[1] ‘The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong.’ By Franz Brentano. English Translation by Cecil Hague. Constable, 1902.—I have written a review of this book, which will, I hope, appear in the International Journal of Ethics for October, 1903. I may refer to this review for a fuller account of my reasons for disagreeing with Brentano.

[2] Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, Chap. iii, §1 (6th edition).

[3] Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, Chap. iv, §1.

[4] ???te?, 436-7.

[5] See Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction, par M. Guyau. 4^me Édition. Paris: F. Alcan, 1896.

[6] Data of Ethics, Chap. II, §7, ad fin.

[7] The italics are mine.

[8] A. E. Taylor’s Problem of Conduct, p. 120.

[9] My references are to the 13th edition, 1897.

[10] My italics.

[11] 481 C-487 B.

[12] Ethical Studies, p. 232.

[13] p. 53.

[14] p. 55.

[15] pp. 56-7.

[16] p. 58.

[17] p. 12.

[18] §48 sup.

[19] pp. 27-30, 36.

[20] The italics are mine.

[21] Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, 4th ed., p. 431. The italics are mine.

[22] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 178.

[23] This sense of the term must be carefully distinguished from that in which the agent’s intention may be said to be ‘right,’ if only the results he intended would have been the best possible.

[24] Kant, so far as I know, never expressly states this view, but it is implied e.g. in his argument against Heteronomy.