In writing the history of the War in Syria, I began after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, which had well nigh laid Turkey prostrate at the feet of her powerful vassal; but it is necessary that the uninformed reader should be acquainted how Mehemet Ali, who began a simple soldier, should have risen to such a height of power as to attract the attention of the nations of Europe, and cause them to come forward, at the imminent risk of a European war, to interfere between the vassal and the master.

Mehemet Ali is of low origin, and was born at Cavallo, in Roumelia, in 1769. He left his parents when young, and began his career as a tobacco-merchant, but soon tired of trade, became a soldier, and was sent to Egypt, at the time of the French invasion, at the head of a body of Arnauts (Albanians.) After the evacuation of Egypt by the French, he made himself extremely useful to Kourschid Pacha, the governor of Egypt, who was unpopular with the Mamelukes, and disliked by his own soldiers. Mehemet was too clever for the Governor, and soon began to see an opening for himself. Kourschid became jealous, and endeavoured to get rid of him; but the future Pacha of Egypt had gained over his countrymen to his interest, and, with the assistance of the Mamelukes, deposed the Pacha, and stepped into his shoes. His own talent, and the weakness of the Porte, kept him in place; though many attempts were made to remove him.

Mehemet Ali never openly opposed the Porte; he was the most submissive of Pachas, and always managed to gain his point, and each unsuccessful attempt of the Porte to displace him left him more powerful than ever. When the British landed at Damietta, in 1807, Mehemet Ali ruled in Egypt, and it was principally owing to his energetic conduct that the expedition failed.

The massacre of the Mamelukes, which took place in 1811, cannot be justified, even according to Eastern ideas. That they were extremely troublesome and dangerous there cannot be a doubt; they would have had no hesitation whatever in overthrowing Mehemet Ali’s government, and putting him to death; and had he openly attacked them, he would have been justified; but a breach of hospitality is a greater crime in the East than in the West. He had invited the Mamelukes to eat salt with him, and he treacherously attacked and butchered them in the citadel of Cairo in cold blood. One alone escaped; he took a desperate leap over the battlements, his horse was killed on the spot, and he alone, of between 400 and 500, survived to tell the story of the massacre of his fellows.

About this time the Pacha began to extend his views beyond Egypt, and his first step was to take advantage of the opening afforded by the depredations of the Wahabees, a reforming military sect of Arabs, who had captured Mecca and Medina, plundered the caravans, and put a stop to the pilgrimages of the Faithful. Less actuated, it may be fairly supposed, by religious zeal than by political wisdom, he procured orders from the Porte, by virtue of which he attacked, and at length, after several campaigns, succeeded in subduing them; his two sons Toussoon and Ibrahim greatly exerting themselves in the war. The pachalic of the Holy Cities was in consequence granted by the Sultan to Ibrahim, but Mehemet Ali pushed his arms still further, and did not desist till he had got into his possession the most valuable parts of the coast of Arabia.

Shortly after the massacre of the Mamelukes, Mehemet, with the assistance of Colonel Seve (now Souliman Pacha), an officer of merit in the French service, set to work to raise an army and to discipline it on the European model. The latter was no easy task; he had to contend against the habits and prejudices of the Arabs, but nevertheless, he succeeded in this, as he has done in most of his undertakings. In 1824 he was enabled to send a powerful army and fleet to Greece to assist in putting down the insurrection; here the Allies interfered; the “untoward” battle of Navarino destroyed his fleet, and not more than half his army returned to the land of their birth. As a reward for his services, however, the government of Candia was conferred on him by the Porte.

From this time to 1831 Mehemet Ali employed himself in improving his country, and perfecting his establishments; and though according to our notions, the means he employed were not very mild or humane, the public works he executed in a short time were almost as wonderful as those of Peter the Great.

His military and naval conscriptions, and other acts of tyranny, induced many of the inhabitants of Egypt to abandon their country and take refuge in Syria, and they were protected by Abdallah Pacha, the Governor of the province in which stands the celebrated fortress of St. Jean d’Acre. This Pacha was under considerable obligation to Mehemet Ali; but, nevertheless, disregarded all his remonstrances. Mehemet Ali was not a man to be trifled with; and, under the pretence of recovering his Fellahs and punishing Abdallah Pacha, he took steps from which the far-famed Eastern Question at length arose.

