"Who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last."

Moorish Proverb.

In a previous work on this country, "The Land of the Moors," published in 1901, the present writer concluded with this passage: "France alone is to be feared in the Land of the Moors, which, as things trend to-day, must in time form part of her colony. There is no use disguising the fact, and, as England certainly would not be prepared to go to war with her neighbour to prevent her repeating in Morocco what she has done in Tunis, it were better not to grumble at her action. All England cares about is the mouth of the Mediterranean, and if this were secured to her, or even guaranteed neutral—were that possible—she could have no cause to object to the French extension. Our Moorish friends will not listen to our advice; they keep their country closed, as far as they can, refusing administrative reforms which would prevent excuses for annexation. Why should we trouble them? It were better far to come to an agreement with France, and acknowledge what will prove itself one day—that France is the normal heir to Morocco whenever the present Empire breaks up."[page293]

Unpopular as this opinion was among the British and other foreign subjects in the country, and especially among the Moors, so that it had at first no other advocate, it has since been adopted in Downing Street, and what is of more moment, acted upon. Nay more, Great Britain has, in return for the mere recognition of a fait accompli in Egypt, agreed to stand aside in Morocco, and to grant France a free hand in any attempt to create there a similar state of things. Though the principle was good, the bargain was bad, for the positions of the two contracting Powers, in Egypt and Morocco respectively, were by no means analogous. France could never have driven us out of Egypt save with her sword at our throat; England had but to unite with other Powers in blocking the way of France in Morocco to stultify all her plans. Had England stood out for terms, whether as regarding her commercial interests in Morocco, which have been disgracefully sacrificed, or in the form of concessions elsewhere, a very much more equal-handed bargain might have been secured.

The main provisions of the agreement between the two countries, concluded April 8, 1904, are—

Art. II. "The British Government recognizes that it appertains to France, more especially as being the Power in contiguity with Morocco, to control the peace of the country, and to lend its assistance in all administrative, economical, financial, and military reforms. The British Government declares that it will not interfere with the action of France in this regard, provided that this action will leave intact the rights which, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usages, Great Britain enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting between the Morocco ports, of which English vessels have had the benefit since 1901."

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Art. VII. "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, both Governments agree not to allow fortifications or any strategic works to be erected on that part of the Moorish coast between Melilla and the heights which dominate the right bank of the Sebu exclusively."

France has secured all that she wanted, or rather that her aggressive colonial party wanted, for opinions on that point are by no means identical, even in France, and the Agreement at once called forth the condemnation of the more moderate party. What appears to be permissive means much more. Now that Great Britain has drawn back—the Power to which the late Sir John Drummond Hay taught the Moors to look with an implicit confidence to champion them against all foes, as it did in the case of the wars with France and Spain, vetoing the retention of a foot of Moorish soil—Morocco lies at the feet of France. France, indeed, has become responsible for carrying out a task its eager spirits have been boiling over for a chance of undertaking. Morocco has been made the ward of the hand that gripped it, which but recently filched two outlying provinces, Figig and TÛÁt.

Englishmen who know and care little about Morocco are quite incapable of understanding the hold that France already had upon this land. Separated from it only by an unprotected boundary, much better defined on paper than in fact, over which there is always a "rectification" dispute in pickle, her province of Algeria affords a prospective base already furnished with lines of rail from her ports of Oran and Algiers. From Oojda, an insignificant town across the border from Lalla MaghnÎa (Marnia), there runs a valley route which[page295] lays Fez in her power, with TÁza by the way to fortify and keep the mountaineers in check. At any time the frontier forays in which the tribes on both sides indulge may be fomented or exaggerated, as in the case of Tunis, to afford a like excuse for a similar occupation, which beyond a doubt would be a good thing for Morocco. Fez captured, and the seaports kept in awe or bombarded by the navy, Mequinez would fall, and an army landed in Mazagan would seize MarrÁkesh.

