the Truth of the old saying, Man talks much, but knows little. The eighth question is, Whether all Centers must needs be full, and close, as a stufft Cushion; and whether the matter in the Center of the Universe or World be dense, compact, and heavy? I answer: This can no more be known, then the circumference of the World; for what man is able to know, whether the Center of the world be rare, or dense, since he doth not know where its Center is; and as for other particular Centers, some Centers may be rare, some dense, and some may have less matter then their circumferences. The ninth question is, Whether Finite Creatures can be produced out of an Infinite material cause? I answer: That, to my sense and reason, an Infinite cause must needs produce Infinite effects, though not in each Particular, yet in General; that is, Matter, being Infinite in substance, must needs be dividable into Infinite parts in number, and thus Infinite Creatures must needs be produced out of Infinite Matter; but Man being but a finite part, thinks all must be finite too, not onely each particular Creature, but also the Matter out of which all Creatures are produced, which is corporeal Nature. Nevertheless, those Infinite effects in Nature are equalized by her different motions which are her different actions; for it is not non-sence, but most demonstrable to sense and reason that there are equalities or a union in Infinite. The tenth question is, Whether the Elements be the onely matter out of which all other Creatures are produced? I answer: The Elements, as well as all other Creatures, as it appears to humane sense and reason, are all of one and the same Matter, which is the onely Infinite Matter; and therefore the Elements cannot be the Matter of all other Creatures, for several sorts of Creatures have several ways of productions, and I know no reason to the contrary, but that Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals, may as well derive their essence from each other, as from the Elements, or the Elements from them; for as all Creatures do live by each other, so they are produced from each other, according to the several ways or manners of productions. But mistake me not, Madam, for I speak of production in General, and not of such natural production whereby the several species of Creatures are maintained: As for example, Generation in Animals; for an Element cannot generate an Animal in that manner as an Animal can generate or produce its like; for as Nature is wise, so her actions are all wise and orderly, or else it would make a horrid confusion amongst the Infinite parts of Nature. The eleventh question is, What is meant by Natural Theology? I answer: Natural Theology, in my opinion, is nothing else but Moral Philosophy; for as for our belief, it is grounded upon the Scripture, and not upon Reason. These, Madam, are the questions which I have pickt out of your new Author, together with my answers, of which I desire your impartial Judgment: But I must add one thing more before I conclude, which is, I am much pleased with your Authors opinion, That Sound may be perceived by the Eye, Colour by the Ear, and that Sound and Colour may be smell'd and tasted; and I have been of this opinion eleven years since, as you will find in my Book of Poems, whose first Edition was printed in the Year, 1653. And thus I take my leave of you, and remain constantly, Madam, Your Faithful Friend to serve you.
XVI. MADAM, Concerning your question of the ascending nature of fire, I am absolutely of Aristotle's Opinion, that it is as natural for Fire to ascend, as it is for Earth to descend; And why should we believe the nature of one, and doubt the nature of the other? For if it be granted, that there are as well ascending, as descending bodies in Nature, as also low and high places, (according to the situation of Particulars) and Circumferences, as well as Centers, (considering the shape of bodies) I cannot perceive by humane reason, but that the Nature of fire is ascending, and that it is very improbable, it should have a descending or contracting nature, as to tend or endeavour to a Center. But, Madam, give me leave to ask what sort of Fire you mean, whether a Celestial, or a Terrestrial Fire, viz. that which is named an Elemental fire, or any other sort of fire? for there may be as many several sorts of fire, as of other Creatures; or whether you mean onely that sort of fire that belongs to this terrestrial Globe, or all the fire in general that is in Infinite Nature? and if you mean onely that sort of fire which belongs to this Terrestrial World we live upon; I answer, There are many several sorts of that fire too; for all the fire belonging to this Earthly Globe, doth not lie in one place, body, or part, no more then all metal, or but one sort of metal, as Gold, lies in one mine, or all Mankind in one womb. Neither can I believe, that the Sun is the onely Celestial Fire in Nature, but that there may be as numerous Suns, as there are other sorts of Creatures in Nature. But as for the ascending propriety of this terrestrial Fire, you may say, That the Elements do commix and unite in this worldly Globe, and if Fire should have an ascending motion, it would pierce into other Globes, or Worlds, and never leave ascending. I answer: That, first of all, the strength of fire is to be considered, consisting not onely in its quantity, but also in its quality; as whether it can ascend to those bodies and places which are far above it: For example; A Man, or any other Creature, hath never so much strength, or ability, or length of life, as to travel to the utmost parts of the Universe, were the way never so plain and free, and the number of men never so great: the like for Elementary fire, which hath life and death, that is, generation and dissolution, and successive motion, as well as other Creatures. But you would fain know, whether fire, if it were left at liberty, would not turn to a Globous figure? I answer; That, to my sense and reason, it would not: but some men, seeing the flame of fire in an arched Oven, descend round the sides of the Oven in a Globous figure, do perhaps imagine the nature of fire to be descending, and its natural figure round as a Globe, which is ridiculous; for the fire in the Oven, although every where incompassed and bound, yet, according to its nature, ascends to the top of the Oven; and finding a stoppage and suppression, offers to descend perpendicularly; but by reason of a continual ascending of the following flame, the first, and so all the following parts of flame are forced to spread about, and descend round the sides of the Oven, so that the descension of the flame is forced, and not natural, and its Globous figure is caused, as it were, by a mould, which is the Oven. But some are of opinion, that all bodies have descending motions towards the Center of this worldly Globe, and therefore they do not believe, that any bodies do ascend naturally: But what reason have they to believe one, and not the other? Besides, how do they know that all bodies would rest in the Center of this terrestrial Globe, if they came thither? For if it was possible, that a hole could be digged from the superficies of this Earthly Globe thorow the middle or Center of it unto the opposite superficies, and a stone be sent thorow; the question is, whether the stone would rest in the Center, and not go quite thorow? Wherefore this is but an idle Fancy; and the proof that Fire tends not to a Center, is, because it cannot be poised or weighed, not onely by reason of its rarity, but of its dilative and aspiring Nature; and as fire is ascending, or aspiring, so likewise do I, Madam, aspire to the top of your favour, and shall never descend from the ambition to serve you, but by the suppression of death. Till then, I remain, Madam, Your constant Friend, and faithful Servant.
XVII. MADAM, In your last, you were pleased to desire my answer to these following questions: First, What the reason is, that a Vessel, although it be of a solid and compact substance, yet will retain the smell or odour of a forreign substance poured into it, for a long time? I answer: The Vessel, or rather the perceptive corporeal motions of the Vessel, having patterned out the figure of the sent of the odorous substance, retain that same figure of sent, although the odorous substance is gone; and as long as that patterned figure is perfect, the sent will remain in the Vessel, either more or less, according as the figure doth last or alter. But you must consider, Madam, that although it be the natural motions that make those patterns of odours, yet those patterned figures are but as it were artificial, like as a man who draws a Copy from an Original; for Nature has divers and several ways of such motions as we call Art, for whatsoever is an imitation, is that which man calls Art. Your second question was, How it came, that the mind and understanding in many did die or dissolve before the body? I answer: The reason is, because the rational corporeal motions alter before the sensitive; for as in some, as for example, in Natural fools, the rational motions never move to a regular humane understanding, so in some dying Persons they do make a general alteration before the sensitive. Your third question was, Why a man, being bitten by a mad Dog, is onely distempered in his mind, and not in his body? The reason, according to my judgment, is, that the rational part of Matter is onely disturbed, and not the sensitive. The fourth question was, Why a Basilisk will kill with his eyes? I answer: It is the sensitive corporeal motions in the organ of sight in the man, which upon the printing of the figure of the eyes of the Basilisk, make a sudden alteration. Your fifth question was, Why an Asp will kill insensibly by biting? The reason, in my opinion, is, That the biting of the Asp hath the same efficacy as deadly Opium hath, yea, and much stronger. Your sixth question was, Why a Dog that rejoyces, swings his tail, and a Lyon when angry, or a Cat when in a fear, do lift up their tails? I answer: The several motions of the mind may produce either but one, or several sorts of motions in some part or parts of the body; and as the sensitive motions of anger will produce tears, so will the motions of joy; but grief made by the rational motions of the mind, may by excess disturb and make a general alteration of the sensitive motions in an animal: the same may excessive joy. But, Madam, you may perhaps find out better reasons for your own questions then these are; for my endeavour was onely to frame my answer to the ground of my own opinions, and so to satisfie your desire, which was, and is still the ambition of, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
MADAM, In your last, you were pleased to desire an account, how far, or how much I did understand the ancient and modern Philosophers in their Philosophical Writings. Truly, Madam, I can more readily tell you what I do not understand, then what I do understand: for, first, I do not understand their sophistical Logick, as to perswade with arguments that black is white, and white is black; and that fire is not hot, nor water wet, and other such things; for the glory in Logick is rather to make doubts, then to find truth; indeed, that Art now is like thick, dark clouds, which darken the light of truth. Next: I do not understand in particular, what they mean by second matter; for if they name figures and forms second matter, they may as well say, all several motions, which are the several actions of Nature, are several matters, and so there would be infinite several matters, which would produce a meer confusion in Nature. Neither do I understand, when they say, a body dissolves into the first matter; for I am not able to conceive their first matter, nor what they mean by magna and major materia; for I believe there is but one matter, and the motion of that matter is its action by which it produces several figures and effects; so that the nature of the matter is one and the same, although its motions, that is, its actions, be various, for the various effects alter not the nature or unity of the onely matter. Neither do I understand what they mean by corruption, for surely Nature is not corruptible. Nor do I understand their individables in Nature, nor a bodiless form, nor a privation, nor a being without a body; nor any such thing as they call rest, for there's not any thing without motion in Nature: Some do talk of moving minima's, but they do not tell what those minima's or their motions are, or how they were produced, or how they came to move. Neither do I understand when they say there is but one World, and that finite; for if there be no more Matter then that which they call the whole World, and may be measured by a Jacob's staff, then certainly there is but little matter, and that no bigger then an atome in comparison to Infinite. Neither can my reason comprehend, when they say, that not any thing hath power from its interior nature to move exteriously and locally; for common sense and reason, that is sight and observation, doth prove the contrary. Neither do I know what they mean by making a difference between matter and form, power and act; for there can be no form without matter, nor no matter without form; and as act includes power, so power is nothing without act: Neither can I conceive Reason to be separable from matter; nor what is meant when they say, that, onely that is real, which moves the understanding without. Nor do I understand what they mean by intentionals, accidentals, incorporeal beings, formal ratio, formal unity, and hundreds the like; enough to puzle truth, when all is but the several actions of one cause, to wit, the onely matter. But most men make such cross, narrow, and intricate ways in Nature, with their over-nice distinctions, that Nature appears like a Labyrinth, whenas really she is as plain as an un-plowed, ditched, or hedged champion: Nay, some make Nature so full, that she can neither move nor stir; and others again will have her so empty, as they leave not any thing within her; and some with their penetrations, pressings, squeezings, and the like, make such holes in her, as they do almost wound, press and squeeze her to death: And some are so learned, witty, and ingenious, as they understand and know to discourse of the true compass, just weight, exact rules, measures and proportions of the Universe, as also of the exact division of the Chaos, and the architecture of the world, to an atome. Thus, Madam, I have made my confession to you of what I understand not, and have endeavoured to make my ignorance as brief as I could; but the great God knows, that my ignorance is longer then that which is named life and death; and as for my understanding, I can onely say, that I understand nothing better, but my self to be, Madam, Your most faithful Friend and humble Servant.