He assembled an army of 40,000 men, including eight regiments of cavalry, and several thousand Bedouins, a large park of artillery and a battering train. At the head of this army he placed his son Ibrahim Pacha. A squadron of five sail-of-the-line and several frigates were despatched to Acre in the month of November, 1831, a season of the year rather too late to commence a campaign. Nevertheless, Ibrahim having crossed the Desert, set himself down before Acre in December.

The Grand Prince of Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, after much hesitation, paid him a visit in his camp before Acre, and brought presents of horses for Ibrahim and Abbas Pachas, and endeavoured to make his visit one of compliment only. Ibrahim, seeing the immense advantage of gaining him over to his interest, either by force or persuasion, detained him in his camp for several months, and at last obtained a promise of his co-operation; he was then permitted to return to Ibteddin, leaving, however, his grandson, the Emir Mahmoud, as a hostage for his fidelity.

The siege was conducted with so little skill both by land and sea, that six months elapsed before the fortress fell into the possession of Ibrahim Pacha, and then it was taken by storm. The following, extracted from the work of Mr. St. John, is the best account I have been able to procure^[1].

The Turkish Government were not unwilling to see Abdallah Pacha deprived of Acre, as they thought he had assumed an air of too much independence, and they also hoped that Mehemet Ali, who they saw with a jealous eye was becoming too powerful, would exhaust his resources by undertaking a campaign in Syria. After the capture of Acre the Porte soon began to perceive that Abdallah Pacha’s position was taken possession of by a more powerful, a more ambitious, and a more dangerous vassal; they therefore ordered him immediately to withdraw from Syria, and not expecting compliance, collected an army of 20,000 men on the banks of the Orontes, and advanced another from Anatolia, to oppose him.

Mehemet Ali, however, had no idea of satisfying himself with the capture of Acre. He had now passed the Rubicon, and he directed Ibrahim to advance a part of his army on Balbeck to watch the operations of Hussein Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman army, and to occupy Damascus with the remainder. Ali Pacha, who commanded the Turkish troops in that city, evacuated it without firing a shot, and retired on Homs, by the old road of Palmyra, and joined the Turkish army.

Ibrahim Pacha, having now possession of Damascus, advanced on Khan Kousseir, where he arrived on the 6th of July. The next morning he attacked and defeated a part of the Turkish army, and took 3000 prisoners and 13 field pieces. On the 8th the Egyptian army entered Homs, and took 1500 prisoners and 14 guns. The remains of the Ottoman army retired on Aleppo, and formed a junction with the force under Hussein Pacha; from thence they continued their retreat, in two columns, on Beylan, and soon after Ibrahim took possession of Aleppo, where he halted a short time to reorganize his army.his army. On the 29th he again came in sight of the Ottoman army, again attacked, and again defeated them, taking 25 guns and 2000 prisoners. On the following day the Egyptians entered Alexandretta, where they found 14 guns and abundance of stores and provisions; and the Turks now retired on Mount Taurus.

The Sultan becoming alarmed for the stability of his throne, made great exertions, and speedily collected an army of 50,000 men, and a good train of artillery, and placed them under the command of Rechid Pacha, the Grand Vizier. The Egyptian army had now assembled at Adana, and on the 14th of October they drove the Turks from the defiles of Mount Taurus, and on the 20th the Egyptian advanced guard occupied Erekli, where they remained till the 27th of November.

On the 13th of December, the whole army was put in motion, and arrived at Koniyeh on the 17th, the day after the Turks had evacuated it. From that time to the 20th of December, various movements took place on both sides, and on the 21st the battle of Koniyeh was fought, when the Ottoman army was totally defeated and dispersed by Ibrahim Pacha, and the Grand Vizier taken prisoner.

Nothing now hindered the conqueror from marching on Scutari, where he might have arrived early in January, and before the Russians had reached the Bosphorus. Had he followed this course, Constantinople would have been revolutionized, and the power of the Sultan overturned, and most probably Mehemet Ali would have been placed on the throne of Osman.

