  Do not suppose, my Friend, that I am opposed to political economy; I am simply opposed to your application of its principles. Let me illustrate my meaning by a comparison between Mathematics and Political Economy:— Mathematics may be divided into two classes—“pure” and “applied.” Political economy may be divided into two similar classes—“pure” and “applied.” Pure Mathematics, being an exact science, is infallible. Pure Political economy, being a matter of opinion, is not infallible; but let us for the moment suppose it to be so. Applied mathematics are not always sound; for example, in applying mathematics to Engineering problems, it is by no means uncommon to find that they appear to err most egregiously; so much so, as to give rise to the saying, that “theory and practice contradict one another.” The fact, in reality, being that theory has not been correctly applied; that innumerable small factors, which can only be ascertained by practice and experience, have been neglected in the application of theory; and even practice often fails to supply these factors. Applied Political Economy is under similar conditions, but with this difference: 1st, that pure Political Economy is not infallible; 2nd, that the application of Political Economy is affected by a greater number of intricate factors than any ordinary problem in Engineering; 3rd, that the observation of results in a complex question of Applied Political Economy is far more difficult than in the case of those simple materials which are dealt with in Engineering problems. The eminent Italian Political Economist, Luigi Cossa, He says:— “It is needful to hold ourselves aloof equally from the so-called Doctrinaires who refuse the assistance of practice, and from the Empiricists who obstinately close their eyes to the light of theory. The Pure science explains phenomena and determines laws; the Applied science gives guiding principles, which practice brings into conformity with the innumerable varieties of individual cases.” Mill also says:— “One of the peculiarities of modern times,—the separation of theory from practice,—of the studies of the closet from the outward business of the world,—has given a wrong bias to the ideas and feelings both of the student and of the man of business. Let us take an example of pure and applied science. You, my Friend, quote an axiom of Pure Political Economy when you say:— “It is unjust to tax all for the benefit of one class” So far I quite agree with you;—it is to your application of the axiom that I object, when you go on to say—“therefore protection in any shape is wrong.” Your application of pure science to the complex question of free trade is quite incorrect. I say “it is just and expedient to tax all for the benefit of all.” I hold that the employment of home and colonial labour, and the development of home and colonial produce and industries, is for the benefit of the community as a whole; and that, consequently, protection, if carried only to the extent necessary to secure this, and no further, is just and expedient. The Corn Laws, as existing in 1846, went beyond this: and their alteration, not their abolition, was needed. Your free-trader’s argument is like that of a man who has discovered that too much water will drown, and proceeds at once to the other extreme of killing by thirst. All extremes are bad. Free trade is an extreme. Want of competition is bad. Extreme competition is bad. Healthy competition is that which is wanted. Unlimited competition defeats its own purpose by crushing out weaker industries, diminishing the supply, and enabling the successful competitors to raise their prices as soon as the rival industry has been extinguished. Even Mill admits that protection may “be defensible when imposed temporarily ... in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry.” And Cossa allows that— “At certain times, and under certain conditions, protection has given notable advantages to industrial organization and progress.... Colbert’s system and Cromwell’s Navigation Act, contributed not a little to the economic greatness of France and England.” There seems to be but little doubt that the political economist of the future will hold up England as an awful warning, but an instructive example, of a country ruined by the persistent misapplication of the principles of political economy. Alexr. Hamilton, the greatest statesman America ever produced, says:— Though it were true that the immediate and certain effect of regulations controlling the competition of foreign and domestic fabrics was an increase of price, it is universally true that the contrary is the ultimate effect with every successful manufacture. It is not merely your misapplication of the principles of political economy to which I object; I also object to the over-bearing way in which you thrust down the throat of your opponent the opinions of your favourite political economists, as if they were infallible and settled the question beyond all possibility of further argument. This is especially the case when you quote Mill. Now Mill is no doubt an eminently able and powerful writer; but he is deplorably subject to mistakes. He constantly contradicts himself, and is contradicted by political economists equally able and more reliable than himself. For example, Professor Bonamy Price Cossa speaks of Mill’s “ardent concessions to socialism more apparent than real;” of his “narrow philosophic utilitarianism.” Also, speaking of Thornton, Cossa says: “His book on labour is an excellent one; it made a great impression on Mill, and caused him to abandon his theory of wages fund; which has also been opposed by Lange, by the American Economist Walker, and by Bretano.” Many of the inaccuracies of Mill have been exposed by Professor Cairnes. Mr. Cook says:— “Mill, however, is said to have abandoned the seesaw theory in his latest and yet unpublished essays.” Macleod also, in writing on the question of rent says:— “This does not exhaust the absurdity of the Ricardo-Mill theory of rent ... but in fact Mill himself has completely overthrown this theory of rent.” Anyone who has carefully studied the writings of Mill cannot fail to be struck with the manner in which he allows that which Herbert Spencer terms “Political Bias,” and which Cossa terms Mill’s “narrow philosophic utilitarianism,” to affect his opinion, and warp his better judgment; and when this is the case, he is guilty of absurdities, inconsistencies, and illogical reasoning that would disgrace a school-boy. FOOTNOTES: |
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