XIX. MADAM, Since I have given you, in my last, an account how much I did understand the Philosophical works of both the ancient and modern Philosophers, or rather what I did not understand of them, you would fain have my opinion now of the persons themselves. Truly, Madam, as for those that are dead, or those that are living, I cannot say any thing, but that I believe they all were or are worthy persons, men of vast understandings, subtil conceptions, ingenious wits, painful students, and learned writers. But as for their works, as I told you heretofore, I confess ingeniously, I understand them not, by reason I am ignorant in their Scholastical Arts, as Logick, Metaphysick, Mathematicks, and the like: For to my simple apprehension, when as Logicians argue of natural causes and effects, they make natural causes to produce natural effects with more difficulty and enforcement then Nature knows of; and as for Mathematicians, they endeavour to inchant Nature with Circles, and bind her with lines so hard, as if she were so mad, that she would do some mischief, when left at liberty. Geometricians weigh Nature to an Atome, and measure her so exactly, as less then a hairs breadth; besides, they do press and squeeze her so hard and close, as they almost stifle her. And Natural Philosophers do so stuff her with dull, dead, senceless minima's, like as a sack with meal, or sand, by which they raise such a Dust as quite blinds Nature and natural reason. But Chymists torture Nature worst of all; for they extract and distil her beyond substance, nay, into no substance, if they could. As for natural Theologers, I understand them least of any; for they make such a gallamalfry of Philosophy and Divinity, as neither can be distinguished from the other. In short, Madam, They all with their intricate definitions and distinctions set my brain on the rack: but some Philosophers are like some Poets, for they endeavour to write strong lines. You may ask me, what is meant by strong lines? I answer: Weak sense. To which leaving them, I rest, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
XX. MADAM, I am not of your opinion, That nice distinctions and Logistical arguments discover truth, dissolve doubts, and clear the understanding; but I say, they rather make doubts of truth, and blind-fold the understanding; Indeed, nice distinctions and sophistical arguments, are very pernicious both in Schools, Church, and State: As for the Church, although in Divinity there is but one Truth, yet nice distinctions, and Logistical sophistry, have made such confusion in it, as has caused almost as many several opinions as there are words in the Scripture; and as for natural Theology, which is moral Philosophy, they have divided vertues and vices into so many parts, and minced them so small, that neither can be clearly distinguished. The same in Government; they endeavour to cut between command and obedience to a hairs breadth. Concerning causes of Law, they have abolish'd the intended benefit, and banish'd equity; and instead of keeping Peace, they make War, causing enmity betwixt men: As for Natural Philosophy, they will not suffer sense and reason to appear in that study: And as for Physick, they have kill'd more men then Wars, Plagues, or Famine. Wherefore from nice distinctions and Logistical sophistry, Good God deliver us, especially, from those that concern Divinity; for they weaken Faith, trouble Conscience, and bring in Atheism: In short, they make controversies, and endless disputes. But least the opening of my meaning in such plain terms should raise a controversie also between you and me, I'le cut off here, and rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XXI. MADAM, Yesterday I received a visit from the Lady N. M. who you know hath a quick wit, rational opinions, and subtil conceptions; all which she is ready and free to divulge in her discourse. But when she came to my Chamber, I was casting up some small accounts; which when she did see, What, said she, are you at Numeration? Yes, said I: but I cannot number well, nor much, for I do not understand Arithmetick. Said she, You can number to three. Yes, said I, I can number to four: Nay, faith, said she, the number of three is enough, if you could but understand that number well, for it is a mystical number. Said I, There is no great mystery to count that number; for one, and two, makes three. Said she, That is not the mystery; for the mystery is, That three makes one: and without this mystery no man can understand Divinity, Nature, nor himself. Then I desired her to make me understand that mystery. She said, It required more time to inform me, then a short visit, for this mystery was such, as did puzle all wise men in the world; and the not understanding of this mystery perfectly, had caused endless divisions and disputes. I desired, if she could not make me understand the mystery, she would but inform me, how three made one in Divinity, Nature, and Man. She said, That was easie to do; for in Divinity there are three Persons in one Essence, as God the Father, the Son, and the holy Ghost, whose Essence being individable, they make but one God; And as for Philosophy, there is but Matter, Motion, and Figure, which being individable, make but one Nature; And as for Man, there is Soul, Life, and Body, all three joyned in one Man. But I replied, Man's Life, Soul and Body, is dividable. That is true, said she, but then he is no more a Man; for these three are his essential parts, which make him to be a man; and when these parts are dissolved, then his interior nature is changed, so that he can no longer be call'd a man: As for example; Water being turned into Air, and having lost its interior nature, can no more be called Water, but it is perfect Air; the same is with Man: But as long as he is a Man, then these three forementioned parts which make him to be of that figure are individably united as long as man lasts. Besides, said she, this is but in the particular, considering man single, and by himself; but in general, these three, as life, soul, and body, are individably united, so that they remain as long as mankind lasts. Nay, although they do dissolve in the particulars, yet it is but for a time; for they shall be united again at the last day, which is the time of their resurrection; so that also in this respect we may justly call them individable, for man shall remain with an united soul, life, and body, eternally. And as she was thus discoursing, in came a Sophisterian, whom when she spied, away she went as fast as she could; but I followed her close, and got hold of her, then asked her, why she ran away? She answer'd, if she stayed, the Logician would dissolve her into nothing, for the profession of Logicians is to make something nothing, and nothing something. I pray'd her to stay and discourse with the Logician: Not for a world, said she, for his discourse will make my brain like a confused Chaos, full of senseless minima's; and after that, he will so knock, jolt, and jog it, and make such whirls and pits, as will so torture my brain, that I shall wish I had not any: Wherefore, said she, I will not stay now, but visit you again to morrow. And I wish with all my heart, Madam, you were so near as to be here at the same time, that we three might make a Triumvirate in discourse, as well as we do in friendship. But since that cannot be, I must rest satisfied that I am, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XXII. MADAM, You were pleased to desire my opinion of the works of that Learned and Ingenious Writer B. Truly, Madam, I have read but some part of his works; but as much as I have read, I have observed, he is a very civil, eloquent, and rational Writer; the truth is, his style is a Gentleman's style. And in particular, concerning his experiments, I must needs say this, that, in my judgment, he hath expressed himself to be a very industrious and ingenious person; for he doth neither puzle Nature, nor darken truth with hard words and compounded languages, or nice distinctions; besides, his experiments are proved by his own action. But give me leave to tell you, that I observe, he studies the different parts and alterations, more then the motions, which cause the alterations in those parts; whereas, did he study and observe the several and different motions in those parts, how they change in one and the same part, and how the different alterations in bodies are caused by the different motions of their parts, he might arrive to a vast knowledg by the means of his experiments; for certainly experiments are very beneficial to man. In the next place, you desire my opinion of the Book call'd, The Discourses of the Virtuosi in France: I am sorry, Madam, this book comes so late to my hands, that I cannot read it so slowly and observingly, as to give you a clear judgment of their opinions or discourses in particular; however, in general, and for what I have read in it, I may say, it expresses the French to be very learned and eloquent Writers, wherein I thought our English had exceeded them, and that they did onely excel in wit and ingenuity; but I perceive most Nations have of all sorts. The truth is, ingenious and subtil wit brings news; but learning and experience brings proofs, at least, argumental discourses; and the French are much to be commended, that they endeavour to spend their time wisely, honourably, honestly, and profitably, not onely for the good and benefit of their own, but also of other Nations. But before I conclude, give me leave to tell you, that concerning the curious and profitable Arts mentioned in their discourses, I confess, I do much admire them, and partly believe they may arrive to the use of many of them; but there are two arts which I wish with all my heart I could obtain: the first is, to argue without error in all kinds, modes, and figures, in a quarter of an hour; and the other is to learn a way to understand all languages in six hours. But as for the first, I fear, if I want a thorow understanding in every particular argument, cause, or point, a general art or mode of words will not help me, especially, if I, being a woman, should want discretion: And as for the second, my memory is so bad, that it is beyond the help of Art, so that Nature has made my understanding harder or closer then Glass, through which the Sun of verity cannot pass, although its light doth; and therefore I am confident I shall not be made, or taught to learn this mentioned Art in six hours, no not in six months. But I wish all Arts were as easily practised, as mentioned; and thus I rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XXIII. MADAM, Concerning your question, Whether a Point be something, or nothing, or between both; My opinion is, that a natural point is material; but that which the learned name a Mathematical point, is like their Logistical Egg, whereof there is nothing in Nature any otherwise, but