  IMPORTANT NOTE.—On pages 4 to 16 will be found a brief summarized account of the Battle of the Marne and of the events which immediately preceded it. We recommend the reading of these few pages attentively, and the consultation of the maps annexed to the same, before reading the descriptive part which commences at page 17. A clear understanding of the action as a whole is absolutely necessary to comprehend with interest the description of the separate combats. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (1914) The above map gives a general view of the ground on which took place successively: the battle of the frontier, the retreat of the Allies, the victorious stand, and the pursuit of the retreating enemy. The distance from Paris to Verdun is 140 miles as the crow flies; from Charleroi to the Marne is 97 miles. In consequence of the tearing up of that fateful "scrap of paper" which preceded the invasion of Belgium by Germany, in violation of the common rights of man, the Battle of the Frontier (also called the Battle of Charleroi) was fought in August 1914 on the line Mons—Charleroi—Dinant—Saint-Hubert—Longwy—Metz. MAUNOURY On August 22, 1914, and the two succeeding days this Allied offensive failed at Charleroi, in consequence of which the French Commander-in-chief, General Joffre, broke off contact with the enemy and ordered a general retreat. It was impossible to do otherwise as the enemy forces were greatly superior in numbers. Moreover, they were well equipped with powerful artillery and machine-guns, whereas the Franco-British forces were short of both. Lastly, the German soldier had long been trained in trench warfare, whereas the Allies had yet to learn this art. To help in readjusting the balance between the opposing forces, Joffre fell back in the direction of the French reserves. The respite thus afforded was utilized to re-arrange the commands, and to train the reserves in the form of warfare adopted by the Germans. Meanwhile, the latter greatly extended their line of communications and more or less tired themselves. Then began that heroic retreat, without precedent in history, which attained a depth of 122 miles, and in the course of which the Allied soldiers, though already fatigued, marched as much as thirty miles a day facing about from time to time and counter-attacking fiercely, often with success. The Germans followed in pursuit, overrunning the country like a plague of locusts. Using their left wing as a pivot, their right undertook a vast turning movement taking in Valenciennes, Cambrai, PÉronne, and Amiens. By August 27 Joffre had fixed up a plan according to which the offensive was to be taken again at the first favourable opportunity. In view of the execution of this plan an important mass of troops, under the orders of General Maunoury, was formed on the French left. General Maunoury's task was to outflank at a given moment the German right wing while, at the same time, a general attack, or at least unflinching resistance, was to be made along the rest of the front. This was the Allies' reply to the turning movement of the German general Von Kluck. A first line of resistance offered itself on the River Somme, where fierce fighting took place. It was, however, realized that the battle front could not be reformed there successfully. Joffre wanted a flanking position not only for his left wing, but also for his right, which the Somme line did not offer. He therefore continued the withdrawal of the whole front towards the River Marne and Paris. On September 3 German cavalry patrols were signalled at Ecouen, only eight miles from the gates of Paris. The inhabitants of the latter were asking themselves anxiously whether they, too, would not have to face the horrors of a German occupation. The suspense was cruel. Fortunately, a great man, General Gallieni, was silently watching over their destinies. This great soldier had just been made Military Governor of Paris, with General Maunoury's Army, mentioned a moment ago, under his orders. The entrenched camp of Paris and this army were, in turn, under the authority of the French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, who thus had full liberty of action from Paris to Verdun. On September 3 General Gallieni issued his stirring proclamation which put soldiers and civilians alike on their mettle: "Armies of Paris, Inhabitants of Paris, the Government of the Republic has left Paris to give a new impulse to the National Defence. I have received orders to defend Paris against invasion. I shall do this to the end." The temptation to push straight on to the long-coveted capital must have been very great for the German High Command. However, in view GALLIENI Seemingly ignorant of Maunoury's existence, Von Kluck's Army slanted off eastwards in pursuit of the British force, which it had received orders from the Kaiser to exterminate and which it had been harrying incessantly during its retreat from the Belgian frontier. There will be heated arguments for many years to come as to whether the German High Command was right or wrong in giving up the direct advance on Paris, but whatever the consensus of expert opinion on the point may eventually be, one thing is certain—Von Kluck did not expect the furious attack by the Army of Paris, which followed. Later, he declared: "There was only one general who, against all rules, would have dared to carry the fight so far from his base. Unluckily for me, that man was Gallieni." On September 3, thanks to the Flying Corps, General Gallieni learned