English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera (Oct. 1813.)

The fall of San Sebastian gave Lord Wellington a new port, and let loose a considerable body of troops; Austria had joined the allies in Germany; the English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns that France should be immediately invaded; the English newspaper editors were actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions; the Bourbon partizans were conspiring, and the Duke of Berri desired to join the British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were armed and organized to receive him. All was exultation and extravagance, but Wellington, despising such inflated hopes and promises, exposed the absurdity of the newspapers, and checked similar folly in higher places, by observing, “that if he had done all that was expected he should have been before that period in the moon.”

Far from designing to invade France, he felt his own position insecure while Suchet was master of Catalonia: and he was only prevented from transferring the war to that province by the disasters Napoleon now experienced in Germany, rendering it impossible to reinforce Soult. However, pressed by the ministers and the allied sovereigns, he so far bent his military judgment to political pressure, as to undertake the establishing his army in a menacing position on French ground; and in that view matured an offensive movement as daring as any undertaken during the whole war. But to comprehend all the audacious grandeur of this operation, the relative positions of the hostile armies must be glanced at.

Soult’s base and place of arms was Bayonne, from whence roads spread out to the Pyrenees like a fan. Two only were great causeways. One, on the French left hand, run to St. Jean Pied de Port; the other, on their right, run along the sea-coast through St. Jean de Luz to Irun. Between these points, a distance of nearly forty miles, the space was filled transversely by a double range of mountain ridges nearly parallel to each other, on which the armies were posted; not in a continuous line, for there were no direct lateral communications, but as the passes and inaccessible peaks governed the dispositions. Thus on the French left, at St. Jean Pied de Port, Foy occupied with fifteen thousand men an entrenched camp in front of that fortress, and was opposed by Hill’s right wing, which was planted at the head of the Val Carlos, in the Roncesvalles and Alduides; but Foy could only communicate by a circuitous road, leading across the Nive river at Cambo, with the French centre, entrenched, under D’Erlon, at Ainhoa and Urdax, opposite the Maya passes, and menacing the Bastan, where Hill’s left was posted.

At Urdax the Nivelle river bisected the French positions, and then, turning to the left, run to St. Jean de Luz. The line of their right centre, beyond that river, was under Clausel, and thrown forward to Vera, along another batch of mountainous ridges, which, touching on the Bidassoa, lined its right bank to the bridge of Behobia near Iran.

From Clausel’s right to the mouth of the Bidassoa, Soult’s right wing, under Reille, guarded the French territory.

Clausel’s ground comprised the Great La Rhune mountain, two thousand seven hundred feet high, whose bleak rocky head overlooked everything around, and from whose flanks the positions of Sarre shot out on the French left, and on their right the Commissari, Bayonette, and Mandale ridge—the two first overhanging Vera, the last lining the Bidassoa down to San Marcial and Irun.

Opposed to Clausel Wellington held, first the Atchiola mountain on the left of Maya, then the Echallar ridges as far as the Ivantelly mountain facing Sarre, and the Santa Barbara ridge abutting on the Bidassoa at Vera, facing the Bayonette and Commissari. On the left bank of the Bidassoa he occupied the flanks of the PeÑa de Haya to San Marcial, from whence his redoubts, as before noticed, run along the river to the Jaizquibel.

Soult had commenced a chain of entrenched camps and redoubts along his whole line, and in the low country, from the end of the Mandale to the sea, was constructing a double chain of entrenched positions and camps bearing many names and to be noticed in the narrative. These works were approaching completion when Wellington resolved to seize the Great La Rhune with its dependents on both flanks, at the same time forcing the passage of the Lower Bidassoa in face of Soult’s entrenchments. Thus he would establish his left in the French territory, from Sarre to the sea, and bring within his own lines the Rhune, the Commissari, and Bayonette mountains, which would give him a salient menacing point of impregnable strength towards France, and shorten his lateral communication on both flanks of those mountains. It would also give entire command of a road running up the Bidassoa from Irun to Vera, and secure the port of Fuenterabia, which, though bad in winter, was desirable for a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty means of transport had to sustain the perverse negligence always, and often the hostility of the Spanish authorities.

He had designed to force the passage in the middle of September before the French works were advanced, but his pontoons were delayed by a negligence of orders; the weather then became bad, and the attempt, which depended upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred to the 7th of October.

Great subtlety was to be combined with wonderful boldness, for the Bidassoa was broad and tidal below Irun, and the ridges lining it above that point rough and terrible to assail; both water and mountain line were strengthened with works, incomplete indeed, but already of strength in defence; the river was also to be passed and the positions beyond carried between tides, or the troops would be swallowed by the returning flood. Hence to mislead Soult, to support the blockade of Pampeluna, and to ascertain Foy’s true position and strength at St. Jean Pied de Port, which menaced anew that blockade, Wellington brought up Del Parque’s army from Tudela to Pampeluna, transferred the Andalusians at the latter place to Giron at Echallar, and directed Mina to gather his irregulars around the Roncesvalles: then repairing himself to that quarter on the 1st of October, he surprised a French post on the Ayrola rock, cut off a scouting party in the Val de Baygorry, and swept away two thousand sheep.

