Garonne. (March, 1814.)

Very perilous was Soult’s state after the battle of Orthes. Losses in actions, desertion of conscripts, and the dispersion of the old soldiers, had reduced his army; all his magazines were taken; his officers were discontented; he was ill seconded by the civil authorities, and a strong Bourbon party was actively exciting the people to insurrection. He was, however, a man formed by nature to struggle with difficulties, and always appeared greatest in desperate circumstances. Retreating towards the foot of the Pyrenees, he took a position covering Tarbes, and commanding the great road from Pau to Toulouse; there he reorganized his army, called in all the detachments made before the battle, put the national guards and gens d’armes of the Pyrenees in activity, and directed the commanders of districts behind him to collect all the old soldiers they could, and send them to the army. Then, to counteract the machinations of the Bourbonists, he issued a proclamation remarkable for its power, and evincing the sternest resolution, which was not belied by his acts, though his difficulties hourly increased.

But Wellington also was embarrassed. The weather had stopped his pursuit when vigorous action would have been decisive; Soult had rallied on a new line of retreat with strong defensive positions; the allied army, weakened by every step in advance, would, if it followed the French, have to move between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, exposing both its flanks and its rear to all the power which the French government could command. It was, therefore, necessary to find a counterpoise by increasing his own force and strengthening the Bourbonists. He had long been promised twenty thousand additional men from England and Portugal, but the governments of both countries failed in their engagements. He had heard and believed that Suchet had detached ten thousand men to join Soult, and he had, as before shown, called up Freyre’s Gallicians through the Landes, because there was less temptation for plunder there, and he had provided them entirely from the English magazines and military chest; yet their entrance into France was instantly marked by outrages which began to dispose the people to listen to Soult’s proclamation, and an insurrection was to be feared. Inactive, however, he could not remain, and while awaiting the junction of the Spaniards he detached Beresford with twelve thousand men against Bordeaux, remaining with only twenty-six thousand in position to observe Soult, who could from Tarbes move by Roquefort, and gain Bordeaux before Beresford. That general entered the city on the 12th; and the mayor, Lynch, eager to betray his sovereign, very quickly tore his own scarf of honour off to meet the invaders with a welcome. The Duke of AngoulÊme then arrived, the Bourbonists took the ascendant, and Beresford returned to the army with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, leaving Lord Dalhousie behind with the seventh division and three squadrons.

Then the Napoleonists, recovering from their first stupor, bestirred themselves. A partizan officer cut off fifty men sent by Lord Dalhousie over the Garonne; the peasants of the Landes formed bands and burned the houses of gentlemen who had assumed the white colours; forces of various descriptions were being assembled beyond the Garonne, and General Decaen was sent by the emperor to organize and command them. General Beurman also, who had been detached by Suchet with six thousand men to aid Lyons, was now directed to descend the Garonne towards Bordeaux, where a counter-insurrection was being prepared. But then the English fleet under Admiral Penrose entered the Garonne, sweeping it of French vessels of war, and ruining the batteries on the banks; whereupon Lord Dalhousie crossed the river, and, meeting with General L’Huillier at Etauliers, took three hundred prisoners, the French flying at the first onset. Better troops were, however, gathering in that quarter, and the British force would have been eventually in danger, if Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity for good known to history since the days of Alexander the Great, had not been just then overthrown to make room for despots; who, with minds enlarged only to cruelty, avarice, dissoluteness, and treachery, were secretly intent to defraud their people of the just government they demanded as the compensation for serving ungrateful masters.

While Beresford was detached, Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself; for the English general, hearing of Beurman’s march, believed his troops had joined Soult, and the latter, not knowing of Beresford’s march until the 13th, concluded Wellington had still those twelve thousand men. The numbers on each side were, however, nearly equal. Three thousand French stragglers had been collected, but were kept back by the generals of the military districts, and Soult had therefore in line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, only twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty-eight pieces of artillery. Wellington had twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty-two guns; having, besides, pushed detachments to Pau, to Roquefort, into the Landes, and towards the Upper Garonne.

Two great roads led to Toulouse; one on the English left from Aire by Auch; the other on their right from Pau by Tarbes; Soult commanded both, and Wellington thought he would take that of Auch; wherefore he desired Beresford to lean towards it in returning from Bordeaux; but Soult had arranged for the other line, and was only prevented from retaking the offensive, on the 9th or 10th, by the loss of his magazines, which forced him to organize a system of requisition first for subsistence. Meanwhile his equality of force passed away; for on the 13th, the day on which he heard of Beresford’s absence, Freyre came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and next day Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry arrived. Wellington was then the strongest, yet awaited Beresford’s arrival, and was uneasy about his own situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet’s twenty thousand veterans; the English ministers, instead of troops, had sent ridiculous projects. The French army in his front, having recovered its stragglers, and being reinforced by conscripts, was now reorganized in six divisions, under Daricau, Maransin, Villatte, D’Armagnac, Taupin, and Harispe. General Paris’s troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, were thus absorbed; the cavalry, composed of Berton’s and Vial’s brigades, was commanded by Pierre Soult, and seven thousand conscript infantry under Travot formed a reserve. Again, therefore, driven by necessity, Wellington called Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops also into France, although Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already created wide-spread consternation.

