THE DUCHESS-DOWAGER OF ORLEANS AND HER SON CAUSE A PUBLIC ANSWER TO BE MADE, AT PARIS, TO THE CHARGES OF THE DUKE OF BURGUNDY AGAINST THE LATE DUKE OF ORLEANS, AND CHALLENGE THE DUKE OF BURGUNDY FOR HIS MURDER.

Eight days after, the duke of Orleans, attended by about three hundred men at arms, came to Paris. He was met by the duke of Berry and other great lords, his relations, without the gate of St Antoine, and went to wait on the queen and the duke of Acquitaine, his cousin-german, at the castle of the Louvre.

Having strongly recommended his cause to them, he took leave and hastened to visit the duchess his mother, and his wife. They were incessant in their petitions to the king and council to do them justice on John duke of Burgundy and his accomplices for the murder of the duke of Orleans, and obtained leave to make any reply they might please against the duke of Burgundy.

In consequence, the duke of Acquitaine, as representative of his father, and the queen, both dressed in royal robes, went, by command of the king, to the great hall of the Louvre, where were present the dukes of Berry, of Brittany, of Bourbon, the counts d’AlenÇon, de Clermont, de Mortaign, de VendÔme, and many more lords of the council; with numbers of knights, the rector of the university of Paris, and great crowds of common people. The duchess-dowager, attended by her son the duke of Orleans, master Pierre l’Orfevre, his chancellor, master Pierre Cousinet, advocate in parliament, and by a large train of friends and familiars, entered the hall. She then caused to be read aloud by the abbot of Saint Fiacre, of the order of St Benedict, the contents of a book, written in French, which she gave to him publicly, and which were confirmed by quotations from the writings of the prophets, in both the Old and New Testaments, as well as from those of philosophers and historians. The contents of the book were as follows.

‘Most Christian king, most noble and sovereign prince, and fountain of justice, to thee do I address my speech; for thou art competent to display justice to all thy subjects of the realm of France, inasmuch as not only the neighbouring, but even the most distant nations may take example from the conscientiousness of thy judgments, which flow from thee and thy council, as from the fountains of justice and truth. I address myself to thee in the names of my highly honoured and most noble lady the duchess of Orleans and of my lords her children, who in their deplorable state present to thee their complaints with lamentations and tears, seeing that after God there can be no relief but in thy pity and compassion.

‘That what I have to say may not have the smallest appearance of fallacy, but may be perfectly clear, I shall divide my discourse into three parts, or principal divisions. In the first, I shall show, to the utmost of my ability, that kings, as sovereigns, are bounden to do justice to all their subjects, and to maintain peace within their realms.

‘Secondly, That our adversary, John duke of Burgundy, and his abettors, have, by counsel and otherwise, been instrumental in unjustly and disgracefully murdering the late duke of Orleans, whose soul may God receive!

‘Thirdly, That my aforesaid lord, the late duke of Orleans, has been wickedly and unjustly accused of several crimes of high treason of which he has been no way guilty, as shall appear hereafter.

‘It is, beside, my intention to divide these three points into six other divisions: thus, therefore, my discourse will consist of eighteen divisions.

‘In regard to the first point, it appears very clear to me, that the king is singularly obliged to do justice in this case, and especially for six reasons. The first of which constrains him to do justice from the consideration of his power and dignity, which not only binds him to do it of his own will, but as matter of right from his title of office; for kings are so called on account of doing justice, and not for anything else.

‘The second reason is founded on his paternal love,—for, as the common proverb says, ‘Nature cannot belie herself:’ the king, therefore, as sovereign and brother, is bound from reason and justice to support his right.

‘Thirdly, From the melancholy state of my lady of Orleans, now reduced to widowhood and despair, who with her disconsolate young children, and many knights, are overwhelmed with grief by the cruel death of her lord and husband.

‘The fourth reason is, The enormity of the crime, which can scarcely have its parallel found; for all who have heard of this scandalous deed have thought it abominable, and have declared, that if the king did not provide a remedy for it, he could not be considered as sovereign of his kingdom when he is thus forced to humiliate himself before his subjects.

‘Fifthly, If this crime be not punished, innumerable evils will ensue,—such as the destruction of cities and towns, murders, and rebellion of subjects.

‘Sixthly, The wickedness of our enemy, who by force of arms seeks to maintain his crime, and who pleads his cause with a drawn sword in his hand. And in these six reasons consist the grounds of our proceedings.

‘With respect to my second point, I will demonstrate by six reasons, that our adverse party has so greatly sinned that it is impossible for any reparation to make amends.

‘My first reason is, That our opponent had no authority whatever for murdering so great and so noble a person as the late duke of Orleans.

‘Secondly, That he followed no forms of law or justice in putting my late lord to such a death; and even supposing that he had any authority over him, which was not the case, it was illegal to put him to death without hearing what he might have to say in his own defence; and seeing that he had not any authority, his crime will appear so much the deeper.

‘Thirdly, From the alliances formed between these two dukes, I do not mean those of blood, but the engagements mutually entered into, to avoid the inconveniences that might arise from their quarrels, by which they were bounden not to annoy or attack each other without having sent a previous challenge. In confirmation of this, they had several times sworn to the same on the holy Scriptures, and on the cross of our Lord, giving to each other letters signed with their seals.

‘Fourthly, The death of my said lord of Orleans was so sudden that no true Christian can say it was not damnable to those who committed the crime, as well as to those who had commanded it.

‘Fifthly, I shall demonstrate clearly, that our opponent did not cause the late duke of Orleans to be murdered for any good purpose, nor for the public welfare, but solely through ambition and covetousness, from a lust of power, and in order to make his dependants rich, and from the great hatred that had been long fostered at his heart.

‘Sixthly, That the death of the late duke of Orleans was not sufficient for our adversary, but that he has exerted himself to the utmost to blast and scandalize his memory by defamatory libels, and by supporting traitors and murderers. This regards the second part of my discourse.

‘In respect to my third point, I shall produce six arguments, in opposition to the six false accusations brought by our adversary against the late duke of Orleans, and which shall clearly prove the innocence of the defunct. Such will be my third division.

‘I have thus shown you my three divisions. The first regards justice,—the second declares the malice of our adversaries,—and the third exonerates the late duke of Orleans from the false charges brought against him. Before I proceed further, I must here solemnly declare, that I intend not to say any thing but the exact truth, or to advance more than has been enjoined me by my foresaid lady of Orleans, and my lords her children.

‘It is true, indeed, that the defender of our adversary has very unadvisedly called my late lord of Orleans criminal, although he has no way proven it; nevertheless I shall not use this expression in speaking of our adversary, though I repute all murderers criminal, and him in particular, not from any suspicion, but from the confession made by himself; and as wisdom conquers malice, according to the holy Scriptures, it will be sufficient for me to name the adverse party, the party of Burgundy; for it will be better that I first demonstrate the crimes, and then show the duke of Burgundy guilty of them, than to follow his example, and call him criminal without any proof or verification. I shall now, having divided my subject into three divisions, enter on my first point, which treats of the justice of the king, and quote the words of the prophet which say, ‘Justitia et judicium prÆparatio sedis tuÆ.’ These words are in the lxxviiith Psalm, and declare to the king that his throne is founded on justice and judgment. I shall quote in regard to my second division, which relates to the malice of our adversary, the very words his defender made use of, namely, ‘Radix omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidem appetentes erraverunt a fide.’ These words are taken from the first epistle of St Paul to Timothy, in the last chapter, and which mean, That covetousness is the root of all evil, and causes a defalcation from the faith.

‘In regard to my third division, respecting the innocence of the late duke of Orleans, I shall use the words of the Psalmist in the seventh Psalm, ‘Judica me secundum justitiam tuam et secundum innocentiam meam super me;’ that is to say, Do me right according to thy justice, and judge me according to my innocence.

‘I shall now return to my first point, and repeat the words of the Psalmist, ‘Justitia et judicium prÆparatio sedis tua.’ This expression I may address personally to the king our lord, in saying, ‘Justice and judgment are the foundations of thy royal throne;’ for royalty without justice is undeserving of the name, and should be called a robbery according to St Austin, in the 10th chapter of his 9th book, ‘De Civitate Dei:’ ‘Regna, inquit, remota a justitia, quid sint nisi magna latrocinia.’

‘It appears, therefore, that the king is bound to do justice to all his subjects, and to preserve to every one his right, and that for the six reasons touched upon at the beginning of my speech,—my first reason being founded on the regard due to the royal dignity, which dignity has been instituted principally in order to do justice, the king being truly, in respect to his subjects, what a shepherd is to his flock, as Aristotle says in his 8th chapter of ethics, or in the 5th of his politics, on the government of cities; and it is also declared, in his book on the ruling of princes, that they are bounden to preserve justice.

‘‘Justitia inquit regnantis utilior est subditis quam fertilitas ipsius;’ which means, That the justice of the governing powers is more advantageous to the subject than fertility or riches. The Psalmist, on this matter, says, ‘Honor inquit regis judicium diligit;’ that is, The honour of the king loves justice and judgment. The justice here spoken of is nothing else than to preserve to every one his right, which is also declared by the emperor Justinian, in the first book of his Constitutions.

‘‘Justitia est constans voluntas unicuique jus suum tribuens,’ meaning, That justice is firm and stable, giving to every one his due; and it should be considered that justice is not to be administered according to pleasure, but as the written laws prescribe. Weigh well, therefore, how much you are bounden to do justice.