These movements awakened Soult’s jealousy. He expected an invasion of France without being able to ascertain from what quarter, and at first, deceived by false information that Cole had reinforced Hill, thought Mina’s troops and the Andalusians were used to mask an attack by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of the light cavalry in the Bastan, Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the Ayrola post, seemed to confirm this; but he knew that pontoons were at Oyarzun, and the deserters, very numerous at this time, said the real object was the Great Rhune. On the other hand, a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining twelve days at Wellington’s head-quarters, assured him nothing there indicated a serious attack. This weighed much, because the negligence about the pontoons, and the wet weather, had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington, merely to please the allied sovereigns in Germany, should thereby seek to establish his left wing in France, when the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, and there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.

The cause of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily impenetrable, and Soult finally inclined to think the only design was to secure the blockade of Pampeluna by menacing the French, and impeding their entrenchments which were now becoming strong. Nevertheless, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line; yet so little did he anticipate the real project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and having no fear for his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side of Roncesvalles, lest a force should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; and at Maya, Hill was already menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle: it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right, that he could act while Pampeluna held out.

Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers arrived from England. Mina was then on the right of Hill, who was thus enabled to call Campbell’s Portuguese from the Alduides, and replace at Maya the third division, which, shifting to its left, then occupied the heights of Zagaramurdi and enabled the seventh division to relieve Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.

These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the Great Rhune and its dependents, for which Wellington assembled the fourth and light divisions on Santa Barbara, Giron’s Spaniards being on their right, and Longa’s on their left. The sixth division, supported by the third, was at Zagaramurdi to make a demonstration against D’Erlon’s advanced posts. Thus, without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar, he could assail the Rhune mountain and its dependents with twenty thousand men, and had still twenty-four thousand disposable for the passage of the Lower Bidassoa.

It has been before said that between the Andarlasa ford, below Vera, and the fords of Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The French, trusting to this difficulty of approach and to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected their troops principally where the Bildox or green mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords, and against them Wellington directed Freyre’s Spaniards from San Marcial.

Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the mountain of Louis XIV., a ridge called the CaffÉ RÉpublicain, and the town of Andaya; behind which the Calvaire d’Urogne, the Croix des Bouquets, and the camp of the Sans Culottes, served as rallying posts. The first and fifth divisions, and the unattached brigades of Wilson and Lord Aylmer, in all fifteen thousand men, were destined to assault these works; and the Spanish fishermen had secretly indicated three fords practicable at low water between the bridge of Behobia and the sea. Wellington therefore, with an astonishing hardihood, designed to pass his columns at the old known fords above and these secret fords below bridge, though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile broad! The left bank of the river also was completely exposed to observation from the enemy’s hills, which, though low in comparison of the mountains above the bridge, were strong ridges of defence; but relying on his previous measures the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were not belied by the result. For the unlikelihood that, having a better line of operations, he would force such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, entirely deceived Soult, whose lieutenants were also very negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions, one under Boyer was dispersed, labouring on the entrenched camp of Urogne far from the river; Villatte’s reserve was at Ascain and Serres; and five thousand men of Maucune’s division, though on the first line, were unexpectant of an attack. The works on the Mandale were finished, those at Biriatu in a forward state, but from the latter to the sea all were imperfect.

The Passage of the Lower Bidassoa. (Oct. 1813.)

On the 6th the night set in heavily. A sullen thunderstorm, gathering about the craggy summit of the PeÑa de Haya, came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning, rolling over the Bidassoa, fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil Wellington, whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, and his columns secretly attained their stations along the banks of the river. The Spaniards, one brigade of Guards, and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords to the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the lower ridge of San Marcial, which had been seized by the French in the attack of the 31st; another brigade of Guards and the Germans were concealed near Irun, close to a ford, below bridge, called the Great Jonco; the fifth division were covered by a river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese and Lord Aylmer’s brigade were posted in the ditch of Fuenterabia.

All the tents were left standing in the camps, and the enemy, seeing no change on the morning of the 7th, were unsuspicious; but at seven o’clock, the fifth division and Aylmer’s brigade, emerging from their concealment took the sands in two columns. The left one moved against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, the other against the ridge of Andaya, but no shot was fired until they passed the low water channel, when an English rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the artillery opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco, and the passage above the bridge also commenced.

From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could now be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles; those above bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below, appearing in the distance like huge serpents sullenly winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missed the Jonco ford and got into deep water, yet quickly recovered the true line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile musket flashed. The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth division made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the Portuguese brigade under Colonel Douglas, was however pushed too far and got beaten with the loss of a hundred and fifty men.

Soult now comprehending the true state of affairs hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived. For when the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s troops assembled at their different posts, and the French guns opened from the Louis XIV. and CaffÉ RÉpublicain; then the alarm spread, and Boyer marched from Urogne to support Maucune, without waiting for the junction of his working parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the allies, were menacing the camp of the Sans Culottes: thither therefore one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. Andaya, guarded only by a picquet, was meanwhile abandoned, and Reille, thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men could reach it, sent a battalion there from the centre; he thus weakened the chief point; for the British brigades of the fifth division were now bearing from Andaya towards the Croix des Bouquets under a fire of guns and musketry.