a word, which word is material, as being natural; for concerning immaterial beings, it is impossible to believe there be any in Nature; and though witty Students, and subtil Arguers have both in past, and this present age, endeavoured to prove something, nothing; yet words and disputes have not power to annihilate any thing that is in Nature, no more then to create something out of nothing; and therefore they can neither make something, nothing; nor nothing to be something: for the most witty student, nor the subtilest disputant, cannot alter Nature, but each thing is and must be as Nature made it. As for your other question, Whether there be more then five Senses? I answer: There are as many senses as there are sensitive motions, and all sensation or perception is by the way of patterning; and whosoever is of another opinion, is, in my judgment, a greater friend to contradiction, then to truth, at least to probability. Lastly, concerning your question, why a Gun, the longer its barrel is made, the further it will shoot, until it come to a certain degree of length; after which, the longer it is made, the weaker it becomes, so that every degree further, makes it shoot shorter and shorter, whereas before it came to such a degree of length, it shot further and further: Give me leave to tell you, Madam, that this question would be put more properly to a Mathematician, then to me, who am ignorant in the Mathematicks: However, since you are pleased to desire my opinion thereof, I am willing to give it you. There are, in my judgment, but three reasons which do produce this alteration: The one may be the compass of the stock, or barrel, which being too wide for the length, may weaken the force, or being too narrow for the length, may retard the force; the one giving liberty before the force is united, the other inclosing it so long by a streight passage, as it loses its force before it hath liberty; so that the one becomes stronger with length, the other weaker with length. The second reason, in my opinion, is, That degrees of strength may require degrees of the medium. Lastly, It may be, that Centers are required for degrees of strength;, if so, every medium may be a Center, and the middle length to such a compass may be a Center of such a force. But many times the force being weaker or stronger, is caused by the good or ill making of the Powder, or Locks, or the like. But, Madam, such questions will puzle me as much as those of Mr. V. Z. concerning those glasses, one of which being held close in ones hand, and a little piece being broke of its tail, makes as great a noise as the discharging of a Gun: Wherefore I beseech you, Madam, do not trouble my brain with Mathematical questions, wherein I have neither skill, learning, nor experience by Practice; for truly I have not the subtilty to find out their mystery, nor the capacity to understand arts, no more then I am capable to learn several languages. If you command me any thing else I am able to do, assure your self, there is none shall more readily and cheerfully serve you then my self; who am, and shall ever continue, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
XXIV. MADAM, I have heard that Artists do glory much in their Glasses, Tubes, Engines, and Stills, and hope by their Glasses and Tubes to see invisible things, and by their Engines to produce incredible effects, and by their Stills, Fire, and Furnaces, to create as Nature doth; but all this is impossible to be done: For Art cannot arrive to that degree, as to know perfectly Natures secret and fundamental actions, her purest matter, and subtilest motions; and it is enough if Artists can but produce such things as are for mans conveniencies and use, although they never can see the smallest or rarest bodies, nor great and vast bodies at a great distance, nor make or create a Vegetable, Animal, or the like, as Nature doth; for Nature being Infinite, has also Infinite degrees of figures, sizes, motions, densities, rarities, knowledg, &c. as you may see in my Book of Philosophy, as also in my book of Poems, especially that part that treats of little, minute Creatures, which I there do name, for want of other expressions, Fairies; for I have considered much the several sizes of Creatures, although I gave it out but for a fancy in the mentioned book, lest I should be thought extravagant to declare that conception of mine for a rational truth: But if some small bodies cannot be perfectly seen but by the help of magnifying glasses, and such as they call Microscopia; I pray, Nature being Infinite, What figures and sizes may there not be, which our eyes with all the help of Art are not capable to see? for certainly, Nature hath more curiosities then our exterior senses, helped by Art, can perceive: Wherefore I cannot wonder enough at those that pretend to know the least or greatest parts or creatures in Nature, since no particular Creature is able to do it. But concerning Artists, you would fain know, Madam, whether the Artist be beholden to the conceptions of the Student? To which I return this short answer: That, in my judgment, without the Students conceptions, the Artist could not tell how to make experiments: The truth is, the conceptions of studious men set the Artists on work, although many Artists do ungratefully attribute all to their own industry. Neither doth it always belong to the studious Concepter to make trials or experiments, but he leaves that work to others, whose time is not so much imployed with thoughts or speculations, as with actions; for the the Contemplator is the Designer, and the Artist the Workman, or Labourer, who ought to acknowledg him his Master, as I do your Ladiship, for I am in all respects, Madam, Your Ladiships humble and faithful Servant.
XXV. MADAM, Your Command in your last was to send you my opinion concerning the division of Religions, or of the several opinions in Religions, I suppose you mean the division of the Religion, not of Religions; for certainly, there is but one divine Truth, and consequently but one true Religion: But natural men being composed of many divers parts, as of several motions and figures, have divers and several Ideas, which the grosser corporeal motions conceive to be divers and several gods, as being not capable to know the Great and Incomprehensible God, who is above Nature. For example: Do but consider, Madam, what strange opinions the Heathens had of God, and how they divided him into so many several Persons, with so many several bodies, like men; whereas, surely God considered in his Essence, he being a Spirit, as the Scripture describes him, can neither have Soul nor body, as he is a God, but is an Immaterial Being; Onely the Heathens did conceive him to have parts, and so divided the Incomprehensible God into several Deities, at least they had several Deitical Ideas, or rather Fancies of him. But, Madam, I confess my ignorance in this great mystery, and honour, and praise the Omnipotent, Great, and Incomprehensible God, with all fear and humility as I ought; beseeching his infinite mercy to keep me from such presumption, whereby I might prophane his holy Name, and to make me obedient to the Church, as also to grant me life and health, that I may be able to express how much I am, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
XXVI. MADAM, Since I spake of Religion in my last, I cannot but acquaint you, that I was the other day in the company of Sir P. H. and Sir R. L. where amongst other discourses they talk'd of Predestination and Free-will. Sir P. H. accounted the opinion of Predestination not onely absurd, but blasphemous; for, said he, Predestination makes God appear Cruel, as first to create Angels and Man, and then to make them fall from their Glory, and damn them eternally: For God, said he, knew before he made them, they would fall; Neither could he imagine, from whence that Pride and Presumption did proceed, which was the cause of the Angels fall, for it could not proceed from God, God being infinitely Good. Sir R. L. answer'd, That this Pride and Presumption did not come from God, but from their own Nature. But, replyed Sir P. H. God gave them that Nature, for they had it not of themselves, but all what they were, their Essence and Nature, came from God the Creator of all things, and to suffer that, which was in his power to hinder, was as much as to act. Sir R. L. said, God gave both Angels and Man a Free-will at their Creation. Sir P. H. answered, that a Free-will was a part of a divine attribute, which surely God would not give away to any Creature: Next, said he, he could not conceive why God should make Creatures to cross and oppose him; for it were neither an act of Wisdom to make Rebels, nor an act of Justice to make Devils; so that neither in his Wisdom, Justice, nor Mercy, God could give leave, that Angels and Man should fall through sin; neither was God ignorant that Angels and Man would fall; for surely, said he, God knew all things, past, present, and to come; wherefore, said he, Free-will doth weaken the Power of God, and Predestination doth weaken the power of man, and both do hinder each other: Besides, said he, since God did confirm the rest of the Angels in the same state they were before, so as they could not fall afterwards, he might as well have created them all so at first. But Sir R. L. replied, That God suffered Angels and Man to fall for his Glory, to shew his Justice in Devils, and his Mercy in Man; and that the Devils express'd God's Omnipotency as much as the Blessed. To which Sir P. H. answered, That they expressed more God's severity in those horrid torments they suffer through their Natural Imperfections, then his power in making and suffering them to sin. Thus they discoursed: And to tell you truly, Madam, my mind was more troubled, then delighted with their discourse; for it seemed rather to detract from the honour of the great God, then to increase his Glory; and no Creature ought either to think or to speak any thing that is detracting from the Glory of the Creator: Wherefore I am neither for Predestination, nor for an absolute Free-will, neither in Angels, Devils, nor Man; for an absolute Free-will is not competent to any Creature: and though Nature be Infinite, and the Eternal Servant to the Eternal and Infinite God, and can produce Infinite Creatures, yet her Power and Will is not absolute, but limited; that is, she has a natural free-will, but not a supernatural, for she cannot work beyond the power God has given her. But those mystical discourses belong to Divines, and not to any Lay-person, and I confess my self very ignorant in them. Wherefore I will nor dare not dispute God's actions, being all infinitely wise, but leave that to Divines, who are to inform us what we ought to believe, and how we ought to live. And thus taking my leave of you for the present, I rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and Servant.