All this could be accomplished with a minimum of loss, for only the lowlands would have to be crossed, and the mountaineers have no army. But their "pacification" would be the lingering task in which lives, time, and money would be lost beyond all recompense. Against a European army that of the Sultan need not be feared; only a few battalions drilled by European officers might give trouble, but they would see former instructors among the foe, and without them they would soon become demoralized. It would be the tribal skirmishers, of whom half would fall before the others yielded to the Nazarenes, who would give the trouble.

The military mission which France has for many years imposed on the Sultan at his expense, though under her control, which follows him in his expeditions and spies out the land, has afforded a training-ground for a series of future invading leaders. Her Algerian Mohammedan agents are able to pass and repass where foreigners never go, and besides collecting topographical and other information, they have lost no opportunity of making known the privileges and advantages of French rule. In case it may be found advisable to set up a dummy[page296] sultan under a protectorate, the French have an able and powerful man to hand in the young Idreesi Shareef of WazzÁn, whom the English refused to protect, and who, with his brother, received a French education.

But while we, as a nation, have been unable to comprehend the French determination to possess Morocco, they have been unable to comprehend our calm indifference, and by the way in which they betray their suspicions of us, they betray their own methods. Protestant missionaries in Algeria and Tunisia, of whatever nationality, are supposed to be the emissaries of the British Government, and in consequence are harassed and maligned, while tourists outside the regular beat are watched. When visiting Oojda some years ago, I myself was twice arrested in Algeria, at TlemÇen and Lalla MaghnÎa, because mingling with natives, and it was with difficulty that I could persuade the juges d'instruction of my peaceful motives.

Determined and successful efforts to become acquainted with the remotest provinces of Morocco, the distribution of its population, and whatever could be of use to an invading or "pacifying" force have long been made by France, but the most valuable portion of this knowledge remains pigeon-holed, or circulates only in strictly official mÉmoires. Many of the officials engaged here, however, have amused themselves and the public by publishing pretty books of the average class, telling little new, while one even took the trouble to write his in English, in order to put us off the scent!

If ever means could justify an end, France deserves to enjoy the fruit of her labours. No[page297] longer need she foment strife on the Algerian frontier, or wink at arms being smuggled across it; no longer need the mis-named "pretender" be supplied with French gold, or intrigues be carried on at Court. Abd el AzÎz must take the advice and "assistance" of France, whether he will or no, and curse the British to whom he formerly looked. This need not necessarily involve such drastic changes as would rouse the people to rebellion, and precipitate a costly conquest. There are many reforms urgently required in the interests of the people themselves, and these can now be gradually enforced. Such reforms had been set on foot already by the young Sultan, mainly under British advice; but to his chagrin, his advisers did not render the financial and moral support he needed to carry them out. France is now free to do this, and to strengthen his position, so that all wise reforms may be possible. These will naturally commence with civil and judicial functions, but must soon embrace the more pressing public works, such as roads, bridges, and port improvements. Railways are likely to be the first roads in most parts, and Mulai Abd el AzÎz will welcome their introduction. The western ideas which he has imbibed during the last few years are scoffed at only by those who know little of him. What France will have to be prepared for is Court intrigue, and she will have to give the Moors plainly to understand that "Whatsoever king shall reign, she'll still be 'boss of the show,' sir."

As one of the first steps needed, but one requiring the co-operation of all other Powers on treaty terms with the Moors, the establishment of tribunals[page298] to which all should be amenable, has already been touched upon. These must necessarily be presided over by specially qualified Europeans in receipt of sufficient salary to remove them from temptation. A clear distinction should then be made between a civil code administered by such tribunals and the jurisdiction of the Muslim law in matters of religion and all dependent upon it. But of even more pressing importance is the reform of the currency, and the admission of Morocco to the Latin Union. This could well be insisted on when the financial question is discussed at the Algeciras Conference, as well as the equally important establishment in competent hands of a State Bank. This and the reform of the whole fiscal system must precede every other measure, as they form the ground-work of the whole.

Whatever public works may be eventually undertaken, the first should be, as far as possible, such as the Moors themselves can execute under European direction, and as they can appreciate. Irrigation would command enthusiasm where railways would only provoke opposition, and the French could find no surer way of winning the hearts of the people than by coping at once with the agricultural water supply, in order to provide against such years of famine as the present, and worse that are well remembered. That would be a form of "pacific penetration," to which none could object.

