[1] Gen. Adams says: "Computations based on the census returns tend to show that at the very lowest estimate the increase of time of military service would represent an increase of at least 30 per cent. in effectives." Id. p. 284.

[2] Our critic has made an error here: 12 per cent, of 1,000,000, i.e., 120,000, so that his aggregate should be 1,420,000.

[3] See Merivale's History of the Romans, III, 416, and IV, 298 and 343, and V. 386.

[4] In the first edition of Col. Henderson's work, cited above, he actually stated that the element of foreigners in the Southern armies was almost as large as in the Northern armies!

[5] Gen. Marcus J. Wright puts this number at only 65,387. But cf. Mansfield's Life of Grant, p. 338.

[6] See a valuable discussion of our subject in a pamphlet entitled "Acts of the Republican Party," by Cazenove G. Lee, who wrote under the nom de plume of "C. Gardner," Winchester, Va., 1906, pp. 59-69.

[7] I acted as adjutant of the Third Brigade A. N. Va., in the Gettysburg campaign. Even then, in the third year of the war, and in that best equipped army, the returns showed only 1480 muskets to 1941 men in the brigade. One-fourth of the command was without arms.

[8] "The Government, at the opening of 1864, estimated that the Conscription would place four hundred thousand men in the field." Lee did not share this belief. By the end of the year it was, in his opinion, "diminishing, rather than increasing, the strength of his army."—Letter of Dec. 31, 1864. See "R. E. Lee, Man and Soldier," p. 591, by Thos. Nelson Page.

[9] Thus, to quote that able and expert authority Gen. Marcus J. Wright: Battles around Richmond (1862), Lee, 80,835; McClellan, 115,249. At Antietam, Confederates, 35,255; Federals, 87,164. At Fredericksburg, Confederates, 78,110; Federals, 110,000. At Chancellorsville, Confederates, 57,212; Federals, 131,661. At Gettysburg, Confederates, 64,000; Federals, 95,000. At the Wilderness, Confederates, 63,981; Federals, 141,160.

[10] A consideration of the portentous difference between the number of men borne on the regimental rolls and the number actually available on the battlefield, suggests that it may be in large degree accounted for by the number of men detailed for service in the industrial army.

Thus in the army of Northern Virginia just before Fredericksburg, Nov. 20, 1862:

Soon after Gettysburg:

Before Wilderness campaign:

On reaching Petersburg, July 10, 1864:

As to exemptions it was customary to exempt farmers who engaged to raise a certain amount of corn.

Again the practice was extensively pursued of granting furloughs for recruiting service. Such men continued to be borne on the rolls of their commands in the field.

[11] Aggregate available military population 792,000, of which 350,000 in the army January, 1862. Above figure is 2-1/2 per cent. of remainder, viz. 442,000.

[12] Col. Livermore's method of computation, if applied to the true available number 760,000, with additions and deductions noted above, yields a very similar result, about 790,000. See his book, p. 23, but note on p. 21 an error of calculation, where instead of 265,000 he should give 246,872.

[13] The ten per cent. addition for extension of military age is too high an estimate in this and the following tables, when we remember that the conscript law lowering the age to seventeen and raising it to fifty did not go into operation until February 17, 1864, by which time the territory of the Confederacy was greatly contracted.

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