XXVII. MADAM, You are pleased to honor me so far, that you do not onely spend some time in the perusing of my Book called Philosophical Opinions, but take it so much into your consideration, as to examine every opinion of mine which dissents from the common way of the Schools, marking those places which seem somewhat obscure, and desiring my explanation of them; All which, I do not onely acknowledg as a great favour, but as an infallible testimony of your true and unfeigned friendship; and I cannot chuse but publish it to all the world; both for the honour of your self, as to let every body know the part of so true a friend, who is so much concerned for the honour and benefit of my poor Works; as also for the good of my mentioned Book, which by this means will be rendred more intelligible; for I must confess that my Philosophical Opinions are not so plain and perspicuous as to be perfectly understood at the first reading, which I am sorry for. And there be two chief reasons why they are so: First, Because they are new, and never vented before; for the have their original meerly from my own conceptions, and are not taken out of other Philosophers. Next, because I being a Woman, and not bred up to Scholarship, did want names and terms of Art, and therefore being not versed in the Writings of other Philosophers, but what I knew by hearing, I could not form my named Book so methodically, and express my opinions so artificially and clearly, as I might have done, had I been studious in the reading of Philosophical Books, or bred a Scholar; for then I might have dressed them with a fine coloured Covering of Logick and Geometry, and set them out in a handsome array; by which I might have also cover'd my ignorance, like as Stage-Players do cover their mean persons or degrees with fine Cloathes. But, as I said, I being void of Learning and Art, did put them forth according to my own conceptions, and as I did understand them myself; but since I have hitherto by the reading of those famous and learned Authors you sent me, attained to the knowledg of some artificial Terms, I shall not spare any labour and pains to make my opinions so intelligible, that every one, who without partiality, spleen, or malice, doth read them, may also easily understand them: And thus I shall likewise endeavour to give such answers to your scruples, objections, or questions, as may explain those passages which seem obscure, and satisfie your desire. In the first place, and in general, you desire to know, Whether any truth may be had in Natural Philosophy: for since all this study is grounded upon probability, and he that thinks he has the most probable reasons for his opinion, may be as far off from truth, as he who is thought to have the least; nay, what seems most probable to day, may seem least probable to morrow, especially if an ingenious opposer, bring rational arguments against it: Therefore you think it is but vain for any one to trouble his brain with searching and enquiring after such things wherein neither truth nor certainty can be had. To which, I answer: That the undoubted truth in Natural Philosophy, is, in my opinion, like the Philosopher's Stone in Chymistry, which has been sought for by many learned and ingenious Persons, and will be sought as long as the Art of Chymistry doth last; but although they cannot find the Philosophers Stone, yet by the help of this Art they have found out many rare things both for use and knowledg. The like in Natural Philosophy, although Natural Philosophers cannot find out the absolute truth of Nature, or Natures ground-works, or the hidden causes of natural effects; nevertheless they have found out many necessary and profitable Arts and Sciences, to benefit the life of man; for without Natural Philosophy we should have lived in dark ignorance, not knowing the motions of the Heavens, the cause of the Eclipses, the influences of the Stars, the use of Numbers, Measures, and Weights, the vertues and effects of Vegetables and Minerals, the Art of Architecture, Navigation, and the like: Indeed all Arts and Sciences do adscribe their original to the study of Natural Philosophy; and those men are both unwise and ungrateful, that will refuse rich gifts because they cannot be masters of all Wealth; and they are fools, that will not take remedies when they are sick, because Medicines can onely recover them from death for a time, but not make them live for ever. But to conclude, Probability is next to truth, and the search of a hidden cause finds out visible effects; and this truth do natural Philosophers find, that there are more fools, then wise men, which fools will never attain to the honour of being Natural Philosophers. And thus leaving them, I rest, Madam, Your Ladiships humble and faithful Servant.
XXVIII. MADAM, Your desire is to know, since I say Nature is Wise, Whether all her parts must be wise also? To which, I answer; That (by your favour) all her parts are not fools: but yet it is no necessary consequence, that because Nature is infinitely wise, all her parts must be so too, no more then if I should say, Nature is Infinite, therefore every part must be Infinite: But it is rather necessary, that because Nature is Infinite, therefore not any single part of hers can be Infinite, but must be finite. Next, you desire to know, Whether Nature or the self-moving matter is subject to err, and to commit mistakes? I answer: Although Nature has naturally an Infinite wisdom and knowledg, yet she has not a most pure and intire perfection, no more then she has an absolute power; for a most pure and intire perfection belongs onely to God: and though she is infinitely naturally wise in her self, yet her parts or particular creatures may commit errors and mistakes; the truth is, it is impossible but that parts or particular Creatures must be subject to errors, because no part can have a perfect or general knowledg, as being but a part, and not a whole; for knowledg is in parts, as parts are in Matter: Besides several corporeal motions, that is, several self-moving parts do delude and oppose each other by their opposite motions; and this opposition is very requisite in Nature to keep a mean, and hinder extreams; for were there not opposition of parts, Nature would run into extreams, which would confound her, and all her parts. And as for delusion, it is part of Natures delight, causing the more variety; but there be some actions in Nature which are neither perfect mistakes, nor delusions, but onely want of a clear and thorow perception: As for example; when a man is sailing in a Ship, he thinks the shore moves from the ship, when as it is the ship that moves from the shore: Also when a man is going backward from a Looking-glass, he thinks, the figure in the Glass goeth inward, whereas it is himself that goes backward, and not his figure in the glass. The cause of it is, That the perception in the eye perceives the distanced body, but not the motion of the distance or medium; for though the man may partly see the motion of the visible parts, yet he doth not see the parts or motion of the distance or medium, which is invisible, and not subject to the perception of sight; and since a pattern cannot be made if the object be not visible, hence I conclude, that the motion of the medium cannot make perception, but that it is the perceptive motions of the eye, which pattern out an object as it is visibly presented to the corporeal motions in the eye; for according as the object is presented, the pattern is made, if the motions be regular: For example; a fired end of a stick, if you move it in a circular figure, the sensitive corporeal motions in the eye pattern out the figure of fire, together with the exterior or circular motion, and apprehend it as a fiery circle; and if the stick be moved any otherwise, they pattern out such a figure as the fired end of the stick is moved in; so that the sensitive pattern is made according to the exterior corporeal figurative motion of the object, and not according to its interior figure or motions. And this, Madam, is in short my answer to your propounded questions, by which, I hope, you understand plainly the meaning of, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
XXIX. MADAM, The scruples or questions you sent me last, are these following. First, you desire to be informed what I mean by Phantasmes and Ideas? I answer: They are figures made by the purest and subtilest degree of self-moving matter, that is to say, by the rational corporeal motions, and are the same with thoughts or conceptions. Next, your question is, what I do understand by Sensitive Life? I answer: It is that part of self-moving matter, which in its own nature is not so pure and subtil as the rational, for it is but the labouring, and the rational the designing part of matter. Your third question is, Whether this sensitive self-moving matter be dense or rare? I answer: density and rarity are onely effects caused by the several actions, that is, the corporeal motions of Nature; wherefore it cannot properly be said, that sensitive matter is either dense, or rare; for it has a self-power to contract and dilate, compose and divide, and move in any kind of motion whatsoever, as is requisite to the framing of any figure; and thus I desire you to observe well, that when I say the rational part of matter is purer in its degree then the sensitive, and that this is a rare and acute matter, I do not mean that it is thin like a rare egg, but that it is subtil and active, penetrating and dividing, as well as dividable. Your fourth question is, What this sensitive matter works upon? I answer: It works with and upon another degree of matter, which is not self-moving, but dull, stupid, and immoveable in its own nature, which I call the inanimate part or degree of matter. Your fifth question is, Whether this inanimate Matter do never rest? I answer; It doth not: for the self-moving matter being restless in its own nature, and so closely united and commixed with the inanimate, as they do make but one body, will never suffer it to rest; so that there is no part in Nature but is moving; the animate matter in it self, or its own nature, the inanimate by the help or means of the animate. Your sixth question is, If there be a thorow mixture of the parts of animate and inanimate matter, whether those parts do retain each their own nature and substance, so that the inanimate part of matter remains dull and stupid in its essence or nature, and the animate full of self-motion, or all self-motion? I answer: Although every part and particle of each degree are closely intermixed, nevertheless this mixture doth not alter the interior nature of those parts or degrees; As