The first division had passed the river, one column above bridge, preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, the other below, preceded by the German light troops, who with the aid of the artillery on San Marcial won the CaffÉ RÉpublicain and the mountain of Louis XIV., driving the French to the Croix des Bouquets. This last was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from both sides, but the Germans were there brought to a check, for the heights were strong and Boyer’s leading battalions close at hand; at that moment however, Colonel Cameron, coming up with the 9th Regiment, passed through the German skirmishers and vehemently ascended the first height, whereupon the French opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then retreated at full speed to a second ridge, somewhat lower, but only to be approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column and bore against this new position under a concentrated fire, yet his violent course did not seem to dismay the French until within ten yards when the furious shout and charge of the 9th appalled them and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. Cameron lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops, coming from different points and rallying on Boyer’s battalions, had gathered on other ridges close at hand.

The entrenched camp above Biriatu had been at first well defended in front, but the Spanish right wing being opposed only by a single battalion, soon won the Mandale mountain whereupon the French fell back from the camp to the Calvaire d’Urogne. Then Reille, beaten at the Croix des Bouquets and having both his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards, the right along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder through the village of Urogne. The British skirmishers entered that place in pursuit, but were immediately beaten out again by the second brigade of Boyer’s division; for Soult had now arrived with part of Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence restored order just as retreat was degenerating into flight.

Reille lost eight guns and four hundred men; the allies only six hundred men, of which half were Spaniards, so easy had the skill of the English general rendered this stupendous operation. But if Soult, penetrating Wellington’s design, had met the allies with the sixteen thousand troops of that quarter, instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a simple check would have been tantamount to a terrible disaster, because in two hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.

Second Combat of Vera. (Oct. 1813.)

Equally unprepared and unsuccessful were the French on the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant.

Before daybreak Giron descended with his Spaniards from the Ivantelly rocks, and Alten with the light division from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa’s force.

One brigade, consisting of the 43rd, 17th Portuguese Regiment, and two battalions of British riflemen, were in columns on the right of Vera; the other brigade under Colonel Colborne, consisting of the 52nd, two battalions of CaÇadores, and a third battalion of British riflemen, were on the left of that town: half of Longa’s division was between these brigades, the other half, after crossing the ford of Salinas, drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains; and General Cole, displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara, presented a formidable reserve.

Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope descended to a small plain, two parts down the mountain. From this platform three distinct tongues shot into the valley below, each defended by an advanced post; the platform itself was secured by a star redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single slope, there was a second retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the defence.

The Commissari, a continuation of the Bayonette, towards the Great Rhune, had in front a profound gulf thickly wooded and filled with skirmishers; and between this gulf and another of the same nature, run the main road from Vera over the Puerto, piercing the centre of the French position. Ascending with short abrupt turns, this road was blocked at every uncovered point with abbatis and small retrenchments, each obstacle being commanded at half musket shot by small detachments placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent. A regiment, entrenched above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with those on a saddle-ridge, which joined those mountains with the Great Rhune, and was to be assailed by Giron.

Between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated advanced ridge called by the soldiers the Boar’s back, the summit of which, half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf on the allies’ right of the road, covered the Puerto and the saddle-ridge; and though of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so lofty, that a few warning-shots, fired from the summit by the enemy, only reached the allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential to take this Boar’s back before the general attack commenced, and five companies of riflemen, supported by the 17th Portuguese, assailed it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s Spaniards, preceded by a company of the 43rd, attacked it on the other. Meanwhile the French were in confusion.

Clausel knew by a spy in the night that the Bayonette was to be assaulted, and in the morning had heard from Conroux who was at Sarre, that Giron’s camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh division were still standing; at the same time musketry was heard on the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun; then came Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops, and to this last quarter Clausel hurried. On his left the Spaniards had then driven Conroux’s outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the Great Rhune; wherefore, ordering four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy the summit, the front, and the flanks, of that mountain, he placed a reserve of two other regiments behind it, hoping thus to secure possession and support Taupin: but that general’s fate had been already decided by Alten.

Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musketry on the right, and the next moment the Boar’s back was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds up and there rested, but soon resumed their movement and with a scornful gallantry swept the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles, save a few shots down the reverse side to show they were masters of the ridge. This had been the signal for the general attack. The Portuguese followed the victorious sharp-shooters; the 43rd, preceded by their own skirmishers and the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged pass; Longa entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on their left; and beyond Longa, Colborne’s brigade, moving by narrow paths, assailed the Bayonette. The 52nd took the middle tongue, the CaÇadores and riflemen the two outermost, all bearing with a concentric movement against the star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade should have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement; but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve.