The head-quarters had been fixed at Aire, with the army on each side of the Adour, all the bridges being restored, and some small bands which had appeared upon the left flank and rear were dispersed by the cavalry; Soult was, however, organizing an extensive system of partizans towards the mountains, waiting only for money to give it activity. Meanwhile, though the main bodies were a long day’s march asunder, the regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and both generals claimed the superiority. In this desultory warfare, on the night of the 7th, Soult sent a strong detachment to Pau to arrest some nobles who had assembled to welcome the Duke of AngoulÊme; but General Fane got there first with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, and the stroke failed; the French, however, returning by another road, made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons. A second French detachment, penetrating between Pau and Aire, carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer with only four hussars captured there thirty-four Portuguese, with their commander and ten loaded mules.

It was these excursions which gave Soult a knowledge of Beresford’s march, and he resolved to attack the allies, thinking to strike a good blow on the 13th, by throwing his army offensively upon the high tabular land between Pau and Aire; the country was open for all arms, yet the movement produced only a few skirmishes. Pierre Soult pushed back Fane’s cavalry posts on the English right with the loss of two officers and a few men wounded; on the left, Berton, having two regiments, sought to pass a difficult muddy ford, but the head of his column was overthrown by Sir John Campbell with a squadron of the 4th Portuguese cavalry. The latter were however too few to bar the passage, and Berton, getting a regiment over higher up, charged the retiring troops in a narrow way, killed several, and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de SÀ, since well known as Count of Bandeira.

Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet’s troops had caused Soult’s boldness, made only defensive dispositions, and on the 14th Pierre Soult again drove back Fane’s horsemen; at first with some loss, yet finally was himself driven clear off the Pau road. Both generals, acting under false information, were afraid to strike, each thought his adversary stronger than he really was; but Soult, who was in a tangled country, now hearing that Bordeaux had fallen, first took alarm, and retreated in the night of the 16th. Pierre Soult then again got on to the Pau road, and detached a hundred chosen troopers under Captain Dania to molest the communication with Orthes. By a forced march that partizan reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other prisoners, and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprise, so far in the rear, was supposed to be an insurgent exploit; wherefore Wellington seized the authorities at Hagetnau, and again declared he would hang all the peasants caught in arms, and burn their villages.

Soult’s offensive operations had now terminated. He sent his conscripts to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced too late, he should have moved the 10th or 11th, when there were not more than twenty-two thousand men in his front. Wellington’s passive state, which had been too much prolonged, was also at an end; all his reinforcements and detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could now put in motion forty thousand bayonets, six thousand sabres, and sixty pieces of artillery.

On the evening of the 17th the hussars went up the valley of the Adour, closely supported by the light division, and, half a march behind, by the fourth division coming from Bordeaux.

The 18th, the hussars, the light and the fourth division, advanced towards Plaissance; and Hill’s troops, on the right, marched against Conchez, keeping a detachment on the Pau road in observation of Pierre Soult’s cavalry; the centre, under Wellington, moved by the high road leading from Aire to Toulouse. The French right was thus turned by the valley of the Adour, while Hill, with a sharp skirmish in which eighty British and Germans were killed or wounded, drove back their outposts upon Lembege.

Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge behind a small river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, his right, under D’Erlon, was extended towards Vic Bigorre, on the great road of Tarhes, and Berton’s cavalry took post in column, covering Vic Bigorre, where the road was lined on each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation, being pressed by Bock’s cavalry, Berton suddenly charged, and took an officer and some men, yet finally he was beaten and retreated. Soult, thinking a flanking column only was in the valley of the Adour, moved to fall upon it with his whole army. But he recognised the skill of his opponent when he found the whole of the allies’ centre had also been thrown on to the Tarhes road, and was close to Vic Bigorre; while the light division, beyond the Adour, was getting in rear of it by Rabastans, upon which place the hussars had driven a body of French cavalry. Berton’s horsemen then passed in retreat, the danger of being cut off from Tarbes was imminent, and Soult in alarm ordered Berton to join the cavalry at Rabastans, and cover that road to Tarbes, while D’Erlon checked the allies at Vic Bigorre on the main road, and enabled him personally to hasten with Clausel’s and Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous way.

