rule | | PAGE. | | Preface | v | | Introduction | sect.
| | | | i | Division of Philosophies into Ideal and Substantial—Substantial subdivided into Mental and Material—Berkeley's philosophy a Mental Substantialism | 1 | | ii | Ontological principles essential to logical theory—Mind consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic Substance—Functions of each—Perception of Inorganic things discussed—Berkeley's view on this point rejected—Body to be considered an apparatus of Perception | 4 | | iii | Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore incoherent—Substantial alone has a connecting principle—Importance of Categories in Substantialism—Its doctrine of Reason totally different from the Academic | 8 | | Intellect | | iv | Origin of Intellect—Its use—Difference between Sentimental and Intellectual consciousness—Intellect not the governing intelligence of Man—Moral education the most important | 11 | | v | Truth, its various meanings—Veracity—Correct Ideation—Correct Inference—No absolute standard of Truth—Nisi utile est, quod novimus, stulta est Sapentia—Schopenhauer on the function of Intellect | 14 | | vi | Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare different from that relating to Mental welfare—Realism the theory of Perception under the former standard—Its main dogmas—Cause why it is superseded—Superstition of One Truth—Realism and Substantialism both true and yet contradictory | 18 | | Perception | | vii | Defined, according to Substantial principles—Noumenon—Subject—Object—Sentiment not excited by Objects, but Objects accompany Sentiments—Subject not passive in Perception—Attention—Kant's opinion on the inconceivability of Noumena refuted—Difficulty of overcoming Realistic prejudices—Science of little use in Philosophy | 23 | | Ideas | | viii | How produced—Hume's notion untenable—No innate Ideas—but Sentiment is innate—Division of Ideas into Particular, General, and Imaginary | 27 | | ix | Memory—Oblivion— Recollection—Images, how preserved and how lost—Good Memory not necessarily advantageous—Recovery of the apparently Forgotten—Sudden extinction of Ideas—'Decay of the mind' in old age—Memory inexplicable on any theory but the Substantial—John Stuart Mill's confession—Memory the chief fact of Mental Science | 28 | | x | Sentiments may be remembered—Feelings and Emotions—No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible or necessary—Spinoza's list—Can sentiments be noumenally excited without objects? | 34 | | xi | Analysis of Comparison—It is the principle of Generalisation and Imagination | 36 | | Generalisation | | xii | Purpose of Generalisation—Objects classified must be similar and have similar utilities—Inferiority of general ideas acquired by definition—Names not essential to general thought—Generalisation resembles composite photography—Classification on mere objective resemblance—neat but superficial—Conceptualism | 38 | | xiii | Matter the most general notion derived from Objects—Belief in Real Matter a form of Mysticism—A material basis for phenomena unnecessary | 43 | | xiv | Nominalism
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