of the change of direction taken by Von Kluck's Army. Realising the possibilities which this offered, he suggested a flank attack by the Army of Paris. As previously mentioned, such an attack formed part of Joffre's general plan, matured on August 27. It was, however, necessary that the attack should be not merely a local and temporary success, as would have been the case on the Somme line for instance, where the remainder of the front was not in a favourable position for resistance, or attack. On September 4, after conferring with General Gallieni, Joffre decided that conditions were favourable for a new offensive, and fixed upon September 6 as the date on which the decisive battle should be begun along the whole front. SEPTEMBER 5, 1914VON KLUCK The map before you shows the respective positions occupied by the opposing armies on September 5, 1914, the eve of the great battle. The Allied forces are represented by a thick black line, those of the Germans by a black and white line. Joffre directed the operations first from Bar-sur-Aube and afterwards from Romilly. As you see, the half-circle formed by the Allies, into which the Germans imprudently penetrated, was supported at the western extremity by the entrenched camp of Paris and at the eastern extremity by the fortified position of Verdun. The River Marne flows through the middle. Although the battle was only to begin on the 6th, General Maunoury's Army was already engaged the day before. Its orders were to advance to the River Ourcq (see map), but, despite furious fighting, it was unable to get there. The British forces were to occupy a line running north and south, with Coulommiers as point of support. Unfortunately, the exceedingly fatiguing retreat it had just accomplished, retarded the execution of the necessary volte-face. The map shows them on the 5th, still far to the south of Coulommiers. The fact that neither of these two forces was able to take up its assigned position greatly increased the difficulties of the turning movement planned by Joffre. In front of the forces under Maunoury and French, were the right and centre of the First German Army, under Von Kluck. The Fifth French Army, under General Franchet d'Esperey, whose position extended from the north of Provins to SÉzanne, delivered a frontal attack against the left wing of Von Kluck's army and the right wing of the Second German army under Von Bulow. At the right of Franchet d'Esperey's army was the Ninth French Army under General Foch, whose task it was to cover his neighbour on the left by holding the issues south of the Marshes of St.-Gond. Opposing Foch was the left of Von Bulow's army, with the right of the Third German Army commanded by Von Hausen. The Fourth French Army, under General Langle de Cary, was minus two army corps which had helped to form Foch's army. This diminution of the forces of the Fourth Army prevented the latter from breaking off contact with the enemy. While, at the extreme left, General Maunoury had already begun his advance towards the River Ourcq, General Langle de Cary received orders to hold up the opposing forces under the Duke of Wurtemberg. Unfortunately, Langle de Cary's forces had not sufficient liberty of movement to effect the necessary volte-face. At the extreme right of the Allied front was the Third French Army, under General Sarrail, established in a position extending from the north-east of Revigny to Verdun, with a reserve group to the west of Saint-Mihiel, to be moved either east or west, according to circumstances. The forces opposing General Sarrail were commanded by the future "War-Lord": the Crown Prince. While the French were preparing to thrust back the invader, "War Lord the Second," drunk with victory, ordered the pursuit to be continued as far as the line Dijon—BesanÇon—Belfort: triumphal dreams destined to give place first to surprise, then to uncertainty, and finally to the bitterness of defeat. Posterity will compare this arrogant order of the Crown Prince's with the stirring proclamation which Joffre caused to be made known to the whole of the French army on the eve of the great battle: FRENCH DOUGLAS HAIG "On the eve of the battle, on which the future of our country depends, it is important to remind all that there must be no looking back. Every effort mast be made to attack and drive back the enemy. Troops which can no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground they have won, and die rather than fall back. Under present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated." SEPTEMBER 6, 1914On this and the succeeding maps, the Allied positions of the previous evening and at the end of the next day are shown. The German positions are not shown, as too many lines might create confusion in reading the maps. Maunoury's Army effected an advance of about six miles, but his left was unable to accomplish its task, which was to outflank the German right. Von Kluck who, till then, seeming to ignore Maunoury had concentrated all his efforts against the British and Franchet d'Esperey's Army, now perceived this manoeuvre. With the promptitude and audacity which particularly marked his character, he completely changed his plans and rounded on Maunoury. Taking advantage of the state of extreme fatigue of the British forces, Von Kluck withdrew one of the army corps which were facing them and despatched it by forced marches to the help of his right wing. It was these unexpected reinforcements which enabled Von Kluck to hold up Maunoury's left. On this day the British army