D’Erlon, not comprehending the crisis, moved slowly with his baggage in front, and, having the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his troops, expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre; but he met the German cavalry there, and had only time to place Daricau’s division, now under Paris, amongst some vineyards, when hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry, and fell upon him.

Combat of Vic Bigorre. (March, 1814.)

The French left flank was secured by the Lechez river; the right, extended towards the Adour river, was exposed to the German cavalry, while the front was attacked by Picton. The action commenced about two o’clock, and Paris was driven back in disorder; but then D’Armagnac entered the line, and, spreading to the Adour, renewed the fight, which lasted until D’Erlon, after losing many men, and seeing his right turned beyond the Adour by the light division and the hussars, fell back behind Vic Bigorre, and took post for the night. This action was vigorous. Two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese fell, and amongst them died Colonel Henry Sturgeon. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war, and possessing a variety of other accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for himself, so usefully for the service, that envy offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.

Soult’s march was through a deep sandy plain, very harassing, and it would have been dangerous if Wellington had sent Hill’s strong cavalry in pursuit; but the country was unfavourable for quick observation, and the French covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill, the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with trees, and well lined by skirmishers. Lord Wellington desired to know what force thus barred his way, yet all the exploring attempts were stopped by the enemy’s fire. Captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier, then made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but in the wood dropped his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy’s light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire, and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and, ascending to the open summit above, put spurs to his horse, and, galloping along the French main line, counted their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had at first essayed in front, reached the spot where Wellington stood, and told him there were but five battalions on the hill.

Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse was inevitable, yet, determined to dispute every position offering the least advantage, he was on the morning of the 20th again in order of battle on the heights of Oleac, three miles behind Tarbes, which he still covered with Harispe’s and Villatte’s divisions, both under Clausel. The plain of Tarbes, apparently open, was yet full of deep ditches which forbad the action of horsemen; wherefore he sent his brother with five regiments of cavalry to his right flank in observation of the route to Auch, fearing Wellington would by that line intercept his retreat to Toulouse.

At daybreak Hill moved with the right along the high-road; the centre, under Wellington, composed of the light division and hussars, Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre’s Spaniards, marched by the road from Rabastens; Cole, having the left, was making forced marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, and throwing out detachments to watch Pierre Soult.

Combat of Tarbes. (March, 1814.)

Wellington’s column was separated by a branch of the Adour from Hill’s, and when he approached Tarbes the light division and the hussars attacked Harispe’s division on the heights of Orleix; Clinton, making a flank movement to his left through the village of Dours with the sixth division, then opened a cannonade against Harispe’s right, and endeavoured to get between that general and Soult’s position at Oleac; Hill, moving by the other bank of the river, assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which were defended by Villatte. These operations were designed to envelop and crush Clausel’s troops, which seemed easy, because there appeared only a fine plain fit for the action of cavalry between them and Soult. The latter, however, having sent his baggage and incumbrances off during the night, saw the movement without alarm, being better acquainted with the difficult nature of the plain behind, in which he had been forced to make roads to enable Harispe to retreat upon Oleac without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless there was danger: for while Hill menaced Tarbes, the light division, supported with cavalry and guns, fell upon Orleix, and Clinton with a brisk cannonade penetrated between Harispe and Pierre Soult, cutting the latter off from the army.

The action commenced at twelve o’clock. Hill’s artillery thundered on the right, Clinton’s answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light division in mass upon the centre, where Harispe’s left brigade, posted on a strong hill, was suddenly assailed by the three rifle battalions. There the fight was short, yet wonderfully fierce and violent; for the French, probably thinking their opponents Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great hardiness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, the fight was muzzle to muzzle, and very difficult it was to judge at first who should win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe, his centre being thus suddenly overthrown, retired rapidly over the plain by Soult’s roads before Clinton could get into his rear; then also Hill forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes, and Villatte retreated along the high-road to Tournay, yet under a continued cannonade. The flat country was now covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately and with an eager musketry, the French guns replying as they could to the allies’ artillery; the situation of the retreating troops seemed desperate; but, as Soult had foreseen, the British cavalry could not act, and Clausel extricating his divisions with great ability gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit was thus checked, and before Wellington could make arrangements for a new attack darkness came on, wherefore he halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown, that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, of whom twelve officers and eighty men were of the rifle battalions.

During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills as points of direction. Next day he reached St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clausel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean, and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner; for Soult having now seen Wellington’s infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother that the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were on his right, feared they would cut him off from Toulouse—his great depÔt, the knot of all his future combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand with his small army.

