APPENDIX I HASSAN BEY HASSANEINWhen Gordon heard of the murder of Colonel Stewart and his companions, he held a sort of court-martial on himself, and, after reviewing all the arrangements which he had made for their safety, he came to the conclusion that Stewart must have been invited on shore and murdered. Then, as if endowed with second sight, he almost exactly described what actually happened. The Abbas, drawing less than two feet of water, ought not to have stranded, as it was High Nile. Treachery on the part of the crew he had guarded against by sending a bodyguard of highly paid Greeks. The cutting adrift of their boats just after passing Berber contributed to the catastrophe, for had they been with the steamer at the time she struck, it is hardly likely that the inhabitants of the village would have planned the treachery they did. As interpreter to the party, Gordon gave them the man he could least spare, and one in whom he had every confidence—Hassan Bey Hassanein. Gordon himself writes, “thus the question of treachery was duly weighed by me and guarded against,” yet, in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” we find the contrary stated. “It is said that the interpreter, Hassan, arranged the betrayal.” Moreover, to clinch the matter, and to show that Gordon had selected a traitor in the very man whom the "326" lives of the party might depend upon, it is added, “And I was afterwards told that, when he got into difficulties later, he sent a petition to Mohammad-el-Kheir, in which he said that he was entitled to reward for having secured Colonel Stewart’s death. He is still living in Omdurman.” Hassan Bey Hassanein has lived to come back to Egypt and bear witness to the goodness and virtues of the heroic defender of Khartoum. The only bit of treachery Hassan Bey acknowledges is that—with his fellow-clerk, Sirri—he cut the Khaleefa’s telegraph and telephone communications as the troops were advancing, to prevent communication between Omdurman and Khartoum and the outpost at Khor Shambat. It was Hassan Bey who ran out of the telegraph-hut as the gunboats advanced and attempted to get on board in order to warn them of the mines. He succeeded in attracting attention, and barely got off with his life, for his shouts in English were drowned by the report of the rifles as the men “potted” at his dervish dress. Hassan Bey Hassanein, speaking English, French, and Arabic, was sent to Khartoum in July, 1883, for telegraphic work. When Gordon arrived, in 1884, he wrote an official letter detailing him for his special service. Orders were given that he was to have access to him at all hours of the day and night. It was Hassan Bey who used to mark the words Gordon required to use at a forthcoming interview, in his Arabic dictionary. Before giving his version of the murder of Stewart’s party, a few words concerning him and his relations with Gordon will prove that, in selecting him as interpreter to the party, Gordon “well-guarded against treachery.” One of Hassan Bey’s first missions after the arrival of Gordon was to seek out the widow of Bussati Bey; for, on arrival at Berber, he had telegraphed to Bussati Bey, not knowing that he had been killed with Hicks. Having found the widow and her children in dire straits, he returned with one of the children to Gordon, and then took the child back carrying a handkerchief containing a hundred pounds. “Bis "327" dat qui cito dat” was certainly Gordon’s motto in Khartoum, from the hundreds of tales which I have heard. On handing the money to the widow, she brought out her husband’s uniform and sword, and, handing them to Hassan Bey, said, “As you take the place of my husband at Gordon’s side, then take his sword and uniform.” Hassan Bey took it to Gordon, who asked what it was worth, and being told “perhaps ten pounds,” sent twenty pounds to the widow to make sure, and told Hassan Bey to keep the uniform, as it might yet come in useful. Later on, when Hassan Bey, who was then but “effendi,” had had a particularly hard spell of night and day work, Gordon asked him which he would prefer—an increase of pay or a rank. Hassan Bey left the matter to Gordon, and he gave him both, writing the “firman” himself. On the Friday following, Hassan Bey presented himself to Gordon in Bussati’s uniform—for uniform was worn on Fridays and feast days. Gordon was evidently much amused at his interpreter and telegraph-clerk appearing in the uniform of a lieut.-colonel, although the rank he had bestowed upon him was nothing more nor less. Telling Hassan Bey that such a uniform did not look well without a decoration, he pinned on to his right breast one of the decorations he had had struck to commemorate the siege of Khartoum, and Hassanein walked off a proud man to delight the eyes of his wife, then nearing her confinement. Fifteen days before the departure of the Abbas, he presented himself to Gordon, and told him that he was the father of a boy. “No, I am the father,” replied Gordon, and, knowing Hassan Bey’s house, he hurried off at a quick walk, which Hassan Bey had to run to keep up with. Pushing his way through the women assembled in the outer room, he tapped gently on the door where mother and child were lying, and asked, “Mary, tyeeb-tyeeb?” (“Is all well?”) and then, as the child’s “father,” he insisted upon entering, took the child in his arms, crooned to it, kissed it, and then hurried off and wrote a note to the Finance Office to pay a hundred pounds from his salary “to his boy.” Mother and child were to meet with a tragic death. "328" Two days before the departure of the Abbas, Gordon told Hassan Bey that he had selected him to accompany Colonel Stewart as interpreter. He was to accompany the party as far as Dongola, at all events, but there was the possibility of Stewart requiring him as far as Cairo, therefore his wife collected a number of presents for her relatives in Cairo, which Hassan Bey was to present in uniform and decorations, so that all should understand how highly she had married. I must now, having given an idea of the relations existing between Gordon and the man who “betrayed” Colonel Stewart, and who had left with Gordon his wife and fifteen-day-old boy, give his account of what actually occurred. I purposely leave out all the incidents of the voyage until the boats reach the island opposite the village of El Salamanieh. A discussion arose between the two Reises (pilots) as the island was neared, as to what course to take; the river was running strong, and between the island and mainland resembled a mill race. One reis contended for the left bank and the other for the right. Stewart, who spoke Turkish and Arabic, asked what was the matter, and decided that judgment was to rest with the oldest of the reises, and he selected the right bank. Instead of coming through the race stern first, it was decided to put on full steam and “shoot” what might be called the rapids. While the decision was being given, the steamer had come end on with the island, and when full steam ahead was signalled, she steamed ahead at an angle of about seventy-five degrees to the southern spit, and before reaching the race proper, struck—swung round, and struck again. Colonel Stewart took down his revolver, and threatened to shoot both reises, upon which they dived overboard and swam to the right bank of the Nile, but thirty or forty yards distant. Colonel Stewart did not fire at them as they swam off. This occurred about an hour before mid-day. About an hour later, the two reises—Mohammad el Dongolawi and Ali el Bishtili—returned to the vessel, said they had spoken to the people of the village, who had declared they acknowledged the authority of Mustapha Pasha Yawer, the "329" Mudir of Dongola; they at the same time begged that Stewart would not molest them in any way, and they would provide camels to take the whole party to Dongola. Colonel Stewart spiked the cannon, and threw it overboard along with the ammunition. He then ordered Hassan Bey, with one of Gordon’s cavasses, and the clerk Mahmoud Ghorab, to go on shore and interview the people. At first they demurred, as, being Egyptians, they felt sure they would be murdered, and asked that the