‘To you, then, my lady of Orleans and her children address themselves, requiring from you justice, which is the brightest jewel in your crown. Recollect the numerous examples of kings, your predecessors, who so much loved justice, and particularly that bright instance of a king, who seeing that his son had deserved, by the laws of that time, to lose both his eyes, ordered one of his eyes to be put out, and had at the same time one of his own destroyed, that the law might not be violated nor infringed.

‘Valerius also mentions, in his 6th book, a king called Cambyses, who commanded a false judge to be flayed, and his skin to be placed on the judge’s seat, and then ordered the son of the late judge to sit on the skin of his father, telling him, ‘When thou judgest any cause, let what I have done to thy father be an example to thee; and let his skin, forming thy seat, always keep thee in remembrance.’

‘O, king of France! thou rememberest what David said, when king Saul unjustly persecuted him, ‘Dominus inquit retribuet unicuique secundum justitiam tuam;’ that is to say, The Lord God will repay every one according to his justice. These words are written in the second chapter of the first book of Kings.

‘Thou oughtest, therefore, like a true follower of our lord, to do in like manner according to thy power, and aid and support such as have been unjustly wounded and persecuted. Thou canst not have forgotten, how Andronicus, a cruel murderer, was condemned to death on the spot where he had slain the high priest, as it is written in the book of Machabees.

‘O, king of France! take example from king Darius, who caused those that had falsely accused the prophet Daniel to be thrown into the lion’s den to be devoured. Recollect the justice that was executed on the two elders who, from false charges, had accused and condemned Susanna. These examples are written in the sixth and fourteenth chapters of the book of Daniel the prophet, and ought to stimulate thee to do justice as king and sovereign,—for it is in doing thus that thy subjects will be obedient to thee, and in such wise art thou bound to do them justice, and which will cause them to be highly criminal when disobedient to thee.

‘Some indeed have doubted whether the subject may not withdraw his allegiance from the sovereign on a refusal of justice and equity. May it please thee, therefore, sire, to consider this well, for thou wilt not have any thing to fear in doing justice, as I shall hereafter demonstrate; and in conclusion of this my first reason, I shall quote the words of the third chapter of Job: ‘Cum justitia indutus sum, et vestivi me vestimento et diademate in coronatione mea;’ that is to say, I am clothed with justice, and have invested myself with it, as the robe and diadem of my coronation.

‘Consequently, most noble prince, I say that fraternal love ought greatly to urge thee to do justice; for I do not believe that greater love ever existed between two brothers than what you both felt. Be then the true friend to thy brother in justice and judgment; for it will be the greatest disgrace to thee and to the crown of France, throughout the world, if justice and reparation be not made for the infamous and cruel murder of thy brother. It is now time for thee to show thy brotherly affection; and be not like to those friends spoken of by the wise man, in the 8th chapter of Ecclesiasticus, as follows: ‘Est amicus socius mensÆ et non permanebit in die necessitatis.’ That is, There are friends who are companions at table, and in prosperity, but who are no longer such in the day of adversity.

‘At this moment, necessity and affection united call upon thee to prove thyself such a friend that the world may not call thee a faint hearted friend, of whom Aristotle speaks, in his 9th chapter of ethics: ‘Qui, inquit, fingit se esse amicum, et non est; pejor est eo qui facit falsam monetam.’ A faint friend is worse than a coiner of base money. Should some tell thee, that our opponent is of thy blood, and thy relation, thou oughtest, nevertheless, to abominate his crime, and do strict justice between two friends, according to what Aristotle says, in his second book of ethics: ‘Duobus existentibus amicis, sanctum est prÆhonorare virtutem.’—That is, It is praiseworthy to give the preference to virtue between two friends.

‘Thou rememberest the strong love that subsisted between thee and thy brother; not that I wish to obtain any favour by that remembrance, but solely to exhort thee to justice and truth. Alas! it would be of little value the being son or brother to a king, if such a cruel murder were passed over without any punishment inflicted on the guilty, nor any reparation made for it,—more especially as he who caused his death ought to have loved him as a brother; for in the holy Scriptures nephews and cousins-german are called brothers, as appears from the book of Genesis, where Abraham says to his nephew Lot, ‘Ne sit jurgium inter te et me, fratres enim sumus.’ Let there be no strife between thee and me, for we are brothers.

‘Saint James is also called the brother of our Lord, when they were only cousins-german. Thou mayest repeat to our adversary the words which God said to Cain, after he had murdered his brother, ‘Vox sanguinis fratris tui clamat ad me de terra.’ The voice of thy brother’s blood cries to me from the earth; and certainly in our case the earth and blood do cry.

‘There cannot be a man of common feelings who has not compassion for such a death as that of my late lord of Orleans; and it must not be wondered at if I compare our adversary to Cain, for in them I see many features of resemblance. Cain, moved by envy, slew his brother, because the Lord had accepted of his brother’s offerings, and had not received his sacrifice, because he was practising in his heart how he could kill his brother. In like manner, the duke of Burgundy, because my lord of Orleans was the more agreeable to the king, in his heart meditated his death, and in the end had him treacherously and infamously murdered, as shall be fully proven. As Cain, instigated by covetousness, committed his crime, so our adversary, urged on by similar passions, did the act we complain of, as shall be demonstrated from his conduct previous to and after the death of the late duke of Orleans. I find, likewise, that the word Cain, by interpretation, signifies, ‘acquired’ or ‘acquisition.’ By the same name our adverse party may be called, for vengeance is acquired by the king in body and goods; but let justice take its course, and events will happen according to the good pleasure of God. It therefore seems very reasonable that I compare the duke of Burgundy to Cain.

‘Sire, remember, I pray thee, the words addressed to Cain, namely, ‘Vox sanguinis:’ The voice of thy brother’s blood. It is the voice of the lady of Orleans, and of her children, crying to thee, and demanding justice. Alas! my lord king, to whom wouldst thou wish to do justice, if thou refusest to do it for the love of thy own brother? If thou be not a friend to thy blood, to whom wouldst thou be a friend, seeing we ask no more than justice? O, most noble prince, consider that thy brother has been torn from thee for ever! Thou wilt never again see him, for the duke of Burgundy has cruelly caused him to be put to death.

‘Recollect he was thy brother, and thou wilt find how greatly he is to be compassioned. He, like thee, was equally fond of the queen and thy children, and, from his natural good sense, honoured all the royal blood of France; and few could be found more eloquent than he was when addressing nobles, clergy or laymen.

‘Our Lord had given him what king Solomon had demanded, prudence and wisdom; for every one knows, that he was adorned with an excellent understanding,—and of him may be said as of David, in the chapter of the Acts of the Apostles,—‘Sapiebat sicut angelus Domini.’ He was endowed with wisdom like to an angel of God.

‘Were I to speak of the beauty of his person, I could only say, that he was thy image and resemblance, with this good quality that he was perfectly courteous to all, and never caused any one to be beaten, or put to death, nor did he ever procure the death of any one. He possessed, however, the power of so doing, even to his enemies, who were notoriously defaming him, and attributing to him evils which he never thought of: he could, more especially, have had our adversary put to death several times, had he so pleased,—for no great power is requisite to have any one treacherously murdered.

‘But, in good truth, such thoughts were not in his heart; for the property of royal blood is to have such compassion and mercy that it cannot suffer any cruelty, murder or treason whatever; and of this blood my late lord of Orleans had a large share, for he was the son of a king and queen.

‘O, king Charles! if thou wert now alive, what wouldst thou say? What tears could appease thee? What would have hindered thee from doing justice for so base a murder? Alas! how hast thou loved, and to what honour hast thou diligently trained the tree that has brought forth the fruit which has put to death thy very dear son? Alas! king Charles, thou mayest now say with Jacob, ‘Fera pessima devoravit filium meum.’ The worst of beasts has devoured my son.

‘Our adversary has made a miserable return to thee, oh Charles! for all the great riches thou hast heaped on his father. This is the gratitude for the expedition to Flanders, wherein thou and thy kingdom were in such peril out of love to him. In truth, all the magnificent gifts thou madest the father are already forgotten. Sire, look down, and hear the lady of Orleans, crying in the words of the Psalmist, ‘Domine deduc me in justitia tua propter inimicos meos.’ Lord, lead me to thy judgment on account of mine enemies.

‘This concludes my second argument. My third is founded on pity, considering the desolate state of the supplicants, namely, the widowed lady of Orleans, in despair, with her innocent children, thy nephews, now become orphans, having no other father to look to but thee. It becomes thee, therefore, to incline thyself diligently to do them justice, as they have no other refuge but in thee, who art their lord and sovereign; and they are beside thy very near relations, as thou well knowest.

‘Let pity move thy breast; for as Saint James the apostle says, ‘Religio munda et immaculata est visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum.’ To visit orphans and widows in their distress is the duty of a pure and undefiled religion. It is melancholy that so great a lady should suffer thus undeservedly; and she may be compared to her whom Valerius speaks of in the sixth book. A widow had a son who had been unjustly slain: she went to the emperor Octavian to demand justice, and said, ‘Sire, do me justice for the cruel death of my son.’ The emperor had already mounted his horse, to perform a long journey, but replied, ‘Woman, wait until I be returned, when I will do thee justice.’ The woman answered instantly, ‘Alas! my lord, thou knowest not if ever thou shalt return, and I wish not justice to be delayed.’ The emperor said, ‘Should I not return, my successor will see thee righted;’ but the widow replied, ‘Sire, thou knowest not if thy successor would wish to see me righted: he may, perhaps, have something to prevent it like to thee; and supposing that he should do me justice, what honour would it be to thee, or what merit canst thou claim for it from the gods? Thou art bound to do me justice: wherefore then seekest thou to throw the burden on others?’

