Second Letter, p. 4. The above was written several weeks before Mr. Maskell took the final step which he has since taken. Possibly many will point to this, and wonder at my blind credulity, as it will seem to them. But, I neither cancel, nor wish to cancel, any part of my remarks. All I will venture to do, is to add (and I trust I shall have Mr. Maskell’s forgiveness, under these peculiar circumstances, for quoting from a private letter) one or two extracts which may perhaps help to justify what I have said, and do him at the same time no wrong. In a letter to me, bearing date, “Easter Eve, 1850,” not long before the publication of the “Second Letter,” he says—“I wish, for my own present comfort, that I had your now faith, hope, trust and determination; but I have not—yet let me think that we may yet be, as we ever have been, true friends; you will not repudiate me, even if I do find that for a while we must be separate in communion; for you will know, surely, that I am not one who ‘would change his faith like a garment unsuited to the clime in which he dwells.’ . . . All this is sad enough—sad for it will break up many ties near and very dear. . . . Well! it is God’s will—now one, now another; here a few; there many: as He sees fit, so He calls, and so we ought to obey. . . . I am very, very sad: sad especially, because of seeming to desert and forsake one acting so nobly and so bravely as my Bishop. He has no doubt about the Church of England: yet I know that, at whatever cost and pain, God’s truth alone must be fought for. Yet for all this, do not conclude that I have decided:—only, you will be prepared to know that the first step has been taken, I mean resignation—and with it my second letter. . . . Pray do not judge me harshly. . . . What an Easter! yet one day there will be the rising of the morning of the resurrection: may God grant to you and me, and all whom we love, so to do our duty here towards him, and to his Church, and to the faith, that we may be glad to look upon the brightness of those beams. Here all seems trouble and anxiety and fear; sorrows, and regret, and parting. I have had sorrows before this: scarcely any, nay NONE, (can it be true?) more bitter. There is now responsibility; before, endurance only. God ever bless you, my dear Friend, ever yours affectionately—W. M.” And in a letter somewhat later, written I believe on my first intimating my intention to publish a second letter to him: he says—“Clear up these doubts; not one or two, but generally the subject of the dogmatic teaching; say, especially, with reference to justification and the Holy Eucharist, and no man will bless you more fervently than I shall.” Those who do not know Mr. Maskell may judge him hardly. I trust I shall never have that guilt upon my conscience, however I differ from him, or combat his conclusions. And perhaps some even of those who may have been least indulgent to him heretofore, will not now so much question my remarks, and may possibly believe I know him at least as well as they do. Second Letter, p., 77. Second Letter, App., p., 85. Second Letter, App., pp., 85, 86. Letter to Maskell, p. 7. Ibid. pp. 14, 15. See Appendix A. Second Letter, pp. 78, 79. Second Letter, p. 19, note; p. 75. Judgment of the Privy Council, p. 18. Judgment of the Privy Council, p. 18. Appendix B. Lord Campbell’s first letter to Miss Sellon, Guardian, April 17th. Lord Campbell in his second letter to Miss Sellon, (Guardian, Ap. 17,) has these words, which are likewise remarkable. “No reproach can be brought upon her (the Church of England) by a misconstruction of her articles and formularies; and it must be a very slight reproach to her if she has omitted to denounce one false doctrine as heretical, considering that no Christian Church has professed to settle dogmatically all points of doctrine.” The beginning of this sentence is a tolerably bold assumption, I think, unless Lord Campbell will allow a few words to be supplied, to explain what I trust he will feel to be an omission; that no reproach will come upon her, by a misconstruction of her formularies, by that court, if only with all her heart and soul, she set herself to correct it, and cast the misconstruction from her: but the latter part of the above quotation seems to admit of no palliation by any possible addition, and is surely a most marvellous slip for a mind of any acuteness to have made. “A very slight reproach,” Lord Campbell says it must be, “to have omitted to denounce one false doctrine as heretical;” without apparently a single thought as to what the doctrine in question may be. That it is an article of the creed which is expunged, and therefore denied, appears never to have crossed his Lordship’s mind, as worthy of the slightest consideration. “It is but one doctrine out of many:—reckon them up by tale, and you will never miss one:—no Churches settle everything:—why then so uneasy?” What hope, what possible chance that a mind constituted so as to be able to write such a sentence, can ever have appreciated, or believed, or understood, the meaning or importance of dogmatic teaching at all. Had he lived in the time of the Arian controversy, could the writer of the above sentence have believed it was possible any matter of moment was, or could be, involved in so minute a distinction as in the two letters of the ????s???, that it could be worth the toil of Athanasius’s life, to contend for so slight a point? and repay all the labours and persecutions of a host of saints to win it? and in truth Lord Campbell’s method of arguing, or consolation to an afflicted Church, would apply just as much, had it been the doctrine of the atonement, or of the divinity of the Son of God, which had been brought in question by Mr. Gorham’s examination. “No need to settle every thing. So one open question can be no great matter, and no great reproach!” Judgment, p. 8. Judgment, p. 9. Bp. of Exeter’s Letter, p. 52. Efficacy of Baptism, p. 85. P. 88. P. 112. P. 113. P. 197. Judgment, p. 14. Ibid. 14. A letter in the Guardian, of March 13th, signed “Solicitus,” has placed this statement in a very intelligible point of view. As it is brief I will venture to quote it.