Education, too, when attempted, should be gradually introduced as a means of personal advancement, the requirements of the public service being raised year by year, as the younger generation has had opportunities of better qualifying themselves.[page299] Above all, every post should be in theory at least thrown open to the native, and in practice as soon as the right man turned up. Better retain or instal more of the able Moors of to-day as figureheads with European advisers, than attempt a new set to start with. But a clean sweep should be made of the foreigners at present in the Moorish service, all of whom should be adequately pensioned off, that with the new order might come new men, adequately paid and independent of "commissions." It is essential that the people learn to feel that they are not being exploited, but that their true welfare is sought. Every reform should be carried out along native lines, and in conformity with native thought.

TUNISIA UNDER THE FRENCH—AN EXECUTION.
Albert, Photo., Tunis.
TUNISIA UNDER THE FRENCH—AN EXECUTION.

The costly lesson of Algeria, where native rights and interests were overthrown, and a complete detested foreign rule set up, has taught the French the folly of such a system, however glorious it may appear on paper. They have been wiser in Tunisia, where a nominally native government is directed by Frenchmen, whom it pays, and sooner or later Morocco is almost certain to become a second Tunisia. This will not only prove the best working system, but it will enable opposition to be dealt with by Moorish forces, instead of by an invading army, which would unite the Berber tribes under the Moorish flag. This was what prolonged the conquest of Algeria for so many years, and the Berbers of Morocco are more independent and better armed than were those of Algeria seventy years ago. What France will gain by the change beyond openings for Frenchmen and the glory of an extended colonial empire, it is hard to imagine, [page300] but empty glory seems to satisfy most countries greedy of conquest. So far the only outward evidences of the new position are the over-running of the ports, especially of Tangier, by Frenchmen of an undesirable class, and by an attempt to establish a French colony at the closed port of MehedÎya by doubtful means, to say nothing of the increased smuggling of arms.

How the welfare of the Moors will be affected by the change is a much more important question, though one often held quite unworthy of consideration, the accepted axiom being that, whether they like it or not, what is good for us is good for them. Needless to say that most of the reforms required will be objected to, and that serious obstacles will be opposed to some; the mere fact that the foreigner, contemptuously called a "Nazarene," is their author, is sufficient to prejudice them in native eyes, and the more prominent the part played by him, the more difficult to follow his advice. But if the Sultan and his new advisers will consent to a wise course of quiet co-operation, much may be effected without causing trouble. It is astonishing how readily the Moors submit to the most radical changes when unostentatiously but forcibly carried out. Never was there a greater call for the suaviter in modo, fortiter in re. Power which makes itself felt by unwavering action has always had their respect, and if the Sultan is prepared not to act till with gold in his coffers, disciplined troops at his command, and loyal officials to do his behest, he can do so with unquestioned finality, all will go well.

Then will the prosperity of the people revive—indeed, achieve a condition hitherto unknown save [page301] in two or three reigns of the distant past, perhaps not then. The poor will not fear to sow their barren fields, or the rich to display their wealth; hidden treasure will come to light, and the groan of the oppressed will cease. Individual cases of gross injustice will doubtless arise; but they will be as nothing compared with what occurs in Morocco to-day, even with that wrought by Europeans who avail themselves of existing evils. So that if France is wise, and restrains her hot-heads, she may perform a magnificent work for the Moors, as the British have done in Egypt; at least, it is to be hoped she may do as well in Morocco as in Tunisia.

But it would be idle to ignore the deep dissatisfaction with which the Anglo-French Agreement has been received by others than the Moors.^* Most British residents in Morocco, probably every tourist who has been conducted along the coast, or sniffed at the capital cities; those firms of ours who share the bulk of the Moorish trade, and others who yearned to open up possible mines, and undertake the public works so urgently needed; ay, and the concession-prospectors and company-mongers who see the prey eluding their grasp; even the would-be heroes across the straits who have dreamed in vain of great deeds to be done on those hills before them; all unite in deploring what appears to them a gross blunder. After all, this is but natural. So few of us can see beyond our own domains, so many hunger after anything—in their particular line—that belongs to a weaker neighbour, that it is well we have disinterested statesmen who take a wider view. Else had we[page302] long since attempted to possess ourselves of the whole earth, like the conquering hordes of Asia, and in consequence we should have been dispossessed ourselves.