The allies pursued in three columns, but their marches were short. However, at St. Gaudens four squadrons of French cavalry were overtaken and overthrown by two squadrons of the 13th Dragoons; they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran Major Dogherty of the 13th was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.

On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.

The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.

The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.

On the 26th Beresford, marching in order of battle by his left, his cavalry skirmishing to the right, took post on the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in four; but the two armies being thus again brought together in opposition with a common resolution to fight, it is fitting to show how the generals framed their combinations.

Operations on the Garonne. (March, 1814.)

Soult, a native of these parts, had chosen Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south, having fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. There he could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities with more power, and counteract the machinations of the discontented; it also gave him command of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could go behind the Tarn and defend successively that river and the Lot, or even retreat upon Decaen’s army near Bordeaux, and thus draw the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.

Thus reasoning, he placed a separate body of troops recently assembled by General Loverdo from the interior, at Montauban, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. This secured the passage of that river, a point of assembly for detachments observing the Garonne below Toulouse, and the command of several great roads. But to hold Toulouse was a great political object. It was the last point connecting him at once with Suchet and Decaen; while he held it, the latter general and the partizans organized in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against Wellington’s long lines of communication. At Toulouse Suchet could aid him, either with his whole force, or by a detachment to the Upper Garonne, where General Lafitte had collected seven or eight hundred national guards and other troops: Suchet, however, though strongly urged, treated this proposition, as he had done those before made, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.

The Garonne, flowing along the allies’ right, presented the concave of a deep loop, at the bottom of which was a bridge masked by the suburb of St. Cyprien; this last, originally protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by massive towers, was now strengthened by Soult with a line of exterior entrenchments.

Beyond the river was the city, inclosed by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to hold twenty-four pound guns.

The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, was generally within point-blank shot of this wall, covering it on the north and east, as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.

Eastward, two suburbs, St. Stephen and Guillermerie, lying on both sides of this canal, were entrenched and protected by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, which were also entrenched, and flanked the approaches to the canal above and below the suburbs.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a high ridge called Mont Rave ran nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly rugged, and overlooked a marshy plain, through which the Ers river flowed.

South of the town was a plain, but there the suburb of St. Michel furnished another outwork; and some distance beyond it a range of heights, called the Pech David, commenced, trending westward up the Garonne in a nearly parallel direction.

Such being Soult’s position, he calculated, that as Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, leaving a force to blockade St. Cyprien lest the French should issue thence against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above Toulouse, and above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross the latter river also, which could only be effected at Cintegabelle, one march higher up. He would then have to come down the right bank, through a country at that time impracticable for guns, from rain. If he passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, his movements would be overlooked from the Pech David, and the heads of his columns attacked; if that failed, Toulouse and the Mont Rave remained as a position of battle, from whence there was a secure retreat upon Montauban.

For these reasons the passage above Toulouse could lead to no decisive result: but a passage below was a different matter. Wellington would then cut the army off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and the French, losing the battle, could only retreat by Carcassonne to unite with Suchet in Roussillon; where with their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France they would starve. Convinced therefore that the attack would be on that side, Soult lined the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up some troops, recently collected at Agen under General Despeaux, to line the Tarn itself, his design being to attack the allies if they crossed between that river and the Garonne rather than lose his communication with Montauban.

Wellington having suffered the French to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes had little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops joined him, without giving Soult time to strengthen his defence; nor without appearing fearful of the French people, which would have been very dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive, and the invasion of France being begun could not be relinquished. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers, his business was to fight; and as he could not force St. Cyprien, he had to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.

A passage below was undoubtedly the prudent course; but Wellington, observing that, when across, the south side of the city would be most open to attack, resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse; designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien.39 Hence, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades approached the river, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced; but the river being measured was too wide for the pontoons, there were no trestles, and that project was necessarily abandoned. Had it been effected, some great advantage would have been gained; for Soult only knew of the attempt two days later, and then by emissaries, not by scouts. Wellington persisted. Collecting a great body of infantry about Portet, he began by driving the French horsemen from the Touch river, which was in his front, for his army lined the bank of the Garonne above Toulouse, and did not face St. Cyprien. In this operation a single squadron of the 18th Hussars, under Major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by Colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martin de la Touch, suddenly came upon a regiment of French cavalry. The rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British; for the enemy, thinking a strong support must be at hand, discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter; Hughes followed, the speed of both parties increased; and as the road did not admit egress by the sides, this great body of horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.