small boat should be sent as far as a village near Derawi, where it was certain “friends” would be met with. Colonel Stewart, after first threatening to throw them into the river, took his revolver again and threatened to shoot all three if they did not obey instantly. They obeyed, and went on shore to meet the men awaiting them—a blind man named Osman, and two men of the Wadi Kamr tribe. On reaching the reception-room of the Sheikh-el-Belad (headman of the village), a copy of the Quoran was produced, and upon this Osman and his companions swore loyalty to the Government. Osman remained behind while the other two accompanied Hassan Bey and the others to the island where Stewart’s party had then landed. Here again the oath of allegiance to the Government was taken, and the men left, promising to send for camels to be ready on the following morning. At about ten o’clock the next day they returned, and suggested that all should come to the right bank and pack up their effects, to be ready for the camels when they arrived. About two hours after mid-day, while all were either seated on the bank or fastening up their effects, a man came, said that the Sheikh-el-Belad had arrived, and invited the “Pasha” and the Consuls to his house. Colonel Stewart ordered Hassan Bey to accompany him as interpreter. On reaching the reception-room, they found about forty or fifty people assembled to receive them. The Sheikh-el-Belad was seated in the centre of the room on the left. Two angareebs were placed at each side of the doorway: Stewart and Power seated themselves on the "330" angareeb on the right, and Hassan Bey and Herbin on the angareeb to the left. Some minutes were taken up in the usual salutations, and before they had time to speak about the journey, the natives rose, and, saying the camels were approaching, left the room, only to rush back a few minutes later shouting, “Salaamoo tisslaamoo ya kaffarah” (“Become Muslims, you infidels, and you will be spared”); but at the same moment Herbin had his head smashed in with an axe, and Hassan Bey was stabbed in the right arm with a crease knife, and, as he was falling, received a large spear wound in the left leg. He fell unconscious, and did not see how Stewart and Power were killed. While the bodies were being dragged out of the room, some time after sunset, Hassan Bey was found to be still alive; it was proposed to kill him, but the brother of the Sheikh-el-Belad, he heard afterwards, pleaded for him, as his “stomach felt sick.” After the murder of Stewart and the others, the party made their way to the river, and a long fight ensued between them and the crew of the vessel, the latter being killed to a man. Hassan Bey was given some engine-oil from the steamer with which to dress his wounds, and, when he recovered, was sent to attend the flocks of the tribe. About fifty to sixty days later, he was sent to Berber on the orders of Mohammad-el-Kheir, and there imprisoned for four months, and, on the death of the Mahdi, was, with other prisoners, sent to Omdurman, to take the oath of allegiance to Khaleefa Abdullahi. In 1889–90 he was sent to Kassala, and, on the breaking out of the famine, he, with his wife and child, and many others, made up a party to return to Omdurman. Hassan Bey’s group consisted of his family, a man named Ismail, with his wife and daughter, and a man with two women. They ran short of water, and, leaving the others, who were worn out, to rest under some shrubs, Hassan Bey and Ismail set off in search of water. In about four hours’ time they reached some pools near the Atbara, and filling their water-skins, set off to rejoin "331" their families. On reaching the spot, they found that they had been devoured by lions; the heads of Hassan’s wife and boy—then between six and seven years of age—and the heads of Ismail’s wife and daughter were all that remained. No trace was left of the heads of the man and the other two women, and it is surmised that they must have escaped, for the lion never eats the head of its victim. Half mad, the two wandered on, living on roots and leaves, until, on reaching the village of El-Mughetta, on the banks of the Atbara, they were taken prisoners and made slaves. Ismail had to work at the ferry, but Hassan Bey, being weak and ill, was allowed to wander about until, meeting with a caravan bound for Geddaref, he joined it, and then made his way to Omdurman, being employed, first, as clerk under Abdallah Sulieman, the head of the cartridge-factory, and then transferred to the telegraph service. The account which I have given of how Gordon died differs so very little in essentials from the account which I have since received from Khaleel Agha Orphali, and which has been read to Khartoum survivors with the idea of comparing the statements made with what was related at the time, that I think it advisable to allow my account to stand, and to append that of Orphali, giving a few details concerning Orphali himself. I might mention that Gordon was credited with having killed a much greater number of dervishes than I have given, but the error arose from his being credited with the killing of the dervishes on the “Gouvernorat” (E) staircase; but these were killed by the guards. The fact of his having killed so many as he did, is to be accounted for in two ways; first, the people who first assailed him on the private staircase were unaccustomed to the use of the small spears they carried—indeed, it is safe to say that they had only been dervishes outwardly for half an hour or so; and, secondly, as they were packed on a narrow staircase, every shot told on the mass. To assist the reader in following Orphali’s narrative, I have drawn from memory a rough plan of the palace as I remembered it while it stood intact, and, with the assistance of Fauzi Pasha and others, have been able to name each of the rooms. Khaleel Agha Orphali joined the army for service in the Soudan in the Coptic year 1591 (1873–74). After taking part in a number of engagements, he was promoted to the rank of Bulok Bashi (commander of twenty-five men), and when "333" Gordon reached Kulkul, in 1878–79, Orphali and his men had been without pay for months. They presented themselves to Gordon and clamoured for their pay; he recommended them to go to Khartoum for it, upon which they became abusive, and Gordon drew his revolver. Orphali followed suit, but neither fired. Gordon quietly ordered the cavasses to remove their chief in custody, which they did. Shortly afterwards, Gordon sent for Orphali, told him he was a “man,” gave him a present of money, and offered him the post of cavass to himself, which Orphali at once accepted, accompanying Gordon to Khartoum, and remaining with him until he left. On Gordon’s return, in 1884, he found Orphali then in Khartoum, and made him his chief cavass. Orphali is one of those men who know but one master, and believe that master to be the ruler of the universe. He, therefore, was no great favourite with some in the administration, as, during the siege, he was never away from Gordon’s side, and his cavasses were allowed to do nothing but keep their arms clean, and be ready to surround Gordon in case of trouble. They were strictly forbidden to leave their posts to carry coffee, bread, run messages, or perform all the other little services which they had been accustomed to perform for the katibs (clerks). Orphali’s ideas as to the duty of his cavasses were the cause of constant bickerings, which came to a climax about twenty days before the fall of Khartoum, when he espied one of them carrying an ink-bottle behind Geriagis Bey—the head-clerk, who succeeded Rouchdi Bey. This was too much for Orphali. Grasping the brass inkstand, he drove it with all his force against Geriagis’ chest, and this assault Gordon could not pass over. Orphali was in disgrace for eight days, and “confined to barracks,” that is to say, the palace precincts, but he slept at Gordon’s door as usual. Twelve days before the fall, he was re-instated in favour, and never again left Gordon’s side for a moment. Orphali—as Gordon is not alive to speak for him, and as so many knew from Gordon himself of his threat to shoot him many years before—has