XXIX

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The Attitude of Certain Northern States
(Concluded)

THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS

Beginning in 1837, Massachusetts adopted the first of the so-called Personal Liberty Laws, which were followed by others of like import enacted by Vermont, New York and Connecticut. The ostensible object of these statutes was to protect free negroes, but as no such laws were necessary until the rise of the Abolitionists and the operations of the Underground Railroad, they were generally accepted as efforts on the part of these states to assist these agencies and defeat the clause of the constitution of the United States which provided for the return of fugitive slaves.

In 1842, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that so much of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as authorized or required state officials to assist in executing the law was unconstitutional, and that upon Federal authorities must rest the whole burden.[294] This decision was followed by a new series of statutes in Massachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.[295]

On the 18th of September, 1850, Congress passed another Fugitive Slave Law amending the act of 1793 so as to charge Federal officials with the whole duty of carrying into effect the clause in the constitution providing for the return of fugitive slaves, and to remedy the difficulties resulting from the action of the Abolitionists and the acts passed by certain states as above referred to. This aroused fresh antagonism to the constitution and the efforts of the Federal Government to carry the same into effect. The constitutionality of the new law was denied and though affirmed by the Supreme Court, its execution in the foregoing states was much embarrassed by a new series of state statutes. Laws of like import, with like results, were also enacted by Wisconsin, Michigan, Connecticut and Maine.

In some instances, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States affirming the constitutionality of the statute was challenged by the legislative department of state governments, and the right of the former tribunal to fix the obligations of states and citizens with respect to the law strenuously denied.

Thus, in Wisconsin one Sherman M. Booth had been indicted in the Federal Court for a violation of the Fugitive Slave Law enacted by Congress, and, after trial and conviction, was sentenced for the offense. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was presented by Booth to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and his release prayed for on the ground that the Federal statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took cognizance of the case and discharged the prisoner from the custody of the Federal authorities.[296]

An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States where the constitutionality of the Federal statute was affirmed, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and Booth remanded to custody.[297] Thereupon, the General Assembly of Wisconsin on the 16th of March, 1859, adopted a series of resolutions in which, after denying the right of the United States Supreme Court to take cognizance of the above mentioned case, they declared:

"That the government, formed by the constitution of the United States, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the powers delegated to itself: but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.

"That the principle and construction contended for by the party which now rules in the councils of the nation, that the General Government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism; since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their powers; that the several states which formed that instrument being sovereign and independent have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction and that a positive defiance by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument is the right remedy."[298]

STATE DEFIANCE OF FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWS

These outspoken and persistent attempts of great states to repudiate their obligations to the constitution and to nullify the laws of Congress had a most reactionary influence upon slaveholders and their sympathizers in Virginia and the South and filled the minds of thoughtful men with the gravest forebodings for the peace and preservation of the Union.

President Buchanan in his message to Congress, December, 1860, refers to the action of the states in nullifying the Fugitive Slave Law enacted by Congress, as "the most palpable violation of constitutional duty which has yet been committed."

Governor Banks in his address before the Legislature of Massachusetts which assembled on the first Wednesday in January, 1861, referring to the statute enacted in that state antagonistic to the act of Congress for the return of fugitive slaves, and the consequent imputation which it brought upon the loyalty of Massachusetts to the Union and its constitution, said:

"It is because in the face of her just claims to high honor I do not love to hear unjust reproaches passed upon her fame—that I say as I do, in the presence of God and with a heart filled with responsibilities that must rest upon every American citizen in these distempered times, I cannot but regard the maintenance of a statute, although it may be within the extremest limits of constitutional power, which is so unnecessary to the public weal and so detrimental to the public peace as an inexcusable public wrong. I hope by common consent it may be removed from the statute book and such guarantees as individual freedom demands be sought in new legislation."[299]

CONGRESS ON STATE INTERFERENCE

Congress, in February, 1861, adopted the report of the Committee of Thirty-three of which Thomas Corwin of Ohio was chairman, which after reciting "that all attempts on the part of the Legislatures of any of the states to obstruct or hinder the recovery," of fugitive slaves, "are in derogation of the constitution ... and dangerous to the peace of the Union," resolved

"That the several states be respectfully requested to cause their statutes to be revised, with a view to ascertain if any of them are in conflict with or tend to embarrass or hinder the execution of the laws of the United States ... for the delivery up of persons held to labour by the laws of any state and escaping therefrom; and the Senate and House of Representatives earnestly request that all enactments having such tendency be forthwith repealed as required by a just sense of constitutional obligations and by a due regard for the peace of the Republic."[300]

President Lincoln in his inaugural address, referring to the clause of the constitution providing for the return of fugitive slaves, and the contention as to whether the same should be executed by Federal or state officials, said: "If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done. And should any one in any case be content that his oath should go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept?"

