(October 30th.) Accordingly on October 30th, nine battalions of the 2nd Guard-Division and five batteries, under the command of Lieutenant-General von Budritzki, At half-past nine the French attempted to bring up into Le Bourget reinforcements from Aubervillers and Drancy; but the left German column had meanwhile seized the railway-embankment, placed a detachment of the Emperor Alexander Regiment to hold it, and was forcing its way into the southern quarter of the village. Two batteries had taken up position on the Mollette brook, and their fire drove back the enemy and even compelled him to evacuate Drancy. At ten o'clock the French still held the buildings on the north side of the Mollette. These were now assailed from the south. The 4th Company of the Emperor Alexander Regiment crossed the stream and forced its way through a breach made by the sappers into the farmstead in which the enemy's main force was gathered. The defenders had to be quelled with the bayonet and with clubbed arms, and here the French Colonel de Baroche met his death. Although by this time—eleven o'clock—all the three attacking columns had struck hands in the heart of Le Bourget, the enemy continued the struggle in detached houses and gardens with embittered desperation till the afternoon, while all the forts on the north front of Paris overwhelmed the place with shell-fire. It was not till half-past one that the troops of the attack could withdraw by companies to their respective quarters. Two battalions remained to garrison Le Bourget. The desperate resistance of the French showed how important they considered their retention of this post. Its success had cost the 2nd (Guard) Division 500 men. The enemy's loss is not known, but 1200 prisoners were taken. This new disaster added to the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Paris. The revolutionary factions, which at all times lurk in the French capital, came ominously to the front. Highly-coloured reports could no longer conceal utter lack of results; the authority of the Government was steadily on the wane. It was accused of incapacity, On the 31st of October uproarious masses again paraded the streets. As General Trochu had forbidden the sentries at the HÔtel de Ville to use their arms, the rebels forced their way in. The Ministers were their prisoners till the evening, when some battalions which remained staunch liberated them. Monsieur Thiers, who had returned from his fruitless tour among the European Courts, thought the time had come for re-opening negotiations with Versailles. On the part of the Germans there was still the readiness to grant an armistice, but it was naturally impossible to accede to the condition demanded by the French, that the city should be re-provisioned, and so hostilities had to take their course. At this time, towards the end of October, the situation on the Moselle had assumed an aspect which essentially modified that of the whole war. By the exchange of German prisoners for French who had fought at Sedan, details of the disaster which had befallen France in that battle were currently known in Metz. But Marshal Bazaine declared that the Army of the Rhine would continue to defend the country against the invaders, and maintain public order against the evil passions of disloyal men—a resolution which certainly could be interpreted in more ways than one. It would have been eminently satisfactory to the Germans, politically speaking, if there had been in France an available Meanwhile the army which had been beleaguered in Metz since the day of Noisseville maintained a waiting attitude. The necessary supplies for 70,000 inhabitants, including the country-folk who had taken refuge in the city, had originally been enough to last three months and a half, those for the regular garrison were calculated for about five months; but for the Army of the Rhine there was sustenance in store for only forty-one days, and there was forage for only twenty-five. Certainly it was possible to supplement the supplies for the troops by purchase from the abundant stores of the citizens; but ere long smaller rations of bread were served out and horses were being slaughtered to furnish animal food, so that most of the cavalry regiments were reduced to two squadrons. On the German side, the service of supplying 197,326 men and 33,136 horses was one of great difficulty. The outbreak of cattle-plague in Germany restricted the importation of live beasts to those purchased in Holland and Belgium. The meat rations had to be supplemented by tinned provisions; and increased rations of oats had to take the place of hay and straw. The losses of the army had hitherto been made good from the reserves, but the transport of the prisoners from Although fifty heavy guns had been brought up from Germany, they were useless for the bombardment of Metz, since in consequence of the superior calibre of the fortress artillery they could only be fired at night, and with frequent change of position. There was nothing for it but to hope for the best, and have patience. For four weeks already had the besieged been consuming their stores. To replenish those in some degree, and at the same time to revive the spirit of the troops by active measures, the Marshal decided on fetching in all the provisions to be found in the villages inside the line of the German investment, under cover of a sortie. At noon on September 22nd Fort St. Julien opened a heavy fire on the outposts of the Ist Corps. Strong bodies of infantry then advanced on the villages to the eastward, drove in the picquets of the enemy, and returned to Metz with the stores which had been seized. But a similar attempt made next afternoon on the villages to the north was less successful. Most of the waggons had to return empty, under the fire of the Prussian batteries quickly brought up into position. Finally, on the 27th, a sortie for the same purpose was made to the southward, which led to a series of small conflicts and the capture in Peltre of a German company, which was surrounded by a much stronger force. A simultaneous sally on the left bank of the Moselle was baffled by the fire of the alert artillery of the besieging force. Thionville, on the north of Metz, had hitherto only been kept under observation by a small force, which could not hinder the garrison from scouring the country as far as the neighbouring frontier, taking many prisoners, seizing fifty waggon-loads of supplies, and even diverting into the fortress a whole train of provision-trucks while passing by the now restored railway from Luxemburg. In point of fact, the Army of the Rhine would have found in Thionville an important rallying-point at the end of its first day's march, if the blockade of Metz could have been broken through. Prince Frederick Charles, realizing this, took care to strengthen the investing lines to the north, on the right bank of the Moselle. On October 1st the Xth Corps took up the position hitherto held by the Reserve Division Kummer, which was transferred to the left bank of the river. The Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth Corps closed up to the right, and the IInd occupied the space between the Seille and the Moselle; the troops before Thionville were also reinforced. The Marshal had really once more determined to break out to the northward, and that on both banks of the river. New bridges were constructed behind St. Julien and from the island of ChambiÈre, the nearest German outposts on the north and west of Metz were pushed back by a series of daily skirmishes. Under cover of the fire of the forts the French established themselves firmly in Lessy and Ladonchamps. The troops to be left in Metz were expressly selected; the others tested as to their marching powers. Light-signals were arranged with Thionville, and all preparations made for a sortie on the 7th. Then the French commander suddenly changed his mind, and the proposed enterprise collapsed into a foraging expedition. For this, indeed, large forces were set in motion; the Guard Voltigeur Division, the VIth Corps, and Four hundred waggons were in readiness to carry off the stores from the large farms lying north of Ladonchamps. FOOTNOTES: |