The Egyptian army did not leave Koniyeh till the 20th of January, 1833, and reached Kutayah on the 1st of February. The Russians had by that time arrived in the Bosphorus, called in by the Sultan, who, being neglected by his natural friends, was obliged to apply to his natural enemy to protect him from the rebellion of one of his own subjects.

The arrival of the Russian squadron and army in the Bosphorus decided Ibrahim to enter into negociations, and the Treaty of Kutayah, by which the Ottoman empire was saved from immediate destruction, was signed, the Pachalic of Adana and the whole of Syria (by far the most valuable part of their conquests,) being entrusted to Mehemet Ali and his son.

This Treaty, so mortifying to the Sultan’s pride, was followed by that of Unkiar Skelessi, and the consequent departure of the Russian squadron from the Bosphorus; they had, however, learnt the road to Constantinople, which neither the British nor French Governments ought to have permitted, and the time is not far distant when they will profit by their experience.

Shortly after the Treaty of Kutayah, Ibrahim retired within the defiles of the Taurus, and the whole province was formally put under the government of Mehemet Ali.

Had the Pacha of Egypt been a wise man, and ameliorated, in the slightest degree, the condition of the people he had released from the barbarous rule of the Turks, so as to have made them feel the difference, he might have consolidated his power both in Syria and Egypt, and restored these two fine countries to prosperity. His tribute to the Porte was small, and he possessed the power to render the people both prosperous and happy. The conduct of his army, too, when passing through Syria had been most exemplary, and the inhabitants had to their astonishment observed the wonderful difference between an irregular and undisciplined Turkish force and the order and regularity of the Egyptian troops, and, generally speaking, were most favourable to the change of masters. But Mehemet Ali, though possessing ten times the intelligence and energy of a Turk, was still an Oriental, and only knew how to govern the people entrusted to his charge with Eastern despotism.

The powers of Europe now turned their attention to Egypt with increased interest, and England was the first to establish a permanent agent and Consul at the Court of Alexandria; her example was followed, shortly after, by the other great powers of Europe. Mehemet Ali had been permitted to send his officers to England, and they were instructed in our dockyards in the art of ship-building, and were even received on board our ships to be instructed in seamanship and discipline. What greater proof could we have given of the interest we took in Mehemet Ali, than such a distinguished mark of favour? and what other conclusion could he have drawn, than that we were favourable to his government? The French were not behind us; they even went farther. A French officer of distinction had disciplined the Pacha’s army; he had now also a French Admiral at the head of the navy; and great credit is due to both for the state of order and discipline into which they have brought both arms of the service.

Had Mehemet Ali been now satisfied, he might have lived to see the inhabitants of the countries he ruled rich and prosperous, and invoking blessings on his head for having given them happiness, tranquillity, and security of property; but the old man, either mistrusting Turkey, or having a lurking ambition to be seated on the throne of Osman, instead of reducing his armies, and remitting part of the imposts on the people, began his government in Syria by increasing the taxation, and afterwards introduced the conscription, of all measures the most unpopular in Eastern countries.

Ibrahim was not insensible to the imprudence of those measures, and remonstrated with his father, and shortly after entirely withdrew from the management of the civil affairs of the country; when Scheriff Pacha was appointed civil governor of Syria, and established the seat of government at Damascus.

Mehemet Ali’s first new financial measure was the ferdeh, a tax on all males from twelve years upwards, varying from fifteen to five hundred piastres, according to their means. This was paid by all classes and religions, and the Christians, who before paid a poll-tax, were also obliged to pay the ferdeh, in addition to the regular taxes. Forced contributions were also occasionally raised to supply the exigencies of the government. According to Mr. Farren, the Syrian contributions was raised from 20,000 to 32,000 purses.

The Governor and local officers, it is true, were not allowed to receive bribes; but the people gained little by this. Besides the regular taxes, and the occasional forced contributions, the government was in the habit of purchasing what was required for the maintenance of the army at their own price, the inhabitants being obliged to deliver it into the government stores at their own risk and cost. They were also liable to be pressed to work at the public establishments, and even transported to distant parts of the country, receiving pay hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together.

