  The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come to be known to English readers, or the "Siegfried Line," as it is called by the Germans, was brought into existence during the winter of 1916 and early spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a very definite strategic purpose. This was to put into effect, on a stupendous scale, a very elementary principle of minor tactics, namely, that field works are constructed for the purpose of reducing the number of men required to defend a given front or locality. In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive value whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men to defend one place, in order that a greater number of men may be available to attack another place. The German High Command proceeded to make use of this principle on a scale previously unknown in history. The whole of the Western front, in Belgium and France, was to be held defensively throughout 1917. The military resources required to defend that front were to be reduced to a minimum, by the provision of a line of defences protected by powerful field works, believed to be impregnable. This would liberate the greatest possible resources for the Eastern front, where an end could be made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes could again be transferred to the West, in order similarly to dispose of the remainder of our Alliance. This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until the middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg line which had been the kernel of the whole conception, and, until the days which It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the expenditure of such enormous labour on the creation of these defences was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle of tactics that in any given battle the advantage always rests heavily on the side of the defence. Where numbers, resources and moral are equal, no attack can hope to succeed. If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that a Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum assuredly did not take into account field defences of the permanent and elaborate character of the Hindenburg Line. I should hardly venture to fix a ratio of relative strength appropriate in such circumstances. But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They had every justification for believing that it would once again serve them to keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter was very near, and the Entente peoples might not have been able to hold together to face another year of war. We, on our part also, had as much justification for the resolve that every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defences before the end of 1918, and for believing that it would require a great, concerted and intense effort to succeed in this. It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude of the effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful success with which it was rewarded, that the nature of the defences of the Hindenburg Line should be clearly understood. This can best be done, I think, by making an endeavour to realize the sense of security which the possession of such a line of defence must have afforded to the enemy. We are here interested only in that portion of the line which extends from St. Quentin northwards towards Cambrai. Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St. Quentin. Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal de l'Escaut. Throughout the whole of that portion which concerns us, it runs in a deep cutting, reaching, for great stretches, a depth of 50 to 60 feet. In certain places where the ground rises still higher, the canal passes through in great tunnels. The southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel, near St. Quentin, is but short; the northern boasts of the imposing length of 6,000 yards, and extends from Bellicourt, The canal excavation—except where the tunnels occur—itself affords an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which could be stoutly contested by resolute troops well dug in on its eastern banks, for the descent and ascent of the slopes could be obstructed by wire entanglements, and swept with fire. The water alone, which is too deep to be waded, would seriously impede infantry, while the passage of tanks, guns and vehicles would be impossible once the few high level bridges over the canal had been destroyed. Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements of modern war, with its searching and destructive Artillery fire. It was to be regarded more as the foundation upon which a complete system of defences could be built, and as a last line of resistance À outrance. The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers, in the lowest ground available, so that its course closely follows the lines of the minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On both sides, therefore, the canal is flanked by somewhat higher ground, from which its immediate banks can be overlooked. On the western side particularly, there is a regular line of such higher plateaux on which the villages of Villeret, Hargicourt and Ronssoy once stood. It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such vantage ground, and also to provide the canal defences with a stout outpost defence. For these reasons, the Germans had constructed an elaborate system of trenches on a line generally parallel to and on the average a full mile west of the canal. These trenches had been perfected with dug-outs, concrete machine gun and mortar emplacements, and underground shelters. They were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire entanglements, in a fashion which no one understood better, or achieved more thoroughly, than the Germans. But much more remained. Deep communication trenches led back to the canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier of comfortable living quarters for the troops had been tunnelled out. Here support and reserve troops could live in safety and defy our heaviest bombardments. They could be secretly hurried to the front trenches whenever danger threatened. There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters and passages. Roomy dug-outs were provided with tunnelled ways which led to cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the best of care was taken to provide numerous exits, so that the occupants should not be imprisoned by the blocking of one or other of them by our bombardment. But it was the barbed wire which formed the groundwork of the defence. It was everywhere, and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd the attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns. The stretch of 6,000 yards of the canal which had been tunnelled was, however, both a hindrance and a benefit to the perfection of the scheme. On the one hand, the advantage of the open cut, as a last obstacle, was lost. Its place had to be taken by a second complete system of trench and wire defences, roughly following the line of the tunnel, but of course far above the latter. On the other hand, the tunnel itself afforded secure living accommodation for a substantial garrison. The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges, The whole scheme produced, in fact, a veritable fortress—not one, in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive walls and battlements, which, as was proved in the early days of the war at LiÉge and Namur, can speedily be blown to pieces by modern heavy artillery—but one defying destruction by any powers of