been afraid, since his return, to talk "334" about his relations with Gordon, and was not a little surprised when I assured him that, if he appeared in “Londra,” he need have nothing to be afraid of from the English people. Having introduced the man, I now give his description of the night of the 25th January, keeping as much as possible to his own words, and only, to give a complete account, mentioning the incidents occurring in other parts of the palace while Gordon and he fought the upper floor:— His excellency was not an early sleeper, and on the night the dervishes entered Khartoum he was in his room. At eight o’clock, Consul Hansall, Consul Leontides and the Doctor, Abou Naddara (he of the spectacles), came to see him, and remained until midnight. After their departure, he did not go to sleep, but sat reading and writing letters, and sometimes pacing the room. At one o’clock in the morning, he sent me to the telegraph-office to inquire about the enemy’s movements, as he had received confirmed news of the intended attack, and his excellency had issued general orders to the soldiers and employÉs to be on guard to attack and withstand the dervishes. Ali Effendi Riza, Mohammad Effendi Fauzi, and Youssef Effendi Esmatt were on duty, also the messenger Mohammad Omar. They reported all was quiet, and this news I gave his excellency. Half an hour later, perhaps, firing was heard from the land side (i.e. to the south); I was sent to seek information. Bakhit Bey, from Buri, telegraphed that a few dervishes had attacked, but had been driven off, and when I told his excellency, he prepared to sleep, and gave me the customary order to bolt his door, and this I did. Then I closed the door of the terrace (I, plan), then the door of the Gouvernorat (H), near Rouchdi Bey’s room, and returning along the corridor leading to the private apartments, closed the door in the middle (B), and then went down the private staircase (D), gave the usual orders to the guards, and returned to my sleeping place opposite the pasha’s room (K), after I had told the telegraph-clerks to bring information as soon as any news came from the lines. About three o’clock, Mohammad Omar, the messenger, with Cavass Ali "335" Agha Gadri, roused me and said that an attack was being made at Kabakat (boats) on the White Nile. I informed the Pasha, who told me to run to the telegraph-office for more news, and there I met Hassan Bey Bahnassawi, who was on duty, and we heard that an attack had been made, but had been repulsed.* On informing the Pasha, he told me to close the door of his room again, which I did, and sat down to make coffee. Then we heard more firing from the White Nile, and the cavasses, having run to the terrace, called to me that the dervishes were coming into the town. I ran down to Buluk Bashi Ibrahim El Nahass, who had twenty-four men; fifteen we placed at the windows (rooms on right ground-plan), and nine on the terrace overlooking the garden (G). There were also twenty-four cavasses and ferrashes; thirteen were placed at the windows (left of ground-plan) under my second, Niman Agha, eight on the terrace (F), and three at the door of the palace (B). Each man had ten dozen cartridges, besides which, each party had a spare case of ammunition. All these arrangements did not take five minutes, as each knew his place. I then ran up to the Governor-General’s room, and informed him of the arrangements. The day had now come (dawned). The dervishes who ran to the front of the palace were killed by the fire from the steamer. About seventy were killed in the garden by the soldiers firing on them from the terrace, and then we saw the dervishes coming over the rukooba (vine-trellis A), and they were met with the fire from the windows and terraces. They came in great numbers very quickly. Some ran to the entrance (B), killed the guards and opened the door; then they all ran to the Gouvernorat door and killed the telegraph-clerks, all except Esmatt, who hid among the sacks in the storeroom; they then went to the terrace (G) and killed the soldiers, and Nahass, seeing the massacre, jumped from the window. Four men were on guard at the private stairs, but when the "336" dervishes came back from the Gouvernorat door (E) they were soon killed, and some of the dervishes ran to the terrace (F), and killed the soldiers there; others came up the steps to the private apartment, and broke the door; Gordon Pasha met them with his sword in his right hand and his pistol (revolver) in his left, and killed of them two who fell at the door, and one who fell down the stairs,† and the others ran away. Then we heard the dervishes breaking the private door (B), while the Pasha was loading his revolver. I went forward and received a little wound in the face, and when the Pasha came, he received a wound in the left shoulder; the man who wounded him was a half-blood slave. We followed them to Rouchdi Bey’s room, killing three and wounding many, and the others ran away and fell down the stairs. We went back to the Pasha’s room and reloaded, but the dervishes came back, and I received a slight wound in my right leg from a sword, but I warded the blow, and the cut was nothing. We attacked the dervishes on the private stairs (D), and while we were passing the door a native of Khartoum, dressed as a dervish, stabbed the Pasha with a spear on the left shoulder; seeing this man’s hand coming from behind the door, I cut at it, and he ran and fell on a spear held by one of his companions on the steps, and was killed. At this time more dervishes were coming along the corridor (from H), and we returned to meet them; I received a thrust in the left hand, but the Pasha cut the man down with his sword, and kicked him on the head and he died; then the dervishes ran into the clerks’ offices (5, 6, 7, upper-floor plan), and while we were standing in the corridor, a tall negro fired a shot from the door (H) near Rouchdi Bey’s room, and the bullet struck the Pasha in the right breast, and the Pasha ran up and shot the man dead. The dervishes then came out of the offices, and we turned, and they ran to the private stairs, and we fired into them, but the Pasha was getting weak from loss of blood. We fought these dervishes down the stairs till we reached the last one, and a native of "337" Katimeh speared the Pasha in the right hip, but I shot him, and the Pasha fell down on the cavasses’ mat at the door, and he was dead, and as I turned to seek refuge in the finance-office (F plan), I was struck down and lost my senses, and I was lying down with the dead. In the afternoon, a man of El Katimeh—Abd-el-Rahman, whom I knew, helped me to go to the river for water, and I saw the body of the Pasha at the door (D), but the head was not there. I was helped to my house, and found my wife and children and property all missing. ... I was taken by a friend and Abd-el-Rahman to El Dem-el-Darawish, and left on the plain all night, and in the morning I was taken before Wad en Nejoumi ... and I was stripped to see if I had any money and papers, but I had not; and when I said that I was ignorant of any treasure, I was heavily beaten, though much wounded, and was very ill for seventeen days, and my wife found me. * This is a literal translation. What Orphali intends to convey is, that on telegraphing to the lines, Bahnassawi Bey, who was on duty, was at his post, and replied to the inquiries sent by telegraph. The distance between the palace and Bahnassawi’s post was about two and a half miles. † That is to say, fell dead or wounded. All who were taken to see the steps where Gordon fell remarked upon the number and extent of the blood stains, for they could not believe that all had come from one body. These stains were shown to me in 1887. It has been stated on good authority that “Stains of blood marked the spot where this atrocity took place, and the steps from top to bottom for weeks bore the same sad traces.” Here is what I choose to consider not only a confirmation of Gordon having died fighting, but a confirmation of Orphali’s narrative, for there were only two people on the upper floor—Gordon and Orphali, and all the fighting must have been done by them. It is quite