“It has been asserted by the Privy Council that the baptismal and burial offices are parallel cases:—we hope that the child is regenerate: we hope the dead brother is to rise to eternal life?
“But are the cases parallel? Is it not a notorious fact, that at the Savoy Conference in consequence of the Puritan objections, the words ‘in sure and certain hope of resurrection to eternal life’ were altered into ‘in sure and certain hope of the’ (i.e. the general) ‘resurrection to eternal life.’ And on the other hand when the words ‘it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant by thy Holy Spirit,’ were objected to by the same parties (on the ground that the ‘regeneration of every child that is baptised,’ is at least’ a ‘disputable point,’) no alteration was made. How came this to pass? Surely the Church of England wanted to show that her language with regard to the dead was only that of charitable hope; but that she held the doctrine of regeneration in baptism absolutely and without qualification.—Yours, faithfully,
“Solicitus.”
As I have said, the notion of the general resurrection being the object of the hope alluded to, appears never to have presented itself to the mind of the Court. If it did not; where was their ability? If it did; where their honesty; so entirely to suppress all mention of it, and force this service to one construction only, in order to open the door to many constructions in another? Faery Queen, Book I. C. IX. St. 43. See Appendix C. Judgment of Sir H. J. Fust, p. 48. Office for Private Baptism of Infants. Office for Private Baptism of Infants. See also Appendix D. Badeley’s Speech, pp. 58, 59. Judgment, p. 16. Ibid. See Bishop of Exeter’s Letter, p. 88. Judgment, p. 17. Judgment, p. 17. Rubric in Office for private Baptism. It is obvious, sanctified, or hath sanctified would not express the sense intended; just as the Holy Ghost who comforted, or hath comforted, would not convey the meaning of the words “The Holy Ghost” (who is,) “the Comforter.” “In any ordinary set of circumstances, in the case of an enclosure, of a railway or matter of property, we should have no question whatever that the doubt of any one on the bench would have made further enquiry desirable. I should instantly have agreed, &c.” Lord Denman’s judgement in the Hampden case; Report of the Case of the Right Rev. R. D. Hampden, D.D. by R. Jebb, Esq. p. 495. See also Appendix E. Appendix F. Maskell on Absolution, p. 49. Maskell’s Doctrine of Absolution, pp. 49, 50. Maskell’s Doctrine of Absolution, pp. 50, 51. Maskell’s Second Letter, pp. 41, 42. It may be worth while to observe here also how entirely this principle is acknowledged in the foundations of English law. I should indeed soon get beyond my depth, were I to attempt an analysis of this part of the subject; but I gladly avail myself of the labours of another whose pen and legal knowledge the present crisis has put in motion, to bring into juxtaposition with my own observations, one or two of the acknowledged maxims by which the construction of legal documents among us is governed. Mr. Chambers, [59b] in his recent letter to the Bishop of Salisbury, has several times referred to this subject. Thus he quotes Mr. Dwarris (himself quoting Lord Coke):—
“To know what the common law was before the making of a statute, whereby it may be seen whether the statute be introductory of a new law, or only affirmatory of the common law, is the very lock and key to open the windows of the statute. For it is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law further than the case absolutely required; the law rather infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified, and beside what has been plainly pronounced: for if the Parliament had had that design, it is naturally said they would have expressed it.” [60a]
It appears to me that in some sense, i.e. in reference, at any rate, to posterior legislation, the pre-reformation doctrines may be called the common law of our Church; and if so, we shall readily see the analogy of the civil law, and the authoritative declaration of its rule of construction of statutes, is, that no alteration is made by subsequent enactments, but what is specified, or beside what is plainly pronounced;—that is to say, what is not “openly, plainly, and dogmatically” altered, remains as it was before. To the same purpose exactly Mr. Chambers adds another passage, stating again “the canon of construction appropriate to statutes,” and again quoting Mr. Dwarris:—
“Affirmative words do not take away the common law, former custom, or a former statute.” [60b]
And again, a little further on, citing further authorities:—
“When particular words are followed by general ones, the latter are to be held as applying to persons and things of the same kind only which precede,” [61a] so that “if a particular thing be given or limited in the preceding parts of a statute this shall not be altered by the subsequent general words of the same statute;” [61b] an observation surely of much weight to show how definitely any part of a statute must be examined, and how directly mentioned in order to its repeal, according to the usage of English law. Once more, to quote but one further passage to the same effect:—
“Unless the intention be apparent for that purpose, the general words of another and later statute shall not repeal the provisions of a former one.” [61c]
Such is the testimony from rules of English law to the principles I desire to maintain, that the pre-reformation dogmatic teaching remains to us, except where it has been “openly, plainly, and dogmatically” repealed.