‘The emperor, observing the firmness of the woman and the reasonableness of her arguments, dismounted, and, without more delay, did her ample justice. It was for this meritorious conduct, that when the emperor died, five years after, in the pagan faith, he was brought to life again by the prayers of St Gregory, then pope, and baptised, as the histories relate.

‘The example of this emperor, O king of France! thou oughtest to follow in regard to the disconsolate widow of the late duke of Orleans, who is now a supplicant to thee, and has formerly demanded, and now again demands justice, for the inhuman and barbarous murder of her lord and husband, who was thy brother. Delays, or reference to thy successors, will have no avail; for thou, as king, art singularly obliged to do this, considering the rank of the supplicants, the duchess of Orleans and her children.

‘This lady is like to the widow of whom St Jerome speaks, in his second book against Jovinian, wherein he relates, that the daughter of Cato, after the death of her husband, was in the deepest sorrow, uttering nothing but groans and lamentations. Her relations and neighbours asked her how long this grief was to last,—when she replied, that her life and her sorrow would end together. Such, without doubt, is the state of my lady the duchess,—for she can have no remedy for her loss but by means of the justice she is soliciting. In truth, she does not require any hostile measures,—for were that the case, she and her children, with their allies, are so much more powerful than the duke of Burgundy that they are well able to avenge themselves.

‘This act of justice thou canst not refuse, nor can the adverse party raise any objections to it, considering the persons who demand it. O, sovereign king! act in such wise that the words the Psalmist spoke of the Lord may be applied to thee: ‘Justus Dominus et justitias dilexit, Æquitatem vidit vultus ejus.’ Our Lord is judgment, and loves justice: equity is the light of his countenance.—This concludes my third argument.

‘My fourth argument is founded partly on the act itself, which was so abominably cruel, the like was never seen; and all men of understanding must feel compassion for it. This, if duly considered, should incline thee the more to do justice, from the usages of the ancient kings, who, through compassion, bewailed even the death of an enemy: how much the more then does it become thee to bewail the death of thy brother, and to exert thy courage to punish the authors of it? Should it not be so, great disgrace will attach to thee and to many others.

‘We read, that CÆsar seeing the head of his enemy Pompey wept, and said, that such a man ought not to have died. He was also very much grieved at the death of Cato, though his enemy, and did all in his power to aid and console his children. O, most courteous king of France! thou oughtest likewise to give consolation for the death of thy brother, who was thy dear and loyal friend. Weigh well the manner of his death, which was piteously lamentable. Alas! my lord, could the spirit of thy brother speak, what would it not say? It would certainly address thee in words similar to these:

‘Oh, my lord and brother, see how through thee I have received my death,—for it was on account of the great affection that subsisted between us! Look at my wounds, five of which are mortal. See my body beat to the ground, and covered with mud! behold my arm cut off, and my brains scattered about! See if any pains were equal to my sufferings. It was not, alas! sufficient for mine enemy to take away my life so cruelly, and without cause; but he suddenly surprised me when coming from the residence of the queen to thee, which has put me in danger of damnation; and even after my death, he has attempted to blast my reputation by his false and defamatory libel.

‘My sovereign king, attend to these words as if thy brother had spoken them; for such they would have been, could he have addressed thee. Be then more active to do justice; and having heard the petition of my lady of Orleans, act so that thou mayest verify what is said in the second chapter of the first book of Kings: ‘Dominus retribuet unicuique secundum justitiam suam.’ Our Lord will render to all according to his justice. And this concludes my fourth argument.

‘My fifth is grounded on the great evils and mischiefs that might ensue if justice be not done on such crimes,—for every one will in future take the law into his own hand, and be judge and party. Treasons and murders will be the consequence, by which the kingdom may be ruined, as I shall demonstrate; for, according to the doctors, the surest way to preserve peace in a country is to do equal justice to all. St Cyprian declares this, in his book on the twelve errors, saying, ‘Justitia regis, pax populorum, tutamen pueris, munimentum gentis, terrÆ foecunditas, solatium pauperum, hereditas filiorum, et sibimet spes futurÆ beatitudinis.’ The justice of a king is peace to the people, the defender of orphans, the safety of the subject, the fertility of the earth, the comfort of the poor, the inheritance of sons, and to himself a hope of future happiness. It is an everlasting glory. And on this occasion the Psalmist says, ‘Justitia et pax osculatÆ sunt.’ Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.

‘Should it be urged, that if due punishment be inflicted on this crime, greater evils might ensue from the reputed power of the duke of Burgundy. To this, which has more of appearance than reality, it may be answered, That the duke of Burgundy is as nothing compared with the power of the monarch; for what power or force can he have but what thou givest him or sufferest him to enjoy?

‘Justice and truth, however they may be delayed, always in the end, through Divine mercy, are the mistresses, and there is no security like working for them. Who are the knights or esquires that would dare to serve him against thee? or where are the strangers that would risk their lives in his traitorous quarrel? Certainly none.

‘O! ye knights of Burgundy and Flanders, clerks and laymen, and all ye vassals of our adversary, send hither men unbiassed by favour or hatred, to hear this cause pleaded, truth declared, and justice adjudged to the right, according as it shall be plainly shown.

‘O! most Christian king, ye dukes, counts and princes, have the goodness to give your aid that justice may be administered, for which end you have been principally constituted and ordained.

‘O, my lord king! consider how small a power, when compared with thine, thy ancestors enjoyed, and yet they punished criminals of yet superior rank to our opponent, as any one may see who shall read our history of former times. Beside, who are they that would dare to oppose their sovereign lord, who, doing an act of justice according to the evidence of truth, becomes a true and upright judge, as Tully showeth, in his second book of Offices: ‘Judicis est semper verum sequi.’ A good judge should give judgment according to truth.

‘The same author says, in one of his orations before he went into banishment,—‘Nemo tam facinorosus inventus est vita, ut non tamen judicum prius sententiis convinceretur, quam suppliciis applicaretur.’ No one has led so wicked a life but that a verdict has been passed upon his case before he was put to the torture.

‘Thou art bounden, most potent king, to do justice; and should any evil result from it, it will fall on the adverse party, on account of his crimes, as I shall show to you hereafter. The judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ will not certainly fail of having its effect: ‘Qui de gladio percutit, gladio peribit.’ Whoso kills with the sword shall die by the sword. And Ovid, in his Art of Love, says, ‘Neque lex est Æquior ulla, quam necis artifices arte perire sua.’ No law is more just than that murderers should perish by their own arts.

‘O, my lord king! open the gates of justice, and listen to the very reasonable complaints which my lady of Orleans makes to thee, that thou mayest verify in thyself the words of the prophet, ‘Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem propterea unxit te Deus tuus oleo leticiÆ prÆ consortibus tuis;’ that is to say, Thou hast loved justice, and hast hated iniquity, wherefore the Lord thy God has anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows;—and this finishes my fifth argument.

‘My sixth and last argument, for the present, is founded on the conduct and demeanour of our opponent after this cruel and detestable crime.

‘There is nothing in this world a king should so much dread and check as the overbearing pride of any subject in regard to his government; and thou, O king! oughtest to follow, in thy governance, the example of the King of kings, of whom holy writ says, ‘Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam.’ God humbles the proud, and raises up the weak-hearted. Thou art therefore bound to humble the pride of our opponent, which has increased to such a pitch as to make him resist thy power in the support of this his wicked deed.

‘Oh! king of France, and all ye my lords, weigh well then the rebellion and disobedience of our adversary, not only against the commands of the king, but contrary to the orders of the whole royal council. It is a well known fact, that the king of Sicily, my lord of Berry, and several others, went lately to Amiens, notwithstanding the great severity of the season, to attempt bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, for the general good of the king and kingdom; but these lords, in truth, could not effect this, though they signified to our opponent the king’s commands,—but he contended that he would not wait upon his sovereign until he should be sent for by the king himself.

‘When the aforesaid lords advised him to obey the king’s commands, they could scarcely obtain from him a promise not to come to the king with a great power of men at arms; and even then he delayed his coming for fifteen days. Consider, my lords, what sort of obedience this is, and what fatal consequences may ensue from it. After the conference at Amiens, what was his conduct? Why, he assembled so large a force of men at arms, that when he came to Paris, he seemed as if he would conquer the whole kingdom.

‘It is true, indeed, that the king and the princes of his blood, hearing of this, collected a sufficient power to provide a remedy. But when the king had commanded him, by especial messengers, not to enter Paris with more than two hundred men at arms, he came accompanied by more than six hundred, in direct opposition to the king’s orders.—On his arrival in Paris with so large a force, it seemed to him that the king, queen, and other princes ought to act according to his will; and for certain, such was the state of affairs that nothing was refused him, but the whole court behaved courteously toward him, to appease his anger.