Soon the open slopes were covered with men and with fire, and a confused sound of mingled shouts and musketry filled the deep hollows, from whence the white smoke came curling up from their gloomy recesses. The French, compared with their assailants, seemed few and scattered on the mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade fought its way without a check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, the skirmishers spreading wider as the depth of the ravines on each side lessened and melted into the higher ridges. When half-way up an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa’s right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and over-matched; but beyond it, on the broad open space in front of the star-fort, Colborne’s CaÇadores and riflemen were seen to come out in small bodies from a forest which covered the three tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a mass; the 52nd were not then in sight, and the French, thinking from the dark clothing all were Portuguese, rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden, the rifle as a weapon is overmatched by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the 52nd soldiers appeared on the platform and raising their shout rushed forward; their red uniform and full career startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped short, wavered, turned, and fled to their entrenchment. The 52nd, following hard, entered the works with them, and then the riflemen and CaÇadores, who had meanwhile rallied, passed it on both flanks; for a few moments everything was hidden by a dense volume of smoke, but again the British shout pealed high and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying, the others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand.

The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade then echoed along the mountain-side, and with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne, after having carried the second entrenchment above the star-fort, was brought to a check by the works on the crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only plied his troops with musketry at a great advantage but rolled huge stones down the steep. These works were well lined with men and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right, yet the defenders faltered, for their left flank was turned by Kempt, and the effects of Wellington’s general combinations were then felt in another quarter.

Freyre’s Spaniards, after carrying the Mandale mountain, had pushed to a road leading from the Bayonette to St. Jean de Luz, which was the line of retreat for Taupin’s right wing. The Spaniards got there first, and Taupin, being thus cut off on that side, had to file his right under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where he joined his centre, but, so doing, lost a mountain-battery and three hundred men. These last were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with his usual cool intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms; an order which they, thinking themselves entirely cut off, obeyed. During these events, the French skirmishers in the deep ravine between the two lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated slowly, and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape also surrendered to Kempt. Taupin’s right and centre being then completely beaten fled down the side of the mountain, closely pursued until they rallied upon Villatte’s reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette, between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette, Commissari, and Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours’ incessant fighting, and toiling, up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French troops on the summit of the Rhune.

Giron, after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre, had pushed a battalion towards the head of the Great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack. When his left wing was free to move by the capture of the Boar’s back, he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to the right of the Puerto; but there his men were arrested by a strong line of abbatis, from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy fire. An adventurer named Downie, then a Spanish general, exhorted them and they kept their ranks, yet did not advance; but there happened to be present an officer of the 43rd Regiment, named Havelock,38 who being attached to Alten’s staff had been sent to ascertain Giron’s progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, called upon the Spaniards, and putting spurs to his horse at one bound cleared the abbatis and went headlong among the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for “El chico blanco,”—“the fair boy,” so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair,—with one shock broke through at the very moment the French centre was flying under the fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from the Puerto on the left.

The two defeated regiments retired by their left to the flanks of the Rhune, and thus Clausel had eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the highest rocks called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, which descended towards Ascain on one hand and Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower parallel mountain behind called the Small Rhune. Giron’s right wing first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit of the Great Rhune, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it on the right. At both points the attempts were defeated with loss; the Hermitage was impregnable: the French rolled down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night.

In this fight Taupin lost two generals, four hundred men killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which half were Spaniards, and the success was not complete; for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position was insecure.

Wellington, observing that the left flank of the mountain descending towards Sarre was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards next day on that side for a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three o’clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded the lower parts of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe and other outworks covering the French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians easily won the rocks and an entrenched height commanding the camp; for Clausel, alarmed by some slight demonstrations of the sixth division in rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned, not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre, still holding with their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon apparent. Wellington established a strong body of Spaniards close to the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without orders abandoned their impregnable post in the night. Next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them.

The whole loss on the three days’ fighting was fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies; but many of the wounded were not brought in until the third day after the action, and others perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes. Some men also descended to the French villages, got drunk, and were taken; nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of Lord Wellington’s proclamations. He arrested and sent several officers to England, observing in his order of the day, that if he had five times as many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was prevented. It is remarkable likewise, that the French troops on the same day acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner, and Soult also checked the mischief with a terrible hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre.

With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa, the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the slopes of mountains scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. These could be seen, but the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, the broad river with its heavy sands and its mighty rushing tide, all were despised by those brave soldiers; and while they attacked with such confident valour, the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit. Yet the feeble defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a general’s, not a soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations overwhelmed every point. Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions, each less than five thousand strong, were separately assailed, the first by eighteen, the second by fifteen thousand men; and at neither point were Reille and Clausel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.

Soult complained that his lieutenants were unprepared, although repeatedly told an attack was to be expected; and though they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th, and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river had, he said, commenced only at seven o’clock, long after daylight; the enemy’s masses were clearly seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost; yet the battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand men, instead of ten thousand in good order and supported by Villatte’s reserve. To this negligence they also added discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before his own arrival, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz and forced the French army back upon the Nive and Adour. This was true, but such a stroke did not comport with Wellington’s system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained; and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.