I need hardly say, these extracts very inadequately represent the force of Mr. Chambers’s argument. A reference to the pamphlet itself will well repay the trouble. A Review of the Gorham Case, by John David Chambers, M.A. Recorder of New Sarum. Chambers’ Review, pp. 23, 24. Lord Coke, 2 Ins. 30; 3 Rep. 31, per Dwarris, 564. Chambers, p. 34. Dwarris, 605. Chambers, p. 44. Sandeman v. Breach, 7 B. and C. 96. Ibid. Stanton v. University of Oxford, 1 Jon. 26. Ibid. p. 45. Gregory’s Ca. 6 Rep. 196; Dwarris, 514. Speech of Edward Badeley, Esq. pp. 95–97. Badeley, p. 99. Badeley’s Speech, pp. 101, 102. Ibid. p. 102. The objection to be drawn from the sentence of the court in the case in question, with reference to Mr. Badeley’s argument from antiquity, and the teaching of the Church previous to the reformation, is even of less real weight than I have here implied; because that court does not appear at all to have applied itself to the principle for which Mr. Badeley contended. It seems rather to have forgotten its existence, than seriously to have examined and condemned it; and though it may be said, perhaps, that such passing it over affords a presumption of its unsoundness, yet this, I think, is all that can be made out of its treatment by that tribunal. Whatever, therefore, be the presumption, it is certainly no proof and no sentence as to the unsoundness of the position taken up by Mr. Badeley even for the purpose of the particular case, much less of its unsoundness generally. So many other causes may be conceived to have operated upon the Judges’ minds in coming to the conclusion they did; for instance, they may have admitted Mr. Badeley’s principle, but thought the doctrine in question, as maintained by the Bishop of Exeter, was not sufficiently identified with the universal teaching of the Church; or that that very teaching was itself vague; or that posterior documents of the English Church absolutely contradicted the earlier doctrine; (however improbable, such reasons are conceivable as influencing the actual decision;) and thus we are not warranted in supposing there is any sentence unfavourable to the soundness of Mr. Badeley’s principle of catholic tradition, by the proceedings of this court of appeal in reference to it.