‘O, government of France! if thou wilt suffer such things to pass with impunity, thou wilt soon have cause for lamentations. Our adversary next caused all the barricadoes and defences round the king’s palace to be taken away, that his wicked intentions, already begun, might be completed. Such deeds are strong proofs of subjects having evil designs against their king. It behoved him to have come to humble himself and seek for pardon; but, on the contrary, he came with his sword drawn, and accompanied by a numerous body of men at arms, the greater part of whom were foreigners.—During his residence in Paris, he frequently excited to rebellion the simple inhabitants, by spreading abroad his defamatory libels, and various false promises. The citizens, believing he was to do wonders, and to be the regent of the kingdom, have been so much deceived by him that they paid great honour to him and to his writings, even by cries of joy, and shoutings of the populace whenever he appeared; by which and other like means, his pride and cruelty are increased, and make him obstinately persist in his iniquities.

‘Alas! my lord king, is it not the very height of presumption to ride through Paris openly armed, after having committed such a crime, and to attend thy peaceful council with his battle-axes and lances? where thou oughtest not to have suffered any one to have entered more armed than thyself, lest the devil, who had instigated him to commit the base act he did, should unfortunately have urged him to commit a still greater, because the princes of the council did not approve of the wickedness he had done. Therefore thou shouldest never allow any one culpable like him, who takes the law into his own hands, to be in thy presence, more strongly armed than thou art thyself; for it is possible for such as him to beguile the people by the means before mentioned, and to lead them to thy own destruction as well as that of thy realm.

‘Be pleased, therefore, to humiliate our opponent, and shew thyself an upright and fearless judge in the cause of truth, that it may be said of thee as it is written in the 8th chapter of the 3d book of kings,—‘Judicabit servos suos, justificans quod justum est, attribuens eis secundum justitiam.’ He will judge his servants, justifying them that are upright, and giving to each according to his deserts. From this, as well as from the preceding arguments, it plainly appears, that thou art bounden to do the justice required by my lady of Orleans.

‘I shall now demonstrate the crime of our adversary, and how he perpetrated such an unpardonable deed, to which I shall add six arguments to prove the fealty and loyalty of my lord of Orleans, taking for my theme the words of the advocate of our opponent,—namely, ‘Radix omnium malorum cupiditas.’

‘It seems to me, that covetousness has been the original cause of this murder,—not covetousness of wealth alone, but likewise covetousness of honours and ambition.—Covetousness has then been the original cause, as shall more plainly be shown hereafter.

‘To prove the greatness and abomination of this crime, I shall use six arguments. The first is founded on our adversary having not the power or authority of a judge over the deceased.

‘Secondly, Supposing he may have had any authority over him, he proceeded in his own way, contrary to every maxim of law and of justice.

‘My third argument is grounded on the strict alliance that had been formed between my late lord of Orleans and our adversary.

‘Fourthly, That this is a damnable murder, and cannot any way be defended or explained.

‘Fifthly, That our opponent caused my lord of Orleans to be slain with a wicked intention.

‘Sixthly, That, not satisfied with having caused the duke of Orleans to be deprived of his life, he has exerted himself to disgrace his fame, by defamatory libels,—thus, as it were, slaying him a second time.

‘As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make himself king.

‘So far was our adversary from having any power or authority over my lord of Orleans that he was bound to do him honour and reverence as son to a king, and to call him his lord, and respect him in his words and actions, for such are the privileges and prerogatives belonging to the sons of kings. This usurpation, therefore, of authority is apparent in our adversary, and consequently his wickedness has been unjustly perpetrated.

‘That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put another to death appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures: and in fact, St Austin, when discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St Matthew,‘Omnis qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit;’ that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, ‘All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’ He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem:’—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes.

‘In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the judge that declares him such?

‘The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants.

‘The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, ‘Tyrannus est, cum aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam et qui incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.’ Now let us see whether my lord of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not; for he never took possession of another’s land: if any one know the contrary, let him say so.

‘Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay and Orchies, notwithstanding his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made.

‘My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws.

‘Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life.

‘If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late lord, for his were the direct opposite.

‘In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain.

‘It is therefore wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to the damnable proposition of our opponent.

‘But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done contrary to the letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the intention of the maker of the law, nor contrary to its spirit, but through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law? The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes. ‘Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.’ It is therefore clear, that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not follow that he had any authority over the defunct; for if so, he would have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What though he be a peer? he has no power but over his own lands; and in so much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he appropriates to himself kingly domination.

‘His advocate has indeed alledged twelve reasons to prove that his lord might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral philosophers,—three on the civil law, and the three last on examples drawn from the holy Scriptures.

‘With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, who says,—‘Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit nolentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tunc qui ad liberationem patriÆ talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et prÆmium accipit.’ To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other’s domination by violence, nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say, he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in the third part of my defence of him.

‘I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may be proved a tyrant,—but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject St Austin proposes a question, whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand afterward determined.

‘I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the princes of his blood,—none of whom would have hesitated to have personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king’s authority. Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him and the king assured of successors.

‘The second reason is founded on the authority of St Peter, who says, ‘Subditi, estote regi quasi prÆcellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum quia hÆc est voluntas Dei.’ These words appear to me of no weight in the present case; for it would seem that the Apostle would not that any duke should have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country: otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy.—The advocate has, therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose.

‘His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.’ That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been proven and known for tyrants.

‘The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my lord of Orleans, as I have before shown.

‘The fifth reason is grounded on the praise Tully, in his book ‘de Officiis,’ gives to those who killed CÆsar. To this I reply, that although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an ill-wisher to CÆsar; for he was always of the party, and supported the cause of Pompey the rival and adversary to CÆsar,—and CÆsar perpetrated many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of.

‘The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: ‘Res est valde meritoria occidere tyrannum.’ To this I answer, That it must apply only in cases where no other remedy can be had; and the conduct of our opponent has been illegal and wicked.

‘The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws, which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to death,—namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans, who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker; and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary.

‘The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the opinion of St Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St Peter both acted contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar,—for Moses was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing.

‘The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew Zambry without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act, that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show.

‘The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St Michael did not slay Lucifer,—and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise, whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords! in what book has this advocate learned such theology? I am confounded at the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St Jude, that St Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had power over him, nor command him to do any thing; but he only said, ‘Our Lord commands thee;’ and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act.

‘I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the king Amalech,—but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished,—for should any evil report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take it into his head to punish them himself for it.

‘O, princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any man may say, ‘I also may kill him as such a one did.’ You will therefore be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious and abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, ‘Confundantur vehementer qui non intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.’

‘The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to the forms of law, by information, and on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses. But he no way followed this course; for he first kills the duke of Orleans, and then seeks for reasons to exculpate himself for so doing. O, God! what a trial, and what a judge!! O, justice! do thy duty; and what thou owest to thyself, defend thy own cause against one who seeks to reduce thee to nothing. In truth, every law ordains that causes should be first tried, and sentences examined, before they are put into execution; and to this purpose Julius CÆsar, according to what Sallust relates, said, That when judges shall put men to death before they be condemned, the greatest evils may arise, and no man live in security. He brings, as an example, the Lacedemonians, who, after their victory over the Athenians, constituted thirty persons to govern the public state, who put to death numbers without any previous trial, which caused great misfortunes.

‘The like will befal us, if such crimes are suffered to go unpunished. Sallust tells us, that when Cataline and his associates were intending to burn the city of Rome and murder its senators, Tully was then consul; but although he was fully acquainted with the plot, he did not cause one of the conspirators to be put to death until he had fully proved their guilt. Now, my lords, as I have fully and clearly proved the heinousness of the crime with which I have charged the duke of Burgundy; and as it was done contrary to all law and justice, I trust it will not remain unpunished, according to the words of our Lord by the prophet Isaiah, in his 47th chap.: ‘Videbitur opprobrium tuum, ultionem capiam, et non resistet mihi homo.’

‘My third argument is grounded on our adversary’s having entered into the strongest possible alliance with the duke of Orleans, in the presence of many of their dependants; and a twelvemonth prior to the murder of the above duke this alliance was renewed before several prelates, nobles, clergymen and counsellors of each side, when the two dukes swore on the crucifix, with the holy evangelists in their hands, to the due and faithful observance of it, promising, on the salvation of their souls, and by their honour, that henceforward they would be to each other as brothers and companions in arms, engaging to reveal mutually any evil designs that might be plotted or meditated against their persons or interests. They then agreed to wear each other’s badge, which was done. And at the last feast at CompiÈgne, for the greater confirmation of the above, my lord of Orleans and our adversary made many of their knights and dependants alternately swear, that they would loyally and truly abide by and support the bonds of friendship entered into between them, through love and attachment to their persons,—and would make known to each party any thing that should be imagined against their persons or estate.

‘Moreover, my lord of Orleans and our adversary entered into other private engagements, promising and swearing on the true cross, that they would mutually defend and guard each other’s person and honour against all who should attack them. This agreement was signed with their own hands and seals.

‘What now, O duke of Burgundy! canst thou say to these things? Who now can put any confidence in thee? for thou canst not deny the above alliance, as there are many witnesses to it now living: thou hast been publicly seen by the whole city wearing the badge of the duke of Orleans.

‘How did my late lord act? Certainly in no way hurtful to our opponent; for from that time no reproachful or angry words passed between them, that could any how be ill interpreted. It is plain, therefore, that our adversary has wickedly and treacherously put to death him who had the fullest confidence in his honour.