Soult’s attention being thus attracted below Toulouse, a bridge was laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, and Hill passed the Garonne with thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. His advanced guard then pushed on rapidly by the great road to seize the bridge of Cintegabelle fifteen miles up the Arriege; and to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The main body followed with intent to pass the Arriege at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south, while Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night of the 30th, but the pontoon bridge was not finished until five in the morning of the 31st; Soult thus got notice in time to observe the strength of the column, and ascertain that the great body of the army was still in front of St. Cyprien. Knowing what swamps were to be passed, and having the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne now in a state of defence, he thought the operation only a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted or the Garonne passed below the city; wherefore, keeping his infantry in hand, he merely sent cavalry up the Arriege in observation, and directed Lafitte, who had some regular horsemen and national guards higher up, to hang upon Hill’s skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. He was, however, disquieted, because the allies’ baggage, to avoid encumbering the march, had been sent higher up the Garonne, to cross at Carbonne, and was by the scouts reported as a second column increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand men.

While in this uncertainty, Soult first heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet in the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still there; hence, as he could not know why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded the intent was to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he gave Clausel orders to fall upon the head of the allies with four divisions if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down; resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was, however, soon relieved from anxiety. Hill passed the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry forward; but his artillery were unable to follow in that deep country, and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned and recrossed the Garonne in the night, keeping a flying bridge and a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank: he was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen, who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult was well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.

Being now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn; and as his works for the city and suburbs were nearly complete, he concluded to hold Toulouse in any circumstances, and set his whole army and all the labouring population to entrench the Mont Rave, beyond the canal, thinking thus to bear the shock of battle, come on which side it would. Fortune favoured him. The Garonne continued so full and rapid that Wellington remained inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3rd, when, forced to adopt the lower passage, and the flood having abated, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse. The bridge was then well thrown, and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third, fourth, and sixth divisions, with three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed; and the horsemen being pushed to the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French. But again the Garonne flooded high, the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and was taken up.

Soult soon heard by his cavalry scouts of this passage, but not of the force across, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, were then in front of St. Cyprien, he thought Hill had moved also to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore, observing Beresford with cavalry, he continued to work at his field of battle, his resolution to fight for Toulouse being confirmed by hearing that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the water subsided again, and the bridge was once more laid; Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery then crossed, and Wellington in person advanced within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure one of the stone bridges. Hence, when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen first drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes; then the 18th Hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade, where after some skirmishing a French regiment suddenly appeared in front of the bridge. The opposite bank of the river was as instantly lined with dismounted carbineers, and the two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sounded a charge at the same moment; but the English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, and their front ranks sabred, while the rear went off in disorder. They had many killed or wounded, lost above a hundred prisoners, and were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, yet rallied beyond on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; whereupon the hussars recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured. The credit of this brilliant action was erroneously given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch. That officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge, and the attack was conducted by Major Hughes.

Wellington having, from the heights of Kirie Eleison, examined the French general’s position, decided to attack on the 9th; and, to shorten his communications with Hill, had his bridge on the Garonne relaid higher up at Seilh, where the light division were to cross at daybreak; but the pontoons were not relaid until late in the day, and he, extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.

Soult had now by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, and had compelled Wellington to fight on ground naturally adapted for defence and well fortified; where one-third of his force was separated by a great river from the rest; where he could derive no advantage from his numerous cavalry, and was overmatched in artillery. Covering three sides of Toulouse the French position was indeed very strong. The left was at St. Cyprien on the west; the centre at the canal on the north; the right at Mont Rave on the east; the reserve of conscripts manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards within the town aided the transport of artillery and ammunition to different posts.

Hill was in front of St. Cyprien, and he could only communicate with the main body by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles. Wellington was advancing from the north, but being still intent to assail on the south, where Soult was weakest in defence, he examined the country on the left of the Ers, designing under cover of that river to make a flank march and gain the open ground which he had formerly vainly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. Again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force in the upper part; and all the bridges there, with the exception of Croix d’Orade, were mined or destroyed. There was no choice then but to attack the north and east fronts. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence; because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musket-shot. Wherefore, as at St. Cyprien, a fortress, not a position, was opposed, and the assault was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.

Naturally strong and rugged, that ridge was covered by the Ers river, and presented two distinct platforms, Calvinet and St. SypiÈre. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two routes called the Lavaur and Caraman roads led to Toulouse, passing the canal at the Guillemerie and St. Etienne suburbs.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on the left with two large redoubts, having open entrenchments in front. On the right were two other large forts, called the Colombette and Tower of Augustines.

St. SypiÈre had also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. SypiÈre, the other without a name near the road of Caraman.