impossible that the steps “from top to bottom”—four flights-could have been stained as they were stained with large patches of blood left by a body which had been dragged downstairs some time after death. The steps were stained with the blood of the dervishes through whom I have said Gordon shot and hacked his way in his heroic attempt to reach his troops. “In the name of God the Most Merciful, and thanks to God the Omnipotent and Generous, with prayers on Mohammad our Lord and his descendants; Greeting. “From the servant of his Lord Abdallah-el-Muslimani-el-Brussi (the Prussian), formerly named Karl Neufeld, to Stephenson the Englishman, at Cairo. “We have to inform you that, in conformity with your letter, dated March 1, 1887, addressed to us, and recommending us to Sheikh Saleh Fadlallah-el-Kabashi with regard to your projects, “We started from Halfa, with his men bearing the arms and ammunition and other things sent him by the Government. “We proceeded on our course, and were constantly on guard on ourselves and our property, until we arrived at a well called Selima, from where we took the water supply, and continued our way to our destination. “It was our fate to be met in the desert by six fakirs, followers of the Mahdi, who attacked us, so that we and Saleh’s men had to defend ourselves, our number being fifty-five men. “The six fakirs were later reinforced by others, all of them being men of Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi. Thus there remained for us no way of escape, and in the space of half an hour we were defeated, many being killed, and the rest taken prisoners. The rifles, ammunition, and things destined for Saleh were seized, and I, my servant Elias, and my slave-girl, Hasseena, were among the prisoners, and "339" we were thus conducted to Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi, to Ordeh or Dongola. “From this place we were sent to the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, at Omdurman, to whom we were presented. We were certain that we were to be killed, taking into consideration our great crime against him. “The Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, however, pitied our condition, and proposed to us to avow the Mohammedan faith. We accepted, and became Muslims by pronouncing the two declarations in his presence, and by publicly professing that there is no God but God, and that Mohammad is the Prophet of God, and I then added that I believed in God and his Prophet Mohammad, and in the Khaleefa of the Mahdi. We then asked him for his clemency and pardon, which was granted. He thereupon embraced me, and named me Abdallah. I was then accepted of the Mohammedan religion. “It was on these conditions that the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, pardoned me and spared my life, which was already forfeited. “This was done to the honour and glory of the Mohammedan religion. “We further inform you that although Dufa'Allah Hogal deceived us, notwithstanding his perfidy, we cannot sufficiently thank and reward him, as his treachery turned to our great benefit, and he has allowed us to enjoy great prosperity. “Finally, we inform you confidentially that Saleh Fadlallah Salem has lost all his power and influence, and has taken refuge in the desert. This is the truth. I write this for your advice. “The 17th Shaaban, 1304.” When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, in 1874, Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi was then a second-lieutenant. Gordon had applied to the then Governor-General of the Soudan, Ismail Pasha Ayoub, for four companies of soldiers to accompany him to the Equatorial Provinces. Ayoub was not at all pleased at Gordon’s mission, as he took it as a slight upon his administration, so that when Gordon’s application for troops was received, Ayoub selected for the purpose his most worthless men, with the double object of getting rid of them, and making Gordon’s mission a failure. Fauzi, anxious to see some service, had volunteered to accompany Gordon, and, for doing so, Ayoub placed him under arrest. Gordon, hearing of the matter, sent to Ayoub demanding that the officer who had volunteered his services should be sent to him immediately. Fauzi was sent to Gordon’s head-quarters, when Gordon first asked him, “Are you the officer who volunteered your services?” following up the question, when Fauzi in reply said, “Yes, sir,” the only two words he then knew of English, by asking why he had done so. On learning that Fauzi wished to see service, he promised that his wish should be gratified. “But,” added Gordon, “I wish you to answer me as an officer—why did the Governor place you under arrest?” Fauzi gave the reason—Ayoub was afraid that "341" Gordon would discover, before departure, that he had been sent the worst troops. Sending back the four companies, he requisitioned four companies indicated by Fauzi, and, Fauzi being too young for a command, he appointed him commandant of his body-guard, and a sort of adjutant-major to the little force. Fauzi accompanied Gordon to the Albert Nyanza, returned with him to Khartoum, was gazetted major in consideration of his services, and appointed Mudir (Governor) of Bohr, but given two months’ leave of absence before taking up his post. Gordon left for England, and Fauzi came to Cairo for his leave, on the expiration of which he set out for the Soudan, but, on reaching Berber, he found a telegram awaiting him from Gordon telling him not to go further than Khartoum, as he (Gordon) was returning as Governor-General. When Gordon reached Khartoum, it was to hear that Darfur was in revolt, and that the Bahr-el-Ghazal province was joining the rebels. A council of war was held, when Gordon asked the officers present to select one of themselves to head an expedition to the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, while he took another into Darfur; he had expected all of them to volunteer for the command, but they believed that such an expedition had more the elements of defeat and death in it than of glory and distinction. Told that they must name an officer, they named Fauzi, who was not present, and Gordon at once accepted him, sending him off with 4000 troops and the clerks for the civil administration. Fauzi succeeded in setting the province to rights without fighting, and while travelling about setting the administration right in the districts, he often met, and assisted with food and money, a holy man then living as a sort of hermit at Abba and the neighbourhood. The man’s name was Mohammed Ahmed—whom the world was to hear of six years later as the Mahdi. Breaking down in health, Gordon ordered Fauzi to Khartoum, for rest, promoted him to the rank of full colonel, and named him Governor of Equatoria, in which province he spent about a year carrying out Gordon’s instructions to the "342" letter, and making a host of enemies amongst the officials whose peculations and interest in the slave-trade he put a stop to. He accompanied Gordon to Cairo in 1879, and when Gordon decided upon resigning, he asked Fauzi whether he would prefer to remain in Cairo or return to the Soudan. Fauzi saw that, without Gordon to back him up, his tenure of office would be but of short duration, unless he engaged himself in the maladministration of the provinces; he elected to remain in Cairo, where, at Gordon’s request, he was gazetted Colonel commanding the 1st Regiment of the 3rd Brigade. Gordon made it a point to be present at Fauzi’s first parade, congratulated him on the handling of his men, and bidding him farewell, gave him three hundred pounds as a souvenir of their days together in the Soudan. At the outbreak of the Arabist rebellion, Fauzi’s regiment, with others under the command of Kourschid Pasha, was ordered to Rosetta, and after the defeat of Arabi, at Tel-el-Kebir, he was, with other colonels, ordered to surrender to Sir Evelyn Wood at Kafr Dawar. Sent to Alexandria, he was tried, degraded, and then dismissed in disgrace. Some days before the arrival of Gordon, in 1884, H. E. Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood sent for Fauzi, and told him to be in readiness to proceed to the Soudan, as Gordon had asked for his services. When Fauzi said that he had been dismissed, and was no longer on the army-list, Nubar Pasha replied, “General Gordon will see to the matter.” It had not been Gordon’s intention to call at Cairo, and Fauzi was to have gone to Suez or vi the Nile, as Gordon might decide. However, Gordon was stopped at Port Said, and asked to come through Cairo; Fauzi went to the station to meet him, and Gordon, on alighting, went up to his old Soudan lieutenant, and asked how it was that he was not in uniform. Fauzi detailed his dismissal, upon which Gordon turned to Sir Evelyn Wood, and asked him how it was. It appears that when Gordon saw Fauzi’s name amongst the names of the colonels to be tried, he wired, or wrote—or both—to Sir Evelyn Wood, asking him to look after Colonel "343" Ibrahim Fauzi. General Wood did do so, but there was another Colonel Ibrahim Fauzi; and while Gordon’s Fauzi was dismissed in disgrace, the other Fauzi retired in glory and with a pension. Gordon had some difficulty in seeing Fauzi reinstated, for his enemies were powerful; but, not to be thwarted, he took Fauzi direct to His Highness the Khedive, and carried his point. Two days later, Fauzi took his seat in the carriage with Gordon and Stewart, and left Bulac Dacroor station on that journey from which he only was to return alive, and that fourteen years later. On the way to Khartoum, Gordon named Stewart sub-Governor-General of the Soudan, and Fauzi Director of Military and Marine, and, in communicating these appointments to Cairo, he wrote of Fauzi, “I especially recognize in Fauzi Bey the desired activity which he has displayed with me while previously in the Soudan; he has already given proof of his abilities, and I am more than ever satisfied with him.” Soon after his arrival at Khartoum, Fauzi was entrusted with the clearing out of the rebels from Khor Shambat and Halfeyeh, and the restoring of the telegraphic communications which they had cut. Fauzi won his dual victory, and restored the line, but, in leading his men, he was hit in the right leg with a bullet fired from an elephant-gun, which split and shattered the bone. Owing to want of skill on the part of the Greek doctor, the broken bone was allowed to overlap, and a suppurating wound set in from the unextracted fragments, which kept Fauzi confined to his official residence for about six months, although he was able to transact the executive part of his duties. On the departure of Stewart, Gordon named Fauzi Governor of Khartoum and Commandant of Troops, calling a special parade for the occasion. Fauzi Pasha must be left to relate, at some future date, the incidents of the siege of Khartoum; I pass on to January 25, 1885. About three o’clock in the afternoon, Gordon called Fauzi to the roof of the palace, to see the activity taking place in "344" the dervish camp. He had a large tripod telescope fixed on the roof immediately over his room.* * It has been repeatedly stated that Gordon had a gun on the roof of the palace, with which he used to shell the dervish camp. In one account of the fall of Khartoum, it is averred that Gordon, in his sleeping suit, served this gun for an hour until it was rendered useless, as it could not be depressed sufficiently to bear upon the dervishes surrounding the palace. There never was a gun on the roof of the palace, for the roof would not have supported its dead weight, much less the shock of its recoil. About 3.30, Fauzi, riding a donkey, accompanied Gordon on what proved to be his last visit to the lines. Most of the troops were lying down exhausted and hungry; as they saw Gordon approach, they wished to present arms, but he kept calling out to them, “Rest, rest; but keep your eyes open.” At sunset they regained the palace, and walked up and down for some time discussing the situation. As the dinner-hour approached, Gordon told Fauzi that he was sorry he could not invite him to dinner, as he had nothing to eat. Fauzi said he had, for himself and guards, the hearts of four date trees, and would send one to the palace, upon which Gordon ran in and brought out his dinner—also the heart of a date tree. This was the last Fauzi was to see of Gordon. At midnight, Fauzi Pasha, as usual, went his rounds of the posts in the town, reaching his guards at about 2 a.m. While giving orders in the courtyard of his official residence, a sound as of shouts in the distance was heard. This was towards dawn. Fauzi went to the roof, and, through his binoculars, could faintly make out hand-to-hand fighting going on in the lines. Hurrying down, he drew up his men, and set off for the palace, being joined by ten Greeks who had been on duty. On coming in sight of the palace, they were met by two bands of dervishes, but succeeded in cutting their way through one, only to be met by a troop of dervish horse. The little party was forced back, fighting every step, and when close to his house all rushed inside, closed the doors, and commenced to fight through the windows, but for every shot they fired, a score came back in reply. The little garrison assembled in the courtyard for a last stand as the dervishes were then beating down the doors. Fortunately, the sight of other dervishes rushing past with loot drew the "345" besiegers off on a similar errand, and the party was able to hold its own against successive parties until the Mahdi sent word to stop the massacre. When Fauzi was taken before the Mahdi, he was asked, “Why is it that you, a good Muslim, have never written to me when every one else has done so, expressing their loyalty? Have you forgotten the days at Abba, and the instruction I gave you? If you have, I have not;” and, kissing him, the Mahdi told him to “go in peace.” The Mahdi was very wroth at the death of Gordon, for he really admired and respected him, and he had given strict orders that he was not to be harmed in any way. As, during his captivity, Fauzi used to receive moneys from Cairo, he had, to explain his being able to live, to engage in some occupation, and took to lime-burning, a business which cost him more than he ever got out of it. As an Egyptian, he was under the surveillance of Youssef Mansour, who, after the escape of Slatin, refused to be responsible for Fauzi any longer. Failing to get him executed for having assisted in Slatin’s escape, he succeeded in getting him committed to the Saier, where he remained as a prisoner for four years, until released by the Sirdar. Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, though actually a civilian employÉ, held the rank in Khartoum, where he was born, of Lieutenant in the 3rd Soudan Artillery. He took part in many of the attacks on the dervishes during the siege, and fought with Bakhit Bey on the night the town was taken. He managed to fight his way to his house, and held out until the Mahdi’s orders came to stop the massacre of the inhabitants, when he gave himself up. His father, uncle, and brother had already been killed fighting. For some time he supported himself at Omdurman by cutting firewood, living in a state of semi-starvation. Being a good clerk, he offered his services to Wad Nejoumi, who, it appears, would employ no one but old Egyptian employÉs as “katibs” (clerks). He was with Wad Nejoumi when I was taken prisoner to Dongola, and throws an interesting light upon Nejoumi’s attitude towards Mahdieh, which more than confirms the impressions I had formed, and which I have given expression to in Chapter VI.: “Dongola to Omdurman.” Kandeel tells me that, on the arrival of our party at Dongola, Nejoumi called a meeting of emirs, and asked what should be done with us. All voted for instant execution, but this Nejoumi would not sanction. Among the emirs was a Taaishi wakil (spy or agent of Abdullahi)—a similar wakil being appointed to each army not actually led by one of the Khaleefa’s relatives. This wakil’s name was Messaad Geydoom-el-Taaishi. When Nejoumi insisted upon saving "347" my life, and, as an alternative, sending me to the Khaleefa, leaving him to decide what should be done with me, he instructed Kandeel to write a letter saying that, as I was a “hakeem” (doctor), I might be useful to him (Nejoumi) and also to the