‘O duke! what reply canst thou make to this? Shouldst thou say, that thou didst cause him to be put to death on account of the wickedness which thou hast by thy command caused to be imputed to him,—say, then, why thou enteredst into any alliance or bonds of friendship with such an infamous traitor as thou hast had him painted. Thou knowest, that loyal men will never form a friendship with traitors. Thou sayest, that the duke of Orleans was a traitor to his king: thou therefore makest thyself a traitor by the act of forming an alliance with him.

‘Thou hast accused my lord of Orleans of having made an alliance with Henry of Lancaster: what wilt thou say to the alliances thou thyself afterward enteredst into with the duke of Orleans. If these things had happened after thy alliance with my late lord, thou wouldst have had some colour to have broken with him, although even this would have been barely sufficient; but thou knowest well that thou hast not alledged any thing against him, in thy scandalous libel, posterior to these alliances.

‘O, abominable treason! what can be offered in thy excuse? O ye knights, who consider honour as your judge! God will never suffer you to approve of such deeds.

‘O, duke of Burgundy! thou hast frequently visited the duke of Orleans, when alive: thou hast eaten and drank with him: thou hast even taken spices out of the same dish with him, in token of friendship. In short, on the Tuesday preceding his death, he most kindly invited thee to dine with him the Sunday following, which thou promisedst to do in the presence of my lord of Berry, now here. Assuredly my lord of Orleans might have quoted the words of Jesus Christ to the traitor Judas, ‘Qui mittit manum mecum in paropside, hic me tradet.’

‘O, my lords! weigh well this treason, and apply a remedy to it. Consider how strongly the faith and loyalty of chivalry should be guarded and the words of Vegetius, when speaking of chivalry, ‘Milites jurata sua omnia custodiant.’ To the observance of this, all princes are bound,—for he who shall disgrace his loyalty or honour is unworthy of being called a knight.

‘My fourth argument is founded on this consideration, that the death of my late lord, the duke of Orleans, was damnable and disloyal,—and any one who should maintain or assert the contrary would not be a good Christian. We see that the secular justice allows to malefactors time for repentance,—but thou, cruel adversary! thou hast caused my lord so suddenly to be put to death that, inasmuch as in thee lay, he died without repenting of his sins. It seems, therefore, that thou hast exerted all thy influence to procure the eternal damnation of his soul when thou destroyedst his body; and most assuredly thou wilt find great difficulty to make thy peace with God,—for insomuch as thou believest him the greater sinner, so much the more need had he, as thou mayst suppose, of a fuller and longer repentance.—It follows, then, that thou hast deprived him, to the utmost of thy power, of any possibility of repentance,—and consequently thy sin becomes the more grievous and inexcuseable, more especially as my lord was no way expecting to die when he was thus suddenly and cruelly cut off.—Nevertheless, I trust that our Lord may have granted that he died in his grace; and I the more readily believe it, inasmuch as, a short time before this sad event, he had most devoutly confessed himself.

‘I repeat, that it is the deed of a wicked Christian thus to put a man to death; and whoever may say the contrary, or maintain that it is meritorious, I tell him, that he speaks wickedly and erroneously, according to the theologians.

‘Hear, my lords, and consider the conduct of our adversary after the death of the duke of Orleans,—how on the Thursday following his murder, clothed in black, and with tears and every sign of grief, he accompanied the dead body from the church of the Guillemins to that of the Celestins! Weigh well, my lords, this treachery and dissimulation! O Lord God, what tears and groans!!! O, Earth! how couldst thou bear such wickedness? Open thy mouth, and swallow up all who commit such dreadful sins.

‘Recollect, that on the ensuing Friday, at the hÔtel of the duke of Berry, in his presence and in that of the king of Sicily, our adversary advanced towards the servants of the late duke of Orleans, entreating them to make every inquiry after the author of this murder, and begging them to recommend him to the duchess of Orleans and to her children: then the three noble persons having conferred together, the duke of Berry declared the request was proper, and that they would exert themselves as much as possible to discover the person who had committed this atrocious act.

‘O, duke of Burgundy! thou promisedst to do this, by the mouth of my lord of Berry, whereas thou didst the worst thou could; for, not satisfied with having caused the murder of his body, thou seekest to destroy the reputation of the defunct. Thou promisedst to seek most diligently after the murderer, while thou knewest it was thyself that wast the criminal.

‘Now, my lords, consider well, that after a resolution had been taken to seek after the author of this crime, our adversary, the duke of Burgundy, conscious of his guilt, confessed that it was he who had caused the death of the duke of Orleans. When he made this confession on his knees to the king and my lord the duke of Berry, he affirmed, that what he had done was by the instigation of the devil; and certainly in this instance he spoke the truth, for he was urged to it by jealousy and ambition.

‘O, my lords! weigh well this confession, and how our adversary contradicts himself,—for when he first confessed his guilt, he said he had been instigated to it by the devil; but afterward he commands it to be argued, that he committed so atrocious a deed legally and justifiably. If he feel no shame for his wickedness, he ought at least to be sensible of his thus meanly contradicting himself. Consider also, that he was desirous of concealing his crime; and God knows, that if his deed had been of that worth as has been advanced for him, he would have gloried in having so done, and not have wished to remain undiscovered as the perpetrator. And why did he own his guilt? Because it could no longer be concealed. That this was the cause is apparent; for when he perceived that it must be known, he fled most precipitately from Paris, like to one in despair. He might have said, with Judas the traitor, ‘Peccavi tradens sanguinem justum.’

‘O Philip, duke of Burgundy! wert thou now alive, thou wouldst not have approved the conduct of our adversary, but wouldst have said thy son had degenerated. Thou wert surnamed The Bold,—but he was always fearful and suspicious, consequently a traitor. Thou mightst have truly applied to him what is written in the fifth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, ‘Cur temptavit sathanas cor tuum mentiri te Spiritui Sancto? non es mentitus hominibus sed Deo.’

‘My fifth argument is grounded on the falsehood of the declarations of our opponent, that he had caused the death of the duke of Orleans with the purest intentions; for, on the contrary, he committed this crime through lust of power, and to gain greater authority over the kingdom, and also to possess himself of the royal treasury, that he might more largely gratify and increase his dependants. This is evident from the conduct of our adversary before and after the death of the duke of Orleans.

‘It is a truth, that shortly after the death of his father the duke of Burgundy, he exerted himself to the utmost to obtain similar power in this realm, and with the same pensions and authority as his late father had enjoyed. But this was not granted to him, because his father had been uncle to the king, and was a man of great prudence and understanding, qualities not possessed by our adversary.

‘Having been disappointed, he instantly began to practise how he could better obtain his object; and for this end, prior to the death of the duke of Orleans, he caused reports to be circulated throughout the kingdom of his affection to the public weal, and that he alone was the fittest person to govern it. When he perceived, that in spite of his fictions, the duke of Orleans still possessed the authority he was panting for, because he was the son of a king, and the only brother to the king, and more fit for the government than the duke of Burgundy,—seeing, therefore, all his plans frustrated, he conspired to take away the life of the duke of Orleans, expecting that when he should be made away with, no other person would dare to dispute his having the sole government of the kingdom.

‘This is the principal cause of so barbarous a murder, notwithstanding the arguments that have been urged in his excuse, as is well known to all. His conduct, likewise, after the death of my late lord of Orleans, confirms it; for instantly, on his return to Paris, he began to push forward those that were his dependants and supporters, by depriving many valiant and deserving men of places which they held under the king, without any other cause but that they had been appointed to them by my lord of Orleans, as others had been, and giving their offices to such as he pleased, in order to gain more authority and power. He also endeavoured to make all placemen, particularly those who had the management of the royal treasury, subservient to him, that they might not refuse him any thing.

‘Our adversary was most anxious to have the government of the treasury, and obtained from it the sum of two hundred thousand livres, by warrants thereon, or otherwise, great part of which he distributed among his people, as is well known to the clerks of the treasury; and this was his principal object in putting to death his rival in power, my late lord of Orleans, namely, covetousness of the king’s money, and to give it away and enrich his followers. It appears, therefore, that covetousness and pride have been the springs of his actions; but, please God, he shall not in this instance profit from them,—and the words of Job, in his seventh chapter, shall be verified, ‘Cum habuerit quod cupierit, possidere non poterit.’

‘My sixth and last argument is founded on the conduct of our adversary, who, not satisfied with having murdered the late duke of Orleans, attempts, in conjunction with his followers, to deprive him of his good fame and renown, by defamatory libels, wherein he groundlessly and falsely charges him with the crimes of divine and human high treason, of which he was perfectly innocent, as has been, and shall be again demonstrated.

‘It may be said, that this justification is even more scandalous than the fact itself; for to fall into sin is the lot of humanity, but obstinately to persevere in it is diabolical. And this manner of justifying murder is the defence of his own sin, and daring to do what God hates: he follows not the example of David when he said, ‘Non declines cor meum in verba maliciÆ ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis.’

‘I come now to my third division, in which I shall reply to the defamatory libel, and to the accusations therein, that were made by our adversary against the character of my late lord of Orleans. I may fairly quote the words of the Psalmist, on the part of my late lord, ‘Judica me Domine secundum justitiam meam, et secundum innocentiam meam super me.’ This request the Psalmist makes to God, and such a request, O king! does the duchess of Orleans now make to thee, as she requires nothing but judgment and justice. May it please thee to listen to the answers of my lady of Orleans to the six charges brought against her late lord, and thou wilt then judge whether he has not been unjustly accused.