The whole occupation was two miles long, and to attack the front it was necessary to cross the Ers under fire, advancing over ground naturally marshy and now almost impassable from artificial inundations to the assault of the ridge and its works. If the assailants should force a way between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come in succession upon new works, at Cambon and Sacarin; upon the suburbs of Guillemerie and Etienne; upon the canal; and finally upon the ramparts of the town. But the Ers could not be passed except at Croix d’Orade, and Wellington was reduced to a flank march under fire, between that river and Mont Rave, until he could gain ground to present a front to the latter and storm it; after which the canal was to be crossed above ere the army could be established on the south of Toulouse. To impose that march had been Soult’s object, and his army was disposed in the following order to render it disastrous.

Reille defended St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions.

Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes, and the Matabiau bridge.

Harispe’s division held the Mont Rave, his right being at St. SypiÈre, his centre at the Colombette, about which Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby, having in front a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, occupied by St. Pol’s brigade.

Soult’s remaining divisions were in columns behind the Mont Rave.

This order of battle formed an angle, each side about two miles long, the apex towards the Alby road being covered by the Pugade hill.

Wellington made the following dispositions of attack for the 10th. Hill to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts according to the progress of the main battle. The third and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards to move against the northern front; the two first, supported by Bock’s cavalry, were to menace the line of canal defended by Daricau—Picton at the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minimes; Alten to connect him with Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade, and then halt to cover Beresford’s column. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three batteries, was to move round the left of the Pugade, and along the low ground between the Mont Rave and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur in the centre, when it was to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. SypiÈre. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons were to connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile Lord Edward Somerset’s hussars and Vivian’s cavalry were to ascend both banks of the Ers in observation of Berton’s cavalry; because the latter could by the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran pass from the right to the left bank, destroy the bridges, and fall on the head of Beresford’s troops.

Battle of Toulouse. (April, 1814.)

On the 10th of April, at two o’clock in the morning, the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and at six the army moved to the attack. Picton and Alten on the right, drove the French posts behind the works covering the bridges on the canal. Freyre, marching along the Alby road, was cannonaded by St. Pol until he passed a small stream, when the French general, following his instructions, retired to the works on the Calvinet platform: the Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, opposite the apex of the French position, which the Portuguese guns cannonaded heavily.

Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast, masked by the Pugade until he entered the marshy ground; but he left his guns behind, fearing to engage them in that deep and difficult country. Beyond the Ers, on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, now under Colonel Arentschildt, drove Berton’s horsemen back over the bridge of Bordes, which the French general destroyed with difficulty. The German hussars then gained the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though defended by a detachment sent there by Berton, who remained in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

During these operations Freyre, who had demanded leave to lead the battle at Calvinet, from error or impatience assailed while Beresford was still in march, and his Spaniards, nine thousand strong, advanced in two lines and a reserve with great resolution, throwing forward their flanks so as to embrace the hill. The French musketry and great guns thinned their ranks at every step, but closing upon the centre they mounted the ascent under a formidable fire, which increased in violence until their right wing, raked also from the bridge of Matabiau, became unable to endure the torment, and the leading ranks madly jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep, covering this part of the French entrenchments; the left wing and the second line ran back in disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers, under Colonel Leon de Sicilia, alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road, poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds in the gulf below, while a battery from the Matabiau, constructed to rake the hollow, sent its bullets from flank to flank, hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals rallied their troops and led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow; but the frightful carnage below, with the unmitigated fire in front, filled them with horror: again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the Matabiau and Calvinet also followed them. The country was now covered with fugitives, and the pursuers’ numbers and vehemence increased, until Wellington pushed forward with Ponsonby’s cavalry and the reserve artillery, while a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the French, who then returned to the Calvinet.

More than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded, and their defeat was not the only misfortune. Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known, were especially given both verbally and in writing, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux; but the enemy, fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders, and approachable only on open ground, repulsed him with a loss of four hundred men and officers; amongst the latter Colonel Forbes of the 45th was killed, and General Brisbane was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the French had vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously; and beyond the Garonne, although Hill forced the exterior line of entrenchments, the inner line, more contracted and strongly fortified, could not be stormed. The musketry now subsided for a time, yet a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line; and by the allies, from St. Cyprien to where the artillery left by Beresford was, in concert with the guns on the Pugade, pouring shot incessantly against the Calvinet platform; injudiciously it has been said by Beresford’s guns, because the ammunition, thus used for a secondary object, was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.

In this state the victory depended on Beresford’s attack, and, from Picton’s error, Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French. The repulse of Picton, the dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of St. Cyprien, enabled Soult to draw Taupin’s whole division first, and then one of Maransin’s brigades, from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on Mont Rave; thus three divisions and the cavalry, in all fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for a counter-attack. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced, as it made slow way for two miles through ground deep and tangled with watercourses: sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, always under fire of their guns without one to reply, the length of the column augmented at every step, and frequent halts were necessary to close up.