I am persuaded no lawyer will contradict what I have here said, as to secular affairs, and I see no reason why the same measure should not be dealt forth in causes ecclesiastical and spiritual. I mean, that no lawyer will contradict the principle, that because a certain argument or line of defence has not been taken into consideration, or not admitted as conclusive upon the side on which it is advanced in any given instance, it should be looked upon as judicially condemned, or not be used again if occasion should arise. If even the reasons of a court of law on which it founds its sentence are really no formal part of the judgment, much less can the mere overlooking or ignoring a particular line of argument, disable or disfranchise that line of argument, so as to render it for ever unavailable. Eccles. Polity, book viii. ch. ii. § 17, vol. iii. pp. 447–8, Keble’s Edit. See also Appendix G. Coke’s 4th Inst. p. 323. 25 Henry VIII. c. 19, § 7. This, however, in the particular case, is an almost impossible supposition, because it was from the petition of the clergy themselves, however obtained, that the scheme emanated, and in accordance with its prayer that this board of two-and-thirty persons was to be appointed. 25 Henry VIII. c. 19, s. 1. See also Gladstone’s Letter to the Bishop of London, p. 9. Gladstone, p. 9. Ibid. p. 62. Badeley, p. 99. See p. 19. Second Letter, p. 42. Second Letter, p. 57. Ibid. p. 61. Second Letter, p. 63. Second Letter, p. 72. “As regards the Church of England in particular, it may be that the so-called reformation contained—perhaps unknown to the original promoters of it—poisonous seeds of evil, bringing in certain though slow decay; and that either new principles were then secretly established, which in their development would most surely lead to the destruction and confusion of essential truths, or old principles were, in ignorance, given up, which the gradual course of time would prove to be necessary, because they lie at the very foundation of Christianity itself. Or, once more, it may be with portions of the Church Catholic as with the vine, her mysterious type. ‘I am the vine, ye are the branches,’ were the words of our Blessed Lord, speaking of His body, the Church, of which he is himself the Head. And we may well conceive how a branch, full of sap and vigour, may be severed from the stem, and yet for a period—longer or shorter—still continue to put forth leaves, and perhaps the blossoms of fruit also; nevertheless, cut off all the while, and severed; requiring time to die, but death itself inevitable at last.”—Second Letter, pp. 72, 73. Maskell’s Doctrine of Absolution, p. 291. Letter, p. 16. Letter in Guardian, March 20th, 1850. Guardian, May 8th, 1850. Bishop of Exeter’s Letter, p. 90. I am not unaware that Mr. Keble has recently further explained his views on this matter in a second number of his “Church Matters in 1850;” and of course I am not forgetful that the Bishop of Exeter has repeated his protest and declaration on the point: but as these authorities serve only to confirm and strengthen the substance of what I had previously noted down, I do not see any occasion to withdraw or alter it. It may be useful to observe here, that nothing affecting our Church at large seems to me to result from the correspondence published in May last, between the Archbishop and Mr. Maskell. However unsatisfactory the answers given by the Archbishop to Mr. Maskell’s queries may be deemed, they do not, as it appears to me, commit the Church of England to anything, but himself only. I cannot but think his Grace is quite right when he says he cannot be understood, in an unofficial correspondence of that kind, to speak for the Church, but only for himself. Therefore, however his answers may serve as evidence of his own opinion, and be a help in determining how far he stands committed to having, personally, little or no dogmatic teaching on the subjects brought under his notice by Mr. Maskell; however, therefore, those answers may be valuable in the settlement of the question whether we are morally bound to withdraw from communion with his Grace, they prove nothing as to our Church at large, and can commit her to nothing unless accepted, confirmed, and adopted by herself; that is to say, they have no bearing at all in reference to the argument of this letter, and being unauthoritative statements, are no refutation of any proofs I may have given of our rule of dogmatic teaching. If the intentions of our reformers are not to be taken as evidence of the meaning of our various formularies, much less the construction of them by an individual archbishop. Neale’s Few Words of Hope, p. 22. No doubt there are persons whose habitual view is so absorbed in the majesty of human law, that they appear to forget there is any higher law with which we have to do. “Sir, I have had the honour to receive your letter, in which you intimate to me your intention of violating the law,” was an answer of some celebrity in its day. Perchance the question had not presented itself to the writer’s mind,
“What law is that?
’Tis not the law of God, nor yet above it.”
Convocations and Synods, by an Anglican Layman, p. 6. Convocations and Synods, p. 11–14. Archdeacon Manning’s Letter, p. 23. Ibid. p. 41. Manning, p. 23. Bramhall’s Works, p. 141. See also Manning’s Sermon on the Rule of Faith.
“The Church of England so far from submitting either the rule, or her decisions according to the rule, to the judgment of her individual members, will not submit them even to the judgment of particular Churches, or to any tribunal less than that to which all particular churches are subject, that is, a general council, of which either the members shall truly represent the Church Catholic, or the decrees be universally received. * *
“We therefore no more submit the doctrinal decisions of the Church to the judgment of individual minds, than the canon of Scripture itself. We do acknowledge an authority higher than either the Church of England, or of Rome in particular. What hinders an appeal to that tribunal, Dr. Wiseman knows as well as we. But if such a council, truly general, freely assembled, should meet to-morrow, the rule of its decisions would be, ‘non sua posteris tradere, sed a majoribus accepta servare.’”—Pp. 25, 26, note.
See Appendix H. Second Letter, p. 80.