for example; a man is composed of Soul, and Body, which are several parts, but joyned as into one substance, viz. Man, and yet they retain each their own proprieties and natures; for although soul and body are so closely united as they do make but one Man, yet the soul doth not change into the body, nor the body into the soul, but each continues in its own nature as it is. And so likewise in Infinite Matter, although the degrees or parts of Matter are so throughly intermixed as they do make but one body or substance, which is corporeal Nature, yet each remains in its nature as it is, to wit, the animate part of matter doth not become dull and stupid in its nature, but remains self-moving; and the inanimate, although it doth move by the means of the animate, yet it doth not become self-moving, but each keeps its own interior nature and essence in their commixture. The truth is, there must of necessity be degrees of matter, or else there would be no such various and several effects in Nature, as humane sense and reason do perceive there are; and those degrees must also retain each their own nature and proprieties, to produce those various and curious effects: Neither must those different degrees vary or alter the nature of Infinite Matter; for Matter must and doth continue one and the same in its Nature, that is, Matter cannot be divided from being Matter: And this is my meaning, when I say in my Philosophical Opinions, There is but one kind of Matter: Not that Matter is not dividable into several parts or degrees, but I say, although Matter has several parts and degrees, yet they do not alter the nature of Matter, but Matter remains one and the same in its own kind, that is, it continues still Matter in its own nature notwithstanding those degrees; and thus I do exclude from Matter all that which is not Matter, and do firmly believe, that there can be no commixture of Matter and no Matter in Nature; for this would breed a meer confusion in Nature. Your seventh question is, Whether that, which I name the rational part of self-moving Matter makes as much variety as the sensitive? To which I answer: That, to my sense and reason, the rational part of animate or self-moving Matter moves not onely more variously, but also more swiftly then the sensitive; for thoughts are sooner made, then words spoke, and a certain proof of it are the various and several Imaginations, Fancies, Conceptions, Memories, Remembrances, Understandings, Opinions, Judgments, and the like: as also the several sorts of Love, Hate, Fear, Anger, Joy, Doubt; and the like Passions. Your eighth question is, Whether the Sensitive Matter can and doth work in it self and its own substance and degree? My answer is, That there is no inanimate matter without animate, nor no animate without inanimate, both being so curiously and subtilly intermixt, as they make but one body; Nevertheless the several parts of this one body may move several ways. Neither are the several degrees bound to an equal mixture, no more then the several parts of one body are bound to one and the same size, bigness, shape, or motion; or the Sea is bound to be always at the high tide; or the Moon to be always at the Full; or all the Veins or Brains in animal bodies are bound to be of equal quantity; or every Tree of the same kind to bear fruit, or have leaves of equal number; or every Apple, Pear, or Plum, to have an equal quantity of juice; or every Bee to make as much honey and wax as the other. Your nineth question is, Whether the Sensitive Matter can work without taking patterns? My answer is, That all corporeal motion is not patterning, but all patterning is made by corporeal motion; and there be more several sorts of corporeal motions then any single Creature is able to conceive, much less to express: But the perceptive corporeal motions are the ground-motions in Nature, which make, rule, and govern all the parts of Nature, as to move to Production, or Generation, Transformation, and the like. Your tenth question is, How it is possible, that numerous figures can exist in one part of matter? for it is impossible that two things can be in one place, much less many. My answer in short is, That it were impossible, were a part of Matter, and the numerous figures several and distinct things; but all is but one thing, that is, a part of Matter moving variously; for there is neither Magnitude, Place, Figure, nor Motion, in Nature, but what is Matter, or Body; Neither is there any such thing as Time: Wherefore it cannot properly be said, There was, and There shall be; but onely, There is. Neither can it properly be said, from this to that place; but onely in reference to the several moving parts of the onely Infinite Matter. And thus much to your questions; I add no more, but rest, Madam, Your faithful Friend and humble Servant.
XXX. MADAM, In your last, you were pleased to express, that some men, who think themselves wise, did laugh in a scornful manner at my opinion, when I say that every Creature hath life and knowledg, sense and reason; counting it not onely ridiculous, but absurd; and asking, whether you did or could believe, a piece of wood, metal, or stone, had as much sense as a beast, or as much reason as a man, having neither brain, blood, heart, nor flesh; nor such organs, passages, parts, nor shapes as animals? To which, I answer: That it is not any of these mentioned things that makes life and knowledg, but life and knowledg is the cause of them, which life and knowledg is animate matter, and is in all parts of all Creatures: and to make it more plain and perspicuous, humane sense and reason may perceive, that wood, stone, or metal, acts as wisely as an animal: As for example; Rhubarb, or the like drugs, will act very wisely in Purging; and Antimony, or the like, will act very wisely in Vomiting; and Opium will act very wisely in Sleeping; also Quicksilver or Mercury will act very wisely, as those that have the French disease can best witness: likewise the Loadstone acts very wisely, as Mariners or Navigators will tell you: Also Wine made of Fruit, and Ale of Malt, and distilled Aqua-vitÆ will act very subtilly; ask the Drunkards, and they can inform you; Thus Infinite examples may be given, and yet man says, all Vegetables and Minerals are insensible and irrational, as also the Planets and Elements; when as yet the Planets move very orderly and wisely, and the Elements are more active, nay, more subtil and searching then any of the animal Creatures; witness Fire, Air, and Water: As for the Earth, she brings forth her fruit, if the other Elements do not cause abortives, in due season; and yet man believes, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, are dead, dull, senseless, and irrational Creatures, because they have not such shapes, parts, nor passages as Animals, nor such exterior and local motions as Animals have: but Man doth not consider the various, intricate and obscure ways of Nature, unknown to any particular Creature; for what our senses are not capable to know, our reason is apt to deny. Truly, in my opinion, Man is more irrational then any of those Creatures, when he believes that all knowledg is not onely confined to one sort of Creatures, but to one part of one particular Creature, as the head, or brain of man; for who can in reason think, that there is no other sensitive and rational knowledg in Infinite Matter, but what is onely in Man, or animal Creatures? It is a very simple and weak conclusion to say, Other Creatures have no eyes to see, no ears to hear, no tongues to taste, no noses to smell, as animals have; wherefore they have no sense or sensitive knowledg; or because they have no head, nor brain as Man hath, therefore they have no reason, nor rational knowledg at all: for sense and reason, and consequently sensitive and rational knowledg, extends further then to be bound to the animal eye, ear, nose, tongue, head, or brain; but as these organs are onely in one kind of Natures Creatures, as Animals, in which organs the sensitive corporeal motions make the perception of exterior objects, so there may be infinite other kinds of passages or organs in other Creatures unknown to Man, which Creatures may have their sense and reason, that is, sensitive and rational knowledg, each according to the nature of its figure; for as it is absurd to say, that all Creatures in Nature are Animals, so it is absurd to confine sense and reason onely to Animals; or to say, that all other Creatures, if they have sense and reason, life and knowledg, it must be the same as is in Animals: I confess, it is of the same degree, that is, of the same animate part of matter, but the motions of life and knowledg work so differently and variously in every kind and sort, nay, in every particular Creature, that no single Creature can find them out: But, in my opinion, not any Creature is without life and knowledg, which life and knowledg is made by the self-moving part of matter, that is, by the sensitive and rational corporeal motions; and as it is no consequence, that all Creatures must be alike in their exterior shapes, figures, and motions, because they are all produced out of one and the same matter, so neither doth it follow, that all Creatures must have the same interior motions, natures, and proprieties, and so consequently the same life and knowledg, because all life and knowledg is made by the same degree of matter, to wit, the animate. Wherefore though every kind or sort of Creatures has different perceptions, yet they are not less knowing; for Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, may have as numerous, and as various perceptions as Animals, and they may be as different from animal perceptions as their kinds are; but a different perception is not therefore no perception: Neither is it the animal organs that make perception, nor the animal shape that makes life, but the motions of life make them. But some may say, it is Irreligious to believe any Creature has rational knowledg but Man. Surely, Madam, the God of Nature, in my opinion, will be adored by all Creatures, and adoration cannot be without sense and knowledg. Wherefore it is not probable, that onely Man, and no Creature else, is capable to adore and worship the Infinite and Omnipotent God, who is the God of Nature, and of all Creatures: I should rather think it irreligious to confine sense and reason onely to Man, and to say, that no Creature adores and worships God, but Man; which, in my judgment, argues a great pride, self-conceit, and presumption. And thus, Madam, having declared my opinion plainly concerning this subject, I will detain you no longer at this present, but rest, Madam, Your constant Friend and faithful Servant.