Soult was very apprehensive for some days of another attack; but when he saw Wellington’s masses form permanent camps he ordered Foy to recover the fort of San Barbe, which blocked a pass leading from the vale of Vera to Sarre and defended some narrow ground between La Rhune and the Nivelle river. Abandoned without reason by the French, it was only occupied by a Spanish picquet, several battalions being encamped in a wood close behind. Many officers and men quitted their troops to sleep in the fort, and on the night of the 12th three French battalions surprised and escaladed the work; the Spanish troops behind went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. Two Spanish battalions, ashamed of the surprise, made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, but were repulsed. An attempt was then made with five battalions, but Clausel brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments, the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded. San Barbe remained with the French, who lost two hundred men, while the Spaniards lost five hundred. Soon after this action a French sloop of war run from St. Jean de Luz, but three English brigs cut her off, and the crew after exchanging a few distant shots set her on fire and escaped in boats to the Adour.

Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina’s and Morillo’s battalions attached to it, was commanded by General Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune and Bayonette mountains, was given to Marshal Beresford. The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at CoruÑa after Sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to Lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war; but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend and comrade of Moore, offered to serve as second in command, and Wellington joyfully accepted him, saying—“He was the ablest officer in the army.”

Battle of the Nivelle. (Nov. 1813.)

After the passage of the Bidassoa, Soult was assiduous to complete an immense chain of intrenchments, some thirty miles long, which he had previously commenced. The space between the sea and the upper Nivelle, an opening of sixteen miles, was defended by double lines, and the lower part of that river, sweeping behind the second of them, formed a third line, having the intrenched camp of Serres on its right bank: the upper river separated D’Erlon’s from Clausel’s positions, but was crossed by the bridge of Amotz; the left of D’Erlon rested on the rough Mondarain mountains, which closed that flank, abutting on the Nive.

Beyond the Nive, Foy was called down that river towards the bridge of Cambo, which was fortified in rear of D’Erlon’s left, and from thence Soult had traced a second chain of intrenched camps, on a shorter line behind the Nivelle, by San PÉ, to join his camp at Serres: thus placed, Foy had the power of reinforcing D’Erlon or menacing the right of the allies according to events.

Reille still commanded on the right in the low ground covering St. Jean de Luz.

Lord Wellington could scarcely feed his troops; those on the right, at Roncesvalles, went two days without provisions, being blocked up by snow; and the rest of the army, with the exception of the first division, was lying out on the crests of high mountains very much exposed. This made them indeed incredibly hardy and eager to pour down on the fertile French plains below; but notwithstanding his recent bold operation, their general looked to a retreat into Spain and a removal of the war to Catalonia; for his position was scarcely tenable from political and other difficulties, all of which he had foreseen and foretold when the foolish importunity of the English Government urged him to enter France. And if Soult, who was continually, though vainly urging Suchet to co-operate with him, had persuaded that marshal to act with vigour the allies must have retreated to the Ebro. Suchet however would not stir, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn Wellington eventually resolved to force the French lines.

For this object, when Pampeluna surrendered, early in November, Hill’s right was moved from Roncesvalles to the Bastan with a view to the battle, and Mina took its place on the mountains; but then the Spanish general Freyre suddenly declared that he was unable to subsist and must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a disgraceful trick to obtain provisions from the English, and it was successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour, with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, contented him for the moment; but it was declared the supply given would only suffice for two days, although there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field!

Heavy rain again delayed the attack, but on the 10th of November, ninety thousand combatants, seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to battle, and with them ninety-five pieces of artillery, all of which were with inconceivable vigour thrown into action: four thousand five hundred cavalry and some Spaniards remaining in reserve near Pampeluna. The French had been augmented by a levy of conscripts, many of whom however deserted to the interior, and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand, including the garrisons. Six thousand were cavalry, and as Foy’s operations were extraneous, scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery were actually in line.

On Soult’s side each lieutenant-general had a special position to defend. The left of D’Erlon’s first line, resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarain, could not be turned; his right was on the Nivelle, and the whole, strongly intrenched, was occupied by one of AbbÉ’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades. The second line, on a broad ridge several miles behind, was occupied by the remaining brigades of those divisions, and its left did not extend beyond the centre of the first line; but the right reached to the bridge of Amotz, where the Nivelle, flowing in a slanting direction, gave greater space. Three great redoubts were in a row on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge.

On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clausel’s position extended to Ascain, along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts, trenches, and abbatis; and as the Nivelle, after passing Amotz, swept in a curve completely round this range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river,—the bridges of Amotz and Ascain being close on the right and left, and a retreat open by the bridges of San PÉ and Harastaguia in rear of the centre. Two of Clausel’s divisions, reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under General Maransin, were there posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada, covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune, which was fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division: a new redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.

On the right of this line, beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s division of Clausel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol, drawn from Villatte’s reserve, held the intrenched camp of Serres; they thus connected Clausel’s position with Villatte’s, which crossed the gorges of Olette and Jollimont. Reille’s position, strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.

Soult’s weakest point was between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle, where the space, gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of Amotz, was the most open and the least fortified. The Nivelle, being fordable above this bridge, did not hamper the allies’ movements, and a powerful force acting in that direction could therefore pass by D’Erlon’s first line, and break between the right of his second line and Clausel’s left; it was thus Wellington framed his battle; for seeing the French right could not be forced, he decided to hold it in check while he broke their centre and pushed down the Nivelle to San PÉ.