In addition to these oppressions, whenever the army was put in motion the inhabitants were obliged to furnish animals to transport baggage and provisions, and were paid two-thirds less than the common wages of the country. If horses or mules were wanted for the government, they were seized without any respect to persons, and paid for at whatever price the authorities thought proper to give. Vessels for the transport of provisions and government stores were seized in like manner, and the owners paid about a third of the freight they could have gained in trade.

Tampering with the currency was a source of dishonest gain to the Pacha: taxes were ordered to be paid in certain coins, Mehemet Ali fixing the value always below its standard; in short, there was a system of legal pillage established from one end of the country to the other.

These oppressions were nevertheless borne with, for they are common in Eastern governments; and, had not their new ruler commenced the disarmament of the people, and the forced levies, they probably would never have endeavoured to shake off his yoke. But his measures, odious in themselves, were rendered quite intolerable by the mode in which they were executed. According to Mr. Farren, the conscription in Syria amounted to 11 per cent. on the male population; the classes who were exempt from the conscription were obliged to find substitutes either by fine or purchase, and many who had been seized and drafted into regiments more than once, and obtained their discharge by purchase, were again seized, and their remonstrances wholly disregarded.

It is not surprising that people, thus driven to despair, should revolt. In the year 1834 the insurrections began in the Haouran, and spread afterwards to the country of the Druses and Naplousians. These insurrections, however, Mehemet Ali managed with his usual energy to put down, and established more security to the people from being plundered by anybody but himself; that, and a greater facility and safety in travelling through the country, appear to have been the only merits of Mehemet Ali’s government in Syria. Thus things proceeded for a while, the Pacha exerting himself to fortify the passes of Taurus, and building barracks at Antioch and other places, particularly at St. Jean d’Acre, while Ibrahim and his officers laboured to introduce new cultures, as of the sugar-cane, the indigo plant, &c., and with some success; but this could not reconcile the Syrians to the grinding monopolies and vexatious burdens of their ruler, and very strong measures were required to keep up the Egyptian authority.

In the year 1838 Mehemet Ali first began to talk of independence, and announced to the Consuls his intention, at no distant period, of declaring himself. Shortly after this he set out on an expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and was absent some considerable time.

The Sultan, as might have been expected, had never ceased to form plans for the recovery of Syria to his rule, and as early as the year 1834 he had committed the charge of several of the pachalics of the eastern part of Asia Minor to a Circassian soldier, named Hafiz Pacha, in order that he might there raise an army for that purpose. Hafiz laboured with great zeal in the cause, and from the remoteness of the districts, his progress was unnoticed by the European Powers. At length, in the beginning of 1839 the Porte more openly made preparations for war; and on the 12th of February of that year, Count MolÉ for the first time brought the affairs of the East under the consideration of Lord Granville, the British Ambassador^[3]; and Lord Palmerston repeatedly wrote to Lord Ponsonby to discourage, by every possible means, the Porte from again embroiling themselves in war with Mehemet Ali; declaring, at the same time, that if the Porte was attacked, assistance would be given; but, if on the other hand they became the aggressors, it might change the whole face of affairs.

Notwithstanding the advice given to the Porte by the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, the Sultan, relying on the reports of the efficiency of his army in Asia Minor, communicated to him by his General, gave directions for the advance of the Turkish army, and they actually marched beyond Bir, which is only sixty miles distant from Aleppo. Mehemet Ali determined, however, not to be the aggressor, and directed Ibrahim to refrain from making any movement in advance.

Russia and Austria becoming alarmed lest the peace of Europe should be disturbed, instructed their Consuls at Alexandria to request that Mehemet Ali would desire Ibrahim to withdraw his troops towards Damascus, assuming that Ibrahim was the first to put his army in motion, which certainly was not the case. France seeing the possibility also of a rupture between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, expressed a strong desire that Great Britain would act in concert with her, and proposed to send a fleet of eight or nine sail of the line to the Levant, to co-operate with the British fleet, which she supposed would consist of ten sail of the line.