gunnery, and presenting the most formidable difficulties to the bravest of Infantry. Even this was not all. On the east side of the St. Quentin Canal and parallel to it were built still two further trench lines, both fully protected by wire entanglements, and capable of determined defence. The first of these is the Le Catelet line, about one mile distant from the canal. It skirts and embraces the villages of Nauroy and Le Catelet, while two miles still further east is the Beaurevoir line, the last or most easterly of all the prepared defences which the Germans had in France. Neither of these latter trench systems was nearly so formidably prepared as the main systems previously described, but together with them they go to make up the whole Hindenburg defensive system. In this region that system runs generally due north and south, with many minor convolutions in its line. It is altogether some 4½ miles across from west to east. As its overthrow could not be attempted in a single operation, it is necessary for clearness of description to give definite names to each of the successive lines of trenches which go to form the whole defence system. Taking them in the order in which we attacked them, from west to east, they will be referred to as:
Australian Artillery—going into action at Cressaire Wood. Battle of August 8th, 1918—German prisoners being brought out of the battle under the fire of their own artillery. During the winter of 1917-1918 the British Fifth Army and the Germans had faced each other in this region for many months. On our side, also, a system of field defences had been developed. They fell far short, indeed, of the completeness and ingenuity of the German works, because the latter had been constructed at leisure, long before, while ours had been built under the very fire of the German guns. For months the opposing Artilleries had pounded the country to pieces, effaced every sign of civilization, and churned up the ground in all directions over a belt some three miles wide. Heaps of broken bricks marked the sites of once prosperous villages. Broken telegraph poles, charred tree trunks, twisted rails, a chaos of mangled machinery, were the only remains of what had once been gardens, orchards, railways and factories. The whole territory presented the aspect of a rolling, tumbled desert from which life itself had been banished. This was the region whose western verge the vanguard of the Australian advance approached on September 11th, on a frontage of about 8,000 yards, the northern extremity directed on Bellicourt, the southern on Bellenglise. That is to say, if our further advance had but continued unimpeded in the same due easterly direction, it would have brought us square upon the open excavation of the canal, and just clear and to the south of the Bellicourt—Le Catelet tunnel. Some significance attached to this circumstance, as will later appear. Now, some little time before, an event of peculiar interest had occurred. This was the capture, on another front, of a very ordinary-looking transport vehicle loaded high with miscellaneous baggage. Little escaped the inquisitive eyes of the British Intelligence Service, which speedily discovered that among this baggage there safely reposed a large collection of maps and documents. On examination these proved to be nothing less than the complete Defence Scheme of the whole These papers were carefully overhauled and arranged. There were dozens of accurately drawn detailed maps, and minute descriptions of every tactical feature of the defences. The position of every gun emplacement was given; every searchlight, machine-gun pit, observation post, telephone exchange, command station and mortar emplacement was clearly marked; the topographical and tactical features of the ground were discussed in minute detail, and plans for the action of every individual unit of the garrisons were fully displayed. Naturally, an army of translators and copying clerks was set to work upon this precious find, and my Intelligence Service was kept busy for many days in making for me digests of those items likely to prove of special interest. It had, of course, to be remembered that the Defence Scheme had been brought into operation for the campaign of 1917, and it remained to be seen to what extent it might by now have become obsolete. It was hardly to be expected that the enemy would adhere to it in its entirety, especially if he were aware, as I was bound to assume that he was, that all this information had fallen into our hands. But the Scheme contained a full exposition of many important topographical facts which it was in any case beyond his power to alter, and which it was of priceless value for me to know. Although I had to devote hour upon hour to a concentrated study of these papers, it proved to be in greater part labour in vain so far as the Australian Corps was concerned, because it ultimately came about that although I did carry out the attack upon the Hindenburg outpost line in my present sector, the attack upon the Hindenburg main line, which I was, later, called upon to make, took place in the next adjoining sector to the north, i.e., the Bellicourt tunnel sector, to which these captured documents only incidentally referred. Nevertheless, the Ninth Corps, under Braithwaite, ultimately got the full benefit of these discoveries. The production of these documents on September 10th formed It was decided that the operation must necessarily be divided into two main phases—separated in point of time by an interval of several days for further preparation. All of us recognized the impossibility of overrunning, in a single day, so deep and formidable a system of defences, in such tortured country, and in weather which was already becoming unsettled. The first phase was to be an attempt to capture the Hindenburg outpost line, along the whole Army front. The French and the Third British Armies were to be asked to make a synchronized attack on the same objective. The three Corps of the Fourth Army were to attack upon the frontages and in the sectors on which they then stood. The date was left undecided, but all were to be ready at three days' notice. One important consideration was the meagre supply of Tanks available. The operations of August had been costly, not to say extravagant, in Tanks, and General Elles' repair workshops, manned largely by very competent Chinese coolie mechanics, had been working night and day ever since to repair the minor damages, and new Tanks were steadily arriving from England to replace those damaged beyond repair. But no large contingent of Tanks was to be expected until towards the end of the month. The upshot was that I was to be content with only eight Tanks for use in the contemplated operation. Late the same afternoon I communicated to Generals Maclagan and Glasgow an outline of the probable rÔle of their respective Divisions in the very near future. In the meantime, the front-line troops had not been idle. My orders were that the First and Fourth Divisions were to These orders were entirely to the taste of the two Divisions now in the line. The First Division had served its apprenticeship to that very kind of fighting in the Merris area in the previous spring, and the Fourth Division did not mean to be a second best. Each Division stood on a one-Brigade front, being ordered to keep its other two Brigades well out of harm's way and resting, for any great effort that might be required. The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the part of the 13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd Brigade of the