In this view, Hill, leaving four of Mina’s battalions to face the rocks of Mondarain, moved in the night by the passes of the Puerto de Maya to fall on D’Erlon.

On Hill’s left, Beresford was to send the third division against the unfinished redoubts and intrenchments covering the bridge of Amotz, thus turning D’Erlon’s right while it was attacked in front by Hill.

On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, pass Sarre, and assail Clausel abreast with the third division.

On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon San Barbe, and then, moving through Sarre also, to assail Clausel abreast with the seventh division.

On the left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others, leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune, and then join the attack on Clausel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry, were to be thrust on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clausel and D’Erlon.

Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, together eight thousand, was likewise to attack Clausel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clausel’s right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be taken. This outwork was a hog’s-back ridge, rising abruptly out of table-land opposite the greater Rhune and inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; on the enemy’s left the rocks gradually decreased, descending by a long slope to the valley of Sarre, and, two-thirds down, the 34th French Regiment was placed, with an outpost at some isolated crags between the two Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into an open platform, but was covered at its termination by a marsh scarcely passable. The attacking troops had therefore first to move against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file, under fire, between the marsh and lower rocks to gain an accessible point from whence to fight their way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back; the bristles of the latter being huge perpendicular crags built up with loose stones into small forts or castles which communicated by narrow foot-ways, and rose one above another until the culminant point was attained.

Beyond this ridge an extensive table-land was bounded by a deep ravine, one narrow space on the right of the marsh excepted, where the enemy had a traverse of loose stones running perpendicularly from behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort. This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by Barbot’s brigade, whose line of retreat was a low neck of land bridging the deep ravine and linking the Rhune to Clausel’s main position. A reserve was placed there to sustain the 34th French Regiment on the slope of the mountain, and to protect the neck, which was the only approach to the main position in that part: to storm the smaller Rhune was therefore a necessary preliminary to the general battle.

Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th, from the Hermitage, the Commissari, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascain. His main body, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; the 43rd Regiment was to assail the hog’s-back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were left on the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the French 34th and connect Alten’s attack with Giron’s. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works: towards morning indeed, five or six guns fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the sea broke the stillness, yet all remained quiet on the Rhunes: the British troops silently awaited the rising of the sun, when three guns fired from the summit of the Atchubia mountain were to be the signal of attack.

Battle of the Nivelle. (Nov. 1813.)

With great splendour the day broke, and as the first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal guns were fired in rapid succession; then the light division soldiers leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment the columns rushing onward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their works with much tumult, they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and two companies of the 43rd were detached to cross the marsh, if possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced, the remainder of that regiment advanced against the high rocks, from whence the French shot fast and thickly; but the quick even movement of the line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh and were immediately joined by the two companies, which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the lower works, and the men, exhausted by their exertions, for they had run over half a mile of very rough difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes lying down and panting within half-pistol shot of the first stone castle, from whence came a sharp and biting musketry: when their breath returned they arose and with a stern shout commenced the assault.

As numerous as the assailants were the defenders, and for six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the 43rd. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men, shrinking on each side, sought safety among the rocks behind. Close and confused then was the fight, man met man at every turn, yet with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths, sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way, and soon carried a second castle, named by the French the magpie’s nest because of a lofty rock within it, on which a few marksmen were perched. From this castle they were driven into a culminant citadel, called the Donjon, larger than the others, and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks fifteen feet deep.

Here they made a final stand, and the assailants, having advanced so as to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while; partly to gather head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath, who were warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese CaÇadores, and the 17th Portuguese. This last regiment was to have followed the 43rd, but seeing how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh. The French thus pressed in front, and taught by the fire they were outflanked on the ridge above; seeing the 52nd also turning their extreme right by the deep ravine beyond the star fort, abandoned their works below. Then the 43rd gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the walls were abandoned at the moment of being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victorious regiment lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.

The whole mountain was now cleared, for the riflemen, dropping almost perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags, had seized it with small loss. Yet they were ill seconded by Giron’s Spaniards, and hardly handled by the French 34th, which maintained its main post on the slope, and covered the flight of the confused crowd then rushing down from the smaller Rhune towards the neck of land behind: there however all rallied and seemed inclined to renew the action, yet, after some hesitation, continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the commander of the 43rd, but the officer intrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had thrown them heedlessly into the fight, and rendered it impossible to collect in time a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass. The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, had not been very severe, but General Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded: nevertheless he did not quit the field, and soon re-formed his brigade on the platform he had so gallantly won. Longa, during the fight, got close to Ascain, in connection with Freyre’s troops, and in this state of affairs, the enemy now and then cannonading from a distance, Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the movements.

The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division against the Rhune, had also sent the fourth and seventh divisions against San Barbe and Grenada, and while eighteen guns, placed in battery against the former, poured streams of shot, the troops advanced with scaling-ladders. The skirmishers soon got in rear of the work, whereupon the French leaping out fled, and then Ross’s battery of horse-artillery, galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada fort, drove the enemy from there also. After that the following troops won the village of Sarre and the heights beyond, and advanced to the attack of Clausel’s main position.