army. Geydoom, having his suspicions about Nejoumi’s loyalty to Mahdieh, used his sparing of my life as a proof of his sympathies with the Government, and Nejoumi was ordered to Omdurman, and kept a prisoner in his house for some months. Geydoom’s treatment of the army during Nejoumi’s absence caused so much discontent that Abdullahi determined to send Nejoumi back to Dongola, but with strict instructions to at once commence the march for the conquest of Egypt. He was given a hundred and twenty rifles only, and very little ammunition. When General Grenfell sent the letter to Nejoumi, calling upon him to surrender, Nejoumi called a council of emirs, said that the army could not possibly fight, as they were tired, hungry, and thirsty, and suggested surrender, for they must either be killed upon the field or die in the desert on the way back. The emirs, being of the Taaishi family, first accused Nejoumi of cowardice and then of treachery. They threatened to report him to the Khaleefa when the fight was won, and to ask that one of themselves should be given the command when the further advance into Egypt was ordered. There appears to be but little doubt that, had it not been for the Taaishi emirs, the army would have followed Nejoumi unarmed to the lines of the Government troops. The emirs dictated the reply which Nejoumi was to send to General Grenfell, and when Nejoumi dashed down into the plain as the dervish army was in retreat, it was doubtless with the object of reaching the Government lines, but under pretence of rallying the few remaining troops, so that they should not shoot him down if they thought he was deserting them—or follow him if they thought he was charging, for this would have drawn the fire of the brigades upon them. After the death of Nejoumi, spies reported to the Khaleefa that he had "348" attempted to open up negotiations with the Government troops, and Kandeel, being suspected as Nejoumi’s “katib,” was loaded with chains and sent to Omdurman, where he was imprisoned for fourteen months, and then released to become the clerk of Yacoub, the brother of Abdullahi. To the present generation the history of the Soudan may be said to commence with the date of its partial conquest by Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt. To go further back than this is to compile from various sources, all more or less inaccurate, a mass of information which, where not misleading, would be next to useless to the would-be correct historian. Even the recent history of the benighted country has from force of circumstances been compiled from sources not the most reliable, and it is extremely difficult for the moment to sift the facts from the legends. The Soudan is still an unknown and unconquered land. Small tribes have been magnified into nations, and petty chiefs and sheikhs into kings and sultans who evidenced their exalted position in the possession of a few more sheep, goats, donkeys, and slaves, than their neighbours. No single tribe or sheikh ever held general supremacy over the others; Zubeir was within an ace of making himself the Sultan of the Soudan, when he accepted an invitation to visit Cairo; that was twenty-five years ago, and he is still here. The Soudan was nothing more nor less than a collection of little commonwealths; occasionally a number of these would acknowledge allegiance to one particular headman, and, in such instances, the “nation” might have boasted almost as great a population as some small and obscure provincial town. But that such instances were rare "350" is proved by the facility with which Mohammad Ahmed and Abdullahi set the various sections of tribes fighting among themselves. When Mohammad Ali established his government, and when later Ismail Pasha attempted to extend his empire, they each took advantage of the chronic anarchy reigning in the Soudan to further their schemes, but the tribes soon found that they had but stepped from the frying-pan into the fire, and waited patiently for the strong man who was to rid them of the thraldom of the now hated and detested Turks, from whom they had hoped so much. From the time when, what the Soudanese call the “Turk” rule, was established, until the rebellion of 1882, nothing whatever was done to develop the natural resources of the country—indeed, the reverse. The only trade the officials fostered was that of slaves, and these were invariably drawn from peaceful and agricultural districts; the adult male population of whole districts was swept away in those raids organized to supply the hareems of Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, with eunuchs and concubines. The mineral wealth of Sennar, Darfur and Kordofan was neglected, as when the soldiers reached the gold, silver and copper mines, they discovered that the precious metals did not exist in the pure blocks they had expected to find, and that to extract the metals meant work. The population of the half-conquered provinces was robbed in every conceivable manner by tax-collectors, who were seldom or never paid their salaries of from twenty-five to thirty shillings a month, and they were assisted in the duties of tax collecting by companies of irregular soldiers whose salaries also were never paid. Where money was not forthcoming, the taxes were collected in kind, and it may be imagined what the result of tax collecting was. The people were driven farther and farther away from the cultivated lands and watercourses. The “Sudd,” that rank growth of weeds which obstruct the navigation of the Nile and its tributaries, was left to accumulate year after year, the little clearances which the inhabitants themselves made formerly, "351" being abandoned as they but aided the passage of boats conveying soldiers on tax collecting or conquest of territory expeditions. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that some of the Soudan tribes may have risen to the dignity of independent kingdoms, their history may be written with one word—“anarchy,” and when the “Turk” government was established, general rebellion was rife from the beginning until it culminated in the rising of Mohammad Ahmed. The population of the Soudan was, and still is, divided into three great classes, (1) the pure Arab to whom manual labour has been unknown since the day his ancestor Ishmael mixed the mortar with which to cement the stones of the Kaaba or House of God, which Abraham built at Mecca; (2) the Negroid, who will perform a few light duties, but who has absorbed all the worst to the exclusion of the few better qualities of his progenitors,—and, (3) the Black—naturally indolent and too lazy to work,—without ambition, and whose presumed avarice only extends to the possession of a little more than he can eat. For centuries the Black has been the slave of the Arab, and performed all the manual labour, such as the collection of gum and senna leaves, indiarubber, ivory, the cultivation of cereals, and the navigation of the rivers; but taking it all in all, the lot of the black slave might be envied by millions of workers in other parts of the world. With the introduction of the “Turk” government, all three classes were considered as “prey”; the slave proper had to work harder so that his master might be able to satisfy the rapacity of his master—the official, and the slave knew this; the negroid, who believed in cultivating only so much dourra as was requisite for his needs, found that he had to cultivate enough to feed the soldiers quartered in his province, and to pay taxes not only on what he grew for himself, but on what he grew for nothing for the soldiers. It is no wonder, then, that the three waited the coming of some strong man to rid them of the common enemy. Although a religious element was introduced into "352" Mohammad Ahmed’s movement, many fail to grasp the fact that religion here takes the place of politics in Europe, and when the Arabs rise against the powers that be, they are backed up by some “religious” question, for their laws are based entirely upon the Quoran. Mohammad Ahmed had for years been preaching against the extortions of the Turk officials, and had it not been suggested to him, it is unlikely that he would ever have assumed