The Russians must be somewhat of a disappointment to many experts, professional and amateur, whose supreme ignorance of the conditions obtaining in the eastern theatre of the war was only equalled by their sublime confidence in the ability of a steamroller to push forward, full steam ahead, over all obstacles and against all opposition. When towards the middle of August the news came that Russia was ready for serious business, it was confidently predicted that the end was in sight. It was only a matter of 180 miles from the Russian frontier to Berlin, the Germans had only Landwehr and Landsturm forces, contemptible third-rate fighting material, to defend her territories, and Austria was too busy shooting her own mutinous soldiers to be a menace to anybody. Obviously then, said the strategists, it could only be a matter of days before the tramp of the Russian legions would be heard perilously close to Berlin, the Kaiser would have to withdraw his forces from the west to meet the danger in the east, the allies would overthrow his weakened armies and hurl them back against the oncoming Russian hordes. Armageddon looked to be in danger of degenerating into a race to Berlin.

The expected has not happened. In spite of many rumours it may be taken as certain that the Germans have not to any great extent reduced their forces in the west. The fierceness of the fighting there is sufficient proof of this. And instead of being on the very threshold of Berlin, the main Russian armies are still 400 miles away.

It is Russia’s due that this failure to come up to expectation should be explained.

It is quite true that from the most westerly point on the frontier of Russian Poland to Berlin is only a matter of 180 miles. A glance at the map, however, will show that Poland is more or less a wedge driven into German territory. The average distance from the frontier to Berlin is much more than 180 miles. Nevertheless, Russia might have made a dash on Berlin along the route indicated. There would be every likelihood, too, of the dash proving successful. The country would be favourable for a quick advance. The communications are good—well-made roads and direct railway connection with the Russian base at Warsaw. The River Oder would be the only natural obstacle, and the fortress of Posen the only artificial one. And the country being open, it would be easier to attack than to defend.

But apart from the fact that the capture of Berlin would no more crush Germany than the occupation of Brussels has crushed Belgium, such an advance would be doomed to disaster. The invading army might reach Berlin itself, but sooner or later, it would find itself cut off from its supplies. It would necessarily have left behind it large forces of German troops in Eastern Prussia, and equally strong Austrian armies in Galicia. It could only be a matter of time before Russia would meet with a greater and more disastrous Sedan. Such a move would be a terrible blunder of which no general in his senses would be guilty.

It may be objected that the German troops in East Prussia were only Landwehr reserves and that the moral of the Austrians was so bad that it would have been possible for Russians to leave sufficient forces to hold both armies in check. In the first place it has been amply proved, again and again during the present war that the partially trained reserves when capably led, and in sufficiently large numbers, can hold their own with first line troops. In the second place, although the Slav regiments were mutinous, Austria had quite two million Teutons and Magyars in her army. These men were unquestionably loyal and quite capable of giving a good account of themselves.

Before, therefore, they could set off on that 180 mile journey, it was necessary for the Russians to remove all sources of danger to their rear. The Germans must be turned out of Eastern Prussia or safely held in their own territories, and the Austrians swept from Galicia.

The task of capturing Eastern Prussia is one of unusual difficulty. It is a region which it is very much easier to defend than to attack. The greater part of it is covered with marshes, lakes and forests, most difficult country for an army to traverse. The means of communication are poor, the roads—a most important consideration in connection with the movement of the heavy artillery necessary for a successful invasion—are in many instances little better than tracks. Moreover, it is strongly fortified. KÖnigsberg is a first-class modern fortress, whilst those on the line of the Vistula at Thorn, Graudenz and Dantzig are even more powerful. KÖnigsberg and Dantzig, it should also be noted, have the advantage of being ports as well as fortified towns. In other words, they could be used for large supplies of men and material. An invading army, therefore, could not content itself with merely masking the fortresses unless it was supported by a navy enjoying the command of the sea. The Russian fleet was practically a prisoner in the Gulf of Finland. The German navy was in complete command of the Baltic, and, therefore, to be safe, the invading army would have to storm the fortresses and gain possession of the ports.

The German War Staff, of course, knew perfectly well how difficult was Russia’s task of subduing Eastern Prussia. Hence it was not likely that they were in any way panic stricken over Russia’s advance, at least in that direction. Before that advance could become dangerous the whole of Eastern Prussia would have to be in Russian hands and the passage of the Vistula forced. There was every prospect of Russia being busily engaged for weeks to come.