It was now eight o’clock, and, to the troops posted on the Rhune, a splendid spectacle was presented. On one hand the ships of war, slowly sailing to and fro, were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa, while Hope, menacing all the French lines in the low ground, sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks. He was answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains, amidst the smoke of which the summit of the great Atchubia glittered to the rising sun, while fifty thousand men, rushing down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France, so long overlooked from the towering crags of the Pyrenees, were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished soldiers in their fury were breaking through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.

The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, yet the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations failed. Far on the right Hill by a long and difficult night march had got near the enemy before seven o’clock; opposing then his Spanish troops to AbbÉ’s left wing on the Mondarain rocks, he with the second division brushed back D’Armagnac’s brigade from the forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa; but he called the sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese over the Nivelle, to act on the right instead of the left bank, against the bridge of Amotz. Thus three divisions approached D’Erlon’s second position in mass, yet the country was very rugged, and it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of the French redoubts, each of which contained five hundred men. They were placed along the summit of a high ridge thickly clothed with bushes and covered by a ravine; but General Clinton, leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the unfinished works covering the bridge, after which, wheeling to the right, he advanced against the nearest redoubt and the garrison abandoned it. Meanwhile the Portuguese and the second division, passing the ravine, appeared on the right of the sixth, menacing the second and third redoubts, whereupon all were abandoned. D’Armagnac then set fire to his hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda, behind San PÉ, pursued by Clinton. AbbÉ’s second brigade, forming the French left, though separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac, after some hesitation also retreated towards Cambo, where his first brigade, coming down the Mondarain mountain rejoined him.

It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered D’Erlon’s fight on the right bank so feeble; for after the fall of San Barbe and Grenada Conroux endeavoured to defend the village and heights of Sarre, but while the fourth and seventh divisions carried those points, the third division, on their right, pushed rapidly to the bridge of Amotz; presenting in conjunction with the sixth division the narrow end of a wedge now formed by Beresford’s and Hill’s corps. The French were thus driven from all their unfinished works covering that bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spread from Sarre to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. When he attempted to defend the finished works at the bridge itself, he fell mortally wounded, his troops retired, and the third division, seizing the bridge, established itself on some heights between that structure and a large unfinished work called the redoubts of Louis XIV. All this happened about eleven o’clock, and D’Erlon, fearing to be cut off from San PÉ, then gave up his strong position to Hill, as before shown; at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in disorder from Sarre, pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the third. The communication between Clausel and D’Erlon was thus cut, the left flank of one and the right flank of the other were broken, and a direct communication between Hill and Beresford was secured by the same blow.

Clausel still stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions, and the latter having recovered Barbot’s brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis XIV. where, supported with eight field-pieces, he attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. Ross’s horse artillery, the only battery which had surmounted the difficulties of ground after passing Sarre, silenced these guns, and the infantry were then assailed in front by the fourth and seventh divisions, and in flank by the third division. The redoubt of Louis XIV. was soon stormed and the garrison bayoneted, Conroux’s men continued to fly, Maransin’s were cast headlong into the ravines behind their position, and that general was taken, but escaped in the confusion: Giron also came up now, yet too late, and after having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.

Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts forming Clausel’s right, still remained to fight. Their left rested on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery, yet overlooked the whole position; their right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres; some works in the ravine itself protected their communication by the bridge of Ascain; and behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San PÉ, along which Maransin and Conroux’s divisions were flying, there was another work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, where Clausel thought he might still dispute the victory, if his reserve division in the camp of Serres could come to his aid. In this view he drew the 31st French Regiment from Taupin to post it in front of the redoubt of Harastaguia; his object being to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops and form a new line, the left on Harastaguia, the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the 88th Regiment. In this position, having a retreat by the bridge of the Ascain, he resolved to renew the fight, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division, which was now again in full action.

About half-past nine, Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his right as far as the eye could reach well engaged with the enemy, had passed the low neck of land in his front, the 52nd Regiment leading with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and musketry from the intrenchments, which covered the side of the opposite mountain. A road coming from Ascain, by the ravine, led up the position, and as the 52nd pushed their attack along it the French abandoned the intrenchments on each side, and forsook even the crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of the division, yet Taupin awaited the assault above, being supported by the conscripts in his rear; but at that moment the Spaniards opened a distant skirmishing fire against the works covering the bridge of Ascain on his right, whereupon a panic seized his men, and the 70th Regiment abandoned the two redoubts above, while the conscripts were withdrawn. Clausel ordered Taupin to retake the forts, yet this only added to the disorder; the 70th Regiment, instead of facing about, disbanded entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There remained only four regiments unbroken: one, the 88th, was in the signal redoubt, two with Taupin kept together in the rear of the works on the right, and the 31st covered the fort of Harastaguia, now the only line of retreat.