XXXI. MADAM, I perceive you do not well apprehend my meaning, when I say in my Philosophical Opinions,[1] That the Infinite degrees of Infinite Matter are all Infinite: For, say you, the degrees of Matter cannot be Infinite, by reason there cannot be two Infinites, but one would obstruct the other. My answer is; I do not mean that the degrees of Matter are Infinite each in its self, that is, that the animate and inanimate are several Infinite matters, but my opinion is, that the animate degree of matter is in a perpetual motion, and the inanimate doth not move of it self, and that those degrees are infinite in their effects, as producing and making infinite figures; for since the cause, which is the onely matter, is infinite, the effects must of necessity be infinite also; the cause is infinite in its substance, the effects are Infinite in number. And this is my meaning, when I say,[2] that, although in Nature there is but one kind of matter, yet there are Infinite degrees, Infinite motions, and Infinite parts in that onely matter; and though Infinite and Eternal matter has no perfect or exact figure, by reason it is Infinite, and therefore unlimited, yet there being infinite parts in number, made by the infinite variations of motions in infinite Matter, these parts have perfect or exact figures, considered as parts, that is, single, or each in its particular figure: And therefore if there be Infinite degrees, considering the effects of the animate and inanimate matter, infinite motions for changes, infinite parts for number, infinite compositions and divisions for variety and diversity of Creatures; then there may also be infinite sizes, each part or figure differing more or less, infinite smallness and bigness, lightness and heaviness, rarity and density, strength and power, life and knowledg, and the like: But by reason Nature or Natural matter is not all animate or inanimate, nor all composing or dividing, there can be no Infinite in a part, nor can there be something biggest or smallest, strongest or weakest, heaviest or lightest, softest or hardest in Infinite Nature, or her parts, but all those several Infinites are as it were included in one Infinite, which is Corporeal Nature, or Natural Matter. Next, you desire my opinion of Vacuum, whether there be any, or not? for you say I determine nothing, of it in my Book of Philosophical Opinions. Truly, Madam, my sense and reason cannot believe a Vacuum, because there cannot be an empty Nothing; but change of motion makes all the alteration of figures, and consequently all that which is called place, magnitude, space, and the like; for matter, motion, figure, place, magnitude, &c. are but one thing. But some men perceiving the alteration, but not the subtil motions, believe that bodies move into each others place, which is impossible, because several places are onely several parts, so that, unless one part could make it self another part, no part can be said to succeed into anothers place; but it is impossible that one part should make it self another part, for it cannot be another, and it self, no more then Nature can be Nature, and not Nature; wherefore change of place is onely change of motion, and this change of motion makes alteration of Figures. Thirdly, you say, You cannot understand what I mean by Creation, for you think that Creation is a production or making of Something out of Nothing. To tell you really, Madam, this word is used by me for want of a better expression; and I do not take it in so strict a sense as to understand by it, a Divine or supernatural Creation, which onely belongs to God; but a natural Creation, that is, a natural production or Generation; for Nature cannot create or produce Something out of Nothing: And this Production may be taken in a double sence; First, in General, as for example, when it is said, that all Creatures are produced out of Infinite Matter; and in this respect every particular Creature which is finite, that is, of a circumscribed and limited figure, is produced of Infinite Matter, as being a part thereof: Next, Production is taken in a more strict sense, to wit, when one single Creature is produced from another; and this is either Generation properly so called, as when in every kind and sort each particular produces its like; or it is such a Generation whereby one creature produces another, each being of a different kind or species, as for example, when an Animal produces a Mineral, as when a Stone is generated in the Kidneys, or the like; and in this sence one finite creature generates or produces another finite creature, the producer as well as the produced being finite; but in the first sence finite creatures are produced out of infinite matter. Fourthly, you confess, You cannot well apprehend my meaning, when I say,[3] that the several kinds are as Infinite as the particulars; for your opinion is, That the number of particulars must needs exceed the number of kinds. I answer: I mean in general the Infinite effects of Nature which are Infinite in number, and the several kinds or sorts of Creatures are Infinite in duration, for nothing can perish in Nature. Fifthly, When I say,[4] that ascending and descending is often caused by the exterior figure or shape of a body; witness a Bird, who although he is of a much bigger size and bulk then a Worm, yet can by his shape lift himself up more agilly and nimbly then a Worm; Your opinion is, That his exterior shape doth not contribute any thing towards his flying, by reason a Bird being dead retains the same shape, but yet cannot fly at all. But, truly, Madam, I would not have you think that I do exclude the proper and interior natural motion of the figure of a Bird, and the natural and proper motions of every part and particle thereof; for that a Bird when dead, keeps his shape, and yet cannot fly, the reason is, that the natural and internal motions of the Bird, and the Birds wings, are altered towards some other shape or figure, if not exteriously, yet interiously; but yet the interior natural motions could not effect any flying or ascending without the help of the exterior shape; for a Man, or any other animal, may have the same interior motions as a Bird hath, but wanting such an exterior shape, he cannot fly; whereas had he wings like a Bird, and the interior natural motions of those wings, he might without doubt fly as well as a Bird doth. Sixthly, Concerning the descent of heavy bodies,[5] that it is more forcible then the ascent of light bodies, you do question the Truth of this my opinion. Certainly, Madam, I cannot conceive it to be otherwise by my sense and reason; for though Fire that is rare, doth ascend with an extraordinary quick motion, yet this motion is, in my opinion, not so strong and piercing as when grosser parts of Creatures do descend; but there is difference in strength and quickness; for had not Water a stronger motion, and another sort of figure then Fire, it could not suppress Fire, much less quench it. But Smoak, which is heavier then Flame, flies up, or rises before, or rather, above it: Wherefore I am still of the same opinion, that heavy bodies descend more forcibly then light bodies do ascend, and it seems most rational to me. Lastly, I perceive you cannot believe that all bodies have weight; by reason, if this were so, the Sun, and the Stars would have long since cover'd the Earth. In answer to this objection, I say, That as there can be no body without figure and magnitude, so consequently not without weight, were it no bigger then an atome; and as for the Sun's and the Stars not falling down, or rising higher, the reason is, not their being without weight, but their natural and proper motion, which keeps them constantly in their spheres; and it might as well be said, a Man lives not, or is not, because he doth not fly like a Bird, or dive and catch fish like a Cormorant, or dig and undermine like a Mole, for those are motions not proper to his nature. And these, Madam, are my answers to your objections, which if they do satisfie you, it is all I desire, if not, I shall endeavour hereafter to make my meaning more intelligible and study for other more rational arguments then these are, to let you see how much I value both the credit of my named Book, and your Ladiships Commands; which assure you self, shall never be more faithfully performed, then by, Madam, Your Ladiships most obliged Friend and humble Servant. [1] Part. 1. c. 4.
XXXII. MADAM, Since my opinion is, that the Animate part of Matter, which is sense and reason, life and knowledg, is the designer, architect, and creator of all figures in Nature; you desire to know, whence this Animate Matter, sense and reason, or life and knowledg (call it what you will, for it is all one and the same thing) is produced? I answer: It is eternal. But then you say, it is coequal with God. I answer, That cannot be: for God is above all Natural sense and reason, which is Natural life and knowledg; and therefore it cannot be coequal with God, except it be meant in Eternity, as being without beginning and end. But if Gods Power can make Man's Soul, as also the good and evil Spirits to last eternally without end, he may, by his Omnipotency make as well things without beginning. You will say, If Nature were Eternal, it could not be created, for the word Creation is contrary to Eternity. I answer, Madam, I am no Scholar for words; for if you will not use the word Creation, you may use what other word you will; for I do not stand upon nice words and terms, so I can but express my conceptions: Wherefore, if it be (as in Reason it cannot be otherwise) that nothing in Nature can be annihilated, nor any thing created out of nothing, but by Gods special and all-powerful Decree and Command, then Nature must be as God has made her, until he destroy her. But if Nature be not Eternal, then the Gods of the Heathens were made in time, and were no more then any other Creature, which is as subject to be destroyed as created; for they conceived their Gods, as we do men, to have Material Bodies, but an Immaterial Spirit, or as some Learned men imagine, to be an Immaterial Spirit, but to take several shapes, and so to perform several corporeal actions; which truly is too humble and mean a conception of an Immaterial Being, much more of the Great and Incomprehensible God; which I do firmly believe is a most pure, all-powerful Immaterial Being, which doth all things by his own Decree and Omnipotency without any Corporeal actions or shapes, such as some fancy of DÆmons and the like Spirits. But to return to the former question; you might as well enquire how the world, or any part of it was created, or how the variety of creatures came to be, as ask how Reason and sensitive corporeal Knowledg was produced. Nevertheless, I do constantly believe, that both sensitive and rational Knowledg in Matter was produced from God; but after what manner or way, is impossible for any creature or part of Nature to know, for Gods wayes are incomprehensible and supernatural. And thus much I believe, That as God is an Eternal Creator, which no man can deny, so he has also an Eternal Creature, which is Nature, or natural Matter. But put the case Nature or natural Matter was made when the World was created, might not God give this Natural Matter self-motion, as well as he gave self-motion to Spirits and Souls? and might not God endue this Matter with Sense and Reason, as well as he endued Man? Shall or can we bind up Gods actions with our weak opinions and foolish arguments? Truly, if God could not act more then Man is able to conceive, he were not a God of an infinite Power; but God is Omnipotent, and his actions are infinite, supernatural, and past finding out; wherefore he is rather to be admired, adored and worshipped, then to be ungloriously discoursed of by vain and ambitious men, whose foolish pride and presumption drowns their Natural Judgment and Reason; to which leaving them, I rest, Madam, Your Faithful Friend and Servant.