the rÔle of Mahdi, though as a holy man only, it is almost certain that his crusade would have succeeded equally as well as it did. The country was ripe for rebellion, and when the followers of Mohammad Ahmed overcame the first “Turk” sent against him, and against whom he had been preaching for years, success was assured, and thousands flocked to him. His crusade, therefore, in the beginning, was not a religious movement pure and simple as we understand such; it was the rising of an oppressed people against a government that had but lately tried to establish its authority over them. It is true that once having had the rÔle of Mahdi forced upon him, Mohammad Ahmed did his best to act up to it; his miracles—in the way of annihilating successive armies sent against him were very real indeed, and if thousands flocked to his banner in consequence of them, they should not be too severely criticized and charged with fanaticism and unreasoning superstition, for while they flocked to see the worker of these very real miracles, just as many thousands of people in more enlightened climes were making pilgrimages to caves, grottoes and shrines in the belief that the miracles they were praying for would be performed. Nor, considering that the faith in dreams and visions is almost as strong in the east as it was when Pharaoh had his dreams interpreted by Joseph, should Mohammad Ahmed and his successor be blamed for taking advantage of the credulity of the most credulous people on earth in the relating of visions, when but a little time since thousands of people in a highly civilized country were flocking to the doors of one who pretended to be the mouthpiece on earth of the angel Gabriel—a much more mythical being than either the prophet Mohammad or the Mahdi. "353" Had Mohammad Ahmed lived, there is no doubt but that he would have succeeded in establishing some form of government which, if not better, would certainly have been no worse than the one he had overturned. With the Mahdi’s death, Abdullahi found himself with a trust which, as he saw immediately, only a powerful military despotism could enable him to keep. Threatened with attack from all points of the compass, he had also internal dissensions to combat, and met them unflinchingly. While his atrocities have been made much of, he invariably went through the farce of trying people for disobedience during his reign of martial law before carrying out the capital sentence; perhaps, if Abdullahi’s atrocities were placed side by side with those associated with revolutions in other countries, his list would be found not the longest. Oppression doubtless was great, but it was concentrated in one place, and being more seen, was as a consequence more felt. Still opinions may be said to be equally divided as to whether oppression was any greater during the worst days of the reign of Abdullahi than it had been under the old government. The foregoing is not written in defence of Mohammad Ahmed or Abdullahi—and I have little reason to say a single good word for the latter, but it is time that the Soudan should be seen through clear glasses. Jealousy of power was Abdullahi’s besetting sin, and to this must be attributed the swift punishment meted out to those who in the slightest degree exhibited disobedience of orders. To this jealousy must be added vanity of his power also. I have heard since my release, from people of the Muslimanieh quarter, some of the reasons for Abdullahi’s sparing of my life. I had forgotten the incident, but am reminded that when on my arrival at Omdurman I was taken to the gallows in chains to be hanged, I turned to the Emirs and shouted “Has your Mahdi (I used this name at the time) no other way of exhibiting his power but by hanging a bound man before all his soldiers? Take off my chains, and I will fight you, or else get on with your work.” Abdullahi was told this while I was still being played with, and said, “A man who will "354" talk like that when he is going to be hanged is a man! He is a big man; I will not hang him; a man who is not afraid of me is not to be hanged; I will keep him.” This was said to the Muslimanieh and others. Abdullahi had not made up his mind whether I was a merchant, spy, medicine man or general. Then, again, he kept me alive in order to prove that he was more powerful than my Malek (the Emperor of Germany). I am told that he very often said to people, “You have heard of Abdalla Nufell; he is not afraid of me; his Malek has millions of soldiers like him, but he dare not bring his armies to release him; he is afraid to meet my ansar.” There are other stories of Abdullahi’s many references to me, but, as they are of a complimentary nature, I must leave others to relate them; the above are only given for the purpose of affording a slight insight into the man’s complex character, and to give an idea of the small actions which could influence him. The Past of the Soudan may be said to close with the battle of Omdurman; the Present may be given in one word—Transition. Its Future is still in the future; but from what I have written, those intending to make a rush to the Soudan as soon as it is declared open for trade, will understand that a settled government has yet to be established. The Soudan has had but one government, and I have given an idea of what that government was to the inhabitants; the next government established will, as a matter of course, be looked askance at. Although the Khaleefa’s army was smashed up at Omdurman, his influence still remains with great numbers, and time must be given for the Soudanese to learn that there are governments and governments. All they are conscious of now is, that the Government they turned out has come back again, and they expect from it no better treatment than they received formerly, if they do not expect worse as a punishment for their rebellion. The possession of slaves will be forbidden, and this will give umbrage to the Arabs, while the slaves will no more appreciate or enjoy their freedom than would so many cage-bred birds theirs. There is a "355" considerable amount of ignorance in Europe on the subject of slavery in Mohammedan countries, but I must confine myself to the Soudan on this question. Slave raiding should of course be put down with a strong hand, and there should be, when a raider is captured, no other formality than that of loading the rifles or affixing the rope; the trial might take place at some future date, so that the fact of his execution might be recorded. I wish to speak now only of those who are already called “slaves,” for, in the majority of cases, it is but a name. I have remarked that the Black is naturally lazy, and will do no more work than he is compelled to; if liberated unconditionally, he will, unless drafted into regiments, loaf about, and occasionally do a little work for the sake of a meal; but he will refuse to keep to any work long unless some sort of pressure is brought to bear, and he will be only too glad if it is. As a slave, his master must keep him in food and clothes, and also support his wife and children in return for his services, and, being “property,” he is well looked after; he is, as I have said, a slave but in name, but the name has an ugly sound to Europeans. The new Government might open a slave register, have a few inspectors to go round and “ask for complaints,” and either give an age, or name a date, when all holding of slaves would be a breach of a law yet to be made. Treaties are all very well when dealing with countries boasting a civilized Government, but it is not an easy matter to compel petty chieftains in the heart of Africa to agree to laws which upset the whole political economy of their domains—and this only to please people who know nothing of the existing conditions. However the whole question bristles with difficulties and with arguments for and against leaving matters as they are—only suppressing raiding as I have said already—but as those difficulties do exist, it would be well not to be rash, or to burden the still unconquered and unsettled country with revolutionary laws. Far better to make haste slowly, for laws are of little use unless a breach of them is quickly