RHODE ISLAND ALONE ACCEDES

Despite these considerations, Rhode Island alone repealed the obnoxious statutes, and great leaders of the Republican Party frankly confessed that the constitution and the law would not be respected in certain of the Northern States. Salmon P. Chase, speaking in the Peace Conference at Washington, in February, 1861, alluding to the provision of the constitution for the return of fugitive slaves, said: "The people of the free states, however, who believe that slave-holding is wrong cannot and will not aid in the reclamation, and the stipulation becomes therefore a dead letter."[301]

Of the Personal Liberty Laws Mr. George Lunt of Boston in his work, Origin of the Late War, says: "They constitute an extreme exemplification of the broadest claim to state sovereignty, and put the states which authorized them in direct hostility to the United States. They were not one whit more defensible than the Rebellion itself to which they had such a principal part in preparing the minds of the seceding states."[302]

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE

Closely associated with the controversies growing out of the return of fugitive slaves and the action of certain Northern States, in defeating the provision of the constitution in regard thereto, was the attitude of many of the same states with respect to the provision for the return of the fugitives from justice. A few notable instances will suffice to illustrate the subject and its profound influence in arraying Southern States, as states, against certain of their Northern sisters.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTION

In 1837 the Governor of Georgia made requisition upon the Governor of Maine for the return to the former state of the captain of a ship charged with aiding and abetting a slave to desert his master. The Governor of Maine refused to comply with the requisition, alleging that the laws of that state did not recognize slavery or the offense complained of as an indictable one. Thereupon the Legislature of Georgia petitioned Congress to enact some law to compel state authorities to comply with this provision of the Federal Constitution. No action, however, was taken by Congress, nor was the slave or his abductor ever carried back to Georgia.[303]

In 1841 the Governor of Virginia made requisition upon the Governor of New York for the return of two men indicted in the former state for aiding and enticing slaves to leave their masters. William H. Seward was at that time Governor of New York. He refused to honor the requisition, alleging that the offense for which the parties were indicted was not one deemed criminal by the laws of New York or the nations of the world. A long and peace-destroying controversy in which the Legislatures of the two states became involved followed; but the fugitives were never returned, and the people of Virginia felt that the highest law officer of a sister state had been recreant to his obligations to the Federal Constitution and reckless of the rights of their state.

In 1860, the Governor of Kentucky made requisition upon the Governor of Ohio for the return to the former state of a fugitive from justice indicted for the violation of a statute imposing penalties upon persons aiding slaves to escape from their masters. The Governor of Ohio refused to honor the requisition; thereupon the State of Kentucky instituted a suit in the Supreme Court of the United States against the Governor of Ohio, to compel him to comply with the provision of the Federal Constitution above referred to and deliver up the fugitive from justice.

The Governor of Ohio interposed as a defense the same reasons advanced by Governor Seward. But the Supreme Court of the United States held that the defense was insufficient, and that it was the constitutional duty of the Governor of Ohio to deliver up the fugitive. The court declared: "The objection made to the validity of the indictment is altogether untenable."[304] The court also decided that the suit was properly instituted, in the right forum, and that the Governor of Ohio was under constitutional obligations to deliver up the fugitive to the authorities of Kentucky, but that no judgment could be entered by the court granting the relief prayed for. Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the court, after alluding to the fact that the framers of the constitution confidently believed that "A sense of justice and of mutual interest would insure a faithful execution of the provision," declared: "If the Governor of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty there is no power delegated to the General Government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him."[305]

EFFECTS IN VIRGINIA OF NULLIFICATION

This decision brought home to the people of Virginia the fact that the authorities of certain of the Northern States were violating their obligations under the Federal Constitution, and yet the Federal Government was unable to remedy the wrong and maintain the rights of the injured commonwealths.

These conditions and the attitude of the Northern States which thus nullified the provisions of the Federal Constitution undoubtedly moved thousands of Virginians and other citizens of the South to secession. They refused to remain members of a Union in which the rights of their states were thus violated by their sister commonwealths.

But the claim that Virginia seceded in order to avert pecuniary loss resulting from the non-return of fugitive slaves is negatived by the fact that by such action she surrendered all the benefits from the Federal Constitution and statute. In the Union, some protection was secured to the state with respect to the rights thus menaced. Outside of the Union, every such benefit was lost, and the state stood absolutely without redress.


See Decision in Case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539.

Fugitive Slaves, McDougall, p. 66.

In re Sherman M. Booth, 3rd Wisconsin Rep., p. 13.

Ableman vs. Booth and United States vs. Booth, 21st Howard, p. 506.

Journal of the General Assembly of Wisconsin, Session 1859, pp. 463 and 865.

History of Massachusetts in the Civil War, Schouler, Vol. I, p. 6.

See Reports of Thirty-second Congress, and Twenty Years of Congress, Blaine, pp. 258-265.

Debates in Peace Conference Convention, Crittenden, p. 430.

Origin of the Late War, Lunt, p. 217.

Fugitive Slaves, Boston, 1891, McDougall, p. 41.

Kentucky against Dennison, 24th Howard, p. 107.

Kentucky against Dennison, 24th Howard, p. 109.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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