And it must not be forgotten that the mobilisation was not complete at the time that the general advance was ordered. Thousands of troops cannot be gathered from the farthest confines of Siberia and transported across Asia and half-way across Europe. Only the first phase was completed. Time was still necessary before Russia could put her full strength in the field. The army under General Rennenkampf which invaded Prussia did not comprise the million men with which it was credited. It is doubtful whether he had half-a-million men with him. Certainly he had no more during the early stages of the campaign. Besides invading Prussia, Russia had to invade Galicia, drive back the forces invading Poland and generally guard a frontier about seven times as long as that between Germany and France. Another reason why General Rennenkampf’s army was not so large as it was popularly supposed to be was the fact that the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief, did not, for reasons that will be subsequently examined, regard the invasion of Eastern Prussia as of such paramount importance as the invasion of Galicia.

In dealing with this campaign, therefore, its secondary importance should not for a moment be forgotten. Both victory and defeat must be tempered with the knowledge that neither will have the far-reaching effect hoped for or feared. Of course, that is not to say that the Russians did not care what happened in Prussia. If it should prove that the defending German forces were weaker than was believed, if it were possible to overcome all transport difficulties, if Rennenkampf should march from victory to victory, driving the Germans back over the line of the Vistula, so much the better. But such an accomplishment would be a feat of arms worthy of Napoleon himself. Rennenkampf was known to be a remarkably clever general and great things were expected of him—otherwise he would not have been chosen for the most difficult command—but there was no reason to credit him with superhuman genius.

Popular enthusiasm, however, both in Russia and the West, knowing nothing of circumstances and conditions, and full of implicit faith in Russian prowess, immediately jumped to the conclusion that Rennenkampf was the man who was destined to alter the whole trend of the war. The campaign, therefore, assumed a rather exaggerated importance which was not remedied until actual events had their inevitable sobering influence.

At the beginning of the general advance, the Russians found themselves firmly established in the neighbourhood of Stalluponen. Before them lay a strong German army, under General von Hindenburg. The advantage in numbers was with the Germans, who were in the proportion of roughly three to two. On the other hand they were composed to a very large extent of reserves. The smaller Russian army was composed of fully trained first line troops. The coming operations, therefore, were a test of the comparative values of numbers and training. Sheer numbers supported by perfect discipline, such as that which obtains in the German army, can accomplish much in modern warfare. The advance of the Germans in the western theatre of war had already proved as much. And in these days when the personal factor in warfare, at least so far as the rank and file is concerned, has been practically eliminated, and the tendency is to rely for victory more and more on artillery and material superiority rather than on personal qualities, the age, training and fitness of the troops is of less importance than in the old days when battles consisted of downright fighting. The finest troops in the world are helpless when exposed to an efficient artillery attack. In point of artillery the two armies in Eastern Prussia were about evenly matched, the superiority, if any, being on the side of the Germans. Consequently, it will be realised that the Russians were faced with a difficult task.

The advance, which after the taking of Stalluponen had temporarily ceased, was resumed with vigour. The region to the north towards Tilsit was cleared of the enemy. Cavalry patrols scoured the country and there were innumerable minor engagements. In all of these the Russians were successful and the Germans were forced to withdraw their outposts towards the line Stillen, Gumbinnen and Goldap. The only engagement of any importance occurred some miles to the north of Stalluponen. Here a strong Russian force fell on a German army corps, which was occupying a rather advanced position. The fighting continued for practically a whole day, and in spite of fierce Russian attacks, the Germans held their ground. Towards the evening, however, their left flank was turned and soon they were in full retreat towards Gumbinnen. The Russians captured some hundreds of prisoners besides eight field guns, twelve cannons and three machine guns.

Inspired by this success the Russians pushed forward. But the Germans contested every foot of ground. The Russian movement, too, was considerably hampered by the excellence of the German means of obtaining information. Their airmen were everywhere in evidence, and displayed the greatest courage and daring in face of the Russian aeroplanes, which were mostly of the heavy Sikorski type. The latter, excellent machines though they are, were outmatched in point of speed by the German Taube machines, and were therefore unable to deal effectively with the menace from the air. The country, too, was infested with spies. Every movement of the Russians was signalled to the defending forces.