XXXIII. MADAM, In obedience to your commands, I here send you also an explanation and clearing of those places and passages in my Book of Philosophy, which in your last Letter you were pleased to mark, as containing some obscurity and difficulty of being understood. First, When I say,[1] Nature is an Individable Matter, I do not mean as if Nature were not dividable into parts; for because Nature is material, therefore she must also needs be dividable into parts: But my meaning is, that Nature cannot be divided from Matter, nor Matter from Nature, that is, Nature cannot be Immaterial, nor no part of Nature, but if there be any thing Immaterial, it doth not belong to Nature. Also when I call Nature a Multiplying Figure;[2] I mean, that Nature makes infinite changes, and so infinite figures. Next, when I say,[3] There are Infinite Divisions in Nature; my meaning is not, that there are infinite divisions of one single part, but that Infinite Matter has Infinite parts, sizes, figures, and motions, all being but one Infinite Matter, or corporeal Nature. Also when I say single parts, I mean not parts subsisting by themselves, precised from each other, but single, that is, several or different, by reason of their different figures. Likewise, when I name Atomes, I mean small parts of Matter; and when I speak of Place and Time, I mean onely the variation of corporeal figurative motions. Again: when I say,[4] Nature has not an absolute Power, because she has an Infinite power; I mean by absolute, as much as finite, or circumscribed; and in this sense Nature cannot have an absolute power, for the Infiniteness hinders the absoluteness; but when in my former Letters I have attributed an absolute Power onely to God, and said that Nature has not an absolute power, but that her power, although it be Infinite, yet cannot extend beyond Nature, but is an Infinite natural power; I understand by an absolute Power, not a finite power, but such a power which onely belongs to God, that is, a supernatural and divine power, which power Nature cannot have, by reason she cannot make any part of her body immaterial, nor annihilate any part of her Creatures, nor create any part that was not in her from Eternity, nor make her self a Deity; for though God can impower her with a supernatural gift, and annihilate her when he pleases, yet she is no ways able to do it her self. Moreover, when I say,[5] That one Infinite is contained within another; I mean, the several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in number, Infinite in duration; as also the Infinite degrees, motions, figures, sizes, compositions, divisions, &c. all which are contained in the Infinite body of Nature, which is the onely Infinite in quantity or substance, neither can the parts of Nature go beyond Infinite. Also when I say,[6] That Matter would have power over Infinite, and Infinite over Matter, and Eternal over both; I mean, that some corporeal actions endeavour to be more powerful then others, and thus the whole strives to over-power the parts, and the parts the whole: As for example, if one end of a string were tied about the little finger of ones hand, and the other end were in the power of the other whole hand, and both did pull several and opposite ways; certainly, the little finger would endeavour to over-power the hand, and the hand again would strive to over-power the little finger: The same may be said of two equal figures, as two hands, and other the like examples may be given. And this is also my meaning, when I say, that some shapes have power over others, and some degrees and temperaments of matter over others; whereby I understand nothing else, but that some parts have power over others. Also when I say,[7] that outward things govern, and a Creature has no power over it self, I mean, that which is stronger, by what means soever, is superior in power. When I say,[8] That the Animate part of Matter is not so gross an Infinite as the Inanimate, I do not attribute an Infiniteness to a part, as if animate matter considered as a part were infinite; but my meaning is, that the Animate matter produces infinite effects: For, it being the Designer, Architect, and Creator of all Figures, as also the Life and Soul of all Creatures, it must needs be infinite in its effects, as also infinite in its duration. But you may object, That a part cannot produce infinite effects. I answer, It is true, if animate matter should be considered in it self without the inanimate, it could not produce infinite effects, having nothing to work upon and withal; but because there is such a close and inseparable conjunction of those parts of matter, as they make but one body, and that Infinite, none can be or work without the other, but both degrees of matter, which make but one infinite Nature, are required in the production of the infinite effects and figures in Nature: Nevertheless, since the Animate part of Matter is the onely architect, creator, or producer of all those effects, by reason it is the self-moving part, and the Inanimate is onely the instrument which the Animate works withal, and the materials it works upon, the Production of the infinite effects in Nature is more fitly ascribed to the Animate then the Inanimate part of matter; as for example, If an architect should build an house, certainly he can do nothing without materials, neither can the materials raise themselves to such a figure as a house without the help of the architect and workmen, but both are of necessity required to this artificial production; nevertheless, the building of the house is not laid to the materials, but to the architect: the same may be said of animate and inanimate matter in the production of natural effects. Again, you may reply, That the animate and inanimate parts of matter are but two parts, and the number of Two is but a finite number, wherefore they cannot make one infinite body, such as I call Nature or natural Matter. I answer, Madam, I confess, that a finite number is not nor cannot make an infinite number; but I do not say, that the animate and inanimate parts or degrees of matter are two finite parts each subsisting by it self as circumscribed, and having its certain bounds, limits and circumference; for if this were so, certainly they being finite themselves, could not produce but finite effects; but my meaning is, that both the animate and inanimate matter do make but one Infinite bulk, body, or substance and are not two several and dividable bodies in themselves, and thus they may be divided not into two but into Infinite parts; Neither are they two different Matters, but they are but one Matter; for by the animate Matter I do understand self-motion; and that I call this self-motion Matter, the reason is, that no body shall think as if self-motion were immaterial; for my opinion is, that Nature is nothing but meer Matter, and that nothing is in Nature which is a part of Nature, that is not material; wherefore to avoid such a misapprehension (seeing that most learned men are so much for abstractions and immaterial beings) I called self-motion animate matter, or the animate part of matter; not as if they were two several matters, but that all is but one natural Matter, or corporeal Nature in one bulk, body, or substance, just like as the soul and body do make but one man; and to avoid also this misapprehension, lest they might be taken for several matters, I have upon better consideration, in this volume of Philosophical Letters, call'd the animate matter corporeal self-motion, which expression, I think, is more proper, plain, and intelligible then any other: Neither would I have you to scruple at it, when I say, that both parts or degrees of animate and inanimate matter do retain their own interior natures and proprieties in their commixture, as if those different natures and proprieties, where one is self-moving, and the other not, did cause them to be two different matters; for thus you might say as well, that several figures which have several and different interior natures and proprieties, are so many several matters. The truth is, if you desire to have the truest expression of animate and inanimate matter, you cannot find it better then in the definition of Nature, when I say, Nature is an infinite self-moving body; where by the body of Nature I understand the inanimate matter, and by self-motion the animate, which is the life and soul of Nature, not an immaterial life and soul, but a material, for both life, soul and body are and make but one self-moving body or substance which is corporeal Nature. And therefore when I call Animate matter an Extract,[9] I do it by reason of its purity, subtilty and agility, not by reason of its immateriality. Also when I name the word Motion by it self, and without any addition, I understand corporeal Motion; and when I name Motion, Matter and Figure, I do not mean three several and distinct things, but onely figurative corporeal motion, or figurative self-moving matter, all being but one thing; the same when I speak of Place, Time, Magnitude, and the like. Concerning Natural Production or Generation; when I say,[10] The same matter or figure of the producers doth not always move after one and the same manner in producing, for then the same producers would produce one and the same creature by repetition, I do not mean the very same creature in number, unless the same motions and parts of matter did return into the producers again, which is impossible; but I understand the like creature, to wit, that one and the same sort of particular motions would make all particular figures resemble so, as if they were one and the same creature without any difference. When I say,[11] Sensitive and Rational knowledg lives in sensitive and rational Matter, and Animate liveth in Inanimate matter, I mean they are all several parts and actions of the onely infinite matter inseparable from each other; for wheresoever is matter, there is also self-motion, and wheresoever is self-motion, there is sense and reason, and wheresoever is sense and reason, there is sensitive and rational knowledge, all being but one body or substance, which is Nature. When I say,[12] The death of particular Creatures causes an obscurity of Knowledge, and that particular Knowledges increase and decrease, and may be more or less, I mean onely that parts divide themselves from parts, and joyn to other parts; for every several Motion is a several Knowledge, and as motion varies, so doth knowledge; but there is no annihilation of any motion, and consequently not of knowledge in Nature. And as for more or less knowledge, I mean more or less alteration and variety of corporeal figurative motions, not onely rational but sensitive, so that that creature which has most variety of those perceptive motions is most knowing, provided they be regular, that is, according to the nature and propriety of the figure, whether animal, vegetable, mineral, or elemental; for though a large figure is capable of most knowledge, yet it is not commonly or alwayes so wise or witty as a less, by reason it is more subject to disorders and irregularities; like as a private Family is more regular and better ordered then a great State or Common-wealth. Also when I say, That some particular Knowledge lasts longer then some other, I mean that some corporeal motions in some parts do continue longer then in others. When I say,[13] A little head may be full, and a great head may be empty of rational matter, I mean there may be as it were an ebbing or flowing, that is more or less of Rational Matter joyned with the Sensitive and Inanimate: And when I say, That, if all the heads of Mankind were put into one, and sufficient quantity of Rational Matter therein, that Creature would not onely have the knowledge of every particular, but that Understanding and Knowledge would increase like Use-money, my meaning is, that if there were much of those parts of rational matter joyned, they would make more variety by self-change of corporeal motions. When I name Humane sense and reason, I mean such sensitive and rational perception and knowledge as is proper to the nature of Man; and when I say Animal sense and reason, I mean such