‘The first charge brought against the late duke of Orleans by the advocate of the duke of Burgundy is, That during his lifetime he committed the crime of high treason in the highest degree, by his idolatrous conduct in witchcrafts and sorceries, contrary to the Christian faith and the honour of God. It is true, that in regard to this accusation, the advocate did not pursue it very far, saying, that the judgment of such crimes belonged to God, the sovereign Lord,—meaning, that no human judge was competent to it.

‘When making this charge, he spoke of an apostate monk and several sorcerers, in whom my late lord of Orleans put confidence, according to his allegations. I shall scarcely offer any reply to this accusation, but, in like manner as he has done, refer the whole to the judgment of God. It will be sufficient for me to show, in the first place, That my late lord of Orleans was a good and true Christian; that he never committed any sorceries or idolatries, nor ever departed from the faith of Jesus Christ.

‘I may likewise add, That from his youth upward, he was of a religious turn of mind,—for, notwithstanding his fondness for amusements, his reliance was in God, to whom he very often confessed himself. Nay, the very Saturday preceding his death, he had most devoutly confessed himself, with many signs of contrition, declaring he would not longer follow youthful pastimes, but solely devote himself to the service of God, and to that of the public welfare. That I may not be suspected of uttering falsehoods, many religious as well as others, are now alive, to whom he had made such declarations; and, without saying more, let his uncle the duke of Bourbon be heard, who knows what promises he made to God,—for a little before his decease, he assured him, that henceforward his conduct should be such as to merit the approbation of God and mankind, and that all the inhabitants of this kingdom should be bound to pray for him.

‘I know not if our adversary had heard of these wise declarations, or whether he was afraid of their being effected, as they were quite in opposition to his wish for the government; for he well knew that if my lord of Orleans should act as he had said he would, his authority in the kingdom would have been very small indeed. It may therefore be presumed, it was for this that he was so eager to have my lord of Orleans put to death.

‘O, Lord God! thou knowest how well he was inclined toward thee at the time of his being murdered, which gives me confidence in his salvation; for the holy Scripture says, ‘Justus si morte prÆoccupatus fuerit in refrigerio erit.’ It is, however, evident, that our adversary did all he could to destroy his soul, and afterward heard mass most devoutly in appearance, putting what had passed out of his thoughts, and daily saying his canonical prayers.

‘O, duke of Burgundy! why hast thou done all this through hypocrisy and fiction? Who has revealed to thee the secrets of hearts? and who has made thee the judge of men’s thoughts? Thou resemblest the Pharisees, who called Christ a deceiver and possest of a devil! Thou knowest, that even angels are ignorant of the secrets of our hearts, and yet thou pretendest to judge them! O! how well does the Psalmist exclaim, ‘Tu solus es scrutans renes et corda!’

‘It is notorious, that my late lord founded many masses and private chapels, doing much service to the church: let then his last will, so devoutly written, be considered with what I have before said, and any one may decide whether he was an idolater or sorcerer. It is true, indeed, that the advocate for our adversary refers to the judgment of God all that respects divine high treason, saying that he will not make this an especial charge against the late duke of Orleans.

‘But I now ask why he thus acts? Because he knows the charge is groundless, and that in many places human judges may and do punish sorcerers and idolaters according to their power; and that numbers have for these crimes been condemned to death, because they were bad Christians, and that from such errors of the faith proceed heresies. It is written in the second book of Kings, that Josias killed and extirpated diviners and sorcerers; and in the tenth chapter of Zacharias, ‘Divini viderunt mendacium et somniatores locuti sunt frustra.’ It is also written in the nineteenth chapter of Leviticus, ‘Ne declinetis ad magos, nec ab ariolis aliquid sciscitemini.’

‘The reason why the advocate passed so rapidly over this charge was, that he knew nothing against my lord of Orleans that could prove him a bad Christian, or that he was not firm in his belief of religion. O, lord king! my lady of Orleans supplicates thee, that the words of Job, in the twenty-second chapter, may be verified,—‘Salvabitur innocens in munditia manuum suarum.’

‘The second accusation was, That my lord of Orleans favoured the schism in the church, by affording aid to Pietro della Luna, formerly called Pope Benedict, and was consequently guilty of high treason in the second degree. In reply, I say, that my lord of Orleans gave no aid nor showed any favour, but with the laudable end of making an honourable peace in the church, and particularly when he considered Benedict as the true pope. It is well known, that our obedience to the church would have been brought about more to our honour if Pietro della Luna had done his duty, by yielding up his claims, for the union of the church, than by violently supporting them. My lord of Orleans may have said, it will be better to wait a little, for the above Pietro to send in his cession, than by hurrying make affairs worse. In this there could not be any evil intentions; for it is a fact, that he was anxious for the union of the church, and believed firmly that Pietro della Luna was willing to abdicate his claims, whenever the roman pontiff should be ready to do the same.

‘Many are now living who have heard the duke swear, that if he knew Pietro della Luna was unwilling to yield up his pretensions, when the other pope should resign his, he would be the bitterest enemy he had in the world; and should it be thought necessary, they are ready to prove it. Now let us consider what advantage the division of the church could be of to him. He was wise enough to see all the evils that flowed from it, and not so weak as to found confidence on a man so old as Pietro della Luna. He knew, besides, that by the union of the church more spiritual and temporal advantages would fall to the share of himself and friends, without comparison, than if the schism were continued.

‘To show more evidently the earnest desire my lord of Orleans had for an union of the church, I will mention a proposal which he made to the university of Paris three weeks before his death. When he perceived that the roman pontiff would neither come to Genoa nor Savoy, nor accept as hostages those who had been presented to him by the mareschal de Boucicaut, and that nothing else prevented the union of the church, for Pietro della Luna was ready to go to either of these places, he addressed the following speech to the members of the university: ‘O rector, and you all my good friends! see I pray ye that we may shortly, through the grace of God, restore peace to the church, and may give satisfactory security, that the roman pope may come to Genoa. I have offered him the choice of one of my sons, as his hostage, and am ready to send him, at my own expense, to Venice, or elsewhere. Write, therefore, such letters as you shall think proper to him, and I will sign them. Tell what I have said to the whole university, and bring me their opinions on it.’

‘The heads of the university thanked him very warmly for his offer,—adding, that he could not make a more generous proposal, and that he had demonstrated by it the affection he bore to the church. There are persons still living whom he had ordered to go to Rome and Venice to give notice of the offer he had made. Now, my lords, could he have done more than to give his own flesh and blood for an hostage? And our witnesses of this act are neither weak nor ignorant persons, but doctors and professors of theology.

‘O, duke of Burgundy! this will show to thee how false has been thy accusation; and on this charge thou oughtest to have been silent, knowing as thou must how anxious thou wert to acquire the friendship of Pietro della Luna. At the time when Pietro was in the greatest disgrace, thou didst write and send to him to obtain bishopricks and other preferments for thy dependants; and thy messengers were not pages nor common persons, but the guardian of thy soul, namely, thy confessor, that he might the more clearly and securely explain thy meaning.

‘It was also said, that my lord of Orleans consented to the malicious excommunication sent by Pietro della Luna to induce the king to continue his obedience to him. Now it is quite clear that this wicked excommunication carries no effect against Pietro della Luna, except in case the king should become disobedient, and that he had given his consent to the said excommunication, which, as has been said, was to have no effect, except in case of renunciation of allegiance or disobedience. It is certain that Pietro della Luna was of a temper obstinate enough to do such things, and that he acted thus without consulting any one, and as certain that my lord of Orleans was unfavourable to this act,—for it was not put in force until after his death.

‘Weigh, at the same time, my lords, the misconduct of our adversary, and the innocence of the duke of Orleans, who may say with the Psalmist, ‘Os peccatoris et os dolosi super me apertum est, locuti sunt adversum me lingua dolosa, et sermonibus odii circumdederunt me.’

‘The third charge of our adversary is, that my late lord of Orleans practised different means to cause the death of his prince and lord, the king of France: first, as it is said, by sorceries, witchcrafts and superstitions;—secondly, by poisons;—thirdly, by fire, water, or other violent injections, which consequently inculpates my lord of Orleans in the crime of human high treason, in the person of the king our lord.

‘In regard to the first part of the charge relative to poison, supposed to be administered by a monk under the forms of a sword, a buckler, a ring, or a wand,—and that, to accomplish this, my lord of Orleans had sent for this monk, a knight, an esquire and a varlet, to whom, our adversary says, he gave large sums of money,—all this I deny as absolute falsehoods, for my said lord of Orleans never consented to sorceries or such forbidden deeds.

‘Should this monk have done such sorceries, it was no way through the exhortation of my lord of Orleans, nor ought this to have been so lightly alledged against him,—for there was a long trial held of this monk before the ministers of the king, from whom the truth may be known. It was then discovered by the confession of the monk, that my lord had forbidden him to use any magic arts that would any way prove to the prejudice of the king’s person; and God knows, if there had been any truth in the charge, it would not have been concealed until after my lord’s death.