On one occasion a large force of Cossacks was sent to carry out a surprise attack on a German force occupying a village to the south of Stalluponen. As they moved forward, it was noticed that a haystack had caught alight. A tramp and a pipe were the explanation. The owner was greatly upset at his loss and made every effort to save his property. He worked with desperate energy, throwing bucket after bucket of water on the flames. The only result, however, was that a dense column of black smoke rose from the stack. The Cossacks pushed on. A couple of miles from the village they had to pass through wooded country. Suddenly a storm of lead swept through them. They had been ambushed. In close formation, and scarcely able to turn, they were mowed down by the score. When the few survivors returned to their headquarters the haystack was still smouldering, but the owner had disappeared. It was found subsequently that the “water” which he had so vigorously thrown on the flames was a chemical solution which had caused the dense clouds of smoke, serving to warn the Germans of the coming attack.

The advance, however, continued in spite of all the courage and cunning displayed by the Germans. The Russian cavalry in particular distinguished itself by its dash and bravery. The German advance guards and outposts were overwhelmed by the fury of its attack. Thanks to its superb, almost reckless, bravery and its bewildering mobility, the way was cleared for the main army, so that on the 19th it found itself facing a strong German army defending Gumbinnen.

In the meantime a Russian force had advanced in a north-westerly direction from Bialestock and had crossed the frontier at Prostken. Moving rapidly, it captured Lyck after a sharp engagement, and pushed on towards Lotzen. Here their progress was barred by a German army corps holding a strong position. Some desperate fighting ensued, but the Russians forced their way into the town and the Germans retreated northward along the lakes towards their main army at Gumbinnen.

Obviously the time had now come for a decisive engagement. Any further retreat on the part of the Germans would entail the abandonment of Insterburg, a most important railway junction, the possession of which was the key to the whole of the country lying east of KÖnigsberg and Allenstein. The Germans, faced by the main Russian army on the south-east towards Goldap, and with its right flank threatened by the victorious force marching on from Lotzen, prepared for a determined resistance.

As early as the 17th the civilian inhabitants had been ordered to leave the town, at the same time reinforcements were brought up from the west and north so that the strength of the defending army amounted to about 200,000 men. On the morning of the 20th, the Russian right rested on the village of Pilkallen, its left on Goldap. Everything was in readiness for a determined onslaught. At dawn the battle began with a terrific artillery duel. Soon the shells of the heavy German guns were causing havoc in the Russian lines, but after a time the Russian artillery began to manifest a superiority, and some of the enemy’s guns were silenced. The Russian infantry then moved forward to the attack, and some of the most desperate fighting of the war took place.

The Russians were subjected to a merciless fire from machine and field guns. On all sides men were falling. But they never wavered for an instant. On and on they pressed until they reached the German trenches. There the bayonets got to work and soon the defenders were forced to give ground. But they were by no means defeated. Time after time they hurled themselves forward in the most desperate counter attacks, but the Russians succeeded in holding their own.

It was during this period of the engagement that one of the most significant events—so far as Russia is concerned—of the whole war occurred. A Russian battalion was in the midst of a veritable inferno. The Germans were determined to hold an important position at all costs. The Russians were equally determined to capture it. On both sides the carnage had been terrible. At last, with a desperate rush, the Russians succeeded in getting to grips with the Germans. Indescribable hand-to-hand fighting ensued. In the midst of the mÊlÉe a German bayoneted the Russian Standard-bearer and seized the flag. Emboldened by this emblem of victory the Germans renewed their efforts and dashed to the assistance of their comrade. But before they could reach him a young Russian had sprung forward, killed him and recaptured the flag. With a howl of disappointment the Germans attacked him. For a moment he seemed to be doomed. Germans, were all round him struggling for the possession of the flag. Then there came a deep-throated roar, a sudden rush, and the Germans were hurled back. The Russians had captured the position and saved their flag.

The youth who had held it against such odds was afterwards discovered severely wounded. He proved to be a young Jewish medical student from Vilna, named Osnas. He was at once hailed on all sides as a hero, and on being invalided back to Petrograd the Commander himself gave orders that every care was to be taken to save the life of “Osnas the hero.” Subsequently he received the military cross of St. George, the Russian V.C., from the hands of the Tzar himself.

The significance of the incident does not lie in the bravery of Osnas, but in the fact that he was a Jew. His action, which has made him a popular hero throughout the Russian Empire, has done more to improve the position of the Jews than any event in the whole course of their history in Russia. It has made the nation realise that a Jew can be a worthy son of Russia.