finally recovered itself, and reached a line running from the north-west to the south-east of Coulommiers. FRANCHET D'ESPEREY The armies of Generals Franchet d'Esperey and Foch fought with great stubbornness. The former wrested several dominating positions from the Germans and approached Esternay, but the latter was able only to maintain himself on the line of resistance assigned to him south of the Marshes of Saint-Gond. General Langle de Cary was eventually able to hold up the bulk of the troops under the Duke of Wurtemberg on positions extending from the south-west of Vitry-le-FranÇois to Revigny. The general plan of operations included an attack by the Third Army, under General Sarrail, against the German left wing, such attack to coincide with that of General Maunoury at the other end of the line. This was, however, anticipated by the Germans who, under the Crown Prince, and in far greater numbers, forced back Sarrail's left and prevented all progress on his right. SEPTEMBER 7, 1914On September 7, Maunoury's army began to feel the effects of the German heavy artillery, established out of range of the French 75's, and could advance but very slowly. However, at the end of the day, Maunoury still hoped to be able to outflank the German right. Meanwhile, Von Kluck continued his risky manoeuvre, and detached a second army corps from the forces opposed to the British, adding it to his right. Each was endeavouring to outflank the other. Fronting the British, there was now only a thin curtain of troops taken from two of the German army corps opposed to Franchet d'Esperey. This small force fought with great stubbornness, in order, if possible, to give Von Kluck time to crush Maunoury, before the advance by the British and Franchet d'Esperey could become really dangerous. VON BULOW The slow progress effected in the British sector is explained by the extreme fierceness of the struggle. General Franchet d'Esperey took advantage of the reduction of the forces opposed to him. Vigorously pushing back the latter, he continued his advance northwards, eventually reaching and crossing the River Grand Morin. This advance helped to lessen the effects of the furious attacks that the Germans were then making against General Foch's army. In front of the latter, Von Bulow, whose armies were still intact, realised the danger which threatened Von Kluck, and, in order to avert it, endeavoured to pierce the French front. He concentrated the whole of his efforts against the 42nd Division, under General Grossetti, whose arduous mission it was to maintain the connection between the Fifth and Ninth Armies, under Franchet d'Esperey and Foch respectively. A terrific struggle followed, as a result of which Grossetti was forced to fall back. Fortunately, as we have just seen, the right of Franchet d'Esperey's Army was able, thanks to its advance, to come to the rescue and prevent the French front from being pierced. Before Von Hausen, the whole line fell back slightly. Meanwhile, the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Crown Prince attacked fiercely at the junction of the Fourth and Third French Armies under Langle de Cary and Sarrail respectively. The aim of the attack was to separate these two armies and force what is known as the Revigny Pass. The latter is a hollow through which flow the Rivers Ornain and Saulx, and the canal from the Marne to the Rhine. While the Germans under the Duke of Wurtemberg attacked the right of Langle de Cary's army, in the direction of Saint-Dizier, the Crown Prince sought to drive back General Sarrail's left towards Bar-le-Duc. The resistance of Langle de Cary's army began to weaken under the weight of the greater opposing forces. On the other hand, General Sarrail's army reinforced by an army corps sent by Joffre stood firm. At this juncture General Sarrail learned that the Germans were getting very active in his rear, on the heights above the River Meuse, and was accordingly obliged to make dispositions to avoid being surprised by German forces who were preparing to cross the river. SEPTEMBER 8, 1914During the night of September 7-8 Gallieni, who had been following carefully the different phases of the battle, despatched a division from Paris, in all haste, to Maunoury's left to assist in turning the German right. To do this with maximum rapidity, Gallieni made use of an ingenious expedient, "a civilian's idea," as he termed it. He commandeered all the taxicabs in Paris. Those running in the streets were held up by the police, and the occupants made to alight. When the latter learned the reason, instead of grumbling, they gave a rousing cheer. Eleven hundred taxis made the journey twice during the night from Paris to the front transporting, in all, eleven thousand men. Unfortunately, the effect of these reinforcements was fully counterbalanced by the troops which Von Kluck had brought up on the two previous days from before the British front, and only the extreme tenacity and courage of his troops enabled Maunoury to avoid being outflanked. However, Von Kluck could not with impunity reduce his forces opposed to the British. The latter pulled themselves together, crossed the Petit Morin river and reached La FertÉ-sous-Jouarre. The danger feared by the German generals became apparent. FOCH VON HAUSEN On this day of September 8, a German officer wrote in his notebook: "Caught sight of Von Kluck. His eyes usually so bright, were dull. He, who was wont to be so alert, spoke in dejected tones. He was absolutely depressed." At the right of the British