  The Attempted Reinforcement of Fort Sumter and its Significance The relative responsibility for the collision at Fort Sumter we are not concerned to consider except in so far as it may have affected the action of Virginia in withdrawing from the Union. The charge is often heard, that, despite Virginia's professed love for the Union, and her efforts to maintain the peace, she made haste to unite her fortunes with the Southern Confederacy because of this assault by its soldiers upon Fort Sumter. It would seem a most illogical conclusion to all her unquestioned efforts if she were thus led to espouse the cause of the Confederacy and to gird herself for battle by reason of the happening of the very event she had striven so earnestly to avert. It was not the assault upon Fort Sumter, however momentous in its potency, which impelled Virginia, but the proclamation of President Lincoln which followed. The proclamation was the proximate cause of her secession, though her action was stimulated by the previous course of the Federal authorities with respect to the Fort. The people of Virginia regarded the policy of the Administration as characterized by a disregard for the peace of the country, a play for position ill-befitting a great nation at such a solemn crisis. Much has been written in defense of that policy. In support of Virginia's arraignment, the sentiments of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet ministers may be quoted. Three weeks previous to the On the 15th of March, 1861, President Lincoln submitted the following request in writing to each member of his Cabinet: "My dear Sir: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please give me your opinion in writing on this question. Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN." VIEWS OF CABINET Secretary Seward, in the course of an extended reply, wrote: "If it were possible to peaceably provision Fort Sumter, of course, I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be that the attempt must be made with the employment of military and marine force which would provoke combat and probably initiate a civil war which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain, through all changes, to some definite conclusion."... Continuing, Mr. Seward said: "Suppose the expedition successful, we have then a garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its batteries to demolish the defenses of the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent disunion? In In conclusion, he said: "If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different." Secretary Cameron wrote he would advise such action if he "did not believe the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict." Secretary Welles wrote: "By sending or attempting to send provisions into Fort Sumter, will not war be precipitated? It may be impossible to escape it under any course of policy that may be pursued, but I am not prepared to advise a course that would provoke hostilities.... I do not, therefore, under all the circumstances, think it wise to provision Fort Sumter." Secretary Smith wrote: "The commencement of civil war would be a calamity greatly to be deplored and should be avoided if the just authority of the Government may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should become inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the resistance of the authorities or the people of South Carolina to the legal "If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralyze the arm of the Government, while the treason in the Southern States would be openly encouraged in the North.... I, therefore, respectfully answer the inquiry of the President by saying that in my opinion it would not be wise, under all the circumstances, to attempt to provision Fort Sumter." Attorney General Bates wrote: "I am unwilling, under all the circumstances, at this moment, to do any act which may have the semblance before the world of beginning a civil war, the terrible consequence of which would, I think, find no parallel in modern times.... For these reasons, I am willing to evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning of civil war.... Upon the whole I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort Sumter." Postmaster General Blair and Secretary Chase united in the opinion that it would be wise to make the effort to provision Fort Sumter. Mr. Blair wrote: "I believe that Fort Sumter may be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with but little risk; and General Scott's opinion that, with its war complement, there is no force in South Carolina which can take it, renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the rebellion.... No expense nor care should therefore be spared to achieve this success." "A correct solution must depend, in my judgment, on the degree of possibility, on the combination of reinforcement with provisioning and on the probable effects of the measure on the relations of the disaffected states to the National Government. "I shall assume what the statements of the distinguished officers consulted seem to warrant, that the possibility of success amounts to a reasonable degree of probability; and also that the attempt to provision is to include an attempt to reinforce; for it seems to be generally agreed that the provisioning without reinforcements notwithstanding hostile resistance, will accomplish no substantially beneficial purpose. "The probable political effects of the measure allow room for much fair difference of opinion, and I have not reached my own conclusion without much difficulty." The Secretary then proceded to declare, that, if such a step would produce civil war, he could not advise in its favor, but that, in his opinion, such a result was highly improbable, especially if accompanied by a proclamation from the President reiterating the sentiments of his inaugural address. "I, therefore," concluded Mr. Chase, "return an affirmative answer to the question submitted to me." It will be seen, from the foregoing extracts, that five of the seven members of the Cabinet concurred in the opinion that no attempt should be made to provision or reinforce Fort Sumter, and that such an attempt would in all probability precipitate civil war. As Mr. Seward expressed it: "We will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act without an adequate object"; or in the language of Secretary If such were the opinions of leading members of President Lincoln's Cabinet, expressed in confidential communications to their chief, as to the character of the proposed action, can it be deemed unreasonable that the people of Virginia held similar views? Fourteen days later, the President made a verbal request to his Cabinet for an additional expression of their views upon the same subject. Seward and Smith adhered to their former opinions. Chase and Blair were joined by Welles. Bates was noncommittal, and no reply was made by Cameron, so far as the records show. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLISION In the light of the facts and arguments presented by the members of the President's Cabinet, men, not a few, will conclude that, if the explosion occurred at Fort Sumter, the mine was laid at Washington.
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