punished, and the Soudan Arabs have yet to be taught to respect laws emanating from a “Government.” "356" These few remarks on the unsettled state of the country are intended for those who may be going out as entire strangers to the Soudan. They must be prepared to meet with difficulties great and small, disappointments, much discomfort, and many annoyances big and little; but it is to be hoped that they will endure these for a time, and not pester the little and still half-formed new administration with big complaints about petty quarrels or troubles. Any reprisals asked for in case of small annoyances or unpleasantnesses, can but bring in their train much bigger ones; you want but to earn the respect of both Arab and Soudanese to earn his devotion, and you may have both by at least treating him as a man and not as a beast. When speaking of my having borrowed money from the guides whom I entrusted with the arrangements I made for my escape, I drew attention to the strange fact of my borrowing money from them. This was putting the principle I have pointed out into practice; I required their aid. I went further, and gave evidence that I was entirely in their hands—a weakling, but they understood that if they helped me in my weakness, I would help or protect them in my strength; above all, they valued my trust and confidence. There are limits, I know, to both, but you must learn those limits. The great want of the Soudan at the present time is means of communication; there are enormous tracts of land on which cereals can be raised with the minimum of cost and labour, but without means of transport they might as well not exist. Some talk has been made of a line of rail connecting Khartoum with the Red Sea, and this, certainly, would provide the means of transport and enable the Soudan to compete with almost any other country in cereals, but it is a question whether it would be worth while to construct a railway for the sake of the grain trade, if the trucks which take it to the seaboard have to be hauled back empty, and, maybe, left idle for the greater part of the year. It is possible that during the last fifteen years Nature has to a great extent repaired the enormous damage done to indiarubber and gum trees, "357" when the plants and trees were destroyed in order to obtain a big enough crop to satisfy the rapacity of the “Turk” officials. The forests abound in ebony and other hard woods, but power to saw them into beams or planks of suitable dimensions for transit is requisite before this valuable industry can be developed. From what prisoners from the south told me, in places an almost pure iron is found on or near the surface; this the Shilluks and Dinkas smelt in mud furnaces about six to eight feet high and three to four feet in diameter. The spear heads of the Shilluks and Dinkas, beside their shape being different from all others, are readily distinguishable from their peculiarly deep black shade, while the spear heads made from imported iron are many shades lighter, and in comparison, when polished, have a tinny appearance. If coal is found, and I believe it will be, if the description I was given of “black stones” which took fire is correct, then one might say that there is no limit to the development of the country. Should the Nile and its tributaries be cleared of the “sudd,” considerable development would be immediately possible, but the whole country must first be studied, and its present condition with its existing means of transport thoroughly grasped, before people will be justified in subscribing for big ventures, for the failure of one means the failure of others, and a retarding, for want of new capital, of present possibilities in the way of development. It is quite impossible to compile any statistics of the former import and export trade of the Soudan, that is to say reliable statistics, and as the whole trade of the country was governed by the slave trade—now abolished—a new condition of things has been introduced but not yet established. Barter must, for some time to come, be the medium of trade and exchange, and, here again, new conditions are certain to be met with. Formerly the principal imports were cheap cotton goods, earthenware, ironware, dried and preserved provisions, sugar, perfumes, and such like, which generally came in the category of things which are “cheap and nasty.” There are two great reasons why all this must now be changed; with almost "358" 20,000 regularly paid troops in the country, and troops, too, who have, in a measure, been living in the lap of luxury, since 1882, their demands must be met. The sight of well-fed, well-housed, and well-clothed troops, will excite the admiration and cupidity of the Soudanese for similar luxuries, and a demand for articles formerly unknown to them will at once be created. I hesitate to specify some of the goods which I know there will be a demand for, not that I am in any way interested in the subject for the moment, but only to guard against numbers of people exporting large quantities of merchandise of the same class far in excess of the actual demand. I cannot too strongly advise manufacturers to study on the spot the requirements of the people, and to comply with their requirements, whatever the article might be. Disappointment and loss can only ensue if articles they do not want, or which do not meet with their requirements, are attempted to be forced upon them, for while engaged upon this suicidal policy, some one else will certainly be studying the question with the intention of meeting the wishes of his prospective customers. I would strongly deprecate the formation of big syndicates and companies for the exploitation of the Soudan; the country, granted certain facilities for transport, has a great future, but it would be very unwise to lock up large capitals, the greater part of which would be lying unused. Small companies, with all the capital employed, will pay best for the time being, and the pioneers of such companies might be accompanied by a mineralogist, to examine the gold, silver, copper, lead, and other mineral deposits. That gold exists is well known, but the richness of the quartz I cannot speak of; one thing, though, is certain, gold can be obtained with little or no difficulty and labour, otherwise the small bags of gold I saw at Khartoum and Omdurman would not have been brought in. Lead and copper will be found to the west and south-west of Darfur—and possibly silver also, but whether it would pay to work the mines can only be ascertained after an examination of the districts. "359" To sum up. The Soudan is a country which for nearly a century has been fighting against the establishment of any foreign government; its experience of a “benevolent” administration is of the very worst; the inhabitants sank all or nearly all differences between them when they rose to turn out the hated Turks; their experience of Christians has evidently not been of the best, else why the saying concerning Gordon? Large numbers are still loyal to the Khaleefa Abdullahi, and it will require but a very little mistake to make the inhabitants flock to his banner, or, what is worse, they will retire to the west and leave the country denuded of the population it stands in so much need of. Strangers are not wanted—they will be looked upon with suspicion until they have given evidence of their honest intentions towards the villagers; traders, before they may look for success, must overcome the prejudice of the people against European traders, a prejudice based upon experience of them formerly. And it is necessary for me to say that, after recent experience, it will take some time before the Muslim will believe that the Christian religion is anything but what he believes it to be, and he will be convinced that the boasted superiority of the European over the Arab does not hold good in the Soudan at all events. If those going to the Soudan will bear these points in mind, they will save themselves and others an infinity of trouble, and all barriers will be surmounted, if they keep in mind always the reputation Gordon made for himself for “Goodness and Justice,” and make Goodness and Justice their motto. |