While these fierce attacks and counter-attacks were taking place at the centre and on the Russian left, determined attempts were made to envelop the right flank resting on Pilkallen. The successful resistance of this movement was chiefly due to the brilliant work of the Russian cavalry.

The Germans occupied a strong position towards the north-west, from which their artillery was able to pour a murderous fire into the Russian ranks. At length it became obvious that unless the guns were silenced the Russians would have to retreat. The Horse Guards were ordered to take the guns. The first squadron charged straight at the battery. There was an ominous silence. The distance grew less and less. Then at point blank range the gunners fired. The squadron was practically annihilated. The second squadron then charged. It seemed as if it were doomed to a like fate, but at the critical moment the third squadron took the battery on the flank. In a few minutes every gunner was either sabred or fleeing for safety. For fourteen hours the battle raged until darkness caused a cessation of hostilities. The Russians were, on the whole, satisfied with the results of the day’s work. They had suffered heavy losses, but the enemy had suffered more. They had made distinct progress in the centre, had captured thirty guns and large numbers of prisoners.

The engagement on the 21st opened sensationally. In the early hours of the morning a strong force of Cossack cavalry moved northwards and managed to envelop the German left flank. Dawn was the signal for a combined movement. The Germans found themselves vigorously attacked in the centre and left. For a time they held their ground, but their position soon became untenable. There was no holding the Russian attack. A regiment of Cossacks, finding the ground unsuitable for cavalry operations, dismounted and hurled themselves forward with all their reckless ferocity. Gradually the Russians pressed forward until they were attacking the enemy on three sides. The result was then inevitable. Von Hindenburg had the choice of flight or of allowing his army to be surrounded. He decided to retreat. Soon retreat degenerated into rout, and vast quantities of stores and ammunition, besides thousands of prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians.

The battle of Gumbinnen was the first decisive engagement of the war. Its immediate result was to make Russia master of the whole of Prussia east of the line from KÖnigsberg to Allenstein. There was no position which afforded von Hindenburg any hope of successful resistance even if he were able to collect his routed troops. Insterburg, the main point in the network of German strategic railways, fell into Russian hands on the evening after the battle and ensured for Rennenkampf ample supplies. Tilsit was isolated, and its capture was a matter of convenience. The whole region of the Mauer lakes was at the mercy of the Russians.

The moral advantages were as great as the material. Von Hindenburg’s army had been badly beaten, and would never be able to face the Russians again with the same confidence. Moreover, the rout of the Germans and the reputation of the pursuing Cossacks caused a panic throughout the province. From every village and town the inhabitants began to fly in terror, some towards Danzig, others towards Graudenz in the hope of reaching Berlin. Soon Danzig was in a state of chaos. Two hundred and fifty thousand refugees poured in with the most exaggerated stories of the prowess of the Russians. Commerce was at a stand-still; the prices of provisions rose daily. Soon there was rioting in the streets. There was no accommodation for the refugees, most of whom were penniless, and who were almost as numerous as the ordinary inhabitants of the town. It was not until the sternest measures had been taken by the military authorities that the panic subsided and some show of order was restored.

Meanwhile the Russians were following up their victory with a vigorous pursuit. Von Hindenburg’s army divided into two, one portion retreating through Tapiau to KÖnigsberg, the other pressing in a south-westerly direction towards Allenstein, and the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz. The former portion safely reached its destination, which was invested by the Russians on the 25th. On the same day Tilsit was formally occupied. Meanwhile the main Russian army, meeting with practically no resistance, pushed on along the line of the railway, occupying Angerberg and Korschen. By this time, however, heavy German reinforcements had come up, and the advance began to be contested with increasing determination. For three days there was vigorous fighting in the neighbourhood of Allenstein. Then, after inflicting heavy losses on the Germans, Rennenkampf entered the town and again forced von Hindenburg to retreat. The action, however, was not a decisive battle comparable with Gumbinnen, and the Russian advance became slow. Further fierce fighting, most of which resulted satisfactorily to the Russians, took place further to the south around Soldau and Nesdenberg.