army, General Franchet d'Esperey continued his rapid advance and occupied the outskirts of Montmirail. Moreover, his troops co-operated efficiently in helping to check the violent attacks of Von Bulow's army against Grossetti's division. The Germans became more and more anxious, and rightly so, at the turn events were taking on their right where Von Kluck's army was beginning to be tightly squeezed between the armies of General Maunoury, the British and General Franchet d'Esperey. Von Kluck was forced to retreat and, in doing so, left exposed Von Bulow's army. The armies of Von Bulow and Von Hausen received orders to crush Foch and break through the French centre at all costs, so as to be able to turn Franchet d'Esperey's army on the west, and that of Langle de Cary on the east. The position was this: If the manoeuvre succeeded, Joffre's entire plan would fall to pieces. If, on the other hand, it failed a general retreat on the part of the Germans would be inevitable. Foch's army received a terrible blow. It was forced back in the centre, and almost pierced on the right. However, Foch in no wise lost confidence, but pronounced the situation to be 'excellent.' The fact was, he clearly realised that these furious attacks were dictated by the desperate position in which the Germans found themselves. He rallied his troops, hurled them again against the Germans, but was unable to win back the ground which he had just lost. DE LANGLE DE CARY Von Hausen's fierce thrust also made itself felt on Langle de Gary's left; the connection between the latter's army and Foch's was in great danger of being severed, and could only be maintained by the rapid displacement of troops, and by the intervention of a new army corps despatched by Joffre just in time to restore the balance. While Von Hausen was striking on the left, the Duke of Wurtemberg brought all his weight to bear on Langle de Cary's right, with the Crown Prince executing a similar manoeuvre against Sarrail's left. The German plan was still the same, viz., to separate the two armies and, if possible, isolate Sarrail's army, so that the latter, attacked at the same time in the rear on the heights above the Meuse, where the Germans had begun to bombard the fort of Troyon, would find itself encircled and be forced to surrender. SEPTEMBER 9, 1914On September 9, the battle reached its culminating point along the whole front. Under pressure from the right wing of Maunoury's army, and before the menacing advance of the British forces which had reached ChÂteau-Thierry, the Germans were obliged to withdraw from both banks of the River Ourcq. In order to make this retreat easier along the banks of the Ourcq Von Kluck, at the end of the day, caused an extremely fierce attack to be made against the French left, which bent beneath the shock and was almost turned. At that time, the situation was truly extraordinary: the Germans were already retreating, while the French, stunned by the blow they had just received, were in anxious doubt whether the morrow would not bring them disaster. The struggle seemed so hopeless, that orders were asked for, in view of a possible retreat on Paris. However, General Gallieni refused to consider this possibility and, faithful to Joffre's instructions, gave orders to "die rather than give way." Maunoury's left continued therefore its heroic resistance. GROSSETTI Von Kluck's retreat along the Ourcq left Von Bulow's army completely unprotected, and he was, in turn, obliged to give way before Franchet d'Esperey's left. The latter continued to co-operate actively in the heroic resistance of the French centre, by taking in the flank the enemy forces which were furiously attacking Foch. This general became the objective of the last and most furious attacks of Von Bulow and Von Hausen who, realizing that should they fail they would be forced to continue the retreat begun on their right, decided to make one more attempt to crush in the French centre. They very nearly succeeded; all along the line, the French were forced to fall back, and the southern boundary of the Marshes of Saint-Gond was entirely abandoned. The position, to the east of SÉzanne, seemed hopeless. It was there that the loss of ground was most dangerous, and it is perhaps necessary to explain in detail this critical phase of the battle. On the large-scale map below is shown the position of Foch's left and centre on September 8 and 9. It was in the region of Villeneuve and Soisy that General Grossetti's Division had fought so heroically for four days. Absolutely decimated, it was replaced on the morning of the 9th by one of the neighbouring army corps under Franchet d'Esperey. This corps advanced during the day but, further to the right, the Germans forced back the French from the Woods of Botrait and from the crest of the Poirier, capturing the heights of Mondement. Mondement is situated on a narrow plateau, the last counterfort before reaching the vast plain of the Aube. On the opposite side of this plateau are to be seen the villages of Allemant and Broyes. If the Germans, in possession of Mondement, had succeeded in reaching these two villages on the day of the 9th, they would have attacked in the rear those forces under Foch which were fighting in the plain. Mondement had, therefore, to be held at all costs. Thus the battle pivoted on this axis. In accordance with Foch's instructions, the Moroccan Division under General Humbert, was placed there and, with the help of the 77th Infantry, not only held its ground but, recapturing the