Whether Mehemet Ali was sincere in his desire to avoid hostilities with the Porte or not, is not very easy to divine; but his actions certainly seem in his favour. He not only remitted the tribute to the Porte, but he declared to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, that if the troops of the Sultan were withdrawn on the other side of the Euphrates, he would order his army to retrograde, and direct Ibrahim to return to Damascus; nay more, if the Turks would retire still further, he would recallrecall Ibrahim into Egypt; and if the Four Powers would guarantee peace, and procure him the hereditary succession, he would withdraw a great part of his army from Syria^[4].

Notwithstanding all this, Lord Ponsonby, so early as the 20th of May, 1839, declared the Pacha the aggressor, and sided with Russia. He finishes a long despatch to Lord Palmerston with these remarkable words, “Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth—the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor^[5].”

In the beginning of May, Ibrahim seeing all prospect of peace at an end, left his agricultural pursuits at Khan Jouman, distant five hours from Aleppo, and immediately gave orders for the assembling of his army at the latter place. The army of Ibrahim was said to consist of 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 196 guns, besides 6000 irregular cavalry. That of the Sultan was supposed to amount to 80,000 men of all arms, and 170 guns.

On the 7th of June Mehemet Ali received intelligence from Ibrahim that the Turks had driven back a detachment of Egyptian cavalry. He immediately invited the Consuls to a conference, and asked their advice as to his future conduct. They unanimously advised him to act on the defensive; and above all, not to send his fleet to sea, which he had determined on doing. This advice he decided for the present to follow, but a circumstance soon occurred to alter his determination.

On the 9th of June the Turkish fleet sailed for the Dardanelles, under the command of the Capudan Pacha; Captain Walker of the British Navy embarked with him as his adviser; and the Capudan Pacha intended to remain six or eight days in the Dardanelles. On the same day, Mehemet Ali, having received letters from Ibrahim, giving an account that the advanced guard of the Turkish army had attacked some of his troops on the territory under his government, lost all patience, and, in spite of the remonstrance of the Consuls at Alexandria, sent orders to Ibrahim to drive the Turks out of his territory, and then march on the main body; and, if victorious, occupy Malatiyeh, Kharput, Urfah, and Diyarbekr.

On the 16th of June Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult’s, arrived at Alexandria, with orders to call upon Mehemet Ali to suspend hostilities, whereupon the Pacha gave him a letter to Ibrahim, desiring him not to pass the frontier; and, if in the Turkish territory, to halt, unless Hafiz Pacha continued to advance; he was then to engage him. On the 16th of June the first division of the Egyptian squadron sailed, and the remainder on the following day. Captain Caillier left Alexandria on the 19th for Alexandretta.

On the 25th and 26th of June, orders were sent by the English and French Governments to their naval Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to proceed to the coast of Syria, and prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and urge them to return to their respective ports, in the event of their having sailed. They were also directed to open a communication with the Turkish and Egyptian Generals, and exert their influence to bring about a suspension of arms, and a wider separation between the hostile armies. Should the Turkish General refuse to agree to these propositions, it was to be pointed out to him that all communication by sea would be closed, and his supplies cut off. If the refusal, on the other hand, should proceed from Ibrahim Pacha, similar representations were to be made to him, and communication cut off between Alexandria and Syria. In some respects the English instructions differed from the French. The English Admiral had no orders to cut off the Turkish supplies by sea, in the event of their refusing the armistice; nor had he any orders to receive a Russian squadron should they tender their services; but the English Admiral was at liberty to force the Dardanelles should a Russian fleet arrive at Constantinople, which the French Admiral was not authorized to do without fresh instructions.

On the 2nd of July a further instruction was sent to Sir Robert Stopford in accordance with the instructions of the French Admiral, to receive a Russian force should it offer its co-operation^[6].

Lord Ponsonby having written to Sir Robert Stopford, that war was inevitable between the Turks and Egyptians, the Admiral, on the 7th of June, being then in Palermo Bay, despatched Sir Thomas Fellowes in the Vanguard, together with a brig, to the Levant, to watch the Turkish squadron, but with positive orders to observe the strictest neutrality. At this time the Commander-in-Chief had received no instructions how to act.