Between the river and the heights the ground became narrower, and more miry as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was a-head, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! Meanwhile Soult, eyeing this terrible march, had carried Taupin’s division to the platform of St. SypiÈre, supporting it with one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, and now, after a short hortative, ordered Taupin to fall on, while a regiment of Vial’s cavalry descended the Lavaur road to intercept retreat, and Berton’s horsemen assailed the flank from the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half the force which might have been employed. Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse, and that general, instead of attacking frankly, waited until Beresford had completed his flank march and formed his lines at the foot of the heights. Then the French infantry poured down the hill, but some well-directed rockets, whose noise and dreadful aspect were unknown before, dismayed his soldiers; whereupon the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, followed with a terrible shout, and the French fled to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen, trotting down the Lavaur road, had meanwhile charged the right flank, but Beresford’s second and third lines being thrown into squares repulsed them; and on the other flank Cole had been so sudden in his advance that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform; his skirmishers even pursued down the reverse slope, while Cole, meeting with less resistance, had still more rapidly gained the height at his side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French sought shelter in Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was now in fear that Beresford would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal, and so gain the south side of Toulouse. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with Vial’s cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s other brigade to Sacarin, checked the British skirmishers there, and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being thus stayed, a part of Travot’s conscripts moved to the bridge of the Demoiselles. This new order of battle required fresh dispositions for attack, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers had decided the first great crisis of the fight, and was still buoyant. Lambert’s brigade wheeled to its right across the platform, menacing the French left flank on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, formed on his right, to march against the Colombette redoubts. Then also Arentschildt’s cavalry came down from the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, round the south end of the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division it again menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles.

Entirely changed now was the aspect and form of the battle. The French, thrown entirely on the defensive, occupied three sides of a square. Their right, extending from Sacarin to the Calvinet platform, was closely menaced by Lambert, solidly established on the St. SypiÈre; the redoubts of Colombette and Augustines were menaced by Pack and Douglas, and the left, thrown back to the Matabiau, awaited a renewed attack: the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side, with the angles defended by formidable works. The canal and the city furnished a refuge, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and the whole of Harispe’s division, except the regiment driven from the SypiÈre redoubt. The victory was therefore still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for on the right Picton was paralyzed by Daricau, the Spaniards not to be depended upon, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and light division; which Wellington could not thrust into action under pain of being without a reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a small force, seeing Lambert’s brigade, and Cole’s division, were necessarily employed to keep in check the French at the bridge of the Demoiselles, at Cambon and Sacarin, where Clausel seemed disposed to retake the offensive.

At half-past two o’clock Beresford renewed the action with the brigades of Pack and Douglas. Ensconced in the Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, they had been hitherto protected from the fire of the French redoubts; but now scrambling up the steep banks of the road, under a wasting fire of cannon and musketry, they carried all the French breastworks—the Colombette and Augustine redoubts being taken by the 42nd and 79th Regiments. It was a surprising action when the loose attack imposed by the ground is considered; and the French, although they yielded to the first thronging rush of the British, came back with a reflux, their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. Harispe, under whom the French seemed always to fight with extraordinary vigour, surrounded the redoubts with a surging multitude, broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the 42nd, and retook the Augustine also; but then the 11th and 91st Regiments came up and the French again abandoned those works: yet so many of the allies had fallen that they appeared only as a thin line of skirmishers.

Some British cavalry, riding up from the low ground, now attempted to charge, but were stopped by a deep hollow road, into which several troopers fell and there perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued, yet the French, though most numerous, never could retake the Platform; and when Harispe and General Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded, drew off by their right to Sacarin, and by their left towards the Matabiau.

During this contest the Spaniards had again attacked the Calvinet platform from Pugade hill, but were again put to flight; the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter, and Beresford halted to reform his battle and receive his artillery, which came to him with great difficulty, and little ammunition from the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished. However, Soult, seeing the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time; that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent; and that Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now ready to advance along the summit, relinquished the Calvinet platform entirely, and withdrew about five o’clock behind the canal, still holding Sacarin and Cambon. Wellington was then master of the Mont Rave, and so ended the battle of Toulouse, in which the French had five generals and about three thousand men killed or wounded, and they lost a gun. The allies lost four generals and more than four thousand six hundred men and officers, two thousand being Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France, and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.

During the night Soult replaced the ammunition expended in the action, reorganized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Looking however to a final retreat, he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest, and proposed a combined plan of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne. I will meet you there with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on by the mountains compel the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour.”