First Division in the capture of tactical points, and in the bloody repulse of all attempts by the enemy to recapture them. In this way our line was carried up to and a little beyond what had been the old British reserve line of trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000 yards of the final objective of the first phase of the contemplated operations. On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders who were to participate in the next great battle, Maclagan (Fourth Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage (Tanks), Chamier (Air Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the four Generals of my own Staff. The conference took place in a Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near Maclagan's Headquarters, and I was able to announce that the date had been fixed for September 18th. The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features. The methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this time we all began to understand each other so well that most of what I had to say could almost be taken for granted. Each The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me. I felt that it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the contemplation of losses among our splendid men, which might be lessened by the more liberal use of mechanical aids, always sorely troubled me. I endeavoured to meet the situation by adopting two unusual expedients. The first was to double the machine-gun resources of the two battle Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete machine-gun battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and adding them to those of the line Divisions. This gave me a total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns on a frontage now reduced to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver so dense a machine-gun barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the infantry, that to quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who was captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely too terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but to crouch down in our trenches and wait for you to come and take us." The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective. This was to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating a number of dummy ones. As soon as the word went round Engineers and Pioneers vied with each other in rapid "Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were clandestinely robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and some weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible of them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle. Four men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position from which it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there abandoned it. There is little doubt that this trick contributed its share to the day's astonishing success. Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall the shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery "Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by regular leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel lines, until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had shown that such a start line for the Artillery should be at least 200 yards in advance of the line on which the Infantry were to form up ready for the assault. A liberal margin of space had to be allowed, in order to minimize the risks to our own Infantry. The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps. The guns were laid upon it by methods which depended upon accurate surveys, on the ground, of the exact position of every gun. When that had been determined, the map and compass helped to decide the range and alignment upon which the gun should open fire. On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of, or on our side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called the Infantry "Start Line." It then became necessary to determine, upon the actual ground, the position of this Infantry Start Line, and to mark it in such a way that the Infantry would be enabled to take up their correct positions. This would ensure that the Infantry would know that the fall of our opening barrage would be 200 yards in advance of the line so marked. This delicate work of marking out of the Infantry Start Line on the ground was invariably entrusted to the Engineers attached to the Brigades co-operating in the attack. The marking was done by laying out and pegging down broad tapes of white linen, which could be recognized in the dim light of early dawn. The whole work, had, of course, to be done unobserved by the enemy, and it was always a dangerous task. Only the fact that we were in possession of reliable large scale maps, recording every feature of the ground, made it possible for the Engineers, resourceful as they were, to do this delicate work with reasonable accuracy. The battered condition of the country was always a difficulty; for it was never easy to recognize, on the ground, reference points, such as a road intersection, or the corner of a field, or a crucifix or similar land mark, which might aid the surveyors in getting their bearings. Map G The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that the ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was ground which was already within our possession, or accessible to us without coming dangerously near the enemy. It was a necessary consequence that portions of our always irregular front line of posts or trenches would lie beyond or on the enemy's side of the tape line. It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind the tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary to order that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their appropriate dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour before Zero. The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour before the actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to take part in the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly straight line, all along the battle front, while no troops previously in occupation of posts or trenches in advance of the tapes were left out in front, exposed to the risk of either being hit by our own Artillery, or mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for enemies by our own Infantry. Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear from this description, they worked out in actual practice with the utmost smoothness. The resulting simplification of the Artillery plans, in this as in similar previous battles, more than justified their adoption. A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked the routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry should, during the last night, march from its place of assembly to the taped line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position which it was to take up upon that line. Each board had painted upon it the name of the unit to which it referred. Such preparatory measures, troublesome as they were, greatly reduced the risk of any confusion or mistake, and lessened the fatigue of the assaulting troops. The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m., and the sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening of the attack, was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five. Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some two hours before, and made movement over the broken, clayey surface anything but pleasant. Although the troops were soon drenched to the skin, this did not in any way damp their spirits. It probably added much to the misery of the enemy, who could hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a fresh attack might break upon him. Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, but in nothing so much as in the employment of what I have more than once referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term is one which should convey its own meaning. It is the direct result of the great extension, which this war has introduced, of mechanical warfare. It is a "set-piece" because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of interesting developments. The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular leaps, at regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, and incapable of alteration once the battle has begun. Should the rate prove too slow and the Infantry could have advanced more quickly, it cannot be helped, and no great harm is done. On the other hand, if there be any risk of the barrage rate being too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen minutes are often introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry line, or any part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch up. Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in skirmishing order, together with the line of Tanks when such are used. The foremost lines advance to capture and hold the ground, the lines in rear to "mop up" and deal with the enemy either showing fight or hiding underground, the rearmost lines collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry supplies, tools and ammunition. In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully silenced by our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, nothing can happen, except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly and methodically across the ground until it reaches the line laid down as the final objective. Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for 80 to 100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery programme is ended the battle is either completely won, or to all intents and purposes completely lost. If the barrage for any reason gets away from our Infantry, and they are relegated to hand to hand fighting in order to complete their advance, the battle immediately assumes a totally different character, and is no longer a set-piece affair. It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a battle proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any incidents awakening any human interest. Only the externals and only the large aspects of such battles can be successfully recorded. It is for this reason that no stirring accounts exist of the more intimate details of such great set-pieces as Messines, Vimy, Hamel and many others. They will never be written, for there is no material upon which to base them. The story of what did take place on the day of battle would be a mere paraphrase of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take place. On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August 8th, the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of Bony and Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore the developments from hour to hour, and even from moment to moment, are full of intense human interest, and replete with tales of individual courage and initiative. Some day, when all the material has been gathered, an abler pen than mine will write their story. If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with special reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in detail upon the performances and experiences in battle of the individual fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however, prove hopelessly inadequate. The numbers engaged were always so large, their activities so varied, the conditions of each battle so different in detail, that to do adequate justice and avoid unfair discrimination would make impossible demands upon the space available to me. Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only because they are the most numerous, but also because they are invariably in the forefront of the battle and often in immediate contact with the enemy. Without the slightest disparagement to the important rÔle of the Infantryman and to the valour which its performance demands, it must never be forgotten that the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, Machine Gunners, Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way equally important and essential to the success of any battle operation. Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the Infantry. In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that the rÔle of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one, provided that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any part of the battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the Infantry task makes no high demand upon courage and resolution. On the contrary, these are the essentials upon which the success of the Infantry rÔle and therefore of the whole battle depends. The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an Artillery barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The barrage is nothing more nor less than a steady shower of shells, bursting over the very heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and striking the ground some 80 to 120 yards in front of them. This So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes may go on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the course of any rush, trenches or strong points are met with and they contain enemy who do not immediately surrender, prompt use must be made of rifle and bayonet. But it is the primary business of the leading line of Infantry to push on and not to delay by engaging in close combat. The second and third lines of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by destruction or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the leading line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special business, and when it has been attended to they go forward at top speed to rejoin the leading line. In such a methodical way the advance continues until the final objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the Infantry in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock time; for the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or ground occurs in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by the topographical features, and thirdly by the expedient of maintaining the barrage stationary at the final objective for fifteen to thirty minutes. In some battles, I also adopted the device of firing from every gun in the barrage, three rounds of smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal to the Commanders of the leading line of Infantry to call the final halt, to select a good line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a process technically called "consolidation." It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering a front of four or five miles, every part of the line should be able to advance without any check whatever up to the final halting place. But the expectation always is that by far the greater Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched battle. It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of the Infantryman to push on vigorously against all obstacles, and to put forth his utmost physical powers to keep up with the barrage, especially when the ground is wet and sticky, or when uncut wire has to be crawled through. All this he must do, utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be directed against him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best hope of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly, and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting place, close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer. Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action of the Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation which partakes of the character of open warfare. The main tactical purpose is still, as before, to advance to the seizure of an appointed objective, but there is no barrage, no time-table, no fixity of route, no prescribed formation or procedure. Everything must be left to the judgment, initiative and enterprise of the leader on the spot. The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a whole battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of its sixteen platoons, each performing the separate rÔle, in a general plan, that may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders, some to advance and fight, some to act in support, some to lie The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises four sections, each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two sections of riflemen, a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. Each section may consist of from five to eight men. Let it be supposed that it is the business of the platoon to capture a small farmhouse which the enemy has fortified and in which he is holding out. Always supposing that the enemy garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would be somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a concealed position, on one flank, keep the place under steady fire. The rifle grenadiers from the same or another flank would fire smoke grenades to make a smoke screen. One section of riflemen would endeavour to sneak up depressions and ditches or along hedges, so as to get well behind the farm and threaten it by fire from the rear. The other section of riflemen would choose some direct line of attack, over ground which offered concealment to them until they were close enough to take the objective with a rush. Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example, but it is sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and energy required on the part not only of the leader, but also of every man in the platoon. The secret of success of the Australian open fighting lay in the extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work which characterized the many hundreds of little platoon battles which were fought on just such lines as I have tried to suggest in this example. It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description is possible which would present an adequate picture of the widely varying activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign. There is only one source from which reliable narratives of individual fighting can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous that space forbids any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts from it. I refer to the recommendations made by Commanders for honours and rewards for individual acts of gallantry. A But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that day each Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No serious opposition was encountered except at La Verguier, which was not far from our start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the "red" line, which was the objective of the "set-piece" phase of the day's battle, was in our possession, throughout the whole length of the Corps front, well before 10 o'clock. This gave us complete possession of the old British front line of March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before us, still distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line was to be the ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's operations, and I could hardly have dared to hope that a trench system of such considerable strength, which had defied the Fifth Army for so long, would fall into our hands so easily as it did. Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before nightfall had overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg outpost line along its front. Maclagan's Division also fought its way forward to within 500 yards of that line. But the troops were by then very exhausted; all movement was in full view of the enemy; and the ground was very difficult. After a consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the troops, and to make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line) that same night. Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery, so that the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded before the final assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the Fourth Division again attacked, and after severe fighting also captured the whole of the objective trench system. It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St. Quentin Canal, and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping ground which lay between us and the Canal, denying the use of that ground to the enemy, and making it impossible for him to withdraw the guns and stores which littered the area. The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized by the following almost incredible analysis of the material results of the day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total strength of 2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties (killed and wounded). They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart from the large numbers who were killed, and the wounded enemy who made good their escape. The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048 of all ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures of live prisoners amounted to 2,543. In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which had been overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy. There is no record in this war of any previous success on such a scale, won with so little loss. The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying quality. The Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line, but the exploitation phase of the operation was not pressed until a later day. The Third Corps, on my left, however, made indifferent progress. Their line still bent back sharply from my left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost system had been gained. This portion of the Army front was that which lay square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the Hindenburg outpost system was to be fraught with very serious difficulties for me, not many days later. The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on September 13th had been realized in part, although not in its entirety. The successes gained on September 18th were nevertheless sufficiently important and decisive to justify immediate preparations for working out the plan for a great, combined and final effort to sweep the enemy out of the remainder of the last lines of defence which he had established in France. The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however, as it turned out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long and brilliant fighting career, which had been opened three and a half years before, the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other in the desert of Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although |
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