In this emergency, Clausel, anxious to bring off the 88th Regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the 31st Regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment and the redoubt. Moreover Alten, previous to this, had directed the 43rd, preceded by Andrew Barnard’s riflemen, to turn, at the distance of musket-shot, the right flank of the redoubt; wherefore Taupin, instead of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell dangerously wounded. Meanwhile the seventh division broke the French 31st, and the rout became general, the French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelle, and the signal redoubt was left to its fate.

This formidable work barred the way of the light division, yet it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the 52nd Regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was turning it on the left. Colborne, whose military judgment was seldom at fault, seeing the work must fall, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which it was situated to save his men; but some of Giron’s Spaniards made a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right and were beaten, and at that moment a staff-officer, without warrant, for Alten on the spot assured the Author of this History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance. The steepness of the hill covered his men until he reached the flat top, and then the troops made their rush; but then a ditch, thirty feet deep, well fraised and palisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched the foremost in death. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously, for he was always at the head on horseback, immediately led the regiment under the brow to another point, where, thinking to take the French unawares, he made another rush, yet with the same result: at three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the head of his column was swept away. Then holding out a white handkerchief he summoned the commandant, and showed to him how his work was surrounded, whereupon he yielded, having had only one man killed; but on the British side there fell two hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men—victims to the presumptuous folly of a young staff-officer.

During this affair all Clausel’s other troops had crossed the Nivelle, Maransin’s and Conroux’s divisions near San PÉ, the 31st Regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh divisions; and the skirmishers of the former, crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San PÉ, entered that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. Conroux’s troops then pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position on the road from San PÉ to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin, and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, while Clausel rallied Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above San PÉ.

Soult was not present at any of these actions. He had hurried on the first alarm from St. Jean de Luz to Serres with his reserve artillery and spare troops, and now menaced Wellington’s left flank by Ascain; whereupon the latter halted the fourth and light divisions and Giron’s Spaniards, to face Serres until Clinton’s division was well advanced on the right of the Nivelle. When he was assured of its progress he crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions, and drove Maransin from his new position, after a hard struggle in which General Inglis was wounded, and the 51st and 68th Regiments were handled very roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and Clinton’s men had been marching or fighting for twenty-four hours: but three divisions were now firmly established in rear of Soult’s right, of whose operations it is time to treat.

In front of Reille’s intrenchments were two advanced positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the centre, covering Urogne. The first had been carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure: the second was also easily taken by the Germans and the Guards, and immediately afterwards the 85th Regiment drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering that part of the line, yet were driven back by the enemy, whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing on the right of the first division, opened a battery against a large work covering Ascain, where he was opposed by his own countrymen under Casa Palacio, commanding the remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards. This false battle was maintained until nightfall, with equal loss of men, yet great advantage to the allies, because it entirely occupied Reille and Villatte, and prevented their troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clausel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened, and Wellington had passed the Nivelle at San PÉ, Reille retired to the heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne. He retired in good order, destroying the bridges.

During the night the allied army halted on the position gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely separated their picquets towards Ascain from the main body—spreading far and wide over the heath, it lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.

On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Hope forded the Nivelle above St. Jean de Luz and marched on Bidart; Beresford moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne; Hill brought his left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre faced Cambo on the Nive. This change of front and the time required to restore the bridges for the artillery, enabled Soult to rally his army upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. His front was of eight miles, but the works were only slightly advanced, and dreading a second battle on so wide a field he drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings.

Next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the intrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. The movement was covered by a dense fog, but when the day cleared Hope took post at Bidart on the left; Beresford then occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe in the centre, and Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz. He also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, but heavy rain in the mountains rendered the fords impassable and both points were defended successfully by Foy, whose operations having been distinct from the rest require notice.

D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had in the night of the 9th sent Foy orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette; but the messenger did not arrive in time, and on the morning of the 10th, Foy, following Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo on Hill’s right he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, having taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, and on the 12th defended them against Hill.

Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position he had been fortifying for three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men and officers, including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and one general killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces of artillery were taken; the greater part abandoned in the redoubts of the low country to Hope. The allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and officers.

In the report of the battle, scant and tardy justice was done to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s Spaniards scarcely fired a shot, that division, of only four thousand seven hundred men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, driving superior numbers from the strongest works: numbering less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clausel, it had defeated one-third of that general’s corps. So doing, it lost many brave men, and of two who fell I will speak.

The first, low in rank, being but a lieutenant, was rich in honour, for he bore many scars and was young of days. He was only nineteen, and had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. Slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and would obey his slightest sign, in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet his natural powers were so happy the keenest and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and all his thoughts and aspirations were proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the 43rd, one of three brothers who all died in the Spanish war. Assailed the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming death, so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight, when they heard of his fate.

On the same day and at the same hour was killed Colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the 43rd. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but promotion had placed Lloyd at the head of the 94th, and leading that regiment he fell. In him were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry of person combined with Herculean strength, and a frank majestic countenance, indicated a great and commanding character. His military acquirements were extensive both from experience and study, and on his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, it is only necessary to remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse; for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was prescient of and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved, but remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes in it until death came, and at the age of thirty, the good, the brave, the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by Lord Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine: let those who served on equal terms with him say, whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.

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