‘By this, the falsehood of the accusation is evident; and although my foresaid lord may have at times held some conversation with this monk, let it be remembered that he was then young, not more than eighteen years old, and that princes of that age are frequently deceived by artful talkers, to gain money from them.

‘With respect to the bone wrapped up in a small linen bag which he wore between his shirt and skin, as our adversary says, until it was torn from him by a knight, whom he hated ever after, and continued to persecute until he had ruined him in his fortune, and procured his banishment out of the realm,—this is most assuredly false; for the knight was banished the kingdom by sentence of the courts of justice for a very notorious cause, and this odious circumstance was never mentioned but by this knight who published it, and who, according to our adversary, was suspected of hatred to the duke of Orleans, and consequently not a competent witness to be admitted against the defunct.

‘Consider, my lords, what falsehoods are contained in the accusations of our adversary, and that such as read his libel must be deceived. It behoves, therefore, the reverend professors of theology to correct it as soon as possible, for they know that such libels ought not to be written nor published; but the most marvellous circumstance of all is, that this libel and these falsehoods have been suffered and made public by a theologian in the presence of the king’s majesty.

‘We are at present in a similar situation to that in which Saint Austin represents the companion of the physician and astrologer disputing on twin children, the one fat and the other lean. The astrologer attributing the difference to the ascendancy of the stars,—the physician declaring, that the fat one received the soul first, and, being the strongest, sucked nearly the whole of the food,—which ought to be believed? The physician, certainly, as St Austin says. We, in like manner, may give greater credit to the faculty of medicine in this manner than to the faculty of theology: the professor has very foolishly argued his case.

‘O, most merciful God! apply a remedy to this, for thou seest theologians affirm that sorcerers may succeed in their incantations; and it is erring against the holy Scriptures to say, that sorcerers are others than liars. And the wise Solomon makes this answer to those who asserted similar errors, in the 33d chapter of Ecclesiasticus,—‘Quod divinatio erroris, et arguta mendacia et somnia maleficiorum vanitas est.’ Thomas Aquinas quotes this authority to prove that sorcerers cannot succeed.

‘O, thou university of Paris! please to correct thyself; for such absurd sciences are not only forbidden, as being contrary to the honour of God, but as containing nothing true, which is confirmed by the workers of magic.

‘Ovid says, in his book, ‘De Remedia Amoris,’

‘Master John de Bar, who was very expert in this accursed art, and who was burnt, with all his books, declared, at his last confession, that the devil never appeared to him, and that his invocations and sorceries never succeeded, although many said the contrary. He added, that he had practised this art to obtain money from persons of high rank. It is therefore most strange to charge the duke of Orleans with such vain and foolish sorceries, as there never was a man who hated them more, or who persecuted such as practised them with greater rigour.

‘Every one knows that my late lord was the principal cause of the trial of John de Bar and of two augustan friars, before the king’s council and clergy summoned for this purpose, and were in consequence executed for their evil deeds.

‘With regard to what the advocate for our opponent says, that the late lord of Milan only gave his daughter to the duke of Orleans in the hope of her being queen of France; and that, on her taking leave of him, he should say, ‘Adieu! my child: I never wish to see thee again but as queen of France.’ This is absolutely false; for my lord of Milan was in treaty with the duke of Gueldres, brother to the king of the Romans, to marry his daughter: ambassadors were even on their road to Milan to conclude the match, when Bertrand Gaad, at that time tutor to the count de Vertus, was sent by the king and the dukes of Berry and Burgundy, (whose soul may God receive!) to propose the alliance of the duke of Orleans.

‘The lord of Milan, preferring the honour of a connexion with France, consented to give his daughter to the duke of Orleans, ceased to treat with the duke of Gueldres, and recalled the ambassadors he had sent to him. As to the words the lord of Milan has been supposed to address to his daughter on her taking leave of him, they are also false,—for he left Pavia without seeing or speaking to her, because he could not have done either without weeping. The advocate for our adversary utters another falsehood, when he says, that the lord of Milan expressed his astonishment to a french knight, on his telling him the king of France was in good health, replying, ‘Thou sayest, that the king of France is in good health: how can that possibly be?’ My lord of Milan is too reserved ever to have held such a conversation; and it is well known to many now alive, that my lord of Milan loved the king of France above all other princes, and was very much attached to his family. This he always testified by the honours and presents he lavished on ambassadors and nobles of France, who travelled through his country, all from his respect to the king and his royal blood.

‘With regard to the history of that gallant man, sir Philip de Mezieres, whom the advocate has most scandalously defamed,—it is true, that when sir Philip came from Cyprus, king Charles, whom God pardon! retained him, and made him his chamberlain. After the death of the king, sir Philip put on the humble dress of a monk, in the church of the Celestins, where he devoutly remained until his death. The late duke of Burgundy had a friendship for the lord of Milan, and, perceiving sir Philip to be a man of ability and prowess, sent him to Milan to propose a croisade to the holy land: the lord of Milan received him honourably, and willingly listened to all he had to say.

‘Before that time, sir Philip had never resided in Milan, nor had any connexion with the lord Bernabo, uncle to the present lord. Sir Philip had left Milan very long before any mention was made of the marriage of the duke of Orleans with the present duchess, which clearly proves how ill founded have been the imputations of our adversary.

‘Another infamous falsehood has been boldly advanced, namely, that my lord of Orleans, seeing he could not compass the king’s death by sorceries, practised other means to accomplish it, that he might succeed to the crown of France, by promising to one man four thousand francs, to another five thousand, to make up and administer different poisons,—and that some accepted his offers, and others refused them. Most assuredly, if there had been such loyal persons as to refuse these great sums of money, they would not have hesitated to reveal the matter, that it might be inquired into and punished; but as they have not done so, we may safely conclude the assertion is false.

‘Our adversary has alledged, that at a dinner at the queen’s palace, the duke of Orleans threw some powder over the king’s dish. This may be proved to be false, for no mention was made during the dinner of any such act,—for it is clear, that if the queen had observed any thing of the sort at her dinner, she would have denounced it to the servants and family of the king, otherwise she would not have been loyal.

‘As to the story of the queen’s almoner, which our adversary has brought forward,—namely, his falling down dead and losing his hair and nails,—it is notoriously false, for he lived five or six years after the time when he was supposed thus suddenly to die. I may therefore apply to our opponent the words of the prophet Jeremiah, in his seventh chapter, ‘Ecce vos confiditis in sermonibus mendacii, sed non proderunt vobis.’

‘Our adversary next advances, that my lord of Orleans, finding he could not destroy the king by poisons or sorceries, attempted to do it by fire and other means; that my lord of Orleans, in consequence, proposed a masquerade dance of persons dressed as savages, in cloth covered with pitch and tow, and other inflammable materials,—among the number of whom was the king,—and that the duke of Orleans caused his dress to be made too tight, that he might be excused from being of the party. Our adversary adds, that when one of the king’s servants was warning him of the danger that might ensue from such dresses, the duke of Orleans was greatly enraged and gave him much abusive language: in short, that my lord of Orleans set fire to the king’s dress, who was in the utmost peril of death, had not God, and certain ladies by their exertions, prevented it.—Now, in answer to this heavy charge, I shall reply, that my lord of Orleans did not provide the dresses, nor could he then have known where to have sought for them.

‘The dukes of Berry and Burgundy, lately deceased, well knew who were the proposers of this dance, and that it was not the duke of Orleans. Had he been the author of it, he would not have escaped death, or very great blame, considering the commotion it caused, for he had then scarcely any power. As to what our adversary says, that the dress of the duke of Orleans was purposely made too tight, there is not the smallest appearance of truth in it, for at that time the duke was the thinnest of the company.

‘It is true, that my lord of Orleans and the lord Philip de Bar had gone before the commencement of this ball to visit the lady of Clermont, who had not come to the wedding held at the hÔtel de St Pol, for which this entertainment was given, and on their return they found all the dresses had been made use of. This was the sole cause why the duke of Orleans was not dressed to make one of the party.

‘It is an infamous lie to say, as our opponent has done, that the duke of Orleans wished to burn the king our lord; for the duke and the lord Philip de Bar intended dressing themselves in these clothes, and, without thinking or intending any ill, they both told Peter de Navarre to set fire to the dresses of the savages, that when on fire they might run among the ladies to frighten them. Peter de Navarre is living, and he can prove the truth of this to the king. Let us suppose, that in this youthful frolic, my lord of Orleans should have set fire to one of the dresses, as he had ordered the same to be done to all, it is not credible that it could have been done through malice or evil intentions. It is then apparent, that what our adversary has asserted is a lie; and I comfort myself with the words of the prophet,—‘Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium,’—and in the 20th chapter of Proverbs, ‘Qui profert mendacia peribit.’

‘As to the alliances which our opponent says the duke of Orleans entered into with Henry of Lancaster, at present calling himself king of England, to the prejudice of the king and realm, and colouring his assertion by adding, that Richard, late king of England, had assured the king of France, that his infirmities were solely owing to the machinations of the dukes of Milan and Orleans,—I answer, that they are wicked falsehoods; for when Henry of Lancaster came to France, he was most honourably received by the princes of the royal family as their relation, and frequented the company of the duke of Orleans and others of the blood royal as of their kindred, when, as a friend to the king, he formed an alliance with the duke of Orleans publicly, and in the presence of the king and princes of the blood, which at the time was considered as perfectly lawful, and for the good of the kingdom. This plainly shows, that my lord of Orleans had made no alliance against king Richard; but what is more, at the treaty of marriage of the king’s daughter, now duchess of Orleans, with king Richard, the duke of Orleans and king Richard formed an alliance similar to that which the latter had formed with the king of France.