Sir Thomas Fellowes arrived in Besika Bay on the 29th of June, and the following day received a visit from Captain Walker, accompanied by M. Etienne Pisani, and Mr. Lander, the British Consul at the Dardanelles, with an offer, on the part of the Capudan Pacha, of provision, and also to ascertain whether Sir Robert Stopford was expected, and whether he would interfere with the Turkish fleet. This, of course, Sir Thomas Fellowes declined answering. M. Pisani then went on board the ship of the Capudan Pacha, who distinctly informed him that he had orders to attack the Egyptian fleet, and should sail in a few days. He was under some apprehensions that the French would interrupt him, but he assured M. Pisani, that, unless the English interfered also, he should proceed in the execution of the Sultan’s orders.

On the 30th of June Sultan Mahmoud, who had been in bad health for some time, died, and his son, Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen, was declared of age by the Divan, and proclaimed Emperor. Orders were immediately forwarded to Hafiz Pacha to suspend hostilities, and the Capudan Pacha was directed not to quit the Dardanelles.

A few days after the Sultan’s death, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to the Ambassadors that the young Sultan was disposed to confer the hereditary Government of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, on condition that he would restore Syria, Candia, and the Holy Cities, to the Porte^[7]. These pacific intentions, however, were too late, for on the 24th of June Ibrahim Pacha had attacked and totally defeated the Turkish army at Nezib, who lost all their guns, ammunition, and baggage, and the remainder repassed the frontier in complete disorder. In addition to this misfortune, the Capudan Pacha had sailed from the Dardanelles, and on falling in with Admiral Lalande, sent his second in command on board to say, that when he heard of the Sultan’s death he was of opinion that he had been poisoned by Hosrew and Halil Pacha, who were devoted to Russia; and under this impression he had written to Hafiz Pacha to march on Constantinople; that he should apply to Mehemet Ali for assistance, and in the mean while take the Turkish fleet to Candia. This M. Lalande advised him not to do, and he then intimated his intention of going to Rhodes.

The French and English Ambassadors, in consequence of these untoward and unexpected events, wrote to the Grand Vizier to assure him of their support, and Lord Ponsonby also wrote to Sir Robert Stopford to recommend him not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.

The Admiral left Malta on the 2nd of July, in consequence of a private letter from Lord Minto, desiring him to proceed off the south end of Cyprus, and there wait for orders. His arrival there he communicated to Lord Ponsonby under date of the 11th of July. It does not appear that at this time Sir Robert Stopford had received Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 25th of June, which pointed out to him the course he ought to follow in the event of the defeat of the Turkish army, and on the Egyptian and Turkish squadron meeting each other at sea. Had these instructions arrived, the Admiral, no doubt, would have conceived it his duty to have taken still stronger steps to have prevented the defection of the Turkish fleet; and it is to be regretted that in the absence of instructions he had not taken upon himself to have immediately proceeded off Alexandria, and forced the Capudan Pacha to return to his duty, particularly if he had received in time Lord Ponsonby’s reply (dated July 19,) to his letter announcing his arrival off Cyprus, in which his Lordship states,

Sir Thomas Fellowes’s orders were so strict, that though he kept company with the Ottoman fleet for several days, he had no communication with the Capudan Pacha; but even if he had, he could not have discovered his intentions, because Captain Walker himself, who was on board, had no notion that they were going off Alexandria for any other purpose than attacking the Egyptian squadron. This, however, was very far from the Turkish Admiral’s intention.

On the 9th of July an Ottoman corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Sheriff Aga, the kiaya of the Capudan Pacha, who was the bearer of a letter to Mehemet Ali; Mehemet did not conceal its contents, which were to ask permission to bring the fleet to Alexandria as a friend, stating that the Capudan Pacha disapproved of the election of Hosrew to the post of Grand Vizier, and that he would co-operate with Mehemet Ali in placing him as vakeel to the young Sultan, as the only person fit to rule the empire. On the same evening Mehemet Ali sent the Nile steamer with his reply to the Capudan Pacha, and on the 10th the Rhadamanthus left Alexandria to communicate this intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, as appears by Colonel Campbell’s despatch to Lord Palmerston of the 11th of July^[8].