Even to have been driven to undertake in Morocco a task such as we were in Egypt, would have been a calamity, for our hands are too full already of similar tasks. It is all very well in these times of peace, but in the case of war, when we might be attacked by more than one antagonist, we should have all our work cut out to hold what we have. The policy of "grab," and dabbing the world with red, may be satisfactory up to a certain point, but it will be well for us as a nation when we realize that we have had enough. In Morocco, what is easy for France with her contiguous province, with her plans for trans-SÁharan traffic, and her thirst to copy our colonial expansion—though without men to spare—would have been for us costly and unremunerative. We are well quit of the temptation.

Moreover, we have freed ourselves of a possible, almost certain, cause of friction with France, of itself a most important gain. Just as France would never have acquiesced in our establishing a protectorate in Morocco without something more than words, so the rag-fed British public, always capable of being goaded to madness by the newspapers, would have bitterly objected to French action, if overt, while powerless to prevent the insidious grasp from closing on Morocco by degrees. The first war engaging at once British attention and forces was like to see France installed in Morocco without our leave. The early reverses of[page303] the Transvaal War induced her to appropriate TÛÁt and Figig, and had the fortune of war been against us, Morocco would have been French already. These facts must not be overlooked in discussing what was our wisest course. We were unprepared to do what France was straining to do: we occupied the manger to no one's good—practically the position later assumed by Germany. Surely we were wiser to come to terms while we could, not as in the case of Tunisia, when too late.

But among the objecting critics one class has a right to be heard, those who have invested life and fortune in the Morocco trade; the men who have toiled for years against the discouraging odds involved, who have wondered whether Moorish corruption or British apathy were their worst foe, in whom such feeling is not only natural but excusable. Only those who have experienced it know what it means to be defrauded by complacent Orientals, and to be refused the redress they see officials of other nations obtaining for rivals. Yet now they find all capped by the instructions given to our consuls not to act without conferring with the local representatives of France, which leads to the taunt that Great Britain has not only sold her interests in Morocco to the French, but also her subjects!

The British policy has all along been to maintain the status quo in spite of individual interests, deprecating interference which might seem high-handed, or create a precedent from which retraction would be difficult. In the collection of debts, in enforcing the performance of contracts, or in securing justice of any kind where the policy is to promise all and evade all till pressure is brought to bear,[page304] British subjects in Morocco have therefore always found themselves at a disadvantage in competition with others whose Governments openly supported them. The hope that buoyed them up was that one day the tide might turn, and that Great Britain might feel it incumbent on her to "protect" Morocco against all comers. Now hope has fled. What avails it that grace of a generation's span is allowed them, that they may not individually suffer from the change? It is the dream of years that lies shattered.

Here are the provisions for their protection:

Art. IV. "The two Governments, equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty, both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not lend themselves to any inequality either in the establishment of customs rights or other taxes, or in the establishment of tariffs for transport on the railways.... This mutual agreement is valid for a period of thirty years" (subject to extensions of five years).

Art. V. secures the maintenance in their posts of British officials in the Moorish service, but while it is specially stipulated that French missionaries and schools in Egypt shall not be molested, British missionaries in Morocco are committed to the tender mercies of the French.

Thus there can be no immediate exhibition of favouritism beyond the inevitable placing of all concessions in French hands, and there is really not much ground of complaint, while there is a hope of cause for thankfulness. Released from its former bugbears, no longer open to suspicion of secret designs, our Foreign Office can afford to impart a little more backbone into its dealings with Moorish officials; a much more acceptable policy should,[page305] therefore, be forthwith inaugurated, that the Morocco traders may see that what they have lost in possibilities they have gained in actualities. Still more! the French, now that their hands are free, are in a position to "advise" reforms which will benefit all. Thus out of the ashes of one hope another rises.

* See Appendix.

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