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready, but Wellington was not. The French position, within musket-shot of the city walls, was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts; the conquest of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal, and throwing of the army on the south side of the town; a great matter, requiring fresh dispositions, and provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. Hence, to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain Hill’s state, and give him further instructions, Wellington repaired on the 11th by Seilh to St. Cyprien; but the day was spent before the arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed, and the attack was therefore deferred until daylight.

Meanwhile the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat on Carcassonne. Their appearance on the heights above Baziege, together with the preparations in front, taught Soult he would soon be shut up in Toulouse instead of fighting; wherefore, leaving eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, Harispe being one, and sixteen hunched men whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors, he filed out of the city with surprising order and ability, made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. Hill followed, and at Baziege the light cavalry beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men, cutting off a like number of gens d’armes on the side of Revel.

Now Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours; but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, retired with the French army; and the British general, true to his honest line of policy, again warned the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk. In the afternoon however two officers, the English colonel, Cooke, and the French colonel, St. Simon, arrived from Paris, charged to make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon. They had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the Empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence: nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor; then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudary and awaited the progress of events. Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as General Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, had acknowledged the authority of the provincial government, he thought Soult designed to make a civil war, and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on the point of engaging, when the Duke of Dalmatia, having then received official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France; with this honourable distinction, that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.40

Lord Wellington immediately transmitted the intelligence to the troops at Bayonne. Too late. Misfortune and suffering had there fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.

Sally from Bayonne. (April, 1814.)

During the progress of the main army in the interior, General Hope had conducted the investment of Bayonne with all the unremitting vigilance that difficult operation required. He had gathered gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel, when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison: he made them known indeed at the outposts, but to such irregular communications, which might be intended to deceive, the governor naturally paid little attention. At this time the fortified posts at St. Etienne were held by a brigade of the fifth division; from thence to the extreme right the Guards had charge of the line, one company being in St. Etienne itself; Hinuber’s German brigade was encamped as a support to the left; the remainder of the first division was in the rear.

In this state, about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter gave General Hay, who commanded the outposts that night, an exact account of a projected sally; the general could not speak French, and sent him to Hinuber, who interpreted the man’s story to Hay, put his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the Guards would have been under arms but for Hinuber. However, at three o’clock, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants; they surprised the picquets, and with loud shouts, breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church and the village of St. Etienne, with exception of a fortified house defended by Captain Forster of the 38th. Masters of every other part, and overbearing all before them, they drove picquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took Colonel Townsend of the Guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and, passing in rear of the right, threw the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans in hand, moved up to Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of Bradford’s Portuguese, bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and church.

On the right the combat was still more disastrous. Neither picquets nor reserves could sustain the fury of the assault, and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the inclosures, and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet;—and sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes—all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight, while some gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by Hope on the first alarm were now coming up. One hundred pieces of artillery were thus in full play at once, the shells set fire to the fascine depÔts, and to several houses, the flames from which cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion General Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the time. Afterwards it became known, that having brought up the reserves, he had pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road behind the line of picquets; but the French were on both banks; he endeavoured to return, was wounded, and his horse, a large one, as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, having received eight bullets fell on his leg. His staff had escaped from the defile, yet two of them, Captain Herries and Mr. Moore, nephew to Sir John Moore, returning, endeavoured to draw him from beneath the horse, but were both dangerously wounded and carried off with Hope, who was again badly hurt in the foot by an English bullet.

Light now beginning to break enabled the allies to act with more unity. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, the reserve brigades of the foot Guards, rallied in mass by General Howard, suddenly raised their shout, and running in upon the French drove them back to their works with such slaughter, that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. On the British side General Hay was killed, Stopford wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers, of which more than two hundred, with the commander-in-chief, were taken. Captain Forster’s firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the ready gallantry with which Hinuber’s Germans retook St. Etienne, had staved off a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were then reorganized in one body under Suchet, but so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that Prince Polignac, acting for the duke of AngoulÊme, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy, for a sum of money to quiet them.

The Portuguese soldiers returned to Portugal; the Spaniards to Spain; their generals, it is said, being inclined to declare for the Cortes against the king, but they were diverted from it by the influence of Lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England; the cavalry, marching through France, took shipping at Boulogne. Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veterans’ services.

Yet those veterans had won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable combats; had made or sustained ten sieges and taken four great fortresses; had twice expelled the French from Portugal, once from Spain; had penetrated France, and killed, wounded, or captured two hundred thousand enemies—leaving of their own number forty thousand dead, whose bones whiten the plains and mountains of the Peninsula.

THE END.

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LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING CROSS.