as is proper to the nature of all Animals; for I do not mean that the sensitive and rational corporeal motions which do make a man, or any Animal, are bound to such figures eternally, but whilest they work and move in such or such figures, they make such perceptions as belong to the nature of those figures; but when those self-moving parts dissolve the figure of an Animal into a Vegetable or any other Creature, then they work according to the nature of that same figure, both exteriously and interiously. When I say,[14] That Place, Space, Measure, Number, Weight, Figures, &c. are mixed with Substance, I do not mean they are incorporeal, and do inhere in substance as so many incorporeal modes or accidents; but my meaning is, they are all corporeal parts and actions of Nature, there being no such thing in Nature that may be called incorporeal; for Place, Figure, Weight, Measure, &c. are nothing without Body, but Place and Body are but one thing, and so of the rest. Also when I say,[15] That sometimes Place, sometimes Time, and sometimes Number gives advantage, I mean, that several parts of Matter are getting or losing advantage. When I say,[16] an Animal or any thing else that has exterior local motion, goeth or moveth to such or such a place, I mean, to such or such a body; and when such a Creature doth not move out of its place, I mean, it doth not remove its body from such or such parts adjoyning to it. When I say,[17] The rational animate matter divides it self into as many parts, and after as many several manners as their place or quantity will give way to, I mean their own place and quantity: also, as other parts will give way to those parts, for some parts will assist others, and some do obstruct others. When I say,[18] That the Nature of extension or dilation strives or endeavours to get space, ground, or compass, I mean those corporeal motions endeavour to make place and space by their extensions, that is, to spread their parts of matter into a larger compass or body. And when I say, That Contractions endeavour to cast or thrust out space, place, ground, or compass, My meaning is, That those corporeal motions endeavour to draw their parts of matter into a more close and solid body, for there is no place nor space without body. Also when I name[19] several tempered substances and matters, I mean several changes and mixtures of corporeal motions. Also when I speak of Increase and Decrease, I mean onely an alteration of corporeal figurative motions, as uniting parts with parts, and dissolving or separating parts from parts. When I say,[20] That the motions of cold, and the motions of moisture, when they meet, make cold and moist effects, and when the motions of heat and moisture meet, make hot and moist effects; and so for the motions of cold and dryness: I mean, that when several parts do joyn in such several corporeal motions, they cause such effects; and when I say cold and heat presses into every particular Creature, I mean, that every Creatures natural and inherent perceptive motions make such patterns as their exterior objects are, viz. hot or cold, if they do but move regularly, for if they be irregular, then they do not: as for example; those in an Ague will shake for cold in a hot Summers day, and those that are in a Fever will burn with heat, although they were at the Poles. When I say,[21] that hot motions, and burning motions, and hot figures, and burning figures do not associate or joyn together in all Creatures: I mean, that the corporeal motions in some figures or creatures, do act in a hot, but not in a burning manner; and when I say, some creatures have both hot and burning motions and figures, I mean, the corporeal motions act both in a hot and burning manner; for though heat is in a degree to burning, yet it is not always burning, for burning is the highest degree of heat, as wetness is the highest degree of moisture. When I say,[22] Warmth feeds other Creatures after a spiritual manner, not a corporeal, My meaning is, not as if heat were not corporeal, but that those corporeal motions which make heat work invisibly, and not visibly like as fire feeds on fuel, or man on meat. Also when I say, Excercise amongst animals gets strength, I mean, that by excercise the inherent natural motions of an animal body are more active, as being more industrious. When I say,[23] That the passage whence cold and sharp winds do issue out, is narrow, I mean, when as such or such parts disjoyn or separate from other parts; as for example, when dilating parts disjoyn from contracting parts; and oftentimes the disjoyning parts do move according to the nature of those parts they disjoyn from. Concerning the actions of Nature, my meaning is, that there is not any action whatsoever, but was always in Nature, and remains in Nature so long as it pleases God that Nature shall last, and of all her actions Perception and self-love are her prime and chief actions; wherefore it is impossible but that all her particular creatures or parts must be knowing as well as self-moving, there being not one part or particle of Nature that has not its share of animate or self-moving matter, and consequently of knowledg and self-love, each according to its own kind and nature; but by reason all the parts are of one matter, and belong to one body, each is unalterable so far, that although it can change its figure, yet it cannot change or alter from being matter, or a part of Infinite Nature; and this is the cause there cannot be a confusion amongst those parts of Nature, but there must be a constant union and harmony betwixt them; for cross and opposite actions make no confusion, but onely a variety, and such actions which are different, cross and opposite, not moving always after their usual and accustomed way, I name Irregular, for want of a better expression; but properly there is no such thing as Irregularity in Nature, nor no weariness, rest, sleep, sickness, death or destruction, no more then there is place, space, time, modes, accidents, and the like, any thing besides body or matter. When I speak of unnatural Motions,[24] I mean such as are not proper to the nature of such or such a Creature, as being opposite or destructive to it, that is, moving or acting towards its dissolution. Also when I call Violence supernatural, I mean that Violence is beyond the particular nature of such a particular Creature, that is, beyond its natural motions; but not supernatural, that is beyond Infinite Nature or natural Matter. When I say, A thing is forced, I do not mean that the forced body receives strength without Matter; but that some Corporeal Motions joyn with other Corporeal Motions, and so double the strength by joyning their parts, or are at least an occasion to make other parts more industrious. By Prints I understand the figures of the objects which are patterned or copied out by the sensitive and rational corporeal figurative Motions; as for example, when the sensitive corporeal motions pattern out the figure of an exteriour object, and the rational motions again pattern out a figure made by the sensitive motions, those figures of the objects that are patterned out, I name Prints; as for example, The sense of Seeing is not capable to receive the Print,[25] that is, the figure or pattern of the object of the whole Earth. And again, The rational Motions are not alwayes exactly after the sensitive Prints, that is, after the figures made by the sensitive motions. Thus by Prints I understand Patterns, and by printing patterning; not that the exteriour object prints its figure upon the exteriour sensitive organs, but that the sensitive motions in the organs pattern out the figure of the object: but though all printing is done by the way of patterning, yet all patterning is not printing. Therefore when I say,[26] that solid bodies print their figures in that which is more porous and soft, and that those solid bodies make new prints perpetually; and as they remove, the prints melt out, like verbal or vocal sounds, which print words and set notes in the Air; I mean, the soft body by its own self-motion patterns out the figure of the solid body, and not that the solid body makes its own print, and so leaves the place of its own substance with the print in the soft body; for place remains always with its own body, and cannot be separated from it, they being but one thing: for example; when a Seal is printed in Wax, the Seal gives not any thing to the Wax, but is onely an object patterned out by the figurative motions of the Wax in the action of printing or sealing. When I make mention[27] of what the Senses bring in, I mean what the sensitive Motions pattern out of forreign objects: And when I say,[28] that the pores being shut, touch cannot enter, I mean, the sensitive corporeal motions cannot make patterns of outward objects. Also when I say, our Ears may be as knowing as our Eyes, and so of the rest of the sensitive organs; I mean the sensitive motions in those parts or organs. When I say,[29] The more the Body is at rest, the more active or busie is the Mind, I mean when the sensitive Motions are not taken up with the action of patterning out forreign objects. When I say,[30] the Air is fill'd with sound, and that words are received into the ears, as figures of exterior objects are received into the eyes, I mean, the sensitive motions of the Air pattern out sound, and the sensitive motions of the Ears pattern out words, as the sensitive figurative motions of the Eyes pattern out the figures of external objects. Also when I speak of Thunder and Lightning, to wit, That Thunder makes a great noise by the breaking of lines: My meaning is, That the Air patterns out this sound or noise of the lines; and by reason there are so many patterns made in the air by its sensitive motions, the Ear cannot take so exact a copy thereof, but somewhat confusedly; and this is the reason why Thunder is represented, or rather pattern'd out with some terrour; for Thunder is a confused noise, because the patterns are made confusedly. But concerning Sound and Light, I am forced to acquaint you, Madam, that my meaning thereof is not so well expressed in my Book of Philosophy, by reason I was not of the same opinion at that time when I did write that Book which I am now of; for upon better consideration, and a more diligent search into the causes of natural effects, I have found it more probable, that all sensitive perception is made by the way of Patterning, and so consequently the perception of Sound and of Light; wherefore, I beseech you, when you find in my mentioned Book any thing thereof otherwise expressed, do not judg of it as if I did contradict my self, but that I have alter'd my opinion since upon more probable reasons. Thus, Madam, you have a true declaration of my sence and meaning concerning those places, which in my Philosophical Opinions you did note, as being obscure; but I am resolved to bestow so much time and labour as to have all other places in that Book rectified and cleared, which seem not perspicuous, lest its obscurity may be the cause of its being neglected: And I pray God of his mercy to assist me with his Grace, and grant that my Works may find a favourable acceptance. In the mean time, I confess my self infinitely bound to your Ladyship, that you would be pleased to regard so much the Honour of your Friend, and be the chief occasion of it; for which I pray Heaven may bless, prosper, and preserve you, and lend me some means and ways to express my self, Madam, Your thankfull Friend, and humble Servant.
Eternal God, Infinite Deity,
Thy Servant, NATURE, humbly prays to Thee,
That thou wilt please to favour Her, and give
Her parts, which are Her Creatures, leave to live,
That in their shapes and forms, what e're they be,
And all their actions they may worship thee;
For 'tis not onely Man that doth implore,
But all Her parts, Great God, do thee adore;
A finite Worship cannot be to thee,
Thou art above all finites in degree:
Then let thy Servant Nature mediate
Between thy Justice, Mercy, and our state,
That thou may'st bless all Parts, and ever be
Our Gracious God to all Eternity. FINIS. |
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