On the same day that the Rhadamanthus left, a Turkish steamer arrived with despatches from Hosrew Pacha to Mehemet Ali, who was very communicative to Colonel Campbell. The purport of this despatch was, to announce the accession of Abdul Medjid, and his pardon of Mehemet Ali: that it was his intention to send him the nichan iftikhar, a decoration indicative of high favour, and grant him the hereditary succession of Egypt and its dependencies; and that he had ordered the Turkish troops to retire from the frontiers of Syria.

On the reception of this, Mehemet Ali said he should consider the war at an end, and should order Ibrahim to retire on Marash. That he hoped the Allies would be satisfied; and as soon as everything was settled, he would proceed to Constantinople to do homage to his sovereign. That should Achmet Pacha wish to deliver up the fleet, he would not accept it, but send it back to Constantinople; and that as for the post of vakeel, he would rather remain in his present position. All this seemed very well; but we shall shortly see how he acted.

On the 14th of July the Turkish fleet arrived off Alexandria, and, as no doubt had been previously arranged, formed a junction with the Egyptian fleet. The following morning, the Nile steamer, bearing the flag of the Capudan Pacha, arrived in the harbour, and the traitor was well received by Mehemet Ali^[9].

So secret was all this kept on board the Capudan Pacha’s ship, that Captain Walker, who was with him, had no notion of what the Turkish Admiral was about, until he sent a steamer to direct two ships, who, being bad sailers, were left astern, to rendezvous off Alexandria. On speaking to the Capudan Pacha, he was assured that Mehemet Ali had put the Egyptian fleet under his orders, and that he was proceeding to Egypt to confer with Mehemet Ali on what were the best steps to be taken for the good of the Turkish empire. When the Turkish fleet anchored, Captain Walker landed, and left Alexandria for Constantinople on the 20th, much to the annoyance of the Capudan Pacha, who wished him to remain.

The Allied Consuls used all their endeavours in vain to advise Mehemet Ali to send back the fleet. He said he would have nothing to do with Hosrew, who was his bitter foe; and that he had written to him to send in his resignation; and should Hosrew do so, all would be right.

Mehemet Ali’s enmity to Hosrew was much strengthened by the latter having sent, through the hands of the French Consul, letters to the General and inferior Admirals of the Turkish fleet, calling upon them to return to their allegiance. These letters M. Cochelet gave to Mehemet Ali, who delivered them to the Admirals, when, as might have been expected from the position they were in, they tore them up with indignation.

On the 16th about sixty of the principal officers of the Turkish fleet came on shore, and were presented to the Pacha, who received them in a gracious manner. By the 28th the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets had entered the port of Alexandria, so that had the Commander-in-Chief proceeded off there immediately after the Rhadamanthus had joined him, or even had he proceeded after his receipt of the despatch of the 25th of June which I believe arrived by the Hydra, there would have been ample time to have secured them. This would have completely anticipated Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 7th of August^[10], which directed the Admiral to use his utmost efforts to prevent the Turkish fleet going into Alexandria, and to endeavour to oblige them to return under the authority of the Sultan.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, may have had other instructions, which do not appear in the Levant Papers, for the guidance of his conduct, or he might have thought that the force under his orders, without the co-operation of the French squadron, was not sufficient to have enforced his demand on the Capudan Pacha to return to his allegiance if supported in his treason by the Egyptian fleet. But, nevertheless, I think the experiment might have been tried, and probably would have succeeded to a certain extent, because the entrance into the harbour of Alexandria is so difficult and so shallow that large ships must be considerably lightened before they can enter, and neither the Egyptian nor Turkish Admiral would have ventured to weaken their squadron by either entering in detail or lightening the ships in the presence of a British squadron hostile to their measures. The Commander-in-Chief, however, as I have before said, may have had other instructions, or he took a different view of the case, for instead of going off Alexandria he repaired to Besika Bay, where he was joined the same evening by the Powerful, Ganges, and Implacable. At this point, then, my history of the War in Syria commences.

1. Egypt under Mohammed Ali, vol. ii., pp. 493-496.