‘After this, my lord of Orleans went to Calais, where he was most amicably received by king Richard as a very dear brother. In addition, when king Richard died, the duke of Orleans showed great grief for it, and made an enemy of king Henry of Lancaster, by the challenges he sent him, accusing him of being guilty of the crime of high treason against his sovereign lord king Richard, offering to fight the said king Henry, in revenge for the death of Richard, either in single combat, or with any number of persons he might choose.

‘These and many more circumstances can be brought forward to prove that my lord of Orleans had a strong affection for king Richard, from his alliance by marriage with the king of France, and that he hated king Henry for having laid hands on his sovereign.

‘There is not more truth in what our adversary has advanced, that my lord of Orleans, when with Pietro della Luna, exerted himself to obtain bulls to the prejudice of the king and his family, and on this account always favoured the said Pietro; for at that time my lord of Orleans had procured with this Pietro, then called Benedict, a very advantageous alliance for the king of France, by which he engaged to support the king and his family by every means in his power, as may be seen in the bulls issued to this effect. It is therefore very extraordinary, that any man endowed with common sense should have asserted publicly things that are evidently false.

‘As to what our adversary says, that my lord of Orleans supported Pietro della Luna, I have before answered it; and my lord proposed himself, that if the two rival popes did not speedily agree to send commissioners to the council, France should withdraw itself from their obedience.

‘This was more displeasing to Pietro della Luna than any thing that had been done in this kingdom relative to church-affairs, and is not a sign that my lord of Orleans was desirous of retarding an union of the church in favour of Pietro della Luna. It is therefore evident, that the duke of Orleans is innocent of the charges that have been brought against him.

‘O, lord king! may it please thee to guard his innocence by means of thy justice, according as it is written in the 13th chapter of Job, ‘Justitia custodit innocentis viam.’

‘The fourth accusation of our adversary is, That for the space of three whole years my lord of Orleans, by his artful and deceitful tales, and advice to the queen, attempted to prevail on her to quit the kingdom, with her children, and reside in the county of Luxembourg, that he might enjoy greater power in the government of the realm. So far is this charge from being true, that my lord of Orleans did every thing in his power to honour and support the queen during the melancholy illness of the king, of which it does not become me to say more, for, thanks to God, she is now present, and knows full well the truth of this, and which she may more fully declare whenever it may be her good pleasure so to do. I do not, however, know that she made any complaints on this subject to our adversary, or to any other persons. I believe the contrary, to this charge of our opponent, will be found to be the truth; and that it has been purposely brought forward to defame the reputation of the deceased.

‘The fifth accusation is, That my lord of Orleans committed the crime of high treason in the third degree, on the person of my lord the dauphin, whose soul may God pardon! by compassing his death by means of a poisoned apple given to a child, from whom one of the nurses of the children of the duke of Orleans took it by force, and gave it to one of the children of the duke of Orleans, and caused its death, as well as that of the dauphin, who also ate of it.

‘This is an absolute falsehood. True it is, that one of the duke of Orleans’ children died about the time when this fact was supposed to have taken place, of a bowel complaint, which was then very prevalent, and carried off many others. Let the physicians, master William le Boucher and master John de Beaumont, be examined, who visited this child, and they will declare the truth, that it did not die of poison.

‘Consider, my lords, the improbability of a nurse of the children of the duke of Orleans daring to give an apple or pear to any of them without the express orders of the duchess of Orleans; and that when the nurse went to these gardens with the child she was accompanied by several women of character, who would not have suffered her to give it an apple, or any suchlike thing.

‘O most noble and well-beloved duke of Acquitaine! while young, learn to love justice, and act like Solomon. Consider the evils that may happen unless justice be observed; and if thou neglectest it, thou wilt not love thy brothers, for they will be in danger of death if the doctrines of our adversary be not checked. The prophet says, ‘JustitiÆ Domini rectÆ lÆtificantes corda.’

‘The sixth crime alledged against the duke of Orleans is, That he committed high treason in the fourth degree, by ruining the king in his finances, and by oppressing the people with intolerable taxes, and quartering large bodies of men at arms in various parts of the country. My lords, it is very astonishing that our adversary should have made this charge; for it is notorious to every one, that these taxes were not levied in this kingdom for its own concerns, nor were they for the profit of the duke of Orleans: they were proposed with great deliberation of the king, the princes of his blood, and his council, for the benefit of our adversary himself, in his expedition to Hungary, and for the payment of the ransom of himself and his army. This was the cause of such heavy taxes being raised throughout the kingdom, and of immense sums of money being sent to Turkey, and other distant places, to the irreparable loss of the country.

‘When our adversary charges the duke of Orleans with having taken four thousand francs from the tower of the palace, and one hundred thousand from the castle of Melun,—I reply, that it is false: if any sums of money were in the tower of the palace, they were distributed according to orders from the king. In regard to the hundred thousand francs in the castle of Melun, it is well known that the queen and the duke of Orleans went thither to amuse themselves,—during which time, our adversary very improperly came to Paris with a large body of men at arms, and forced the duke of Acquitaine to return thither, instead of going, as he intended, to join his mother the queen. He had collected this force of men at arms with the design of attacking the queen and the duke of Orleans in Melun, which, of course, made it necessary for her majesty to raise an army for her own defence, and for the security of the king and kingdom.

‘She was therefore advised to make use of the money in the castle of Melun for the pay of the men at arms, but my lord of Orleans never touched one penny of it; and when it came to the knowledge of the king, he was well satisfied that it had been so applied.

‘It therefore appears, that this sum of money was expended to oppose the damnable act of our adversary, and for no other cause. In regard to the men at arms said to have been kept on foot by my lord of Orleans, certainly some bodies of them, being quartered over the country, declared they were sent thither by command of the duke of Orleans, in order that no one might dare to molest them,—but they had no letters or commissions from him. On the contrary, he was greatly displeased at the evil acts they at times committed.

‘When their conduct was laid before the king and council, the duke of Orleans caused letters to be sent in the king’s name to all bailiffs and other officers throughout the realm, ordering them to assemble the nobles and gentlemen of the country to force those who committed such disgraceful acts to quit the kingdom, having first punished them for their wicked conduct.

‘O, duke of Burgundy! recollect the irreparable damages that have been done to many parts of this realm by the bodies of men at arms which thou hast introduced within it, many of whom were foreigners, who wasted the countries they passed through, and every one should feel compassion for events of so pitiable a nature: they can never be enough bewailed.

‘O, thou king of France! most excellent prince, deplore the death of thy only brother; for thou hast lost the most precious jewel in thy crown, which thy justice ought to avenge, if no other way be found.

‘O, thou most noble queen! weep for a prince who so greatly honoured thee, and whom thou hast seen so infamously murdered.

‘O thou, my most redoubted lord, duke of Acquitaine! lament that thou hast lost the most precious member of thy blood, council and state, which has caused thee to fall from peace into great tribulation.

‘O, thou duke of Berry! grieve that thou hast seen the brother of the king thy nephew thus disgracefully end his days, solely because he was brother to the king, and for no other reason.

‘O, duke of Brittany! thou hast lost the brother to thy duchess, who greatly loved thee.

‘O, thou duke of Bourbon! weep that thy friend is now buried under ground; and ye other princes! join in lamentations, for the way is now opened to put ye all to death most traitorously and unexpectedly.

‘Mourn, men and women, old and young, rich and poor! for the sweetness of peace and tranquillity is now torn from ye, by this assertion of the doctrine of assassinating princes, whence wars and destruction must fall upon you.

‘O, ye churchmen! deplore the loss of a prince who was much attached to you, and who greatly respected all who performed the divine service, from his love to God.

‘Ye clerks, and nobles of all degrees! consider how ye will henceforward act; for our opponent has deceived you by his false arguments, and caused you to favour his wickedness. But as ye are now aware of the murder committed on the person of the duke of Orleans, of the falsity and lies published in our adversary’s defamatory libel, and consequently of the innocence of my lord of Orleans,—should ye, from this time forth, in any way support the party of our adversary, know that it will be treason against the king, and you will then incur the danger of losing your lives and fortunes, as usual in such cases.

‘Understand then, princes and men of all degrees, that ye are bounden to assist in maintaining the laws against the duke of Burgundy, who, by this murderous act, has usurped the power and authority of the king and his sons, and has deprived them of great aid and consolation; for he has brought the commonweal into grievous tribulation by shamelessly violating the wholesome statutes in vindicating his offence against nobility, kindred, oaths, alliances and assurances,—against God and all his saints. This mischief cannot be amended except by the laws. To obtain this reparation, my lady of Orleans and her children are now come before thee, O lord king! and the princes of thy royal blood, supplicating you all to weigh well the injury that has been done to them, and to make them amends in the manner required by her council, or in any other way, so that it may be publicly known that her lord was cruelly murdered, and unjustly and falsely accused and defamed. By doing this, you will perform your duty as you are bounden to do, and acquire eternal life, as it is written in the 21st chapter of Proverbs, ‘Qui sequitur justitiam inveniet vitam et gloriam,’—which may God, who reigns and lives for ever and ever, grant. Amen.’

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