The Russians, after a remarkably quick advance through very difficult country, had now come within hail of the line of the Vistula. The line was protected by three first-class fortresses covered by at least four army corps in addition to the armies which had been driven back by the Russians. It was the critical moment of the campaign. With their heavy numerical superiority and strongly fortified position, the Germans would be sure to make a more determined resistance, and in greater force than any which the Russians had yet had to meet. In attacking the line Rennenkampf would be handicapped by a lack of heavy siege artillery, and by the numerical inferiority of his forces. On the other hand his troops comprised some of the finest fighting material in the world, they were flushed with victory and could be relied upon to make a tremendous effort to win the greatest triumph of all. If they could drive the Germans over the Vistula and bring up sufficiently large forces to invest Thorn, Graudenz and Danzig, the northern route to Berlin would be open to them as far as the Oder. The beginning of the end would indeed have arrived.

The Russians accordingly pushed forward. But they did not advance much further on the road to the Vistula. An immense German army, heavily supported by artillery, including numbers of the heavy siege guns which had already proved themselves to be the Kaiser’s most potent weapons, awaited the Russians in a strong position in the neighbourhood of Osterode, midway between Allenstein and Graudenz.

Von Hindenburg now proved himself to be a leader of remarkable skill and resource and he performed as brilliant a feat of generalship as the war has yet produced. Only a year before he had taken part in the manoeuvres in East Prussia, and was acquainted with every inch of the ground. It was even stated that he had already solved the exact military problem with which he was now faced, and in the same locality. In addition he enjoyed the advantage of outnumbering the Russians by at least two to one.

These factors practically decided the battle. The district around Allenstein and Osterode is of the worst possible description for an invading force. It is a mass of lakes, swamps and forests, and an intimate knowledge of the locality is essential for the success of any military operations there. There are almost insuperable difficulties in the way of transport alone.

Utilising his advantages to the full, von Hindenburg lured the Russians towards Tannenberg to the south-east of Osterode. The Russians, realising that a successful offensive was their only chance, blundered forward. They pressed on until they found themselves in a position where their flanks rested on more or less solid ground, but their centre was backed by a vast swamp. Then von Hindenburg struck his blow. An immense force was hurled against the Russian right. A desperate encounter followed, but sheer weight of numbers gave victory to the Germans. The Russians were forced back on to the swamps. A similar attack on the Russian left was equally successful.

What followed was not a battle; it was one of the most hideous slaughters history has known. The Russians were unable to manoeuvre on the swampy ground; the Germans, on the other hand, were in possession of the solid higher ground and free to move at will. From three sides they poured a murderous fire into the helpless Russians, forcing them deeper and deeper into the swamps. Guns sank in the mud, horses were unable to move, men stood up to their waists in the deadly slime. The carnage continued until nightfall, when Rennenkampf managed to escape with a remnant of his army, leaving Generals Samsonov, Martos and Pestitsch among the thousands of slain.

Thus von Hindenburg won the battle of Osterode and obtained ample revenge for his defeat at Gumbinnen.

The battle caused a complete reversal of the campaign. The route to Berlin via the north was not only barred, but the Russian advance was turned into a retreat. Hopelessly outnumbered, Rennenkampf was forced back on Allenstein. Every foot of the way was contested, but bit by bit he had to give up the results of his victorious move forward. Allenstein and Intersburg were in turn evacuated before the merciless pressure of the advancing Germans. The troops investing KÖnigsberg were recalled. It was not until the frontiers were almost reached and strong reinforcements came up from Kovno and Grodno that the German advance was checked and finally held.

In spite of official attempts at secrecy, the news soon spread that the invasion of Germany upon which Russia’s Allies had placed such high hopes had ended in what appeared to be complete failure. Berlin was as far off as ever, and the Germans were at the very gates of Paris. Something had gone seriously wrong with the steam roller on which so much had depended!

The strategists were wrong in the blame they heaped on Rennenkampf’s head because of his failure. As a matter of fact, his chief fault was that he had played his part too well. He had never been expected to push forward so far as Osterode. His “advance” was intended simply to attract German attention and to prevent Germany from sending reinforcements to the Austrian army. In attaining this object he succeeded admirably. After the battle of Gumbinnen the Germans poured regiment after regiment of Landwehr and Landsturm troops into Eastern Prussia, which otherwise would have gone to the aid of the Austrians. Rennenkampf’s unexpected success took him too far forward. His advance was so rapid that it was difficult to bring up reinforcements. Osterode and its heavy losses was the penalty he paid for success.

The only really unfortunate result of his efforts was that he attracted such strong forces into Prussia that the Russians will have great difficulty in dislodging them. They are, however, strong enough to keep them confined to their own territories, and so have little to fear from that direction.

Besides, there are other ways to Berlin.