castle during the day, forced the Germans back on the Marshes in the evening. At the foot of the villages of Allemant and Broyes, the vast plain of the Aube spreads itself out, and it was there that things were going badly with Foch, the loss of ground being serious. The colonials under General Humbert, who were hanging on grimly to the Plateau of Monde ALB. VON WURTEMBERG If the centre had given way completely, the defenders of Mondement would have been taken in the rear, and obliged to abandon the plateau. In other words, it would have meant complete defeat. To avert this terrible danger, Foch had only Grossetti's Division which, as mentioned a few moments ago, had been decimated by four days of the fiercest fighting, and which he had that morning taken from his left wing and sent to the rear to rest. Foch recalled this division, and hurled it against the most critical point of his line between Linthes and Pleurs. He hoped it would be in a position to attack about noon, but at three in the afternoon it had not yet been reformed. These were hours of mortal suspense along the whole front. General Grossetti needed all his energy to reform the scattered units of his division, and his men, who were on their way to the rear to rest, when they were again ordered into the thick of the battle, had need of superhuman courage to carry out the long fatiguing flank march of twelve miles, which was to bring them that afternoon to Foch's centre. Finally, at about four in the afternoon, Grossetti appeared on the scene and the situation rapidly changed. With what feelings of intense relief the defenders of Mondement must have seen Grossetti's men moving eastwards to the attack and driving the Germans back again behind Mount Chalmont. The enemy was literally demoralized by this unexpected arrival of reinforcements. The objective of Grossetti's attack was the junction of the armies of Von Bulow and Von Hausen, viz.: the weakest point of the German front. The German generals had at that time nothing with which to counter this last effort of Foch's, and, realising that the battle was indeed lost, began to make preparations for retreat. Just as Franchet d'Esperey had supported Foch energetically on his SARRAIL CROWN PRINCE Sarrail, in turn, supported Langle de Cary, by operating with his left against the flank of the German forces, which were pressing that commander. Meanwhile, his right was in a critical position, owing to the operations in his rear by German forces on the heights above the Meuse. In spite of the danger, and although he had been authorized by the commander-in-chief to withdraw his right so as to escape this menace, Sarrail clung with dogged tenacity to Verdun: he would not abandon his position, so long as the Meuse had not been crossed, and while there was still the slightest hope of being able to hold out. SEPTEMBER 10 to 13, 1914The morning of the 10th witnessed a theatrical change of scene on the French left, where it will be remembered Maunoury's army was in a most critical position. After a night of anxious suspense, it was seen that the Germans had abandoned their positions, and were retreating hastily towards the north-east, to avoid being caught in the pincer-like jaws formed by the Franco-British forces the previous day. Thus Paris and France were saved, as Von Kluck's retreat carried away Von Bulow's army with it, and Franchet d'Esperey crossed the Marne. Von Langle de Cary precipitated the retreat of Von Hausen's army. His right, still under heavy pressure, was however obliged to fall back. Here, the Germans were only held up by the increasingly effectual help rendered by Sarrail's army. The latter withstood the furious attacks of the Crown Prince without flinching, while on the heights above the Meuse, the fort of Troyon, the heroic defence of which has since become famous, withstood the terrible onslaughts of the enemy forces which sought to cross the river. It was only on the 11th that the Duke of Wurtemberg followed the retreat begun on his right the day before, and it was only during the night of the 12th-13th that the German retreat became general. On the 13th the Germans reached their line of resistance, and, as will be seen on the map before you, their front extended from Soissons to Verdun, passing by Rheims. This map also shows the positions at the beginning of the battle. The foregoing sketch gives a general idea of the character of this great battle, which has been called "The Miracle of the Marne," and for the winning of which the following factors were responsible: firmness on the part of the commander-in-chief; the clear and well-laid plan which he caused to be executed by highly capable army commanders working in close collaboration with one another; and, above all, the superhuman courage and endurance of the soldiers. As time passes, these memorable days stand out more and more gloriously. The study in detail of this stupendous event will continue for centuries hence, but its main lines, which we have been at pains to trace, already stand out clearly. They recall all the old French traditions. The clearness of the plan, the suppleness of manoeuvre, the bold use of the reserves, remind one of the Napoleonic era. The enthusiasm which galvanized soldiers and chiefs alike dates back to the Revolution. And going back into the remote past, it was the remembrance of the arresting on the soil of Gaul of the great barbarian invasions which inspired the Victory of the Marne. MARSHAL JOFFRE |
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